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Abstract of Thesis 
This thesis analyses some of the changing features by which Indian Muslims were 
identified in British colonialist discourse between the outbreak of revolt in 1857 and 
the partition of Bengal in 1905. Most of the texts examined emanate out of the 
relatively circumscribed Anglo-Indian official community, and range from personal 
correspondence, to 'Mutiny' memoirs, travel guides, and socio-political essays. The 
argument takes as its starting point David Washbrook's description of the self-
constitution of the Raj as a centralised, secular and neutral state arbitrating the claims 
of competing ascriptive racial and ethnic communities. Drawing on recent Lacanian 
analyses of the formation and maintenance of ideologies, as well as on the 
sociological schema of Zygmant Bauman, the thesis argues that in the post-1857 
period the preservation of this official identity became dangerously reliant on a 
discourse of power centred on representations of Indian Muslims. Chapter One reads 
the stereotype of the Indian Muslim in 1905 for its most salient features - debased 
foreign origins, religious incontinence, isolation within Indian society, and secret 
ambitions towards temporal power. It then traces them back to their first marked 
appearance in colonial discourse in 1857. Chapter Two begins with a reassessment of 
the historiography with regard to Muslim 'conspiracy' during the revolt, as well as a 
reconsideration of official praxis towards Indian Muslims in the half-century before 
its outbreak. Proceeding to a detailed analysis of' Mutiny' texts, it concludes that the 
unprecedented, widespread British misperception of 'conspiracy' stemmed in part 
from an irrational colonialist attempt to re-possess their own fractured secular 
ideology through tropes of Christian persecution. Chapter Three compares the highly 
ambivalent post-'Mutiny' representations of Indo-Muslim 'fanaticism' that resulted 
with a secularised late eighteenth-century discourse on Mughal figures of authority. It 
argues that the strikingly similar discourses of alienation and lack of self-command 
structuring both forms of representation derived from crises in the colonialist inability 
to command their own self-presentation as rulers within the Indian environment. In 
the later discourse, in particular, these instabilities issued in a disastrous process of 
representational stigmatisation and segregation. 
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Introduction 
In May 1888, travelling through the princely states of Rajputana as a reporter for the 
Allahabad Pioneer, Rudyard Kipling found himself unexpectedly bivouacked one 
night with three sepoys.l Settling down together around the campfire, the young 
Anglo-Indianjournalist, anxiously knowledgeable, hastily established his credentials 
for his readers by fixing in place the ethnographic framework of the scene.2 It is a 
brief, lightly sketched reference, but it determines the very possibility of the guarded 
conviviality that follows. 'They were all Mahomedans', he wrote simply and without 
fear of controversy: 
and consequently all were easy to deal with. A Hindu is an excellent person, 
but. .. but ... there is no knowing what is in his heart, and he is hedged about with 
so many strange observances [ ... ] But a man who will eat with you and take 
your tobacco, sinking the fiction that it has been doctored with shrab [liquour], 
cannot be very bad after all. 3 
The almost fraternal evening that follows literally orients the bewildered traveller, 
serving as the one instance in his journey in which he inserts himself into an Indian 
social group for any length of time, and on a relatively equal footing; and with whom 
all his expectations of conduct are fulfilled. This tableau of shared expectations is all 
the more remarkable for its juxtaposition against an earlier, altogether different, 
encounter with a Hindu sadhu (religious mendicant). When asked directions, the 
sadhu 'scowled at the driver, scowled at the fare, and then settled down in the dust, 
laughing wildly, and pointing to the earth and the sky.,4 The reporter is faced here 
with a parody of conviviality, directed at no particular object, and directing him 
anywhere but onward. Its very lack of meaning is what seems to be so disturbing: 
'Now for a native to laugh aloud without reason, publicly and at high noon, is a 
I Some ofthe details of this tour can be found in Harry Ricketts, The Unforgiving Minute: A Life of 
Rudyard Kipling (London: Pirnlico, repro 2000; 1999), Chapter Seven. 
2 The term 'Anglo-Indian' is used here, as throughout the thesis, as it was commonly understood by the 
British until 1947, denoting a British resident in India. 
3 Rudyard Kipling, Letters of Marque (Allahabad: Wheeler, 1891), P 143. 
4 Rudyard Kipling, From Sea to Sea and Other Sketches: Letters of Travel Volume II (London: 
Macmillan & Co, 1900), pp 384-85. 
gruesome thing and calculated to chill the blood. ,5 On that occasion, there had been 
no sharing of information, tobacco and sleeping arrangements; only a retreat, pursued 
by laughter and a story that failed to materialise, a quarry that never had 'the decency 
to be interviewed.' 6 
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For Kipling, then, as for most Anglo-Indians, 'Hindu' and 'Mahomedan' were 
partly terms of orientation, the one baffling and the other encouraging his sense of 
being placed in India.7 This is a division that is consistently played out through his 
journalism and fiction, nowhere more so than in a series of articles he wrote for the 
Civil and Military Gazette in Lahore between 1887 and 1888, and which he later 
collected under the title 'The Smith Administration,.8 Couched as comic tales of 
Anglo-Indian household management, Kipling in fact builds up a remarkably 
compressed portrait of Anglo-Indian views on the political 'management' of India. 
Largely a matter of reading correctly and manipulating its ethnic divisions ('skilfully 
playing off people against people, sect against sect, and kin against kin,9), the 
narrator, Smith, relies upon essential character traits indicative of caste and religion. 
Nevertheless, as with the travels through Rajputana, the narrative appeal of the 'The 
Smith Administration' stories lies in the way in which its ironic ruler is frequently 
outfoxed by his unruly staff, his patient knowledge soon exhausted, his disciplinary 
measures overturned. While shedding an intentionally ironic light on the perspicacity 
of his theories of 'divide and rule', there remains a single seemingly predictable 
element among Smith's 'subjects' on and through whom the principles of British 
justice and its manipulation of ethnographic characterisations manage to retain their 
sense of paramountcy. For as in Rajputana, checking anarchy, Kipling installs the 
invariant framework of orientation that anchors the illegible Hindu with the 
apparently reliable transparency of the 'Mahometan'. And as the narrator is quick to 
point out, in his ideal household, his paradigm of Anglo-Indian governance. "the 
5 Kipling, Sea, p 385. 
6 Kipling, Sea, p 386. 
7 Ronald Inden, Imagining India, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990), p 86. 
8 Kipling, Sea, pp 341-68. 
9 Kipling, Sea, p 341. 
Mahomedan element largely predominated; because the Supreme Government 
considered the minds of Mahomedans more get-at-able than those of Hindus' .10 
This 'get-at-able' dimension is commonly considered by scholars as the 
keynote of late nineteenth-century colonialist discourse on Indian Muslims. II But 
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although touched on in most critical studies on the literature of the period, and despite 
a predominance of Muslim characters in Anglo-Indian fiction far in excess of their 
numerical incidence in Indian society, it has oddly never been subject to more than an 
anecdotal treatment. 12 The terms of that treatment revolve around the core ideas that, 
both as former conquerors of India and as a familiar monotheistic corporate entity, the 
Muslims were invariably apprehended as figures of comparison for the British in 
India.13 As such, they were considered a cardinal point on the map of discrete, 
absolutely differentiated communities by which Indian society was reconstructed in 
later colonialist records and literature. I4 Despite the periodically perceived fact that 
local factors such as caste ran across these divisions, informing Muslim as well as 
other communal structures, the British came to insist in particular in this period on 
'the supposedly ineradicable sense of community dividing Hindus from Muslims and 
other non-Hindus' .15 In this regard, the 'get-at-able' quality of the Muslim anchored 
the colonialist apprehension of Indian society as a whole. Like the increasingly rigid 
perception of caste in the later nineteenth century, Muslim legibility circumscribed 
and held in place, the fluidity of a Hindu society seen as threatening in its very ability 
to elude systems of apprehension, to direct the colonialist anywhere but onward. 
10 Kipling, Sea, p 345. 
11 Thomas R Metcalfe, Ideologies o/the Raj (New Delhi: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p 89. 
The term 'discourse' is used here, and throughout the thesis, in Foucault's sense not simply of 
'language', but of the spectrum of 'practices' which determines the conditions of 'emergence' for 'the 
objects of which they speak'. Michel Foucault, trans. A M Sheridan Smith, The Archaeology 0/ 
Knowledge (London: Routledge, repro 1995; 1972), pp 40-49 
12 Alan Greenberger, The British Image o/India: a Study in the Literature o/Imperialism 1880-1960 
(London: Oxford University Press, 1969), pp 47-48. 
\3 Metcalfe, Ideologies, pp 138-40; Greenberger, pp 45-51; and Benita Parry, Delusions and 
Discoveries: Studies on India in the British Imagination, 1880-1930 (Allen Lane, London; 1972), pp 
49-50. 
14 Metcalf, Ideologies, Chapter Four. 
15 Susan Bayly, Caste Society and Politics in Indiafrom the Eighteenth Century to the Modern Age 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, repro 2001; 1991), pp 18,99; Richard M Eaton, The Rise of 
Islam and the Bengal Frontier, 1204-1760 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, repro 1994; 1993), p 101. 
Implicit to this idea of transparency and its role in ordering a kaleidoscopic. 
bewildering and alien world, is the cognate but far more problematic notion of 
similarity. Anglo-Indian literary representations of Indian Muslims therefore do not 
simply abound with the kind of virile, martial and 'active' qualities that the British 
frequently attributed to themselves; they are organised by them. 16 As with the 
opposing notion of Hindu 'effeminacy', the subject underwriting this reification of 
manly virtues and vices is that of paramountcy itself.17 But in contrast to, for 
instance, the characterisations of the 'effeminate Bengali babu' or the Sikh 'lions of 
the Punjab', Anglo-Indian rhetoric surrounding Indian Muslims transcends the 
language of 'manliness' and 'martial races' .18 It enters instead into a continuum with 
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the British apprehension of themselves as holders of political power in India, but alien 
to, and deriving their origins and ultimate allegiances outside of, its immediate 
environment. When the beleaguered Smith departs for his travels, it is therefore 
Bahadur Khan, his Muslim 'khitmatgar', whom he appoints 'Viceroy' in his place. 
Even when (or indeed, because) Bahadur Khan fails in his duty, the Englishman 
insists on the definitively Anglo-Indian ruling qualities of his substitute as 'an 
administrator ... decisive and capable-of-ruling-men' .19 This consistent theme of 
congruence between Anglo-Indian and Indian Muslim exposes a relatively unexplored 
area of ambivalence in late colonial epistemologies. As Partha Chatterjee puts it, 
British rule in India was predicated on 'colonial difference', that is, on 'the 
preservation of the alienness of the ruling group. ,20 In the traumatised wake of the 
sustained evidence of indigenous coalition building in 1857-59, Anglo-Indians had 
bec0111e nlore than ever reliant on this fonn of self-construction, putting themselves 
16 Greenberger, p 46. 
P This is a line of argument pursued by Mrinalini Sinha with regard to the figure of the 'effeminate 
Bengali babz/ in Colonial .\lasclilinity: The 'It;{aniy Englishman' and the 'Effeminate Bengali' in the 
Late .\'inclt'enth Century (New Delhi: Kali for Women. repro 1997: 1995). On the more generalised 
association of Hinduism with femininity. see Inden, Imagining, pp 85-89. 
18 On the evolution and effects of colonialist descriptions of Sikh identity. see Richard G Fox, Lions of 
the Punjab: Culture in the .\faking (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985). 
I~ Kipling. Sea. pp 363-64. 
~\) Partha Chatterjee. The Nation and its Fragments: Colonial and Postcolonial Histories (Princeton, 
New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1993). P 10. 
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forward as arbitrators of what they increasingly insisted was an irremediably 
heterogeneous, and disputatious, Indian social comity.21 In his seminal essay on the 
sociology of the late nineteenth century Raj, David Washbrook has described this 
British self-projection as the vital, but avowedly neutral and discontinuous, hub of 
multiple and petitioning, ascriptive ethnicities.22 The pervasive discourse of similarity 
that marks Anglo-Indian descriptions of Indian Muslims thus represents something of 
an anomalous area within British systems of knowledge in regard to their extrinsic 
relationship to Indian society. In entering, through Indian Muslims, upon a 
continuum of similarity (running from potency to decline, autocratic ruthlessness to 
patemalliberalism, discipline to decadence), perhaps more than in any other aspect of 
colonialist discourse, the British in India bound themselves as hostages to the 
consistent, indeed despotic, apprehension of difference. And yet given the prior 
paradigm of identification everywhere determining that apprehension, absolute 
difference is precisely the outcome already denied. In other words, the rule of 
'colonial difference' was liable to collapse at its most familiar point of orientation. 
Clearly, the idea of the 'get-at-able' Muslim is more treacherous than it would seem, 
containing as it did the possibility of a potentially 'vulnerable' Anglo-Indian. 
The consequent pressures exerted on Anglo-Indian representations of Indian 
Muslims are everywhere apparent in colonialist discourse. They can, for instance, be 
immediately detected in 'The Smith Administration'. At the centre of Kipling's 
narrative is the story of the disruption of peace and paramountcy; and as with the 
majority of such Anglo-Indian tales, located as the source of that disruption is a 
Muslim, here a 'coachwan' (coachman) conducting a 'vicariousjehad' against the 
goat-herder in Smith's compound.23 His capture, trial and expulsion lead to a 
21 Gyanendra Pandey, The Construction o/Communalism in Colonial North India (New Delhi: Oxford 
University Press, repro 1994; 1990), p 16; D A Washbrook, 'Ethnicity and Racialism in Colonial Indian 
Society' in Robert Ross (ed), Racism and Colonialism: Essays on Ideology and Social Structure (The 
Hague: Nijhoff for Leiden University Press, 1982), p 157. 
22 Wash brook, 'Ethnicity', p 170. 
23 Kipling, Sea, p 345. The story of the coachwan extends over the fIrst two articles reprinted in From 
Sea to Sea, 'The Cow-House Jirga' and 'A Bazar Dhulip'. In the six stories that are directly related to 
the Smith household, only one ('The Hands of Justice') revolves around a Hindu central character. 
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recurrence of the feud, now directed at Smith himself, from outside the walls of the 
compound. At last, the coachman is caught again and imprisoned within its walls as 
'a living example and most lively presentment of the unrelaxing wrath of the State. ,24 
But now, with his nemesis safely immured as a constantly visible example of British 
power in India, Smith begins to reveal something of his own investments in this odd 
tale of rivalry: 
However well he may work, however earnestly strive to win my favour, there is 
no human chance of his ever rising from his present position so long as [Smith] 
Sahib and he are above the earth together.25 
Invading from elsewhere (CorkIer's compound next door), liable to exile, but 
inevitably brought back within the realm, only to be there held apart: the Muslim 
figure is clearly both a necessary and disturbing presence for Kipling's narrative of 
domestic management. He can neither be effaced from, nor intricated within its 
society, and yet he somehow proves, indeed narrates, the worth of its rulers. 
Moreover, this is an ambivalence literally inscribed. From his first appearance, there 
is a paradoxical quality to his 'Muslim-ness', signalled by the falsifying signs of 
caste, which lends to the coachman the oxymoronic designation, 'chamar-Mahometan 
not too long converted' .26 His 'jehad' is thus also a matter of pretence, 
simultaneously manipulative and in its cumulative, meaningless progression, self-
directing - a fraudulent motivating force that effectively becomes irresistibly 
motiveless. But perhaps the most surprising issue of the masquerade is that, in 
bringing this anarchic figure to heel, the narrative comes alarmingly close to undoing 
the neutral, if exasperated, characterisation of its narrator. In the last lines of the tale 
he signals a distressed awareness that his own claims to uphold British justice, even in 
its more autocratic Anglo-Indian mould, are under threat. Like the imprisoned 
Significantly, it is the only story in which an Indian manages to defY and escape the authority of the 
narrator unpunished. 
24 Kipling, Sea, p 351. 
25 Kipling, Sea, p 35 I. 
26 Kipling, Sea, p 342. Chamar is one of the denominations (jati) of the Hindu Shudra caste (S. Bayly, 
Caste, pp 9- I 0). As will be seen throughout the thesis, where caste intrudes in colonialist discourse on 
Indian Muslims, it does so most commonly as a deconstructive agent, falsifYing other definitions. 
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'chamar-Mahometan', Smith becomes subject to a comparable form of motiveless 
malignity, making him in a sense, secondary to his Muslim nemesis. But by then the 
investments between them have gone too far: 'a narrow-souled public may consider 
my present lenient treatment of him harsh and illegal ... I will never, never part with 
CorkIer's coachwan,.27 Even in this ephemeral comic tale, then, it would seem that a 
site of mutual deconstruction quickly opens out around the 'get-at-able' Indian 
Muslim. The presumption of a monolithic, fixed identity declared by Smith is belied 
by the paradoxes by which the' Mahometan' is described: a fanatical Muslim who 
only pretends to be religious; an object of justice who will never properly be 
punished; a volatile, ungovernable figure of insurrection who must nevertheless be 
kept within the realm as a means of securing its stability. Far from offering a secure 
point or orientation, it is this very fluidity of identity that engenders the narrative and 
draws the Anglo-Indian into an inexplicable dependency. 
While indicating some of the terms of this ambivalence, historians have as a 
rule, stopped short of attempting to test out its full implications. Critiques of British 
constructions of Indian society often tend either to situate their engagement with 
representations of Islam in India to the period of Company rule ending in 1857; or to 
treat them as largely unproblematised further examples to the broad sweep of colonial 
epistemologies of difference and antagonism.28 Thus they frequently catechrise later 
colonialist observers such as Alfred Lyall or W W Hunter only in regard to their 
perceptions of Hinduism, despite the fact that their writings are saturated with, and 
significantly modified by, Islam as a conjoint figure of comparison.29 As Washbrook 
points out, to fully understand the politicisation of ethnicity and race by Indian socio-
political movements in the modem period requires the coherent analysis of the 
27 Kipling, Sea, p 351. 
28 See for instance: Lewis D Wurgraft, The Imperial Imagination: Magic and Myth in Kipling's India 
(Middletown: Wesleyan University Press, 1983); Sara Suleri, The Rhetoric of English India (Chicago 
and London: University of Chicago Press, 1992); and Jenny Sharpe, Allegories of Empire: the Figure 
of Woman in the Colonial Text (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993). 
29 Inden, Imagining; Susan Bayly, Caste, Chapter Three. The works of both Hunter and Lyall are 
explored in detail in Section 3.3 below. 
colonial state with which those movements engaged.3o One consequence of this gap 
in the historiography is that colonialist representations of Indian Muslims have at 
times remained a blind spot for theoretical studies of the evolution of nationalist 
discourse.31 Even in histories of Hindu nationalism in which British stereotypes of 
Islam in India are located as founding models for simultaneous 'emulation and 
stigmatisation', they are cited as if self-evident and straightforward, rather than 
historically variegated and complex phenomena.32 
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Most surprising of all, however, is the lack of any substantial interpretative 
rubric in otherwise comprehensive and nuanced studies of the development in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries of Indo-Muslim socio-political movements. 
In this regard, Francis Robinson's important and groundbreaking account of the 
political genesis of the Aligarh Movement in the United Provinces in this period has 
set a course from which few historians have deviated in the last thirty years.33 
Broadly, he sketches the initial progress of the Muslim Urdu-speaking elite from a 
preoccupation with the loss of government patronage in 1857, to the development of a 
'loyalist' strain of political rhetoric and institutional focus. When this mode of 
interaction fails to bring adequate results, there is a swing towards the more 'militant' 
petitioning ofa new 'Young Party' of Indo-Muslim politicians and publicists, which 
results in the concession of the principle of separate electorates in 1909.34 At every 
step of the process, the movement is interpreted as being guided by its relationship 
30 Washbrook, 'Ethnicity', p 171. 
31 See in particular, the refusal to subject Muslim stereotypes in the writings of Bankimchandra 
Chattopadhyay to any but a cursory acknowledgement, in Partha Chatterjee's highly influential 
Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World: A Derivative Discourse? (London: Zed Books, repro 
1993; 1986), P 77. To some extent this omission is redressed in The Nation and its Fragments, 
Chapter Four. 
32 Christophe Jaffrelot, The Hindu Nationalist Movement and Indian Politics 1925 to the 1990s 
(London: C Hurst & Co, 1996), pp 20-2 I; John Zavos, The Emergence of Hindu Nationalism in India 
(New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2000), p 2; and Thomas Blom Hansen, The Saffron Wave: 
Democracy and Hindu Nationalism in Modern India (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, repro 2000; 
1999), pp 60, 71. 
33 See for instance, David Lelyveld's fascinating exploration of the cultural and institutional framework 
of that movement in his Aligarh 's First Generation: Muslim Solidarity in British India (Delhi: Oxford 
University Press, repro 1996; 1978). 
34 Francis Robinson, Separatism Among Indian Muslims: The Politics of the United Provinces' 
Muslims 1860-1923 (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, repro 1994; 1974), pp 1-174. 
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with the government, first supplicating for the retention of its privileges, and finally 
demanding administrative 'separatism'. Government motivations on the other hand, 
are largely confined to a deep-seated suspicion of Indian Muslims after the events of 
1857-59. Since Robinson, in consonance with the other major history of the period by 
Peter Hardy, notes the limited scope of Indo-Muslim co-ordination during those years, 
colonialist discourse in this respect remains a largely unexamined, irrational engine-
room to the account as a whole.35 More problematic, however, is the parallel 
observation that Anglo-Indian politicians regarded Indian Muslims as 'an important 
conservative force' for the maintenance of British rule.36 Robinson does not attempt 
to articulate the faintly Machiavellian undertones to this observation with the 
perception that the British were themselves manipulated by their own fears. In effect, 
the movement driving the formation of a pan-Indian Muslim political identity is left 
responding to a series of irreconcilable and unpredictable contradictions. 
Without giving British discourse a theoretical coherence, there is little 
possibility of fully recovering the 'mechanisms to exchange' between cultures 
through which certain racial and ethnic emphases may have been 'internalised' by the 
protagonists of Indian socio-political movements of the period.37 Since in particular, 
the Aligarh Movement has been seen as crucially reactive, there is a worrying sense 
here in which it is portrayed by historians as the naively disorientated subject of what 
Richard Eaton has elsewhere called the 'fuzzy and tendentious' thinking of 
nineteenth-century colonialist perceptions of Indian Islam.38 The aim of this study is 
to construct an alternative, more coherent narrative of some of the main elements to 
this Anglo-Indian thought. It is intended ultimately as a means of facilitating the 
process of reinterpreting the 'mechanisms to exchange' which clearly inform, but by 
35 Peter Hardy, The Muslims of British India (New Delhi: Cambridge University Press, repr. 1998; 
1972), pp 61-70. 
36 Robinson, Separatism, pp 163-64. 
37 Washbrook, 'Ethnicity', p 158. 
38 Eaton, Rise, p 125. Eaton's phrase is itself indicative of the extent to which modem historiography 
has refused to engage with that thought on any but an empirical level. 
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no means direct, the genesis of Indo-Muslim self-descriptions at this time.39 As such, 
it is intended to serve as another strand in the reconstruction of the full terms of 
dialogue involved in the formation of Indian political identities in the later colonial 
period. 
The focus of the thesis will be on the conflicted questions of' separatism' , 
'alienness' and 'antagonism' as they were manifested in Anglo-Indian writings about 
Indian Muslims in the later nineteenth century. Through detailed readings of a wide 
range of Anglo-Indian texts it will attempt to trace and account for this discourse from 
its initial marked appearance in 1857 until the first physical enactment of its 
underlying rationale in the partition of Bengal. These texts have been selected 
deliberately from within the orbit of the official community which, it will be argued, 
was most closely involved with the formation of this discourse. Directed outwards 
from that community as tools for the formation of public opinion both in India and 
Britain, they are intended to fill out what Christopher Bayly has recently described as 
'the dead ground between what is now a vibrant social history of India and its 
apparently lifeless intellectual history' .40 It is this area of discursive formations that 
constituted an important, if concealed, element in the administrator Sir John 
Malcolm's infamous assertion that 'our Indian Empire is one of opinion. ,41 It 
represents a level of textual polemic between the physical act of data gathering and 
the final arguments of political documentation, but mediated by the same strata of 
Anglo-Indian society responsible for both. Moreover, as we shall touch on in Chapter 
Three, it was an arena of debate that was closely monitored by the indigenous 
educated elites of colonial India.42 The plethora of genres addressed here is intended 
39 Farzana Shaikh has approached this discourse from the vantage point of Islamic norms of 
expectation in Community and Consensus: Muslim Representation in Colonial India, 1860-194-: 
(Bombay: Orient Longman, repr. 1991; 1989). 
40 C A Bayly, Empire and Information: Intelligence Gathering and Social communication in India, 
1780-1870 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p ix. 
41 J Malcolm, 'Report of the General Committee for Public Instruction' in Friend on India, 27 October. 
1836, quoted in Bayly, Empire, p 2. 
42 See for instance, Sayed Ahmad Khan, Review of Dr Hunter's Indian Musalmans: Are they Bound in 
Conscience to Rebel Against the Queen (Benares, 1872), pp 5-6. On the often unexpected indigenous 
interpretations and reformulations of this level of public debate, see Javed Majeed, 'Narratives of 
Progress and Idioms of Community: Two Urdu Periodicals of the 1870s', in David Finkelstein and 
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to demonstrate the remarkable coherence of underlying themes across a wide range of 
Anglo-Indian cultural productions, a unity that invests those forms with such 
rhetorical force. Following the approach mapped out by Sander Gilman, each of the 
examples are analysed as 'structured systems of representations' which, 'no matter 
what the medium, can be construed as "texts" for the study of sterotypes. ,43 The 
surprising contradictions manifested by these stereotypes, in contrast to the uniformity 
of their structuring themes, urges in this case a reconsideration of Clive Dewey's 
contention that: 
the crucial factor, clinching most policy decisions, was the constant repetition of 
simple axioms by large numbers of comparatively obscure officials. What 
made one course of action seem preferable to another was the incessant 
reiteration of easily remembered slogans, not the original insights of brilliant 
minds. 44 
In regard to colonialist discourse on Indian Muslims, it will be argued that 'simple 
axioms' are the least reliable guides to the complex, and highly ambivalent, currents 
of thought in which they were always implicated. 'Fanaticism' such as that of the 
'coachwan' can be at one and the same time a ruthless, self-directing force and a 
matter of strategic pretence. Rather than the stereotype itself, it is the contending 
currents from which it emerges that provide an insight into the course of policy in this 
respect, and which implicitly informed the responses of indigenous observers. 
Chapter One will attempt to set the parameters of the discourse as it had 
evolved by the early twentieth century. Beginning with a close reading of a particular 
Anglo-Indian text, Flora Annie Steel's India (1905), it notes the disparity between its 
markedly limited representations of Indian Muslims and the multivocal Indo-Muslim 
socio-political public arenas of the period. But as a means of exposing its specific 
emphases at that time, it concentrates on testing these representations against the 
Douglas M Peers, (eds), Negotiating India in the Nineteenth-Century Media, (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 
2000), pp 135-63; and Ayesha Jalal, Self and Sovereignty: Individual and Community in South Asian 
Islam Since 1850 (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2001). 
43 Sander L Gilman, Difference and Pathology: Stereotypes of Sexuality, Race, and Madness (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1985), p 26. The role of stereotypes in colonialist discourse is discussed in 
more detail in Section 1.3 below. 
44Clive Dewey, The Mind of the Indian Civil Service (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, repr. 2000; 
1993), P 9. 
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wider modes of late nineteenth-century British perceptions of Indian society, as well 
as noting their connections to earlier eighteenth-century descriptions of 'oriental 
despotism'. In Section 1.3 some of the methodological issues are taken up with 
regard to colonialist investments in their forms of knowledge and representation. An 
argument is put forward for the relevance, and potential vulnerability, of the se1f-
projection of the British Indian state as secular and neutral, comparing it as a system 
based on prohibition and disavowal to that of the Lacanian conception of 
socialisation. In particular, a case is made there, and in Section 1.5, for the relevance 
of the investments and instabilities imported into that identity by the official 
community during the period under discussion. Chapter Two carries these questions 
over into a detailed examination of some of their accounts of Muslim 'conspiracy' in 
1857-59. As a preface to this discussion, the first two sections re-examine the modem 
historiography surrounding colonialist perceptions of and praxis towards Indian 
Muslims in the preceding half-century, as well as detailing the actual extent of co-
ordinated Indo-Muslim participation in the events of the 'Mutiny' .45 Arguing that the 
outbreak of 'Musulmanophobia' in 1857 was not only out of all proportion to Indo-
Muslim activity, but constituted a significant departure in colonialist discourse, this 
revised assessment therefore suggests the value of a re-examination of the motivations 
and rhetoric involved in that phenomenon. The conclusions reached here are then 
tested out through the experiences and correspondence of Alfred Lyall, at that time a 
fresh recruit to the Indian Civil Service. Partly using a Lacanian model of the 
formation and preservation of ideologies, the patterns of representation that emerge 
from those letters are then compared with other accounts of the period by ICS 
officials, and a preliminary set of themes sketched out as a guide to the post -1859 
discourse. 
In Chapter Three, Zygmaunt Bauman's description of 'the stranger' is put 
forward as a useful model for interpreting the broader currents of official attitudes 
45 The quotation marks around the term 'Mutiny', here as throughout the. thesis, advert to the . 
misleading implication that those events were confined to a sepoy rebellIon, rather than the congenes 
ofrebel1ions that seems to have taken place in 1857. Bayly, Empire, p 329. 
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over the next half-century. Section 3.2 goes on to draw comparisons between the 
radical indeterminacy of the Indo-Muslim 'stranger' and late eighteenth-century 
figures of Mughal authority. The intention here is to de-centre the primacy of religion 
as a factor in the construction of the Indo-Muslim 'stranger' in the wake of rebellion, 
since representations of that earlier comparable figure did not necessarily rely upon 
religious determinants. Rather, the argument pursued is that the 'stranger' is, above 
all, the object of a renascent discourse over power. Finally, these observations are 
tested out, in Section 3.3, on the mature writings of Alfred Lyall, collected in Asiatic 
Studies: Religious and Social (1882), and through the influential volume by W W 
Hunter on the so-called 'Wahabi conspiracy', Indian Musalmans: Are They Bound in 
Conscience to Rebel Against the Queen? (1871). Both are read as narratives that 
mimic the genre of the Sensation Novel in terms of disguise and discovery, as a mode 
of attempting to forestall the final revelation and unmasking of the Anglo-Indian 
lineaments of the conspiratorial figure of the Muslim 'fanatic'. Here, as throughout 
this study, it is the Indian Muslim as an elusive, as opposed to 'get-at-able', figure of 
comparison that provides the explanation for his extraordinary and lethal appeal to the 
disorientated colonialist official in pursuit of a safe perch on Indian society. For by 
1905, it was no longer the 'established coherence,46 of Islam that made it such an 
important part of colonialist epistemologies, and which had at one time drawn the 
British towards its appropriation as a compass in India. Rather, on the eve of the 
constitutional establishment of the principle of 'separate electorates', it was the very 
impossibility of placing the Muslim on a map of India that came to organise the 
solidifying patterns of Anglo-Indian discursive conceptions of their socio-political 
environment. 
46 Metcalf, Ideologies, p 138. 
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Chapter One 
1.1 Indian Muslims and India: a preliminary discussion 
When Flora Annie Steel (1847-1929) published India in 1905 it had been seventeen years 
since her residence there as part of the official Anglo-Indian community had ended, and 
almost forty years since she first became acquainted with her subject. l Sold primarily on 
the back of her phenomenal success as a writer of fiction for an equally Anglo-Indian and 
Metropolitan audience (all her novels were first published in London), India offered the 
prospective British traveler a poetic conspectus of Indian history, contemporary social 
ethnography and 'insider' shopping tips, packaged with all the proprietorial assurance of 
a seasoned 'India hand'. Alongside The Complete Indian Housekeeper and Cook (which 
she had co-authored with Grace Gardiner in 1888), it was to become a popular classic of 
Anglo-Indian travel literature, reprinted (with only minor corrections to the main body of 
the text) a further five times in the subsequent three decades.2 
Though rooted in the 1870s and 1880s during which her experience of the country 
was formed, Steel's description of twentieth-century colonial India survived without 
emendation as a serviceable guide to its contemporary indigenous society for almost 
twenty years. It was only at the time of the publication of the fourth edition in 1923, in 
the wake of the widely reported civil unrest caused by the Noncooperation Movement (in 
alliance with the Khilafatists) from 1919-22, that the publishers decided its lack of more 
recent socio-political detail posed any sort of threat to India's viability as a guidebook 
1 Flora Annie Steel accompanied her husband, Henry Steel, out to the Punjab in 1868 where he served in the 
Indian Civil Service; she returned to Britain on his retirement in 1888. For details of her life, see Violet 
Powell, Flora Annie Steel: Novelist of India (London: Heinemann, 1981). 
2 These were restricted to 'the correction of a few misprints ... the provision of one or two footnotes ... the 
modernisation ofthe spelling oflndian names', a 'revised .. .Index' and the addition ofa concluding chapter 
on 'The Problems ofIndia' (discussed below). 'Preface' by H Clive Barnard to 1923 edition, reprinted in 
Flora Annie Steel, India (London: A & C Black, 1929), pV. All further references are to the 1929 edition. 
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and added a hastily-executed final chapter by H Clive Barnard.3 As an afterword to 
Steel's determinedly static vision of an essentialised and fragmented society, Barnard's 
abrupt prophecy of a self-determining 'federated' India should have signaled to its readers 
a deeper problem with the practical relevance of the foregoing narrative. In fact, though, 
India was to last out the decade, with a final edition published in 1929, and it remains a 
remarkable instance of the persistence of parallel economies of knowledge and 
representation in British thinking about Indian society in the late colonial period. 
The notion of parallel economies of knowledge about India has been used by 
Bayly to describe colonial systems of information collection in the post-1857 Raj.4 His 
study of the British engagement with indigenous systems of social communication makes 
a forceful argument for resituating colonial knowledges of India, Orientalist, taxonomic, 
as well as the ever-increasing media of what Christopher Pinney (borrowing from James 
Clifford) has called 'para-ethnography' ,5 within the 'vast hinterland' of the 'Indian 
ecumene'. That is, to see it as intermeshed with, and until 1857 dependent on, pre-
colonial means of extracting, interpreting and disseminating knowledge about India. The 
events of 1857-59 were to shatter these interlocking economies and momentarily force 
Anglo-Indians to the conclusion that they had never penetrated more than the 'externals 
of Indian life,.6 One consequence of this vital rupture was that subsequent colonialist 
understandings of Indian society were shaped by an unprecedented reliance on Western 
modes of information collection and interpretation (typified by the inauguration of the 
census in India in 1871), combined with the marked distrust of - though not infrequent 
resort to - all other indigenous, pre-colonial sources. 'By the 1870s', Bayly concludes, 
3 For an overview of the period, see Sumit Sarkar, Modern India, 1885-1947 (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 
1993; 1985), Chapters 4,5. 
4 Bayly, Empire, p 372. . . 
5 Pinney, 'Colonial Anthropology in the 'Laboratory of Mankind', in C A Bayly (ed), The Raj." India and 
the British 1600-1947 (London: National Portrait Gallery, 1990) p 254. 
6 Bayly, Empire, p 316. 
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'British knowledge [ about India] had become more reactive and static.' 7 
Steel's narrative of Indian society as a series of discrete, fragmented' little Indias,8 
- divided into impermeable linguistic, regional, religious and social formations - is very 
much a product of that rupture in the British mode of apprehending India which 
characterises the later nineteenth century. The preoccupation with the 'ordering of 
difference,9 - the perception and enforcement of static, essentialised divisions of Indian 
society - that dominated Anglo-Indian thinking in the decades succeeding the 'Mutiny' 
diverged sharply from the simultaneous explosion of nationwide forms of indigenous 
representation and political agglomeration. In this respect, conspicuous by their absence 
in India are the substantial developments in Indo-Muslim socio-political identifications 
over the last half-century, a diverse spectrum of movements ranging from the ulama-Ied 
reformist Deobandis, to the popular revivalism of the Ahl-e Sunnat, and the profusion of 
more obviously 'modernist' educational, scientific and literary societies. 10 Indeed, only a 
year after its publication, the All-India Muslim League was formed, staking its own claim 
to 'a new world of Indian party politics,.l1 As scholars such as David Lelyveld, Barbara 
Metcalf and Usha Sanyal have shown, each of these movements and their 'publicists' 
eagerly appropriated the new media of communications, institutional organisation and 
funding, in order to influence a multivocal and increasingly politicised set of cross-
regional constituencies. 12 Steel's determinedly circumscribed vision in India thus 
7 Bayly, Empire, p 351. 
8 Bayly, Empire, p 352. 
9 See Thomas Metcalf, Ideologies, Chapter 3. 
10 See for instance, Usha Sanyal, Devotional Islam and Politics in British India: Ahmad Riza Khan Barelwi 
and his Movement, (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1996); Barbara Metcalf, Islamic Revival in 
British India: Deoband 1860-1900 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982); Lelyveld; and Rafiuddin 
Ahmed, The Bengal Muslims, 1871-1906: a Questfor Identity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, repro 
1988; 1981). 
II Lelyveld, p 103. 
12 Drawing on Habermas, 'publicists' is the term Bayly gives to the variety of indigenous activists 
appropriating the new forms of social communication, particularly in the post-'Mutiny' period (Bayly, 
Empire, pp 338-64). For a useful collation of figures on the rapid expansion ofvemacular publishing 
(discussed with reference to Urdu publishing in particular), see Robinson, Separatism, pp 77-78. For a 
recent study of aspects of the rise of Hindi literature and publishing in the same period, see Vasudha 
Dalmia, The Nationalization of Hindu Traditions: Bharatendu Harischandra and Vineteenth-century 
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conforms to the Anglo-Indian reaction to these kinds of aggressive indigenous intrusions, 
a psychic 'circling of wagons' apparent in increasing colonial obsessions with issues of 
racial contamination and native disorder pursued through legislation on health, policing, 
and moral and social purity.13 Accompanying these apartheitic inclinations in the late 
nineteenth century was a renewed emphasis on ritual, tradition and caste hierarchies as 
the keys to colonial descriptions of India. 14 This perceived feudal character of Indian 
society not only developed as a natural concomitant of British concerns with constructing 
manageable units of administration, but was a defensive response to the promiscuous and 
threatening ability of the new class of indigenous 'publicists' to freely cross between 
informational spheres. It was this class which was proving so adept at entering and 
manipulating the gradual expansion of Indian patronage in government administration, 
and the opportunities opened up by electoral reforms (begun in the 1880s as a means of 
devolving the task of enforcing growing tax demands). 15 As Bayly convincingly 
demonstrates, Indian society could never have been perceived as radically 'other' because 
of the proximity, interaction and dependence with which its relationship with the Anglo-
Indian community had always been conducted. 16 Nevertheless, in contrast to the 
expanding indigenous networks of social communication and patronage, from the 1840s 
Banaras (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1997). 
13 The prevailing separatist ethos is captured well by Anthony King in his seminal study of the residential 
architecture of the period: King, The Bungalow: The Production 0/ a Global Culture (London: Routledge, 
1984); on the post- 'Mutiny' ruthless demarcation of urban space into native and British zones in colonial 
Indian cities, see especially, Veena Talwar Oldenburg, The Making o/Colonial Lucknow, 1856-1877 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984). On colonial health and policing policies, see Mark Harrison, 
Public Health in British India: Anglo-Indian Preventive Medicine, 1859-1914 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1994); David Arnold, Colonizing the Body: State Medicine and Epidemic Disease in 
Nineteenth Century India (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993) and idem, Police Power and 
Colonial Rule: Madras 1859-1947 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986); and on the sometimes farcical 
colonial efforts to legislate moral and racial purity, see Kenneth Ballhatchet, Race, Sex and Class Under the 
Raj: Imperial Attitudes and their Critics, 1793-1905 (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1980). 
14 On later nineteenth century ideological reconstructions of 'traditional' Indian society in the context of a 
self-consicously imperial British state, see Bernard Cohn, 'Representing Authority in Victorian Britain', in 
Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger (eds), The Invention o/Tradition, (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, repro 1999; 1983), pp 165-211; and Clive Dewey, 'Images of the Village Community: a Study in 
Anglo-Indian Ideology,' in Modern Asian Studies, vol 6 (1972), pp 291-328. 
15 Bayly, Empire, pp 374-75. 
16 Bayly, Empire, p 371. 
onwards, and particularly in the wake of the rebellions of 1857, the Anglo-Indian 
community found itself significantly withdrawn from the more direct, indigenous 
knowledge bases of the Indian 'ecumene'. Ever more reliant on Western taxonom ies of 
gazetteer, census and survey, it simultaneously promoted a parallel economy of 
Orientalist constructions of an entrenched feudal Indian environment, quite at odds with 
the statistical flux of populations, religious communities and regional dispersal which its 
institutional records everywhere recorded. 17 Bridging the growing rift between these 
modes of apprehension were precisely the kind of popular 'para-ethnological' works of 
Anglo-Indian literature represented by Steel's India. 
This crucial divide between colonialist forms of knowledge, and its tendency to be 
cemented by the deployment of ideology over local observation, is nowhere more 
apparent in Steel's narrative than in the selective presentation of Indian Muslims as an 
isolated and decaying community helplessly gripped by pre-'Mutiny' visions of Mughal 
glory. As a means of sketching an initial framework for this thesis's analysis of the 
principal constituent elements of that particular Anglo-Indian vision and the rationale 
behind its longevity, it is instructive to compare Steel's perception in 1905 of Indo-
Muslim society as subsumed by a distressed Mughal gentry fixated on an imperial past, to 
the Indo-Saracenic style of architecture that had emerged victorious at the turn-of-the-
century from its battle with the Gothic style over British Indian building design. IS Both 
India and the Indo-Saracenic were to survive into the 1920s as anachronistic, insistently 
imperial, visions of a rapidly changing colonial environment - the Indo-Saracenic 
reaching its apotheosis in the new capital at Delhi, still being built at the height of the 
cross-communal Khilafat and Noncooperation Movements. In his study of the evolution 
of the Indo-Saracenic style, Thomas Metcalf has pointed out that the retrogressive vision 
17 For a lucid survey of these ideological contradictions, see Metcalf, Ideologies, Chapter 5. 
18 Metcalf, An Imperial Vision: Indian Architecture and Britain's Raj (London: Faber, 1989), especially 
Chapters Three and Five. 
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it proferred of an irretrievably fractured and mediaeval Indian society involved the 
rehabilitation of the Mughal empire as a worthy predecessor to the British, and in 
particular, as an artificially reconstructed example of a 'foreign' invader successfully 
transformed into an imperial Indian polity.19 In projecting an ethic blended from British 
and Indo-Islamic features, the Indo-Saracenic aimed at the aesthetic reconstitution of a 
perceived heterogenous social comity through the assimilating body of an encompassing 
imperial polity. The following study will attempt to analyse the widespread Anglo-Indian 
depiction of an incorporated body of Indian Muslims in just these terms: that is, as a 
reconstituted element in an artificially-constructed ethic directed towards the projection 
of a transformative (and transformed), encompassing British Indian state. As in the Indo-
Saracenic, the Indian Muslim elements of this blend are indispensable to its self-
definition: their wholeness and separateness linked (often ambivalently) to the illusion of 
its incorporative function; their obsolescence required for its renascence after the trauma 
of 1857 . Available, in the first instance, through Steel's narrative of India, it is to the 
local mechanics and specifically Anglo-Indian genealogies of these representational 
issues that this thesis now turns. 
19 Metcalf, Imperial, p 56. 
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1.2 'Mohammedanism' in India 
The structure of the text of India mimics that of the more practical travel guides of the 
period (such as Murray's Handbook: India, Ceylon and Burma, 1903), in which the 
sections are grouped around the themes of history, religion, architecture, art and 
handicrafts. Unlike most travel guides arising out of a purely Metropolitan context, 
however, Steel chooses to give her narrative a scientistic cast by adopting the syntax and 
categorisation of the census for the titles of her three consecutive chapters on religion 
(respectively, 'Hinduism'; 'Mohammedanism'; 'Buddhism, Jainism, Parseeism, 
Animism,).2o This reference to the All-India census signals not only the pointedly Anglo-
Indian textual authority Steel wishes to arrogate for her guidebook (and therefore its 
ability to command the most up-to-date localised resources of the Orientalist archive), but 
to an important rationale for the descriptive paradigms by which her narrative of 
contemporary Indian society - present only in these chapters on religion - is constructed. 
The census in India grew out of the early nineteenth century British project of the 
wholesale collection of social and economic information about India at a district level, 
arranged into a series of Gazetteers which came to serve as the primary archival source 
for British local revenue administration. Formally coordinated under W W Hunter's 
direction in 1869, the pan-Indian 'Imperial Gazetteer' (as it was renamed) had already 
begun to be supplemented in the 1850s and 1860s by provincial censuses aimed, as has 
been described above, at redirecting the perceived anecdotal, indigenous modes of 
'knowing the country,21 into the Western paradigms of statistically-based information-
collection on which administrators increasingly came to rely in the aftermath of the 
20 Murray's Handbook: India, Ceylon and Burma (London: J Murray, 1903), like most others of the period, 
contents itself with brief surveys of 'Mahommedans' and 'Hindus'. 
21 The phrase is taken from Bayly's, 'Knowing the Country: Empire and Information in India' . .\fodern 
Asian Studies 27, 1 (1993), pp 3-43. 
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'Mutiny'. The first All-India Census was conducted in 1871-72 and renewed on a 
decennial basis throughout the rest of the colonial period; by the end of the nineteenth 
century it had superseded the Gazetteer as the primary vehicle for the organisation of the 
bureaucratic infrastructure of British Indian administration. 
In contradistinction to the census in Britain, as Kenneth Jones has pointed out, 
'from its very inception, the Indian census employed religion as one of its fundamental 
categories' :22 along with caste, religious affiliation was taken by census officials as the 
basic unit of enquiry into the social stratification of Indian society.23 Underlying the 
methodology of the census was the larger ideological trend towards the British 
apprehension of Indian society through the lens of religion that, since the late eighteenth 
century, had helped shape the knowledges of India in fields as diverse as law, language 
and even clothing.24 What the census did, at a time in which British knowledge of its 
Indian subjects had suffered a traumatic epistemological rupture, was to entrench a 
discursively ontological categorisation (as it was understood and used by most colonial 
officials in India) into the diachronic representation of an increasingly mobile indigenous 
population. From 1871, then, the dynamics of Indian society were contained for British 
observers by the official inscription of what Ronald loden, borrowing from R G 
22 Jones, 'Religious Identity and the Indian Census', in N Gerald Barrier (ed), The Census in British India: 
New Perspectives (New Delhi: Manohar, 1981), p 78. Between 1801-1931, religion was used only once as 
an object of census enquiry in Britain - in the 1851 Census of Religious Worship, which concerned itself 
exclusively with religious affiliation, was implemented on a voluntary basis, and whose statistics were 
considered highly provisional, the results being published separately from the main census reports (Jones, 
'Religious', p 76). For a more detailed account of this census, see also Gerald Parsons, 'From Dissenters to 
Free Churchmen: The Transitions of Victorian Nonconformity', in Parsons (ed), Religion in Victorian 
Britain: Volume One: Traditions, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, repro 1997; 1988), pp 67-
117. Note how the title of this British census ('of Religious Worship') itself distinguishes religion as a 
performative rather than ontological category. 
23 Bernard S Cohn, 'The Census, Social Structure and Objectification in South Asia', in Cohn, An 
Anthropologist Among the Historians and Other Essays (Delhi: Oxford University Press, repro 1994; 1987), 
p 242. 
24 See for instance, Bernard S Cohn, Colonialism and its Forms of Knowledge: the British in India (Delhi: 
Oxford University Press, 1997). For a cogent precis of the morphology of the pervasive perception of 
Indian society through religion in the nineteenth century, see Metcalfe, Ideologies, especially pp 132-48). 
On the role of religion in the evolution of colonial law, see also, Michael R Anderson, 'Islamic Law and the 
Colonial Encounter in British India' in David Arnold and Peter Robb (eds), Institutions and Ideologies 
(Richmond: Curzon, 1993), pp 165-85. 
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Collingwood, has referred to as the 'substantialised agent' ofreligion25 - that is, 
effectively ordering that dynamic according to hypostatized divisions. It should be 
understood as more than happenstance that, within an evolving Raj sociology of 
officially-ascribed, competing ethnicities, the statistical sedimentation of this 
representational strategy of containment had the immediate effect of precipitating among 
indigenous observers a new conceptualization ofreIigious community as 'fundamentally 
insecure', liable for the first time, not only to a detailed analysis of change in terms of 
growth or diminution, but to a disturbingly new comparative framework.26 At the very 
start of the post-Mutiny period, then, colonial stability and indigenous insecurity were 
mutually interdependent perceptions, closely tied through the census to religious identity. 
While Steel's literal reproduction of census categorisation replays the crucial 
nexus between the census and all subsequent colonial studies of Indian society,27 it also 
reverses the expectations of the census by pointing that social enquiry back towards a 
broader description of the religions themselves. In one respect, that reversal is merely the 
restatement of the paradox of census categorisation (indeed, its banalization: effortlessly 
moving between 'Hinduism' and 'Hindus'). More significantly, though, it serves to 
obscure the anachronous descriptive tropes that Steel deploys in her construction of a 
'contemporary' Indian society (and which, we can assume, played no small part in 
steering the successive print-runs through three decades of unprecedented social 
upheaval). The category of 'Animism', for instance, was by 1905 (when Steel took it up) 
under considerable pressure by various indigenous groups (Muslim and Hindu) lobbying 
to reclaim sections of its putative adherents for their own constituency; and similarly 
'Sikhism', which Steel absorbs into the larger denomination of 'Brahmanism' / 
'Hinduism', had by the time of the second Punjab census of 1868 been established as a 
25 Ronald Inden, 'Orientalist Constructions oflndia', Modern Asian Studies (1986), pp 402-3, 428. 
26 Jones, 'Religious', pp 84-85. 
27 For the imbrication of later Anglo-Indian Orientalist texts and the census, see Cohn, 'Census', pp 241-42. 
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separate census denomination?8 In other words, at the very threshold of Steel's account 
of contemporary Indian society, its socio-political context is effectively excised by the 
descriptive strategies built into its specifically Anglo-Indian framework for ethnographic 
enqUIry. 
What is being suggested in these reflections on the simultaneously atemporal and 
diachronic deployment of religion by Steel is that the gap that appears to have opened up 
in India between Orientalist and local colonial paradigms (for instance, between Steel's 
textual experience of 'BrahmansimlHinduism' and her local observations of Sikhism in 
the Punjab where she spent twenty years as the wife of a colonial official) is one mediated 
by the very language of colonial practice. The paradox here surrounding a hypostatized 
religion as the primary mode of ethnographic enquiry is not simply an anomalous 
slippage between the larger theoretical and more immediate practical discourses, as Bayly 
has suggested often exists between Orientalist and official writings by Anglo-Indians/9 
but a form of conflicted discourse central to all Anglo-Indian apprehensions of India, in 
which religion operates as a descriptive means of containing a threatening social 
dynamic. In the context of this thesis' exploration of a British discourse on Indian 
Muslims, however, it is significant that the faultline opened up by this paradox within the 
narrative of India aligns itself most noticeably along the axis of the central chapter on 
'Mohammedanism', and that the division it enforces between 'Mohammedanism' and its 
neighbours is one founded on a unique and unmistakable absence: the absence, that is, of 
religion. 
For, unlike 'Hinduism' or 'Jainism', 'Mahommedanism' in Steel's narrative, is 
formed in an exegetical vacuum; its genesis in India appears purely temporal. While the 
chapter on 'Hinduism' demanded an examination of 'creed', 'conception' and 'eternal 
conviction' before passing on to the details of customs and festivals, 'Mahommedanism' 
28 Steel, India, p 85; Jones, 'Census', p 79. 
29 Bayly, Empire, p 326. 
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begins and ends with 'population', 'type' and 'circumstances' .30 In one sense, this 
separation between 'Hinduism' and 'Mohammedanism' in India reflects the larger 
Hegelian division of Asia into two geographical and racial entities. Hegel's terms for this 
division have been translated as 'Hither' and 'Farther' Asia, by which he referred to, 
respectively, what is now broken up into the NearlMiddle East and the Far East. 3 I 'The 
nations of hither Asia', Hegel wrote, 'belong to the Caucasian, i.e. the European stock' 
and were to some extent unified by Islam.32 Through Islam they represented to the 
Christian West what Ronald Inden has described as 'a false, fanatical cousin' .33 In 
contrast, the nations of 'Farther Asia', loosely unified by Buddhism, were deemed, 
principally in the form of India and China, its 'true Others' .34 One essential component 
of this division, which was to persist throughout nineteenth century British historiography 
of India, was the temporal opposition between the two: 
With the Persian Empire we first enter on continuous History. The Persians are the 
first Historical People; Persia was the first Empire that passed away. While China 
and India remain stationary, and perpetuate a natural vegetative existence even to 
the present time, this land has been subject to those developments, which alone 
manifest a historical condition.35 
'Continuous History', then, was in India only considered an appurtenance of its later 
invaders from 'Hither Asia'. Thus, neither history nor time figure in Steel's chapter on 
'Hinduism', but might be said to be the hegemonic formations of her understanding of 
30 Steel, India, p 63, 73, 80. 
31 Ronald rnden gives a concise discussion of these divisions, taken from Hegel's The Philosophy 0/ 
History, in Inden, Imagining, pp 49-56. 
32 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, The Philosophy o/History, trans J Sibree (New York: Dover, 1956), p 
173. 
33 Inden, 'Orientalist', p 424. In this regard, it is worth noting Steel's own use of the denomination 
'Mahommedanism' out of a variety of possible Anglo-Indian terminologies for Indian Muslims at the end of 
the nineteenth century ('Musalmans', 'Mahommedans', 'Moslems'). As Said has po~nted out, .the term 
'Mahommedanism' - erroneously implying 'the followers of Mohammed' - reflects Its pervasive 
comparison in pre-twentieth century Western literature with 'Christianity' (Edwar~ Said, Or~enta~ism, 
(London: Penguin, repro 1991; 1978), p 60. For a more explicit development of this companson III the 
Anglo-Indian context, see Sections 2.4 and 2.5 below. 
34 Inden, 'Orientalist', p 424. 
35 Hegel, p 173. 
'Mohammedanism' , annexing the synchronic elements of religion itself so that the 
description of 'creed' becomes less a matter of philosophical exegesis than its historical 
manifestation in contemporary India in 'the lees of a dead [Mughal] court' .36 
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But the element of temporal grounding indicated by the narrative concentration on 
'population' and 'circumstances' accounts for only one aspect of the faultline that opens 
up around 'Mohammedanism' in India. A secondary dislocation can be glimpsed in the 
manner in which the temporal element is witheld from Steel's brief portrait of 
'Parseeism' - itself derived from 'Hither Asia', and therefore a religion which might have 
been expected to have been coupled with 'Mahommedanism' under its temporal sign. If 
the influence of Hegel's readings of what he calls the 'Hindoo' and 'Mahometan' 
religions, representing the different aspects of 'Hither' and 'Farther Asia', can be 
distantly felt in the different descriptive modes of Steel's early twentieth-century 
conception of' Hinduism' and' Mahommedanism' , her characterisation of' Parseeism' as 
'fit[ting] in better with Western forms of thought than do the more mystical abstractions 
of Hindu philosophy' would indicate an opaque, but nevertheless broadly congruent, 
reflection of this same schema.37 Hegel situates what Steel calls 'Parseeism' as the 
spiritual impetus necessary to the condition of 'continuous History' that he attributes first 
to the Persians: 
But here in Persia first arises that light which shines itself, and illuminates what is 
around; for Zoroaster's "Light" belongs to the World of Consciousness - to Spirit 
as a relation to something distinct from itself .. 38 
It is this 'Spirit' that Hegel understands as the point of meeting between the 'Hither Asia' 
and the West, and which is contrasted with 'Farther Asia', and with 'the Hindoos' in 
particular: 
In contrast with the wretched hebetude [sic] of Spirit which we find among the 
36 Steel, India, p 77. 
37 Steel, India, p 85. 
38 Hegel, p 173. 
Hi?doo~, ~ pure ether - an exhalation ~f Spirit - meets us in the Persian conception. 
In It, Spint emerges from that substantIal Unity of Nature, that substantial 
destitution of import, in which a separation has not yet taken place - in which Spirit 
has not yet an independent existence in contraposition to its object.39 
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This 'independent existence' is the vital relation of Self to the world, predicated on the 
Individual, and precipitating 'Continuous history'. Its absence in their construction of 
Hinduism lies at the centre of the Romantic idealist depiction of human agency in Indian 
civilization as 'displaced ... on to an internal, spiritual nature which [the idealist] wanted 
to see as ineffable,;40 and it is this passivity that explained India as an environment in 
which history was enacted by invaders, and not by the inheritors of the ancient (Hindu) 
Indian civilisation. Since Steel's conception of history in India, like that of most of her 
Anglo-Indian contemporaries, draws heavily on this Romantic tradition, we would 
certainly expect 'Parseeism' to find its place in her taxonomy alongside 
'Mahommedanism' as an alien - and in every way, antithetical- importation. 
Yet the reference to a philosophical consonance between 'Parseeism' and 
'Western thought' is introduced at the very end of the passage, and only as an 
afterthought to the striking image which she places at the centre of her brief portrait of the 
'Parsees'. It is that image which Steel uses as the primary means oflocating 'Parseeism' 
within the larger framework of the religions of India; and it is one that points 
unexpectedly towards a taxonomic configuration that runs directly counter to the 
Hegelian divisions (between 'Hither' and 'Farther Asia') which her comparison to 
'Western thought' might have been thought to endorse: 'The Parsees', she writes, 
'are ... outwardly even more European than the Europeans; but within, the old faith of the 
fire-worshippers remains less touched by Western thought than Hinduism in CaIcutta.,41 
What is remarkable in this definitive image of the 'Parsees' is the way it effortlessly lifts 
39 Hegel, pp 177-78. . . . 
40 Inden, Imagining, p 73. For a useful summary ofthe Romantic conception of India and Its close 
relationship to that of Hegel, see Inden, Imagining pp 66-69. 
41 Steel, India, p 85. 
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them beyond the narrative concern with historical origins that marks the chapter on 
'Mahommedanism' - and would here presumably necessitate reference to the Persian 
empires of what Marshall Hodgson calls the Axial and Pre-Axial ages42 - and places them 
instead into the 'primitive' orbit of Steel's Romantic conception of 'Hinduism', recasting 
their prophetic religion in the mould of an ancient 'Farther Asian' civilisation impervious 
to historical change. Ontologically separated from Hegel's historical Persians, the 
locution used - 'outwardly ... European ... but within ... untouched ... ' - instead refers 
explicitly to the narrative's earlier portrait of the 'Hindu' who often conceals his 
'unalterable belief beneath a 'Europeanised' exterior.43 This unexpected marriage within 
the narrative of 'Hindu' and 'Parsee' - across the divisions of 'Asia' and the temporally-
mapped body of the 'Mahommedan' - retroactively illuminates the absence of a similar 
invariant core of religion in the Indian 'Mohammedan'. 
Part of the explanation for what we might call the 'indianisation' of (in the 
language of nineteenth century racial taxonomy) the 'Semitic' origins of the 'Parsee' -
semantically drawn into the circumference of an invariant Aryan 'Farther Asian' ancient 
civilisation44 - can be found in the preoccupation of nineteenth century Orientalist 
discourses with the idea of conquest.45 In these discourses on philology, ethnology and 
history, India is repeatedly described as an 'ancient civilization' which, despite its 
42 Hegel's first 'Persian empire' was the Achaemenid, 538-331 BC (Hegel, p 181). The death of Zoroaster 
preceeded its founding by appoximately two decades and Zoroastrian Mazdeism, an important feature of the 
Achaemenid empire, became the official state religion of the Sasanian empire around 275-292AD - in other 
words, at about the same time as Christianity was becoming established in the Roman empire (Marshall G S 
Hodgson, The Venture of Islam: Conscience and History in a World Civilization. Volume One: The 
Classical Age of Islam, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, repr. 1977; 1974), p 141, 126-27. Given 
this comparable timeline, and Hegel's influential association of the Persians and their religion as together 
inaugurating 'continuous History', Steel's comparison of , Par see ism' and 'Hinduism' should not be 
considered a simplistic equation of antique religions - that is, of two religions predating Christianity. 
43 Steel, India, pp 67-68. 
44 Steel's chapter on 'Our Aryan Brother', along with her later discussion of' Animism', makes clear that 
she conceives ofthe 'Hindu' as distinctly Aryan. The identification of the 'Parsee' and 'Hindu' is no less 
remarkable for the way in which it bypasses common late colonial racial taxonomy. For an excellent set of 
essays on the impact of racial theory in colonial India, see Peter Robb (ed), The Concept of Race in South 
Asia (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1995). ., . . 
45 For the importance of 'conquest' to Orientalist constructIons of IndIa, see Inden, Imagining, pp 54-56. 
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repeated invasions (distinct from the original Aryan incursion), 'had survived into the 
present more or less unchanged.,46 'Hindu' and 'Parsee', philosophically antithetical, are 
semantically united under the sign of resistance to invasions and their now shared 
survival- more or less 'unchanged' - in contemporary India. Though ostensibly that 
invader is British (inciting in both a skin-deep European aspect), the secondary 
implication is their linkage in common opposition to the Muslim despoilers of their 
ancient civilisations, in Persia and in India.47 The binding of 'Parsee' and 'Hindu' within 
the conception of Indian history in India appears anomalous only if we ignore its 
consequent separation of the 'Mahommedan' not just from the rubric of 'unalterable' 
belief that produces contemporary Indian society, but from the shared role within that 
society of sUbjection to an invading power. 
We can begin to see here that the location of 'Mohammedanism' in India on the 
fault-line of the diachronic and synchronic categories of census and religion, on the 
temporal divide of 'Hither' and 'Farther' Asia, and in the Romantic conception of an 
ancient civilisation resistant to Muslim conquest, is part of a relentless, undisclosed 
process of what can be thought of as the deconstruction of the very denomination, Indian 
'Mohammedan'. Ifwe then situate the text - despite its apparently anachronistic census 
categories - in its specifically late colonial context, the absence of religion (in the 
confinement of its description to 'population' and 'situation', in its temporal grounding 
and particularly in the divorce of the Indian 'Mohammedan' from any invariant religious 
core) becomes an implicitly political argument. As Partha Chatterjee has shown, by 1905 
nationalist discourse in India had long begun the process of appropriating and 
46 Inden, Imagining, p 55. . , ,. 
47 H I also refers to the conquest of the 'Zend' people (whose 'canonIcal books are those on whIch the 
ege f'll . P . 
religion of the ancient Parsees is founded') by the 'Mahometans', bu~ on.lY as a means 0 I ustratmg ersla 
as 'the first empire that passed away', and thus its fundamental constItutIOn as the first exa~ple of 
'continuous History' (Hegel, p 176). By its implicit echo di:~rced from the larger ~e~ehan s~hema of 
history in Steel's narrative, we can gauge the degree of selectIVIty that produces Steel s Parsee as 
semantically affianced to the 'Hindu'. 
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demarcating from the colonial state an 'inner' or 'spiritual domain' (as opposed to the 
'material', 'outer domain' ceded to colonialism) as a primary arena of self-
determination.48 The denial of such a - here religious - 'inner' core to the Indian 
'Mohammedan' figures neither a merely Romantic nor a purely historiographical rupture. 
What begins to surface are the lineaments of a process which entails the socio-political 
detachment of the 'Mohammedan' from contemporary Indian society itself.49 
It is important, however, to distinguish that detachment as a necessary by-product 
rather than the goal of this process in the narrative of India. Returning briefly to the 
language of the text, we can further understand that the invariant core of religion witheld 
from the 'Mohammedan' not only produces a disturbing disconnection from the 'Hindu' 
of 'unalterable belief and the 'Parsee' unchanged 'within', but gives rise to a curious 
effect within the chapter on 'Mahommedanism' as a whole. For in Steel's narrative, 
'Mahommedanism' is not so much a description as a misnomer for its Indian practitioner. 
Its manifestation in India goes beyond signaling its absence, the hoJJow core of an 
invariant religion, but occurs rather as the accretion of a series of negative signs. 
Customs are seen as 'repugnant to the whole teaching of Mahommed'; Indian 
'Mahommedans can only be described as a 'social comity ... riddled and permeated with 
Hinduism'; even the more positive portrait of' Mohammedan' gentlewomen is -
inevitably - set out as 'a compendium of all the most Christian virtues' .50 So relentless 
is this descriptive undoing of the category 'Mahommedanism' that Steel's concluding 
comment that the 'Mahommedan is not at his best in India' is not simply an exercise in 
bathetic irony, but a suspiciously disingenuous reading of her own narrative: 
48 Chatterjee, Fragments, pp 3-14. For a fuller discussion of this process in nationalist discourses, see 
Chatterjee, Nationalist. .., . 
49 Alth h 't does not fall within the remIt of thIs thesIs, It could be argued that an even more overt process 
oug I . . . I' . I 
of the descriptive detachment of Muslims from thelT South ~sIan cont~xt contI~ues to p ay Its part In trave 
literature today. See for instance, V S Naipaul, Beyond Behef ~slamlc ExcurSIOns Among the Converted 
Peoples (London: Abacus, repr. 1999; 1998), pp 263-381, especIally pp 264-65, 274. 
50 Steel, India, p 74, 79, 75. 
34 
semantically speaking, the 'Mahommedan' is not in India at all. 51 
And it is here that we can properly discern an important impulse behind the 
process of disassociation that produces Steel's 'Mahommedans' as a community divorced 
from their religion. Because cumulatively, the effect of this disconnection is not simply 
the suggestion of an irreligious, but of a markedly secularised, community.52 A clue to an 
important constituent of its epistemology - and the true starting point for this chapter's 
examination of the colonial discourse on Indian Muslims - can be found in the opening 
line of the second paragraph of 'Mahommedanism': 'With the exception of enforced 
converts from the Jat and Rajput races, all the Indian Mahommedans are, like ourselves, 
alien to the soil.,53 Yoked to the irreducible 'foreigness' of the majority of the Indian 
Muslims, it is the apparently innocuous phrase, like ourselves, which points towards a 
crucial, though unacknowledged, motivation behind the secularised description of 
'Mohammedanism' that follows. Steel's 'ourselves' does not refer to the British 
metropolitan audience for which the guide-book was published, but to the officially 
secular identity of a far smaller, and (to use Sara Suleri's trope) intimate audience: 
Anglo-Indians.54 The description it precedes, it should be remembered, is of a 
community that appears almost phantastically within the text, its presence in 
contemporary 'India' always on the point of dissolution; a community divorced from 
Indian society, just as the institutions and institutional knowledges of colonial rule -
predicated on difference - constantly reinforced for the British in India,55 and as India 
51 Steel, India, p 80. This process of disassociation from the Indian context within the narrative of India 
needs to be distinguished from increased claims, particularly among the ashraf(and those aspiring to ashraf 
status) in the later nineteenth century, to genealogies deriving outside South Asia. For some of the 
ideologies surrounding these claims and their r~lationship t? .Mughal po~itical cultur~, see Shaikh, ~p 94-96, 
114-18. On 'ashrafisation' among Indian MuslIm cOmmUnIties, see Imttaz Ahmad, The Ashraf-AJlaf 
Distiction in Muslim Social Structure in India', in Indian Economic and Social History Review 3 
(September, 1966), pp 268-78; and Ra~uddin. Ahm~d: The B~ng~l ~uslims, p~sim. 
52For further reflections on the ideologies behmd thiS secularlsatlOn, see SectIOn 1.4 below. 
53 Steel, India, p 73. . . . 
54 Th tion of , intimacy' as a means of understanding the psychiC mterdependence of colOnIsed and 
e no d' h . 
colonist is developed in Suleri, pp 1-23. These arguments will be pursue 10 t e next sectIon. 
55 Chatterjee, Fragments, p 10. 
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itself replicates with the marginal (and in tone, embattled) appearance of the Anglo-
Indians in the final chapter of the text. And most importantly, it is a community 
deformed by its commitment to the preservation of power (' [the Indian Mohammedan's] 
position wars with his religion,S6); a commitment that, for the Anglo-Indians, as Suleri 
has so pointedly observed, charges every colonial encounter with the simultaneous 
possibility of the loss ofpower.S7 The relentless process of dissolution that structures 
Steel's chapter on 'Mahommedanism' - and, it will be argued, the larger Anglo-Indian 
discourse on Indian Muslims - cannot be understood, or uncoupled from, her own 
seemingly unconsciously inserted community. 
56 Steel, India, p 80. . 
57 Sara Suleri, The Rhetoric of English India (ChIcago, 1992), P 6. 
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1.3 Identification and disavowal in colonial representations 
To insist upon this 'coupling' of 'Mohammedan' to 'Anglo-Indian' is unexceptional 
in the context of the theories of colonial discourse analysis inaugurated by Edward 
Said's Orientalism (1978). But it is necessary to go further than merely confinning 
the 'production' of Eastern subjects for a Western Metropolitan audience as a process 
ofidentity-fonnation dependent on a discourse of , Otherness' 58 (available here, for 
instance, in a reading of 'Mahommedanism' in India as so many points of inversion 
between the anatomised Muslims and the inferred, integrated ideal of British 
Christians in India). It is necessary, rather, to begin to problematise the casual 
admission of identification between coloniser and colonised that, it will here be 
argued, directs the colonial representation of Indian Muslims. 
While Said's insight into 'Orientalism' as a markedly 'paranoid' discourse 
disclosed the existence of complex modes of fantasy inherent in Western 
representations of Eastern society, Orientalism itself paradoxically suggested an 
unchallenged autonomy - as well as a misleading transhistoricity - available to the 
imperialist in the field of representation. 59 Building on Said's work, Homi Bhabha 
has sought to deconstruct this appearance of autonomy and to re-frame 'Orientalism' 
within the specificity of the colonial encounter. In doing so, he has developed a more 
inflected understanding of the psychic 'processes of subjectification' that envelop 
both coloniser and colonised - in effect, repositioning both as, equally, the 'colonial 
subject'.6o This reframing of the 'colonial subject' (native and colonialist) within a 
psychic economy of the mutually responsive circulation of intensely ambivalent 
affects, has given rise to two significant criticisms: that its psychoanalytic apparatus 
58 Said, pp 1-73. .. 
59 For some recent critical analyses of Said's work, see Bart Moore-GIlbert, Postcolomal Theory: 
C texts Practices Politics (London: Verso, 1997), pp 34-73; John Mackenzie, Orientalism: History. th~:ry a~d the arts '(Manchester: Manchester University ~ess, .1995), pp 1-19; Aijaz Ahmad, In 
Theory: Classes, Nations, Literatures (Delhi: Oxford UmversIty Press, repro 1994; 1992), pp 159-220; 
and Robert Young, White Mythologies: Writing History and the West (London: Routledge, repr. 2001; 
1990), pp 126-40. . . .. d th D· fC I . I· ,. 
60 Bhabha, 'The Other Question: Stereotype, DISCrImmatIon an e Iscourse 0 0 oma Ism, m 
Homi K Bhabha, The Location o/Culture (London: Routledge, 2000), p 67. 
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has the tendency in Bhabha's work to sublate the considerable materiality of the 
political and economic relations of subordination that are the most immediate and 
determinative affects of colonialism; and that it has the additional propensity to 
reproduce psychoanalysis as a universalising discourse capable of describing non-
Western societies, but inadequately problematised as itself racially-encoded and 
specific to the historical context in which it was generated. 61 The first criticism will 
be addressed below.62 For the moment, it is only necessary to emphasise that 
Bhabha's contribution to the understanding of the colonialist (as opposed to, but not 
separated from, the colonised) as a psychic subject negotiating an alien and alienating 
environment, form the focus of the discussion in this section. The 'agency' of the 
colonised, problematised by critics of Bhabha's theories (whether, for instance, the 
subversive effects of 'mimicry' are the result of transitive or intransitive native acts of 
resistance63), is therefore only at issue here insofar as it restrained or directed the 
colonialist will to represent: in short, as a pressure acting upon colonialist psychic 
processes from the realms of what Elizabeth Wright has described as 'brute 
existence', and which Lacan has theorised as 'the Real.,64 Though having a 
substantial and immediately political effect upon the psychology of colonial 
descriptive strategies, it will be approached in the discussion in this section primarily 
as an immanent - and refigured - presence within those psychic processes. On the 
latter question of pyschoanalysis as a universalising, racially-encoded discourse, it is 
rather suggested that as a mode of criticism it is an unusually well-fashioned tool with 
which to examine these processes at work in the late nineteenth century European 
. d 65 mIn. 
61 See Bart Moore-Gilbert, postcolonial, p~ 1 ] ~-] 51; an~ Abdul ~~o~amed, ':~e Economy ~f 
Manichean Allegory: the Function of ~clal Dl~eren~e In Col~malIst LIterature 10 Henry LOUIS Gates 
(ed), Race, Writing and Differen~e (ChIcago: Um.versity of ChIcago Press, 1987). 
62 But see in particular, Moore-GIlbert, postcolOnial, pp ] 40-~ 1. .,. 
63 For the problems attendant on Bhabha's conceptions of natIve agency and mtentIonalIty, see Moore-
Gilbert, Postcolonial, pp 131-33. . . . . . ' 
64 Elizabeth Wright, Psychoanalytic Crttlclsm: a.ReapprOisal, (Oxford: Poltty Press, 1998). p 102. 
65 The seminal study of this racial encoding remams that of Sander L GIlman, Freud, Race, and Gender 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993). 
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Working on the premise that 'it is the realm of representation and the process 
of signification that constitutes the space of the political' ,66 Bhabha has sought to 
reinterpret that 'signification' in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries as 
doubly-inscribed by the coincidence of a post-Enlightenment discourse of 'civility' _ 
with its assumptions of democracy and the universal rights of man - and the inimical 
despotic modes of colonial conquest and governance alongside which it was 
formulated. 67 At every point of its articulation, he argues, the colonial discourse that 
emerged in this period was thus inevitably split between the language of democratic 
national self-expression and the imperial depotism that shadowed it. It is in this sense 
that he reads the 'colonial moment' as fundamentally interrogative of the very 
constitution of a British identity.68 Bhabha's work explores this idea of the 'splitting' 
of a British identity along the axes of empire and nation through its manifestation in 
the particular representational strategies of colonial discourse. He locates these 
strategies as highly ambivalent 'sites of enunciation'; never simply an act of 
interpretation, but rather an agonistic 'act of communication between the I and the 
You' which repeatedly challenges the authoritative basis from which (and towards 
which) those cultures - British, Indian, and British in India - are addressed.69 
Bhabha's '1' and 'You', then, refer primarily to the colonialist and the shifting 
sites of identification he/she is forced to adopt in order to maintain divisions 
constantly under threat of erasure. These divisions run both between the colonialist 
and the native subject under representation, and between the colonialist as the bringer 
of civilisation and 'democracy's despotic double'. The imaginative identificatory 
praxis he locates at the heart of the rhetorical project of liberal humanist ethics (in, for 
instance, J S Mill's 'On Liberty,)70 thus becomes in colonial discourse a problematic 
site of multiple inscription as it seeks to legitimate the 'rule of colonial difference'. 
66 Bhabha, 'The Postcolonial and the Postmodern' in Bhabha, The Location o/Culture, p 190. 
67 Bhabha, 'The Commitment to Theory' i~ The Location o/Cultur~,. p ~2: .. ,. . 
68 For an illuminating analysis of the persIstence of the myth of Bnttsh CIVIlIty mto twentIeth century 
Metropolitan culture, see Jacqueline Rose: States. 0/ Fantasy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), Chapter 
Three. Some of her insights are taken up m SectIon 1.5 below. 
69 Bhabha, 'Commitment', p 36. 
70 Bhabha, 'Commitment, p 24. 
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That is, it represents a potential site of destabilisation at the heart of the systemic 
hierarchization of the indigenous population, in which the colonialist is 
simultaneously placed as onto logically separate, as both the arbiter and the point of 
difference.71 The act of interpretation, and the strategies of representation it gives rise 
to in this discourse, invariably aim at constituting the colonised as a 'population of 
degenerate types on the basis of racial origin, in order to justify conquest and to 
establish systems of administration and conquest.' 72 Despite the 'play' involved in 
adopting (in order to represent) different points of identification within these 
descriptive strategies, ultimately what is at stake in colonial discourse is the 
separating out of the colonised as a 'social reality which is at once an 'other' and yet 
entirely knowable and visible.' 73 
Bhabha's analysis of the basic unit of this discourse, the stereotype, offers up a 
representational paradigm in which what is known - the essential degeneracy of the 
native - requires constant repetition; is repeatedly made obvious and visible, and can, 
at the same time, never be proven.74 This is because the assumed 'fixity' of the native 
(always degenerate, and always visibly so) operates as a means of occluding the 
'multiple beliefs and split subjects that constitute colonial discourse', and which are 
already inscribed into the very site of his representation.75 Its myth of purity - racial, 
cultural, historical - encoded into the stereotype is in fact representative of a desire to 
contain the disturbing hybridity in a British identity consequent on the 'colonial 
moment' (at once the benevolent instrument of civilisation and 'democracy's despotic 
double'; part of a universal 'family of man' , but ontologically separate from its native 
incarnations 76). The representational contradictions attendant on every attempt to 
capture the 'fixity' of the native (for instance, those between synchronic and 
diachronic modes of representation explored in the previous section) must be 
71 ChatteIjee, Fragments, p 10. 
72 Bhabha, 'Other', p 70. 
73 Bhabha, 'Other', pp 70-71. 
74 Bhabha, 'Other', p 66. 
75 Bhabha, 'Other', p 74. 
76 Bhabha, 'Sly Civility', in The Location o/Culture, p 96. 
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understood as the local signs of a frustrated desire to disavow an unacceptable 
colonialist impurity. Or rather, in Bhabha's Lacanian inflection, the manifestation of 
'identification' and 'disavowal' which the desire for purity (an image of self-identity 
that is not split) provokes, and which the fetishistic repetition of the stereotype partly 
(but never wholly) assuages. At the heart of Bhabha's argument, then, is the 
contention that colonialist representational strategies -locally expressed by the 
stereotype - can never be secure at any point of their articulation, since there is no 
'secure [or pure] point of identification' for the colonialist to draw upon.77 It is this 
important observation that will now be taken up with regard to the later Raj's 
sociology of ascriptive multiple ethnicities (described in the Introduction). The 
argument it prompts, aims at de stabilising the assumptions of hegemony in the field of 
representation invested by the British in this self-constituted model, by turning its 
framework inside out to get at the rhetorical dependencies that ran counter-
directionally to the flow of descriptive patronage. In other words, the intention is to 
rephrase (but not to defer) the question of what immediate political uses their 
descriptive strategies served, by asking alongside of it, What did the colonialist need 
from the representations of Indian Muslims? The answer to this question, it will be 
suggested, shares a fundamental affinity with Bhabha's understanding of the 
stereotype, in that an important component of the colonialist demand to represent, was 
the need not to describe themselves. 
With this in mind, this section will now turn to the model of 'misrecognition' 
that Bhabha refers to for his study of the stereotype,78 and attempt to use it as a first 
means of untangling the lines of affect running between the colonialist and colonial 
representations of Indian Muslims. The concept of 'misrecognition' is here derived 
from Lacan's 'mirror stage,.79 Lacan, following Anna Freud, uses the word, 
meconnaissance, by which he intends the 'failure to recognise', or 'misconstruction', 
77 Bhabha, 'Other', p 69. 
78 Bhabha, 'Other, p 77. . . 
79 Jacques Lacan, 'The mirror stage as formative of the function of the I as revealed m psychoana!ytlc 
experience' in Lacan, Ecrits: A Selection (London: Routledge, repro 1999; 1997), trans Alan Shendan, 
pp 1- 7. 
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that is inherent to all forms of knowledge. 80 It is this deftnition of knowledge as a 
continuous dialectical process of recognition and disavowal that is of particular 
relevance to all colonialist representations of indigenous populations. 8 1 Essentially a 
psychoanalytical developmental model, the 'mirror stage' ftgures the process by 
which the subject ftrst recognises and relates to themselves as an agent in the world. 
Though a crucial stage of 'identiftcation', it is effected, paradoxically, through the 
appropriation of an 'alienating' identity (the mirror image); and it is in the successful 
assimilation of this 'temporal dialectic' that 'a relation between the organism and its 
reality' is ftrst established.82 Put simply, in recognising an image of themselves that 
exists at ftrst separately in the 'outside' world (what Lacan, using Freudian 
terminology, designates the Umwelt) and integrating it into their 'inner organisation' 
(Innenwelt),83 the subject begins the crucial process of the dialectic between the two 
on which their apprehension of themselves and their actions in the world will be 
based. Or more crudely still: ftrst there is the subject; then there is the world; and 
ftnally, there is the subject in the world. As Lacan describes it, the completion of the 
'mirror stage' not only 'decisively projects the formation of the individual into 
history' but 'will henceforth link the I to [all] socially elaborated situations. ,84 It is a 
process that, like all primal psychoanalytic scenes, has important reverberations 
throughout the psychic life of the subject; and it is one that has the recurrent potential 
of inaugurating 'paranoic knowledge' of the world - that is, fragmented knowledges 
based on the fundamental discordance between the inner and exterior organisations of 
the subject's 'reality'. 85 
80 Lacan, Erits, p xi. 
81 Bhabha, 'Other', p 77. For an informative discussion of dialectical knowledge in Lacanian thought, 
see Wright, pp 99-119. . 
82 Lacan, 'The mirror stage', in Ecrits: A Selection, p 4. An account of the development of thIS theory 
can be found in Elisabeth Roudinesco's 'The Mirror Stage: an Obliterated Archive' in lean-Michel 
Rabate ed The Cambridge Companion to Lacan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp 
25-34. 'Fo; some interesting reflections on how Lacan came to see this theory as containing the essence 
of much of his later thought, see Jane Gallop, Reading Lacan (Ithaca: Cornell University Press. repro 
1996; 1985), Chapter Three. 
83 Lacan, 'Mirror', p 4. 
84 Lacan, 'Mirror', pp 4-5. 
85 For a description of the implication of the mirror stage in the disruption of this inner 'organization' 
and outer 'reality' and its potential relationship to the formation of 'paranoic' knowledge, see Lacan, 
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Lacan describes the 'mirror stage' (somewhat bathetically, perhaps, given its 
centrality to the psychodrama of the ego he uses it to illustrate) in the literal terms of a 
child's confrontation with its specular image. His description is worth reproducing 
here for the concise way it dramatises the kind of spatial model of apperception we 
wish to enlist in a reconsideration of colonialist representational strategies: 
This act [of recognizing his specular image], far from exhausting itself, ... once 
the image has been mastered and found empty, immediately rebounds in the 
case of the child in a series of gestures in which he experiences in play the 
relation between the movements assumed in the image and the reflected 
environment, and between this virtual complex and the reality it reduplicates -
the child's own body, and the persons and things, around him. 
Lacan here maps out a model of what he calls 'situational apperception', in which the 
ego begins to work out the relationship of its 'empty' specular image to the complex 
of images around it, and how that complex constitutes a meaningful 'outer' reality 
which then relates to the ego. Lacan calls this total system a 'quadrature,:86 ego, 
'empty' bodily image, virtual environment, 'real' environment. All must be brought 
into a manageable alignment before the 'history' of the subject can be inaugurated. If, 
broadly speaking, psychoanalysis is concerned with mapping out the negotiation of 
bodily drives in the world, then we may conceive of the mirror-image as the specular 
threshold on which that negotiation first takes place. What Lacan calls the 'total form 
of the body,87 - the integration of the 'quadrature' of ego, bodily images and world-
will from the moment of its inception interpose everywhere between subject and the 
world. It is a stage and site of socialisation to which the subject will have particular 
recourse as he/she negotiates those moments of what Elizabeth Wright has aptly 
called 'undecidability' - when the boundaries between 'bodily drives' and the 'reality 
principle' are under stress.88 In the context of what we might aptly term the 
'undecidability' precipitated by the 'colonial moment', Bhabha appears to suggest, 
that stage is reinvoked and negotiated anew. The alignment of the Lacanian 
'Aggressivity in psychoanalysis' in Ecrits, especially pp 18-19. 
86 Lacan, 'Mirror', p 4. 
87 Lacan, 'Mirror', p 2. 
88 Wright, p 16. 
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'quadrature' is excavated as the (colonial) subject attempts to 'postulate a series of 
equivalences, samenesses, identities, between the objects of the surrounding world. ,89 
Bhabha pursues the Lacanian schema into a fourfold armature of simultaneous 
'metaphoric/narcissistic' and 'metonymic/aggressive' responses at work in the 
colonial stereotype.90 In a trenchant critique of his deployment of this psychoanalytic 
model, Bart Moore-Gilbert has suggested that Bhabha's 'method would be unable to 
explain the varied patterns and expressions of affective structures like ambivalence in 
diachronic terms, thus registering the fact that certain stereotypes emerged in 
particular periods and locations, and often in response to specific socio-political 
developments.,91 Moore-Gilbert's observation is a necessary one in the context of the 
intention in this thesis to analyse some of the psychic and rhetorical investments at 
work in Washbrook's historical model of colonial neutrality. It is therefore proposed 
to take Lacan's insights into the 'mirror stage' as a useful analogy for the 
apperceptional strategies of the colonial subject's representations of hislher 
environment. In other words, as an insight into a similar series of alignments made 
during and in the aftermath of 'Mutiny' by the colonialist between themselves and 
their ascriptive racial and ethnic objects of representation. More than ever, that 
ascription had become dependent on - and required constant re-validation by - the 
self-projection of the image of a 'neutral' colonial state.92 Lacan describes the 
completion of the 'mirror stage' as just that moment at which a 'normalising' 
representational system comes into being that will organise 'the whole of human 
knowledge' .93 If the apperceptional paradigm of late colonial sociology can thus be 
compared to a recurrent moment in the socialisation of the ego (the object of the 
'mirror stage'), we can begin to understand the 'neutral' identity of the colonial state 
as itself entering into a kinetic dependency - always liable to disturbance - with the 
89 Bhabha, 'Other', p 77. 
90 Bhabha, 'Other', p 77. 
91 Bart Moore Gilbert, Postcolonial, p 151. 
92 A W shbrook describes it: 'The British experience of Indian society was mediated through systems 
f s ko~ing and evaluation, which centred on the implications of ethnicity and race ... They lay at the o rec . hn··' 157) 
core of the hegemonic ideology of the Raj' (Washbrook, "Et tCtty, P . 
93 Lacan, 'Mirror', p 5. 
representational paradigms it seeks to legislate.94 Indeed, we can go further and 
suggest that those representations are not only what legitimates and strategically 
determines its socio-cultural identity in colonial India, but are simultaneously, in a 
sense, the hostages to which it is bound. 
'Misrecognition', in this analysis, refers in part to the strategies of disavowal 
by which these dangerous interdependencies are managed, and through which the 
apprehension of a 'neutral' colonialist identity is continually reconstructed. But it 
also refers to the primary identification on which they are constituted - the 
assumption of an alienating image that begins the renewed process of apperceptional 
situation. In this regard, it is useful to recall Lacan's observation that this process of 
assimilation 'situates the agency of the ego .. .in a fictional direction'; that is, as a 
creative agent in the ordering and re-ordering of its world.95 And furthermore that 
44 
management (or productive mismanagement) is premised on an 'exteriority', a visible 
referent that is primarily performative - recognizable only as long as it maintains or 
can be perceived to maintain, that quality ofvisibility.96 It is this that gives the 
stereotype its currency, but also obscures the fictional processes by which it has been 
'worked Up,.97 That curious conjunction of visibility and fictionality with which 
every renegotiation of situational apperception will be invested is, of course, a telling 
characteristic of 'Orientalism', yielding what Said has described as its paranoid mode 
of articulation as 'declarative and self-evident' .98 It is also, though, the principal 
rhetorical strategy by which the 'neutrality' of the post-'Mutiny' colonial state is 
asserted. Like the stereotype, from the 1858 Proclamation of Queen Victoria 
onwards, the identity of the British state as 'neutral' (and bound up with that, 
'secular') can never be reiterated enough. The instances of its disassociative 
enactment become the principal- and more significantly, the occluding-
94 Or as Lacan puts it, upon the completion of the 'mirror stage': '~e v~ry nonna~i~tion,ofthis 
maturation [is] henceforth dependent, in man, on a cultural mediation ... (Lacan, Mrrror, pp 5-6. My 
emphasis). 
95 Lacan, 'Mirror', p 2. 
96 Lacan, 'Mirror', p 2. 
97 Bhabha, 'Other', pp 79-80. 
98 Said, p 72-73. 
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characteristic by which the Anglo-Indian is described. In this sense, the colonialist 
official identity is itself, after the 1858 declaration of neutrality, always performative, 
and even more disturbingly, like the stereotype, can never, fmally, be proven. In 
short, the assumption of this 'neutral' identity is here posited as the primary 
'alienating' image through which the colonialist's representational universe in India is 
henceforth constructed. 99 
In the colonial stereotype, 'lack' necessitated its constant repetition. By 
'lack', Bhabha refers to the gap between the sign and what it signifies: in other 
words, the essential division between the pre-language wholeness of the body, and the 
fragmented perception precipitated by the 'mirror stage' and its consequent entrance 
into the Symbolic order structured by language. This is the dialectic between body 
and language at the heart of Lacan's theories. 100 What Bhabha has done is to identify, 
through the furious repetition of the colonial stereotype, a renewed crisis over this 
essential division: that is, the colonialist's inability to properly signify hislher 
environment as a reflection of an undifferentiated self, one not split by the paradoxes 
attendant on the 'colonial moment'. He has therefore drawn a direct parallel between 
the desire to represent indigenous society and what he calls an 'archaic affirmation of 
wholeness/similarity' ,101 that primal sense of bodily wholeness before the crisis of the 
'mirror stage', before the entrance into language. Just as that moment can never again 
be captured, so a British identity before the fracture of colonial experience is 
irretrievable (that 'colonial moment' having been entirely coterminous with the birth 
of British identity). In this respect, 'lack' is an inevitable element in all forms of 
colonial representation. In the stereotype, Bhabha perceives its transmutation, 
however, into a 'productive ambivalence': its incessant repetition implies the 
presence of 'lack', and thus the continued presence of the desire for the quest for 
99 This perception of the dependency of the 'neutral' col.onial state on represe~ti~g others i~ ~rder to fill 
out and validate its own empty contours has been used, m the context of descnptlOns of rehglous 
competition, by Pandey, Construction of Communalism in Coloni~l North.lndia, passim. ; an~ Gauri 
Viswanathan, Outside the Fold: Conversion, Modernity, and Belref(Delhl: Oxford University Press, 
repro 2001; 1998), P 17. 
100 Wright, p 99. 
101 Bhabha, 'Other', p 74. 
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'wholeness/similarity'. 'Lack', in this schema, is precisely what keeps the economy 
of desire going. But at the same time, it performs the key function of generating 
'negative difference'. 102 In registering its insufficiency to signify the colonialist's 
total bodily schema, the 'lack' of the stereotype also - and crucially - ensures that 
representations of indigenous society can never imply (or return to the point of) 
representations of the colonialist. The colonialist thus remains both the arbiter and 
point of difference, without the implications of similarity that difference entails. This 
is a singular achievement, for, as Partha Chatterjee has argued in the context of 
colonial representations of Indian history, 'identity' and 'difference' are always 
mutually dependent signs produced within a 'universal theory of the modern regime 
of power.' 103 
Bhabha's 'negative difference', then, is that aspect of the racial stereotype 
which withholds the implications of difference/similarity from their return to the 
colonial site of enunciation. 104 In this sense, it is a remarkably empowering psychic 
outcome, leaving the colonialists free to describe, unfettered by the connections 
established between themselves and their systems of representations. It could even be 
argued that such an analysis partly reproduces the autonomy of Said's binary. Instead 
of paranoiac and object of paranoid discourse, however, we are presented with a 
slightly different, perhaps even more powerful formulation. It can be glimpsed in the 
use of the epithet 'negative', which bears a striking comparison to the functions of the 
'negative therapeutic reaction' within the psychoanalytic relationship itself. lOS The 
semantics are worth elaborating on here. Since that relationship can in some ways be 
seen to mimic the superficial effects - and even mannerisms - of colonial discourse, 
the return of its language to a prior scene of colonial exchange necessarily brings with 
102 Bhabha, 'Other', p 75. . ' 
103 'It is obvious, of course, though not always noticed that the difference which produces ~ndla (or the 
Orient) as the "other" of Europe also requires as its condit~on an identity of Europe and India; 
otherwise they would be mutually unintelligible.' ChatteI]ee, Fragments, p 32. 
104 Bhabha, 'Other', p 75. 
105 Lacan, 'Aggressivity in Psychoanalysis', in Ecrits: A Selection, p 13. 
it the potential shadow of those assumptions of the disposition of power and 
manipulation. 106 
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Lacan describes the (ideal) analyst as the 'pure mirror of an unruffled surface' 
in which the imago [image] of the subject is reflected. 107 It is through this mechanism 
of the efficient withdrawal and impassivity of the analyst that the pathology of the 
subject is manifested. Indeed, 'analytic action' can even involve the 'inducing in the 
subject a controlled paranoia' to further draw out the symptoms of the illness. 108 Thus 
the 'negative' reaction aimed at here involves a simultaneous form of defence and 
exposure. Defence, that is, for the analyst themselves and for the success of the 
processes they control; and exposure (toxic, self-revelatory) for the analysand. In this 
respect, it is also a remarkably compressed form of the 'principle of compulsory 
visibility' for the' disciplined' and the invariable exercise of the 'disciplinary 
power ... through its invisibility' that Foucault has argued emerged in the late 
eighteenth century, and which has been identified as a primary mode of representation 
in colonial discourse. 109 The 'disciplined' here are the spontaneously visible signs of 
the stereotype; the 'disciplinary power' is the legislator of those signs, the colonialist, 
always one step ahead of the implications of similarity - always, in short, invisible. 
In other words, it is being suggested that, in Bhabha's semantic linkage of 'negative' 
psychic affects, the colonialist as the object of critical discourse is also simultaneously 
figured as its analyst. 110 The 'productive ambivalence' the colonialist manages 
through the stereotype could be interpreted as the result of this confiation, whereby 
the colonialist psychically revolves, in Bhabha's argument, between the two positions 
of analyst and analysand to effect a therapeutic outcome: the self-revelation of the 
106 It is these assumptions that inform Ronald Inden's instructive comparison of the Indologist and the 
psychoanalyst in their roles as the 'knowing subject' towards the 'known' - the Other - comparably 
manifested as the Indian and the analysand (Inden, 'Orientalist', pp 420-21). 
107 Lacan, 'Aggressivity', p 15. 
108 Lacan, 'Aggressivity', p 15. 
109 Pinney, 'Representations,' pp 150-51. . . . 
110 It could be argued that this semantic conflation of coloDl~hst an.d analyst dIs~antly echoes 
commonly-held colonialist views of their relatio~ship to IndIan objects of.scrutmy. Ronald I~den, for 
. t ce has made a similar, instructive companson between the assumptIOns of the IndologIst and the ~~~:oa~alyst in their roles as the 'knowing subject' towards the 'known', the Indian subject and the 
analysand (lnden, 'Orientalist', pp 420-21). 
pathology of the Indian subject (the 'self-evident' stereotype), and the stasis, 
concealment of the colonialist/analyst. 
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The problem here for the historian is that the autonomy of affect discerned in 
the stereotype, its (however precarious) ability to maintain a 'self-evident' difference, 
though perhaps locally effective, is misleading when replaced into the larger strategies 
of representation in which that stereotype is so variously deployed. Bhabha rightly 
describes the inconsistency of the deployment of the stereotype as inherent to the 
paradoxes it seeks to contain, but fails to pursue this insight to its conclusion: 
namely, that the stereotype is not the 'basic unit' of colonial discourse, but one of its 
more flexible signs. It does not structure the colonial language of representation; it 
merely populates it. In this sense, the stereotype tells the historian nothing of material 
value about those larger strategies of representation; indeed, it could even be said to 
partially deflect the historiographical enterprise by re-translating an important source 
of its material- the rhetorical figures of colonialism - into an irreducibly self-
referential language. In order to account for some of these limitations in Bhabha' s 
understanding of colonial representational strategies, it is useful to return briefly to an 
important impetus for Bhabha's study of the stereotype, Frantz Fanon's Black Skin, 
White Masks. IlI Fanon was the first critic of colonial culture to employ Lacan's 
'mirror stage' (or 'period', as his English translator calls it) as a means of 
understanding colonialist culture as directed by 'alienation' .112 His implicit bias, 
however, is always towards an understanding of those processes of alienation from 
the point of view of the colonised. Inevitably, he often fails to pursue the possibilities 
of his theories fully into the realms of what he calls the 'duping', that is, the 'whites' 
of his study.l13 This failure is most noticeable in Fanon's central formulation, which, 
given the reading above, appears to have acted as a spur - and perhaps 
circumscription - to Bhabha's analysis of the stereotype: 
III Indeed, Bhabha's foreword to the 1986 Pluto edition of Black Skin, ~hite Masks, entitl.ed 
'Remembering Fanon', is remarkable for the way it offers the OppOrtunity for a retrospective of all the 
key points of his own critical thinking. 
112 Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks, (London: Pluto, repro 1986, 1967), pp 161-64. 
113 Fanon, p 29. 
When one has grasped the mechanism [of the mirror period] described by 
Lacan, one can have no further doubt that the real Other for the white man is 
and will continue to be the black man. And conversely. Only that for the white 
man The Other is perceived on the level of the body image, absolutely as the 
not-self - that is, the unidentifiable, the unassimilable. For the black man, as 
we have shown, historical and economic realities come into the picture. I 14 
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While Bhabha's theory of the stereotype interrogates the integrity of that 'not-self, he 
appears to revalidate Fanon's underpinning assumption about the transhistorical and 
trans geographical hegemony that produces it. Which is to say that, in effect, he 
reaffirms Fanon's implication that the colonialist's will to represent operated entirely 
on the level of a rhetorical dialectic between the psyche and its arbitrarily-determined 
image, with no reference to the more intractable realms from which that image 
emanated. 
What this section is attempting to argue is that, on the contrary, changing 
historical and economic realities are closely implicated in the workings of the 
'mechanism' for the colonialist in India, and that those considerations partly engender 
the particular kinds of representations of difference and alienation that structure 
colonialist discourse. I IS For, translated to the larger schema of a constellation of 
competing asciptive ethnic entities around the reflective (that is, organising and 
affirming) hub of the British Indian state, we can begin to see that Bhabha's insights 
into the stereotype as never finally proveable, as requiring constant visibility, and as 
repeatedly registering a 'lack' that can never satisfactorily be effaced, make the 
'neutral' identity ofpost-'Mutiny' British India a potentially precarious - indeed 
volatile - point of dependency. As they came to believe had occurred in 1857, 
instabilities or insufficiencies in the signification of that 'neutrality' had immediate 
political consequences. As a political identity, its collapse was unthinkable, since by 
the end of the nineteenth century all Anglo-Indian rhetoric returned to neutrality as 
the legislating idea of the Raj's structure; it had quite literally become the sign of the 
114 Fanon, p 161. 
115 This is a seam of criticism already richly mined by Sinha in reference to stereotypes ofthe 
'effeminate Bengali babu'; and more generally, by Bart Moore-Gilbert in Kipling and 'Orientalism' 
(London: Croom Helm, 1986). 
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Raj.116 But as an alienating identity, one assumed at the point of entrance into a 
renegotiated psychic and political environment in post-'Mutiny' India, 'neutrality' 
was - as in the schema of the 'mirror stage' - no more than an 'empty' specular 
image. It required continual substantiation through being brought into alignment with 
the representational universe through which it could be filled with meaning. It is in 
this context that post-l 858 colonial representations of Indian Muslims need to be 
understood as not only a strategy of identification rather than pure inversion, but as a 
means of overcoming the 'lack' of that renegotiated crisis of socialisation whereby the 
image assumed is always, and necessarily, incommensurate. In short, we need to 
understand those representations as situated on the fault-line of the British emergence 
into a new symbolic order of self-representation; an order paradoxically structured by 
the language of representing others. 
In re-framing the question of official colonialist identity as an historically 
variable process of socialisation available to Lacanian modes of interpretation, two 
final points can be emphasised. The first is that, as an affect of self-identity, the 
stereotypes of Anglo-Indian literature are neither irreducible, nor invariant. As 
Sander Gilman has observed, 'paradigm shifts in our mental representations of the 
world can and do occur.' 117 The latent tradition of stereotypes available for use and 
subject to periodic 'revaluation' within any given society are always the products of 
anxiety over the question of that society's sense of 'self-integration'. Stereotypes 
therefore arise or are 'revaluated' whenever the sense of control exerted by a 
community over its own social identity comes under threat; and it is in this regard that 
they should never be seen as 'isolated from the historical context' . 118 Moreover, as a 
form of public affirmation over the question of (a threatened) social integration, the 
116 Washbrook, 'Ethnicity', P 157. As Gyanendra Pandey writes, the later nineteenth century British 
state in India was 'far more self-consciously 'neutral' - standing above [author's emphasis] society, 
and not really part of it - than any previous state, a position that no previous state had claimed or 
desired. For a long time, moreover, the claim to 'neutrality' formed a large part of the argument for the 
perpetuation of colonial government' (Pandey, p 16). This emphasis on 'neutrality' as a means o~ 
separating the Anglo-Indian from Indian society places 'secularism' at the heart of Partha Chatterjee's 
'rule of colonial difference' (Chatterjee, Fragments, p 10). 
117 Gilman, Difference, p 18. 
118 Gilman, Difference, pp 19-20. 
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reformation and maintenance of stereotypes must be understood not only as part of a 
wider process of socialisation. They must be interpreted as the signs of an inherently 
ideological language, since ideologies are themselves primarily structured as a means 
of social incorporation. 1 19 
Crises in the maintenance of a group identity are thus inextricably linked to 
the social construction of their environment. Dislocations in the latter are conceived 
of in Lacanian thought as coming from the realm of an intractable reality, one that 
resists the hegemony of systems of representation (or 'symbolisation'), and which 
entails immediate effects upon the self-construction of identities. This is the dialectic 
of social identity around which Lacan's model of situational apperception is built. 120 
Yarmis Stavrakakis has explicitly located this dialectic within political discourse, 
since it is always the' dislocation of the preceding socio-political order' that creates a 
reciprocal perception of dislocation (or 'lack') in collective self-representations. That 
perceived insufficiency in the self-projection of a social identity then serves as the 
primary cause of the 'desire for a new discursive articulation', a process that often 
involves the revaluation of stereotypes discussed above. 121 The second point of 
comparison that we can therefore emphasise between Washbrook's description of 
ethnic ascription and the Lacanian model of socialisation, is that both systems are 
predicated on prohibition. Specifically, the Lacanian subject's entrance into 
socialisation is marked by their submission to the awareness of their inability to fully 
represent themselves. The subject accedes to the innate insufficiency of the forms of 
symbolisation by which they will now reconstruct their social reality, and through that 
that reconstruction, represent themselves as social beings. All sites of identification 
are henceforth shifting, temporary, and partial; and the implicit perception of this fact, 
above all others, organises their understanding of their social environment. Similarly, 
in the assumption of the ideology of secular neutrality, and particularly in its re-
assumption after the dislocations of 1857-59, the colonialist implicitly agreed to 
119 Slavoj Zizek, The Sublime Object of Ideology (London: Verso, repro 1999; 1989). p 126. 
120 Yanni Stavrakakis, Lacon and the Political (London: Routledge, 1999), pp 67-68. 
121 Stavrakakis, p 74. 
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submit to the fundamental insufficiency of their public self-identity. The penalty for 
entering upon the sociology of the later Raj was the abnegation by the British of the 
ability to freely describe themselves. By relinquishing the complete satisfaction of 
their own identity, they inaugurated the dialectic of ascriptive representation. It is in 
this sense that we might translate the Lacanian imperative that there is no subject 
'which is not already a social subject' into an Indian colonial context. 122 Which is to 
say, the insufficiency, or 'lack', in the 'secular' and 'neutral' colonialist official 
ideology was inevitably played out in their racially and ethnically ascribed social 
environment. But at the same time, it was this dimension that continually threatened 
to fill out, and dispossess, the contours of an otherwise empty social identity. The 
particular parameters of this highly ambivalent dialectic will now be taken up in the 
next two sections with regard to the mechanism of disavowal that is always the 
corollary of identification, and which, it will be argued, structures the peculiar fate of 
the 'Mahomedan' in India. 
122 Stavrakakis, p 37. 
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1.4 The tyranny of 'Mohammedanism' 
It has been suggested that Steel's Indian 'Mahommedan' is essentially a secular 
entity. That secularity is achieved, in part, through a series of negative comparisons 
to the category 'Mahommedanism'. Indeed, as one by one other forms of description 
(geographical, racial, social) are exploded, it is the rapid accumulation of these 
negative signs - the accretion of customs 'repugnant' to the 'whole teaching of 
Islam', an alienated 'social comity'(,riddled ... with Hinduism') - that performs the 
initial narrative task of definition. 123 In this way, 'Mahommedanism' as a 
deconstructive category (literally separating 'Indian' and 'Mohammedan') 
paradoxically becomes the means by which the narrative as description continues to 
function. The portrait that evolves out of this paradox, centred on the relationship -
antagonistic, incommensurate - between the two terms, Indian and 'Mohammedan', is 
thus necessarily characterised by the notion of degeneration. The apparent bathos of 
Steel's concluding comment that the 'Mahommedan is not at his best in India' is 
misleading precisely because not being at his best is what the 'Mahommedan' in India 
is all about. 
Of course, 'decline' has always formed an important trope in the modem 
Western perception of Islam. F or Western writers reflecting on the Enlightenment 
ideal of progress through the apprehension of things Islamic, 'decline' as an 
illustration of Islam's essential lack of 'perfectability' becomes (in the words of Aziz 
AI-Azmeh) 'metaphysically necessary' .124 More specifically here, Steel's 
degenerated 'Mohammedan' joins the larger trend in later imperial ideologies that 
insisted upon Indian racial 'decline' as a necessary corollary to a self-consciously 
British rule of progress (and in particular, feeds into the long-held British perception 
of the enervating influence of the Indian environment on non-indigenous racial 
123 Steel, India, pp 73- 74. 
124 Aziz AI-Azmeh, Is/oms and Modernities (London: Verso, repro 1996; 1993), P 172. 
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stoCk).125 But the dialectic between 'Mohammedanism' and the Indian 
'Mohammedan' in India goes beyond its obvious impetus in Orientalist and 
imperialist theories of racial degeneration. It produces a figure central to the late 
colonial discourse on Indian Muslims, one not simply disconnected from or 
incommensurate to, but actively corrupted by, religion. Steel spells out the nature of 
this corruption in the fmal paragraph of the chapter: 
His star is not in the ascendant, and his position wars with his religion. That 
enjoins conversion by the sword if need be, and an almost fierce intolerance of 
the idolater. His whole entourage therefore is galling, and the friction shows 
itself in a lower moral standard in the many. 126 
Apart from a reference to 'Mahommedan' visions of 'heaven' as 'an eternal 
procession of sensual pleasures', 127 this retrospective explanation of the preceding 
portrait of moral and social degeneration constitutes the only attempt to describe 
Islamic doctrine in the chapter. It is a common enough colonial misreading of what 
Marshall Hodgson has called 'kerygmatic piety' (that is, piety 'focused on 
history,128), developed in the High Caliphal Period of Islam and adapted by nineteenth 
century Indian Muslim intellectuals attempting reformulations of their faith. 129 What 
was conceived of as the example of a glorious past sealed in the 'classical period' of 
Islam, both as an ideal and as holding out the possibility of future spiritual and 
material renewal for the Muslim community, functions here as a form of inexhaustible 
125 Kate Teltscher, India Inscribed: European and British Writing on India 1600-1800 (Delhi: Oxford 
University Press, repro 1997; 1995), pp 111-15. For an excellent discussion of representations of racial 
degeneration in nineteenth and early twentieth century European discourses, see Daniel Pick, Faces of 
Degeneration: A European Disorder, 1848-1918 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989); for 
a conspectus of Victorian racial theories centred on the conviction of 'Aryan decline' in India, see 
Metcalf, Ideologies, pp 80-92; on British perceptions of 'Hindu decadence' in the mediaeval period, 
see Inden, Imagining, pp 117-122; and for a recent insightful analysis of indigenous disruptions to 
imperial narratives of 'progress' in nineteenth century India, see Javed Majeed, 'Narratives', pp 135-
63. 
126 Steel, India, p 80. 
127 Steel, India, p 79. 
128 Hodgson, pp 362,359-92. 
129 The complex role of history as 'decline' and 'ideal' in one of the most celebrated Urdu works of the 
nineteenth century, AltafHussain Hali's Musaddas-e Madd 0 Jazr-e Islam (The Flow and Ebb of 
Islam, 1879), is discussed in Christopher Shackle and Javed Majeed (trans and eds), Hali's Musaddas: 
The Flow and Ebb of Islam , (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp 51-53. 
tyranny through which the corruption of the Indian 'Mohammedan' is endlessly re-
enacted. 
55 
This cycle of corruption finds a partial genealogy in European perceptions of 
Mughal rule since the seventeenth century as a paradigmatic form of 'oriental 
d t · ,130 AI· G . h . espo Ism. aIn osnc ard has suggestIvely described this paradigm as an 
economy of 'enjoyment' which, primarily in travel accounts, presented a spectacle of 
the ceaseless consumption and reproduction of power aimed at the simultaneous 
gratification of and disavowal by, a European audience. l31 At the centre of this 
economy he locates the despot himself as a necessary absence, a 'vanishing point' 
into which the service of the realm is drawn, never to be satisfied. l32 What Steel 
retails to the early twentieth century Metropolitan reader is an inversion of that 
economy of 'enjoyment', divested of power and producing not 'jouissance' (to 
borrow Grosrichard's Lacanian terminology) but an eternal 'galling'. In a sense, it is 
an economy of powerlessness: in place of the absent despot, an immanent, 
unassuageable religious tyranny; in contradistinction to the despotic mode of self-
pleasuring, an inexhaustible spectacle of self-destruction, enacted and witnessed by 
the Indian Muslim as a proxy for the British reader. 
Significantly, however, this spectacle has managed to bridge the rupture of the 
illusion of 'oriental despotism' that followed the intrusion of the British observer as a 
political force increasingly located within that economy of power in late eighteenth 
century India. As Grosrichard makes clear, the undisclosed participation of the 
European observer in the economy of 'oriental despotism' was dependent upon the 
130 Teltscher, p 29. Like all figures of 'oriental despotism', it also shares in the common Orientalist 
perception of the Muslim as 'a creature in diremption, as the unlikely coexistence of sheer animality on 
the one hand, and an abstract, hence forever forced and repressive, principle of order on the other' (AI-
Azmeh, Is/ams, p 170). The 'unlikely coexistence' of animality and a repressive despotism of order 
(obeying the commands of his religion) in Anglo-Indian representations ofIndian Muslims is explored 
below in Section 3.3. 
131 Alain Grosrichard, The Sultan's Court: European Fantasies o/the East, trans Liz Heron (London: 
Verso, 1998; originally published in French in 1979), pp xvi-xix. Though largely focussed on the 
Ottoman Empire in the eighteenth century, Grosrichard makes frequent reference to the Mug~al cou.rt 
in both the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, particularly through the accounts of FranCOIS Bernier 
and Niccolao Manucci. 
132 Grosrichard, P xxi. 
illusion of the observer's detachment from the spectacle. It was this separation (or 
rather, a disavowal of the knowledge of participation) which enabled belief in the 
. . f h 133 '. Integnty 0 t e fantasy. Thus the perceptIOn of 'on ental despotism' in late 
eighteenth and nineteenth century India by British observers involved a precarious 
game of comparisons, distinctions and disavowals quite different from contemporary 
French accounts of the Ottoman Empire. Indeed, so precarious were these 
distinctions for the Anglo-Indian community that, from the last quarter of the 
eighteenth century, British rule in India was itself frequently inscribed with the 
language of despotism, often by more distant Metropolitan commentators, (most 
famously, for instance, in Burke's speeches at the impeachment trials of Warren 
Hastings 134). 
What, then, is startling about Steel's portrait of the Indian 'Mohammedan' is 
the manner in which the British observer/participant has apparently been extricated 
and the integrity of the illusion - inverted; self-destructive rather than self-pleasuring 
- returned to its place in the late colonial travel guide. 135 That such a restoration is 
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brought about through the antagonistic role of religion - religion crucially divorced 
from government - points towards another, more recent phase in the genealogy 
underlying Steel's seemingly self-contained portrait, one in which the tyranny of 
religion and the integrity of the illusion of separation can be identified as the traces of 
a specific earlier unresolved debate over Anglo-Indian identity. Just as the rise of the 
133 Grosrichard, p xvi. 
134 Teltscher, pp 163-72. This transposition continued into the mid-nineteenth century, culminating in 
the annexation of Awadh in 1856: see, for instance, Malcolm Lewin, Has Dude Been Worse Governed 
by its Native Princes Than Our Indian Territories by Leadenhall Street? (London, 1857); R W Bird, 
Dacoitee in Excelsis or The Spoliation o/Oude (London: J R Taylor, 1856). J S Mill's 'On Liberty' 
(published in 1859 after his retirement from service with the East India Company) is perhaps the key 
instance ofthe post-'Mutiny' attempt to redefine the concept of 'oriental despotism' for British 
governance in India as a necessary - indeed, altruistic - tactic of the 'civilising missio~' (see Bhabha, 
'Sly', p 96). As if drawing her own historical line under this particular p.hase oft~e dl~cours7 of. , 
'oriental despotism', Steel inaugurates her most popular portrayal ofIndlan Mushms (m her Mutmy 
novel On the Face o/the Waters, 1896) with the auction of the ex-King of Awadh's emaciated mena~erie, in which both British and Mughal despotisms are implicate~ ~the insensitive purchase ~f ~ 
royal parrot by a British officer has tragic consequences in the later upnsmg). The pre-I857 colomahst 
discourse of 'oriental despotism' wi11 be taken up in more detail in Section 3.2. 
135 As Suleri has argued in the context of preserving the 'obscurity' ofIndia through the rhetoric of the 
sublime, the 'myth of integrity' was vital to the preservation of the 'fiction of [the British observer's] 
invisibility'. Suleri, p 39. 
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paradigm of 'oriental despotism' accompanied and reinforced the construction in the 
West of concepts of modernity during the Enlightenment,136 it will now be argued that 
the restoration of an uninterrupted economy of corruption to a circumscribed 
community of Indian Muslims, propelled not by power but by the unappeasable 
appetite of religion, is in part derived from the contested identity of a religiously 
neutral modem British state in India after 1858.137 It is here that the process of 
excavating the invisible participant in the redirected paradigm of what we might call 
in its inverted late colonial manifestation, 'oriental dispossession', should first be 
directed. 
136 • d . Grosnchar ,p Xl. . ' d' . 
137 In Grosrichard's Lacanian schema it is the impossibility of the satisfactIOn .ofthe esp~~ s appetIte, 
rather than the desired currency ofpower/love, that fuels the economy. Grosnchard, p XXII. 
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1.5 The 'heroic self-denial' of 'Christian rulers,138 
The question of the inter-relationship of religion and state in British rule in India, so 
often debated in the second half of the nineteenth century, is conspicuously 
underplayed in the narrative of India. In the three historical sections, 'The Raj puts , , 
'The Great Moghuls' , and 'The Western Rulers' , religion as a ( deleterious) factor is 
used to draw a line under pre- and post-I 858 British rule. Indeed, the disavowal of 
the nexus of government and Christianity provides the only concrete explanation of 
the difference between the two dispensations. 139 The relegation of the chapter 
describing 'The Anglo-Indian' to the very end of the text, conclusively separated from 
the descriptions of contemporary Indian communities through the lens of religion 
(' Hinduism', 'Mahommedanism', 'Buddhism, Jainism, Parseeism, Animism'), 
implicitly emphasises this epistemic break, and with it, the logic of colonial 
difference, as in part, predicated on religious identity. Consequently there is no 
mention in the chapter on 'The Anglo-Indian' of either religion or religious neutrality. 
Instead, the chapter, as in most Anglo-Indian literature of the period, concentrates 
exclusively on the portrait of the embattled colonial official, underpaid, overburdened 
and implicitly secular. 140 
In attempting to lock the question of the religious identity of the Anglo-Indian 
community into the pre-I 857 period of British rule in India by referring to it only in a 
causal (but historically cauterised) relationship to that epistemic rupture, the 'Mutiny', 
Steel insists, in 1905, upon the apparent success of the self-proclaimed religious 
138 The phrases are taken from Alfred C Lyall, 'Our Religious Policy in India' in Lyall, Asiatic Studies: 
Religious and Social, (London, 1882),262,274. . .. 
139 Steel, India, p 60. Given the argument advanced here concernmg th~ nexus of rehgIOn and . 
government, it is suggestive that the morally opprobrious language apph~d t? Co.mpany rule ~ Its 
'aggression', 'shady transactions', 'double-dyed scoundrels', and perv~lve feehng of shame (~teel, 
India, pp 56-61) - appears to anticipate some of the rhetoric of COrruptIO~ t~at s~o.unds .the Indian 
'Mohammedan', almost as if religious incontinence (the ungoverned ChrIstian miSSIOnarIeS; the 
ungovernable Muslim conscience) and corruption were c~gnate affiict~ons. . 
140 For an interesting exposition of the ideology of work m represen.tatIons of A~glo~lndlan b~~acracy 
as a means of obscuring problematic aspects of the colonial enterprIse, se.e Damel S!vona, BrltlS~ 
Imperial Literature, 1870-1940: Writing and the Administration o/Emplre (CambrIdge: CambrIdge 
University Press, 1998), Chapter 3. 
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neutrality of the British presence in India. Although their identity as Christians 
became an important means of Anglo-Indian differentiation from Indian society in the 
latter half of the nineteenth century, it was an identity consciously separated from the 
public sphere in which their' official' roles as representatives of colonial authority 
were enacted. 141 Steel seems to suggest that the possibility of a connection between 
public and private affirmations of faith, which was widely understood to have 
.. d h 142 . precIpitate t e events of 1857-59, IS no longer a subject of debate; it would have 
no place in an Anglo-Indian guide to modem colonial India. 143 But it is precisely this 
exemplary separation that is invoked by what we can now more exactly characterise 
as the faulty secularisation - involuntary, destructive - of Steel's Indian 
'Mahommedan' . 
To understand the nature of the interlinked identities of secular 'Anglo-Indian' 
and religiously-tyrannised Indian 'Mohammedan' it is necessary to pursue this 
portrait of faulty secularisation beyond its appearance as either self-aggrandising 
inversion or as an uncanny form of self-representation. 144 Christopher Bayly has 
recently argued for a reinterpretation of colonial policies in India in the second half of 
the nineteenth century in the light of the persistence of what he calls 'crypto-Christian 
ideas' at a variety of official levels of interaction with Indian society. 145 Contrary to 
post-1858 Anglo-Indian rhetoric (taking its cue from Queen Victoria's 1858 
141 Metcalf, Ideologies, pp 47-48. The problematic of Anglo-Indian differentiation from Indian 
Christians in 'Mutiny' accounts is explored in Section 2.5 below. 
142 On this perception of 'religion in danger' as a primary cause ofthe 'Mutiny', see for instance, 
Alfred Lyall, 'Our Religious Policy in India' in Asiatic Studies, pp 273-75. 
143 Steel attempts a similarly covert circumvention of this problem of the interaction of officially 
secular and privately (even aggressively) Christian Anglo-India in her novel, The Hosts of the Lord 
(1900), in which, during a fictional, late nineteenth-century small-scale revolt in a North Indian town, 
two Anglo-Indians, one an erstwhile member (female) of a questionable missionary group, the other an 
army officer, are detached from their respective besieged spheres, and manage together to prevent the 
religiously-motivated uprising from escalating any further, setting British rule in the town back on its 
course. This romantic solution is tellingly enacted on the liminal- and transforming - space of the 
river that connects the missionary encampment, the fort and the Indian town. The novel is discussed 
in more detail in Section 3.3 below, in reference to the enabling role played by the instigator of the 
revolt, a disaffected - Muslim - army officer. 
144 Freud's essay on 'The Uncanny' has been adapted by Gail Chiang-Liang Low (prompted by 
Bhabha's model of 'mimicry') to describe the undesired return of the familiar as an alienated, 
destabilising image in colonial discourse. Chiang-Liang Low, White Skins, Black Masks: 
Representation and Colonialism (London: R?utle~ge, 1 ?~6), pp 1 \3-15. . . '" 
145 Bayly, 'Returning the British to South ASian History meA Bayly, The Origins ofNatlOnaltsm In 
South Asia (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1998), pp 284-85. 
proclamation of the religious neutrality of her government in IndiaI46), Bayly argues 
that what had amounted to a 'covert confessional state' in the 1840s and 1850s in 
India, was carried over into the very institutional fabric of British rule in the second 
half of the nineteenth century, in educational policies steeped in 'Victorian religious 
mores', and most of all, in an Anglo-Indian mindset that continually focused on 'the 
moral rearmament of self and community' .147 Drawing on the insights of Andrew 
Porter in particular, he posits an imperial state in nineteenth-century India 'mirrored 
by and informed by a British Protestant ... spiritual empire ... [that] moulded, limited 
and directed, even if it did not determine the ideology of most officials and other 
expatriates.' 148 
60 
Alongside his call for the reassessment of government policy in the light of 
this religious imperative, Bayly makes a rather broad case for a renewed analysis of 
emergent indigenous political ideologies of the period for the possible influences of 
late imperial Christian ideologies on such nationalist concepts as, for instance, 'sewa, 
or service, [as] an energizing public doctrine.' In returning Victorian doctrinal debate 
to the history of colonial India, however, Bayly appears to make the assumption of a 
largely uncontested and unconscious process of assimilation into those emergent 
indigenous political ideologies. This perception of a species of indoctrination leads, 
for instance, to the somewhat simplistic conclusion that, rather than Vedic or 
Enlightenment systems of thought, 'it was Christian moralizing which informed 
Gandhi's encounter with the West' .149 One might contrast such a polemic notion of 
indoctrination with Shackle and Majeed's more cogent analysis of the adaptation of 
146 For the full text of the Royal Proclamation, see Michael Maclaglan, 'Clemency Canning': Charles 
John, r l Earl Canning, Governor-General and Viceroy of India, J 856-62, (London: Macmillan, 1962), 
fB 350-52. 
7 Bayly, 'Returning the British', p 280,284-85. ., . .. 
148 Bayly, 'Returning', p 279; Andrew Porter, 'Religion and Emprre: B~ltlsh ExpanSIOn m the Long 
Nineteenth Century', in The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth HistOry, Volume XX, No 3 
(1992), pp 270-390. . '. 
149 Bayly, 'Returning', p 285. Bayly's insight here could be co~sl~ere~ somewhat remlll1~Cen,t (and 
therefore lacking the timeliness) of V S Naipaul's famous descnptlon (m 1964) of Gandhi as The 
Colonial' (V S Naipaul, An Area of Darkness, (New York: Vintage, repro 19~!, 1~64~, ~p 72-87~. For 
a more nuanced analysis along these lines, see Gerard Studdert-Kennedy, Brltlsh (hrlstlans. Indian 
Nationalists and the Raj (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999). 
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ideologies such as Samuel Smiles' ethic of 'self-help' in a late nineteenth century 
Muslim reconstruction of Islamic history and doctrine in which the Prophet, re-
imagined to some extent in the figure of a Victorian social reformer (but drawing 
equally from earlier Islamic traditions of moral conduct that had begun to be re-
emphasised in the earlier nineteenth century), effectively contests a British Orientalist 
discourse that denied such personal virtues as self-discipline to Indian Muslims, while 
simultaneously drawing on the 'ludic' qualities of those stereotypes of decadence to 
create an alternative, at times competing, source of energy within the narrative. ISO 
Similarly, while Christian moralizing no doubt played a part in Gandhi's ethos, in 
historiographical terms it might, for instance, be more fruitful to speculate on the role 
of 'manly Christianity' (and its accompanying notions of chivalry) in late imperial 
representations of passive Hindus as an important but overlooked impetus in the 
genesis of Gandhi's reconstruction of the feminised Hindu male as an oppositional, 
religiously-centred persona. lSI Common to both Muslim and Hindu reformulations, it 
is being argued, is an implicit awareness of, and engagement with, a colonial 
discourse centred on constructions of specific religious communal identities that were 
partially moulded by often unconsciously displaced Victorian doctrinal thought. It is 
through the prism of these aspects of colonial representation of Indian society, as 
much as through any more direct vehicles of Victorian moral doctrines, that 
(frequently disguised) disquisitions on Christian identity in colonial India were often 
150 Shackle and Majeed, Hali's Musaddas, pp 76-79. 
151 Ashis Nandy's explication of the influences of the Sermon on the Mount and Wildean androgyny on 
Gandhi's adoption of the principle of non-violence as a critique of the colonial culture of masculinity 
does not take into account the persistence in colonial chivalric ideologies of forms of 'muscular 
Christianity' that had long since been problematised or eclipsed in Metropolitan cult~e. ~andy, The 
Intimate Enemy: Loss and Recovery o/Selfunder Colonialism, (Oxford: Oxford UmversIty Press, repro 
1994; 1983), pp 48-55. For a useful survey of the resurgence of chivalric codes and. their 
interdependence with 'muscular Christianity' in the nineteenth century, s~e M.ark GIrouard, The Return 
to Camelot: Chivalry and the English Gentleman (New Haven: Yale. UmversI~ Pres.s, 1981); and. for 
some recent analyses of the role of ideologies of masculinity and notIOns of chivalry m Anglo-IndIan 
literature, see Jenny Sharpe, Allegories o/Empire The Figure o/Woman i~ ~he Colonial Text. 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993); Nancy L Paxton, Wrrtlng. Under the Raj: Gender. 
Race and Rape in the British Colonial Imagination, 1830-1947 (New BrunSWiCk, NJ: Rutgers 
Univ~rsity Press, 1999), especially Chapter 3; and Sinha, Colonial. 
first refracted by British writers, and encountered and contested by indigenous 
intellectuals in colonial India. 
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Before proceeding to a detailed examination of some of the effects wrought by 
the problematic of Christian identity in Anglo-Indian thinking about Indian Muslims 
in the second half of the nineteenth century, it is useful to begin by complicating 
Bayly's description of a largely Protestant 'spiritual empire' by recalling that 
alongside its periodic self-definition in opposition to Catholicism as 'the antithesis of 
true religion' , Protestant congregations in Victorian Britain were characterised by 
often bitter conflict, both between and within, dissenting and establishment camps. 152 
While such doctrinal rivalry played only a circumscribed part in colonial settings, it is 
worth proposing a tentative religious characterisation of the British official 
community in the later nineteenth century in more specific denominational terms than 
has usually been attempted, in order to approach more precisely the ethos out of 
which religious arguments were made in Anglo-Indian society. 153 
Bayly's perception of a consensus over Anglo-Indian distaste for government 
intervention, and its voluntarist ethos of self-help, makes the potentially misleading 
assumption of a questionable degree of homogeneity among the Anglo-Indian 
community in regard to the propagation of Christian doctrines and what he has called 
a 'deep suspicion of state intervention' in religious issues. 154 Andrew Porter's 
description of nineteenth century 'colonial white settler societies' as 'almost without 
exception ... hostile to missionary ambitions' disregards an important anomaly in 
Anglo-Indian society whereby Indian Civil Service officials were often found 
faithfully supporting in private the activities of missionaries which in public they were 
152 John Wolffe, 'Victorian Religion in Context', in Wolffe (ed), Religion in Victorian Britain. Volume 
5: Culture and Empire (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1997), P 15; Gerald Parsons, 
'Reform Revival and Realignment: the Experience of Victorian Anglicanism' in Parsons (ed) Religion 
in Victo;ian Britain, Volume 1: Traditions (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1988), pp 14-
66. Gerald Parsons 'From Dissenters to Free Churchmen: the Transitions of Victorian 
N~nconformity', i~, Ibid, pp 67-116; for the role ofCatho.licism as an.opposition~l rallying poi~t for 
the construction ofa British identity, see Linda Colley, Britons: Forgmg the NatIOn, 1707-183" 
(London: Vintage, repr. 1996, 1992). ...... , 
153 But on these distinctions, see also, Bart Moore-GIlbert, Klplmg and OrIentaltsm , pp 112-15. 
154 Bayly, 'Returning', p 285. 
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forced to officially disown, indeed frequently reprove. 155 This ambiguous position in 
the first quarter-century after Victoria's proclamation was further compounded by the 
leading role taken by the Church Missionary Society, born out of the evangelical wing 
of the Church of England, in the 'campaign to evangelize India' through an active 
'partnership of church and state' .156 As Alfred Lyall complained in 1872, if in 'Great 
Britain the relations of State to religion are still in a very delicate 
position ... Englishmen at home do not always realise or make allowances for the 
degree to which the universal problem of the proper functions of government becomes 
complicated ... whenever we have to decide upon the attitude which Christian rulers 
should take up in regard to the numerous creeds and sects which abound in [India].,157 
Anglo-Indian religious policy, as Lyall's article makes clear, was as much concerned 
in 1872 with that epithetical identity, 'Christian' (substituted by 1905, it would seem 
from Steel's narrative, with the less controversial 'Western') as with the enforcement 
of non-Christian denominational equality. 
While there has as yet been no conclusive research done on the 
denominational allegiance of ICS officers in the second half of the nineteenth century, 
it is possible to make the above - necessarily tentative - characterisation of a largely 
Anglican official community using Clive Dewey's invaluable study of the education 
of the Indian civil service during the 'era of competitive examination'. Dewey 
155 Porter, 'Religion and Empire', p 381. Sir Charles Trevelyan, for instance, was enrolled as an 
honorary vice president in the Christian Vernacular Education Society, the flagship of renewed 
missionary endeavour founded in the immediate post-'Mutiny' period, but was later, as Governor of 
Madras, to publicly condemn Bible education in Government schools. David W Savage, 'Evangelical 
Educational Policy in Britain and India, 1857-60' in The Journal O/Imperial and Commonwealth 
History, Vol 22 (1994), No 3, p 444, 452. Like his contemporaries, Sir Bartle Frere and W W Hunter, 
Alfred Lyall privately supported Christian Missions while strongly advocating state religious neutrality 
(Parveen Shaukat Ali, Pillars 0/ British Imperialism: A Case Study o/the Political Ideas o/Sir Alfred 
Lyall, 1873-1903, (Lahore: Aziz Publishers, 1976), pp 39-40; Francis Henry Skrine, Life o/Sir William 
Wilson Hunter, (London: Longmans, 1901), P 98). This potential conflict is taken up in the next 
section with particular reference to Lyall's flirtation with the possibilities offered by his perception of 
state-sponsored religious sectarianism in imperial China. 
156 Savage, 'Evangelical Educational Policy', p 437. In contradistinction to official rhetoric, the 
nineteenth century was to witness the gradual movement of the CMS towards the 'centre of the English 
establishment' (T Thomas, 'Foreign Missions and Missionaries in Victorian Britain' in John Wolffe 
(ed), Religion in Victorian Britain. Volume V: Culture and Empire (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 1997), p 124). .. . , . ... .. 
157 My emphasis. Alfred C Lyall, 'Our Religious PolIcy m IndIa , ~ ~yall, ASla~IC Stu~les: ReligIOUS 
and Social (London: John Murray, 1882), p 258. The article was orIgmally publIshed m The 
Fortnightly Review, April 1, 1872. 
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identifies the professions of recruits' fathers during this period as overwhelmingly 
drawn from among landowning, professional (solicitors, barrister, physicians and 
surgeons) and Anglican clergy (as much, at one point, as 25 percent) - in other words, 
from the constituencies most solidly allied to the established Church. I5S The same 
period also witnessed the dramatic - though fluctuating - increase in the percentage 
of recruits that passed through Oxford and Cambridge, as Macaulay's 1854 committee 
had urged in their review of the system of competitive examinations. 159 Throughout 
the nineteenth century a strong Anglican ethos prevailed in both universities, 
surviving the partial abolition of religious tests in 1854, which had insisted on 
subscription to the nine articles of faith of the Church of England; 160 and even after 
the repeal of all religious tests in 1871, the general ethos remained markedly 
establishment - indeed, to such an extent that Nonconformists in the 1890s felt 
compelled to agitate for their own colleges in Oxford free from its influence. 16I 
In short, what is being proposed here is the salience of an Indian Civil Service 
characterised by a strong Anglican ethos in its struggle to come to terms with renewed 
arguments in post-'Mutiny' India over the proper relations of church and state. This 
is not to argue that Anglo-Indian officials sought any formal political expression for a 
Christian state in colonial India. It is rather to foreground a set of impulses, formally 
restrained and rationally set aside, that must be understood as potentially immanent in 
official colonial discourse. If we then situate that broadly establishment-orientated 
official community in the midst of a predominantly Nonconformist, not infrequently 
158 Clive Dewey, 'The education of a ruling caste: the Indian civil service in the era of competi?ve 
examination' in The English Historical Review, Volume 88, (1973), Table 2, p 284. As B B Misra 
concludes, '[in the nineteenth century] the social complexion of the candidates selected ... remained by 
and large from the higher middle classes' (Misra, The Bureacracy in Inda: An Hisloric~l An~lysis of 
Development up to 1947, (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1~77), p 203). For a co~tras~g picture of 
the social background of Nonconformist congregations, rangmg ~o~ ~he comme~ctal middle-class 
constituency of the Unitarians to the trade unionist elements of Prlffiltlve Methodism, see Gerald 
Parsons, 'From Dissenters to Free Churchmen'. 
159 See Table 1 in Dewey, 'The Education ofa Ruling Caste', p 276. By 1896 as much as 77 percent of 
ICS recruits were drawn from among Oxbridge graduates. 
160 Owen Chadwick, The Victorian Church. Part 1 (London: A&C Black, 1971), P 480-81. 
161 P T Marsh, The Victorian Church in Decline: Archbishop Tail and the Church of England (London: 
Routledge, 1969), P 84, 238-39. 
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adversarial, missionary constituency,162 we can begin to appreciate how the issue of 
disestablishment - one central to Victorian mid-century religious controversy163 _ 
might have been translated into a colonial context in which the possibility of religious 
particularism was once again (problematically) raised. These potential lines of 
cleavage that might form around the official Anglo-Indian community need to be 
taken into account if only as an ethos against which the mind of the ICS required 
constant vigilance (in league with its former Metropolitan opponents, it might be said, 
against its own inclinations). 164 Given the fissiparous nature of British Anglicanism 
in the later nineteenth century, in which a range of responses towards 
disestablishment in Ireland in 1869 included, for instance, agitation by some Anglican 
clergymen in the 1870s in favour of formal disestablishment in England (fearing an 
interventionist Parliament),165 it would be misleading to read into even a broadly 
conservative Anglican ICS any straightforward, if privately-held, consensus over the 
role of Christianity in colonial government. Nevertheless, bearing in mind the 
remarkable contrast between an overwhelmingly Anglican official community in 
India and the substantial percentage of Nonconformist congregations in Britain (the 
1851 Census of Religious Worship revealed that the Church of England attracted less 
than half of the aggregate of British church-goers on 'Census Sunday'), it is possible 
to posit, at the very least, a set of potentially destabilizing reflexes at work in Anglo-
162 Although the Church Missionary Society was to take an initial lead in Metropolitan missionary 
politics aimed at the eventual evangelisation of India in the immediate aftermath of the 'Mutiny', at this 
time it was still 'unusual for an Anglican clergyman, even an Evangelical one, to take up missionary 
work as a vocation' (T Thomas, 'Foreign Missions and Missionaries in Victorian Britain', P 103). The 
adversarial politics of early Indian missions is discussed in P Carson, 'An Imperial Dilemma: the 
Propagation of Christianity in Early Colonial India' in Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth 
History, Volume 18, pp 169-90; David Savage gives a detailed acco~t of the rene,;ed fervour ~f . 
missionary politics in the wake of the 'Mutiny', and in particular agamst the Queen s ProclamatIOn, m 
Savage, 'Evangelical Educational Policy in Britain and India, 1857-60'. 
163 Chadwick, p 6. 
164 Though distinctions between 'officials' and 'settlers' was to become a stronger feature of the later 
rather than earlier nineteenth century, even in the 1820s and 1830s Company employees were not 
infrequently labelled by radicals among the latter community as essentiall~ 'Tory', ~d accused of 
obstructing Protestant Dissenting religious missions in favour of the Anglican establishment. P J 
Marshall, 'The Whites of British India', p 30, 34. 
165 Parsons, 'Revival and Realignment', p 57. 
Indian official engagement with the relationship of the evolving British state to all 
questions of religious expression or representation in colonial India. 166 
66 
Arguments regarding the religious neutrality of the state in such a context, 
then, must be read against the grain because that is precisely the spirit in which they 
were - often zealously - first made. In this respect, we need to re-read Steel's 
beleaguered and misunderstood Anglo-Indian official of 1905 as embattled partly 
against the very 'secularism' which had become hislher badge. 167 If by the beginning 
of the twentieth century such impulses had been banished beyond the framework of 
popular narrative, it is necessary to emphasise that even in the earlier period during 
which Steel resided in India, any desire for a visible relationship between church and 
state could not be expressed as a conscious element of the political identity of the 
official community in which she lived. Jacqueline Rose has convincingly argued for 
the integral part played by fantasy, not only in disclosing the 'unspoken components 
of social belonging', but in the very construction of the political identities through 
which societies express themselves historically. 168 Her persuasive observations on 
these fantasmatic (and fantasmagoric) elements in embattled national imaginings 
prompt the question of what happens when such an essential component of national 
identity as religion becomes translated into (and in a sense, delegitimated within) the 
context of a colonial state in which religion cannot be expressed as a part of national 
life? 1 69 In her chapter on 'civility' as a form of moral imperative at the heart of 
English national self-definition Rose invokes Christopher Bollas's psychoanalytic 
concept of 'violent innocence' to explain the link between English 'civility' and the 
166 Gerald Parsons, 'From Dissenters to Free Churchment', p 70; idem, 'Revival and Realignment', p 
59. 
167 As an Inspector of Schools in the Punjab, Flora Annie Steel would h~ve in~l~~ed herself among the 
beleaguered officialdom. The argument being advanced here about the mstabIhttes. a~endan.t upon the 
'badge' of secularism is only partially addressed in Clive Dewey's .study o~the (rehgIously-mflecte~) 
sense of mission in the twentieth century careers of two Anglo-IndIan offiCIals (Dewey, Anglo-IndIan 
Attitudes: The Mind of the Indian Civil Service, (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, repr. 2000; 
1993). 
168 Rose, States, p 5, 7. . . . . 
169 As Rose writes - in reference to Linda Colley's account of the constructIOn ofa BrItIsh natIonal 
identity in Britons - 'the two great icons which Colley places at the centre of English national life [are] 
property and God.' Rose, States, p 72. 
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objects against which it is constituted. As a mode of projective identification 
(whereby 'you pass across to the other facing you what you least like inside your own 
head, so that they hold it and become answerable for it at one and the same time' 170) 
'violent innocence' offers an approach towards a partial understanding of the problem 
of disestablishment in colonial India as it played itself out in the Anglo-Indian official 
psyche. In this reading, 'secularism' as an article of faith in Anglo-Indian official 
discourse, like 'civility' (indeed, as a colonial manifestation of its correlative , 
'detached benevolence' 171), can be characterised as a moral imperative, not so much 
constructed in response to its object of chastisement (religious incontinence), but as a 
means of refiguring a perceived undesirable prior relationship to it. 172 We might then 
understand the degree of, by turns, alarm and punishment that are the basic narrative 
of colonial accounts of unregulated indigenous religious activity as partly enacting 
and purging 'its own felt 'criminality"(with all the pleasure that such punishment-
enforcing a reassuring distance - entails). 173 
The consolidation of the doctrine of 'secularism' as an integral component of 
Anglo-Indian political belonging in the later nineteenth century can thus to some 
extent be figured as the by-product of an Anglo-Indian inability to acknowledge the 
radical dislocation of one of the 'icons' of British identity: the outcome, in other 
words, of what we might call a peculiarly colonial 'violent innocence'. Similarly, 
Rose's description of how the moral conscience, because it draws from the same 
sources of energy as the objects it 'seeks to tame', is always vulnerable to 'a stunning 
propensity to defeat itself, can be utilised to bridge the separation between Steel's 
embattled and self-righteous secular Anglo-Indian official in 1905 and her 
descriptions of indigenous communities defined and directed by religion. 174 Indeed, 
170 Rose, States, p 59. 
171 Rose, States, p 61. . . ' . . . 
172 Mannoni based his critique of colonialist sociological observatIons of natIve socIetIes on a SimIlar 
reading of projective identification. Octave Mannoni, Prospera and Caliban: The Psychology of 
Colonization trans Pamela Powesland (London: Methuen & Co, 1956), P 20. 
173 Rose, Sta:es, p 60. This reading helps explain not only i~ p~macy, but the peculiar urgency, ?f 
what Pandey calls 'the narrative of communal riot' in colomal dIscourse (Pandey, The ConstructIOn of 
Communalism ). 
174 Rose, States, p 57. 
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drawing on those same energies that the moral doctrine of 'secularism' sought to 
contain, it can be argued that the willingness with which the official Anglo-Indian 
mind was soon to embrace the principle of separate electorates based on religious 
exclusivism (in the Morley-Minto reforms of 1909) is a cogent illustration of Rose's 
cognate observation that 'as soon as [civility/morality] acquires the status of 
conviction or badge .. .it starts internally to disintegrate, rushing headlong into the 
arms of its foes.' 175 This highly unstable element of reciprocity at work between the 
evolution of an official colonial secular identity and the Raj 'sociology of multiple 
ethnicity' based primarily on religious categories, is of direct relevance to an 
understanding of how representations of Indian Muslims by Anglo-Indians in the late 
nineteenth century might have acted as signposts in what - upending V S Naipaul's 
phrase - we might call a British 'way' in the colonial world. 176 
In this reading it is necessary to extend the notion of 'violent innocence' as a 
means of 'shedding' unwanted histories (as Rose deploys it in the construction of an 
English national identity from within the Metropolitan context - 'violent innocence 
abroad') into the colonialist culture itself in which such traumatic histories, among 
them an armed insurrection triggered in part, it was widely believed, by the operations 
of a 'covert confessional state', are always close at hand, and always figuring a 
terrifying prolepsis. l77 Suleri' s injunction that in the intimacy of the colonial context 
the moment of the 'transfer of power' charges every encounter with what she calls the 
'precarious condition of the present tense', reminds us that in grappling with a 
religious identity (or multiple perceived indigenous religious identities) the Anglo-
Indian official was simultaneously preoccupied with precisely this question of the 
fundamental instability of paramountcy. 178 In a sense then, this thesis will approach 
the subject of religion - as those officials did - as a form of language in an ongoing 
colonial discourse on the future of British rule in India. It is here, in the context of 
175 Rose, States, p 68. . 
176 V S Naipaui, A Way in the World: A Sequence (London: Hememann, 1994). 
177 Rose, States, p 60, 63 
178 Suieri, Rhetoric, pp 5-6, 21, Ill. 
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'the anarchic disempowennent underlying [the colonial] system of control', that 
Anglo-Indian 'secularism' departs from the fantasy of English 'civility' and enters 
instead into a process of misrecognition aimed at preventing the disclosure of an 
impossible identity in the aftennath of revolt: that of the Anglo-Indian Christian 
ruler. 179 The paradox of that conflicted colonialist identity, it will be argued in 
Chapter Three, can be seen enacted in the simultaneous deployment in Anglo-Indian 
literature, particularly in the 1870s and 1880s, of representations of Islam in India as a 
'tall obelisk pointing direct to the sky', the often admired, implacably visible aspect of 
a cohesive religious identity; and as the invisible figure of conspiracy which, 
propelled by political dispossession and always eluding any commensurate 
punishment, reveals the alienating contours of a hidden mirror colonial state as it 
pursues the secret goal of 'theocratic Home Rule' .180 But it is to the source of 
'Mahometan revival', that apocalyptic spectre of pan-Indian Muslim insurgency 
which was periodically to convulse Anglo-Indian society throughout the second half 
of the nineteenth century, that this thesis first turns in order to map out the initial 
mechanisms of prohibition and disavowal. As Chapter Two will now explore in 
detail, the Muslim 'fanatic' as a pan-Indian figure of insurrection was born into 
colonialist discourse in the events of 1857-59. It was the surprising, and highly 
ambivalent, fonns of investment made at that time by ICS officials in the rhetoric of 
Muslim 'conspiracy' that underwrote the paradoxical tenns of his later conspiratorial 
reincarnation in the Anglo-Indian imagination, and marked out his road to isolation in 
India. 
179 Suleri, Rhetoric, p 115. 
180 Alfred Lyall, 'Our Religious Policy in India', in Asiatic Studies, p 276. The two main texts under 
discussion in Section 3.3 are Lyall's Asiatic Studies and Hunter's Indian Musalmans. For some other 
instances of the debate initiated by Hunter's book and the 'Wahabi' trials of the 1860s, see: 'A 
Mahometan Revival' in The Cornhill Magazine, Vol XXIV, No 142, October, 1871, pp 421-37; W 
Nassau Lees, Indian Musalmans: being three letters reprintedfrom the Times' with an article on 
education, reprintedjrom the 'Calcutta Englishman '. With an appendix containing L?~d Macaulay's 
Minute (London, 1871); Anonymous review of'W W Hunter, T~e.lndian Musalmans m The . 
Atheneum, London, Saturday August 26, 1871, P 263; N B E BaIllIe, 'On the d~ty.ofMohammedans 10 
British India,' in Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, 1881, pp 430-34; for an mdlgenous 
contemporary perspective, see Sayed Ahmad Khan, Review on Dr Hunter's Indian Musalmans: Are 
they bound in conscience to rebel against the Queen? (Benares, 1872). 
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Chapter Two 
2.1 Introduction 
The subject of this chapter as a whole is the particular set of emphases that emerged in 
the representations by Indian Civil Service officers of Indian Muslims during the 
traumatic events of 1857-59. These representations will be examined in detail, first 
through the correspondence of Alfred Lyall (1835-1911), and then through a comparison 
of those writings with other ICS official accounts. Before proceeding to that discussion, 
however, the following two prefatory sections will concern themselves with a 
reassessment of the historiography surrounding the extent of Indo-Muslim coordinated 
activity during 1857-59, and of British perceptions of Indian Muslims in the preceding 
half century. The central thesis proposed in these sections is that the events of 1857-59 
established for the first time in Anglo-Indian discourse a rhetoric of potential pan-Indian 
Muslim disaffection with British rule. This emotive language was significantly at 
variance with Anglo-Indian intelligence reports at the time, yet neither the manner of its 
emergence, nor the tenacity with which it was maintained in the next quarter century, has 
ever adequately been explained. The emphasis here is on the novelty of such a 
perception in Anglo-Indian ideological constructions of Indo-Muslim society, entailing as 
it did the violent conflagration of a series of related but hitherto discrete elements. It wil1 
be argued that the precise delineation of the mechanisms of that conflagration is 
necessary to any critical analysis of the rhetorical and psychological investments 
subsequently made by the Anglo-Indian official community in their reconstructions of 
Indo-Muslim society. 
Without the recognition of 1857-59 as a transformative moment, it could be 
argued that the historiography of British representations of Indian Muslims can proceed 
only along the lines of enquiry that Anglo-Indian observers had themselves laid out in the 
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wake of the 'Mutiny'. These are concisely conveyed in an extract from the official report 
on the genesis of rebellion in the North-West Provinces: 
The green flag of Mahomed too had been unfurled, the mass of the followers of the 
false prophet rejoicing to believe that under the auspices of the Great Mogal of 
Delhi their lost ascendancy was to be recovered, their deep hatred to the Christian 
got vent, and they rushed forth to kill and destroy. I 
Three apperceptions are typically conjoined in this summary, each explaining the other: 
Muslim discontent centred on the dispossession of the former Mughal rulers; the natural 
and irresistible appeal of militant war to all Muslims; and the Christian identity of the 
British rulers as an essentialised provocation to Indian Muslims. These introductory 
sections will contend that until 1857 none of these elements had played a significant role 
in Anglo-Indian constructions of Indo-Muslim society; and that their conjunction at this 
time has never been adequately explained. In pursuing these observations, it is 
anticipated that a fuller apprehension of the post-I 857 process of what Bernard Cohn has 
called the 'desacralization of the Mughal emperor' can be obtained with reference to its 
relevance to the British discourse about Indian Muslims in this period - an area of 
analysis with which his seminal essay only briefly treats, but which the following two 
sections will argue was in fact central to Anglo-Indian attempts to re-define the colonial 
state. 2 
Alfred Lyall had only one year's service in the ICS under his belt when the 
'Mutiny' broke out in 1857. Nevertheless, his immediate perception of the irruption of a 
religiously-driven, Muslim-led rebellion against British rule was typical of most Anglo-
Indian accounts both during and after the 'Mutiny,.3 They commonly insisted that the 
Muslims of India had taken over what had originally been no more than a localised sepoy 
1 Notes on the Revolt in the North-Western Provinces of India (London, 1858), p 159. Quoted in Hardy, p 
63. 
2 Cohn, 'Representing Authority in Victorian India', in Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger (eds), The 
Invention of Tradition (Cambridge: Cambridge University P~ess, repro 1993; 1983) pp ~65-210.. . 
3 Durand, Lyall, p 69. Lyall's family background and education, as well as a more detailed exammatlon of 
his letters in 1857-59, can be found below in Sections 2.3 and 2.4. 
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revolt and turned it into a holy war of persecution aimed at the restoration of the Mughal 
empire.4 Lyall was to sum up this version of events fifteen years later: 
In Delhi, Lucknow and other centres of disaffection the Mahomedans at once 
caught the contagion of rebellion, and almost immediately seized the lead of it 
using the wild, aimless fury of the soldiery for their own compact and straight: 
pointed political designs.5 
Modem historiography has repeatedly concluded that this widespread perception among 
the British ofa Muslim 'conspiracy' in 1857 was out of all proportion to the available 
evidence.6 There are several points that can be briefly emphasised here. The first is that 
Muslim socio-religious movements actively advocating a 'jihad' against the British state 
in pre-'Mutiny' India played almost no part in the events of 1857-59;7 and that while 
there was sporadic propagandist activity by some of the ulama (religious scholars), there 
is little evidence of any coordination among them.8 The most recent conclusions in this 
4 Metcalf, Aftermath, p 298; Bayly, Empire, p 321. Important exceptions to this widespread belief included 
the Governor-General Lord Canning. After the suppression of the 'Mutiny', he was vilified by the Anglo-
Indian press - under the soubriquet of 'Clemency Canning' - for failing to exact adequate retribution on the 
Muslims as a treasonous pan-Indian community (Hardy, p 71; for examples of Anglo-Indian press attitudes 
towards Canning as a 'Mussulman' collaborator, see The Indian Punch, 1859, Vol I, Nos 1-12, pp 2, 18, 
90-91, 102-3, 114-15, 126-27, 136-37, 142-43). 
5 'Islam in India' in Lyall, Asiatic Studies: Religious and Social (London: John Murray, 1882), p 239. The 
essay was first published in the Theological Review in 1872. 
6 The most recent, overall assessment of the causes and genesis of the 'Mutiny' can be found in Bayly, 
Empire, pp 315-338. On Muslim involvement see the detailed regional studies by Eric Stokes, 'Nawab 
Walidad Khan and the 1857 Struggle in the Bulandshahr district', in Stokes, The Peasant and the Raj: 
Studies in Agrarian Society and Peasant Rebellion in Colonial India (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1980; 1978), pp 140-58; and E I Brodkin, 'The Struggle for Succession: Rebels and Loyalists in the 
Indian Mutiny of 1857', Modern Asian Studies, 6:3 (1972), pp 277-90. 
7 This was even noted at the time by George Campbell (Hardy, pp 67-68). Harlan Otto Pearson points that 
not only did the largest socio-reform movement of the period, the tariqah-i muhammadiya (whom the 
British called 'Wahabis') 'not join as a community against the British', but the leader of the Bombay 
'Wahhabis' even provided assistance to the British during the disturbances. Pearson, 'Islamic Reform and 
Revival in Nineteenth Century India: the Tariqah-i Muhammadiya (PhD thesis, Duke University; 1979), p 
56. 
8 As Usha Sanyal has pointed out, Bayly's asssessment ofulama involvement may partly stem from a 
confusion of Bareilly in Rohilkhand and Rae Bareilly in Awadh, the birthplace of the so-called 'Wahhabi' 
movement ofSayyid Ahmad Barelwi. In fact, the Rohilkhand ulama were opposed to Barelwi's movement 
(Sanyal, p 30). Similarly, his valorisation ofulama fatwas (judicial opinions) from Deoband and Thana 
Bhawan may well have a doubtful provenance (see Metcalf, Deoband, pp 82-83). These confusions may 
lie behind his persistent overstatement of the extent of~lama coordinatio~ (Bayly, ~m~ire, ~ 3~0). On the 
limited nature of this participation in 1857-59: see Avnl A Powell, Muslims and M,SSIOnaries In Pre-
Mutiny India (Richmond, Surrey: Curzon, 1993), pp 272-4; Metcalf, Deoband, pp 83. 
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regard are that religiously-inspired Muslim participation was neither cohesive, extensive 
nor, ultimately, significant in its impact upon the 'Mutiny,.9 At the level of the Muslim 
service gentry, Eric Stokes has demonstrated that even in the districts adjacent to the 
Delhi court (in particular, the district in which Lyall served at the time), loyalty to the 
former Mughal regime played a marginal part. 10 At the level of the semi-autonomous 
Muslim polities in colonial India, the picture is even less convincing. I I The 
interventions on the side of the British by the Nizam of Hyderabad and the Nawabs of 
Rampur and Murshidabad (among others) proved decisive to the relatively swift 
conclusion of the British military campaigns. 12 Most important of all for the argument 
advanced in this section, the Mughal emperor, whose authority was nominally restored by 
the original mutineers from Meerut, consistently issued proclamations in a language that 
appealed to a cross-communal constituency - communications which were closely 
monitored by the besieging British. I3 
Studies of Indo-Muslim history during the colonial period have been particularly 
notable in this reiteration of the lack of evidence of Muslim 'conspiracy', since the 
resulting British attitudes and retributive measures were to have such an important impact 
on the evolution of both the 'modernist' and 'traditionalist' Muslim socio-reform 
movements in the second half of the nineteenth century.I4 Given the increasing detail 
with which these studies have, in the last thirty years, analysed the variety of Muslim 
responses in this formative period to the British accusation of 'disloyalty', it is 
9 Bayly, Indian, pp 184-88. 
10 Stokes, 'Nawab'. 
1\ Hardy, p 67. 
12 Hardy, pp 69-70; Bayly, Indian, p 183. . 
I3 Bayly Empire, pp 325-26; Metcalf, Deoband, pp 83-84; Bayly, Indian, p 187. 
14 Hard;, pp 61-70; Metcalf, Deoband, pp 80-86; Francis R~binson,. Islam and M~slim History in South 
Asia (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, ?OOO~ C~apter ~IX. An Idea.ofthe res~dual po~er of~e 
accusation itself can be gauged by the way m whIch It contmues to reqUIre refutatIon even m studIes of 
Indo-Muslim history concerned with the period before the 'Mutiny' (see fo~ instanc~, Powell, Missionaries, 
pp 272-74, 279, 283-84, 291). On British retributive me.asures tow~ds IndIan .Musl.lms, see also Thomas R 
Metcalf, The Aftermath of Revolt: India, 1857-1870 (Pnnceton: Pnnceton Umverslty Press, 1965), pp 
298-305. 
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remarkable how little attention has been paid to the complex shifts within that British 
discourse, towards which the leaders of these Muslim movements often reacted and 
shaped communal perceptions. IS As a result the historiographical record has been left 
with what could be regarded as a deeply problematic imbalance. As early as 1859, the 
British had determined that there was no factual basis to the idea of Muslim 'conspiracy' 
- yet the Anglo-Indian belief in it persisted into the twentieth century. 16 This disparity 
between the British historiographical record and the Anglo-Indian conviction of a 
globalised Muslim revolt in 1857 points to the presence of a complex of undisclosed 
ideologies with which all sections of Indian society, were forced (often unknowingly) to 
enter into daily dialogue in their own constructions of Indo-Muslim identity.17 In regard 
to the Indo-Muslim dialectic with the British in the later nineteenth century, it opens up a 
crucial line of enquiry, perhaps most forcibly in the writings of Sayyid Ahmad Khan. His 
repeated engagement with a British discourse of 'disloyalty' and 'backwardness' 
structured the genesis, and informed the evolution, of his Aligarh movement, from which 
emerged the first generation of Muslim political leaders in late colonial India. Such a line 
of enquiry might usefully be initiated, for instance, by a re-examination of his collection 
of biographies addressed to the British, An Account of The Loyal Mohammedans of India 
(1860-61), as infected by what Sara Suleri has seen (in the context of colonialist 
15 The two key studies of these movements are: Lelyveld, Aligarh; and Metcalf, Deoband. 
16 Hardy, p 69. Muslim 'conspiracy' is central to the narrative of Flora Annie Steel's 'Mutiny' novel On 
The Face o/the Waters (1896); and of course, it is present in India, in the form of the feigned 'slackness' of 
the Muslim community as she saw it fifty years after the 'Mutiny', still 'ready to strike if it finds the 
of,portunity' ( Steel, India, p 78). 
1 This kind of daily interaction at a variety of levels below that of the political arena has only relatively 
recently begun to receive nuanced historiographical attention. For instance, Javed Majeed's study of two 
Urdu periodicals (including Sayyid Ahmad Khan's 'modernist' journal, The Aligarh Gazette) during the 
1870s usefully illustrates the degree to which the Urdu press operated in a shared informational order with 
the Anglo-Indian as well as other vernacular press (Majeed, 'Narratives', pp 135-163); and the wide-
sweeping changes introduced into the judicial interaction with Indian society after 1858, and particularly 
the increasingly narrower interpretations of Muslim law by British judges, are given an interesting account 
with reference to the' Aga Khan Case' brought by Khoja Muslims in 1862, in Amrita Shodhan, A Question 
o/Community: Religious Groups and Colonial Law (Calcutta: Samya, 2001), Chapter 3. Unfortunately, as 
regards the influence of the post-'Mutiny' discourse on non-Muslim native constructions of Indo-Muslim 
identity, there has as yet been little sustained critical attention. 
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ethnography) as the 'mutual fear attendant on acts of colonial self-definition' that shows 
itself in the limitless c1assicatory list - the very open-endedness of Sayyid Ahmad's 
(abandoned) project pointing towards a latent, unconscious apprehension that, finally, the 
question of 'loyalty' could never be proved: that something beyond the accusation itself 
was at stake. I8 These pamphets, as well as The Causes of the Indian Revolt (1859), were 
addressed by Sayyid Ahmad directly to the British to counteract the 'anti-Muslim' British 
bias that he was only too well aware of in Anglo-Indian writings in the post-'Mutiny' 
period,19 and that he returned to refute again in 1871 in his letters to the Anglo-Indian 
newspaper, The Pioneer. Alfred Lyall's own counter-refutation of the arguments (and 
even the evidence) put forward by Sayyid Ahmad in these letters is not only a remarkable 
instance of the fundamental misprisions and doubts at work between Muslim and British 
discourses, but of the urgent British needs answered in the language of Muslim 
'disloyalty' .20 
We can begin the process of excavating some of the general features of the pre-
1857 British discourse on Indian Muslims by first pointing up the element of the 
teleological that most distorts the modem historiographical account. Although for 'most 
British observers in 1857 a Muslim meant a rebel' ,21 this perception marked a radical 
shift in the nature of British representations of Indian Muslims; for Anglo-Indian 
observers, the equation of religious faith and political loyalty had never before been 
considered as either straight-forward or self-evident. Francis Robinson's assessment of 
the pre-'Mutiny' colonial discourse is perhaps the most demonstrably teleological in its 
18 Suleri, p 21. Though the form ofthese biographies was partly determined by Indo-Persian tazkhira 
traditions, it could be argued that they were also designed by Sayyid Ahmad Khan (himself an ICS officer) 
to appeal to the ethos of large-scale ethnological enumeration that had by the 1860s come to characterise 
Indian Civil Service descriptions of native society. Hali notes that the pamphlets were discontinued 'due to 
lack of interest on the part of the Muslims' (AltafHusain Hali, Hayat-i Javed, trans Qadiri and Mathews 
(Delhi: Idarah-I Adabiyat-I Delli, 1979; 1901), P 69). 
19 Hali, pp 60-69 
20 Lyall, 'Islam', pp 246-47. This post-'Mutiny' debate is addressed in detail in Section 3.3. 
21 Hardy, p 62. 
failure to take account of this development. 'After the British became the paramount 
power,' he writes: 
They tended to see the Muslims as the displaced rulers whom they expected, as a 
group, to resent the loss of their former power and to be strongest in resisting 
foreign rule and western civilisation. From this anticipation there sprang the most 
important source of British awareness of the Muslims: the threat they presented to 
the security of the Raj. 22 
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This assumption lies at the core of his examination of later British policy with regard to 
Indian Muslims - indeed, he considers it 'one of the most important facts of British 
Indian history,?3 Nevertheless, it could be argued that Robinson here credits the British 
with the kind of transhistorical, essentialised opposition that after 1857 they came to 
invest in their understanding of Indo-Muslim attitudes towards themselves; and in this 
respect it could be said that he accedes to, rather than historicizes, the consistency of 
Anglo-Indian self-perceptions.24 Though Robinson's assessment appears directly to 
contradict that of the other major overview of Indo-Muslim colonial history, Peter 
Hardy's The Muslims of British India (1972), they share certain key assumptions that 
need to be highlighted before the problems attendant upon Robinson's teleology can be 
examined. 
Unlike Robinson, Hardy locates the events of 1857 as precipitating, rather than 
confirming, the British view of Indian Muslims as a potentially rebellious collectivity. 
He contends that 'the effect of 1857 was to make [the British] conscious of Muslims as 
Muslims and to endow them ... with a corporate political character which in British eyes 
Muslims had not previously possessed. ,25 However, the only assumption that lends 
coherence to his presentation of British perceptions of the 'evidence of Muslim 
22 Robinson, Separatism, p 99. 
23 Robinson, Separatism, p 100. 
24 The argument here is not for any exceptional status for Robinson, but rather the typicality of his thesis in 
this regard. For another, more recent example of a certain trans historicity in characterising Anglo-Indian 
perceptions oflndian Muslims, see P Robb, 'Impact'. 
25 Hardy, p 62. 
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responsibility for mutiny and rebellion' is precisely that for the British in 1857, acts 
performed by Muslims were, by definition, committed by Muslims as Muslims. His 
'evidence' for the catalyst to this perception is thus largely a list of uncoordinated 
rebellious activities committed by Muslims.26 In other words, although Hardy explicitly 
denies the possibility of the pre-I 857 British aggregation of the Indian Muslim 
communities, like Robinson, he appears to suggest that given the right circumstances, 
such an aggregation would 'naturally' spring to the British mind. The right 
circumstances, it would seem, were a large-scale (even if obviously cross-communal) 
insurrection. Implicitly then, Hardy validates the pre-'Mutiny' existence of a British 
apprehension about inter-regional Muslim insurrection directed against themselves; and 
since the idea of such a 'conspiracy' itself presumes the possibility of large-scale 
incorporative activity, his description of the post-I 857 emergence ofa British tendency to 
'incorporate' Indo-Muslim identity must be treated as something of an anomalous 
formulation in his historical narrative. It would be more accurate to say that, in Hardy's 
account, the incorporation of Indian Muslims was a perception exposed, rather than 
substantiated, by the events of 1857 - and that both the catalyst for that exposure and its 
prior manifestation, was an already imagined conspiracy. However, because it is an 
assumption so deeply embedded within the logic of Hardy's narrative of the 'Mutiny', the 
British perception of an Indo-Islamic communal identity based on 'conspiracy' receives 
almost no critical attention.27 As with Robinson, who argues the British predication of 
Indo-Islamic identity on the idea of 'conspiracy' solely on British observations written 
after 1857, 28 its invariance over a period of a hundred years is presumed self-evident. 
26 Hardy, pp 63-66. 
27 We can only register its echo in Hardy's elliptical explanation of the appeal of 'Muslim responsibility' to 
British 'minds knocked off balance by fear and wounded pride' (Hardy, p 63); and in a much earlier 
reference to the Mughal emperor serving as a focus for Muslim discontent - an idea he discounts as 
relevant by 1857 (Hardy, p 33). This latter point will be taken up below. 
28 One of Robinson 's primary texts here is Greenberger's The British Image of India, from which he derives 
the sense of 'affinity' - and therefore presumably rivalry - between the British and Indian Muslims since 
the eighteenth century (Robinson, Separatism, p 99). His reference, however, is to Greenberger's 
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The accounts of both Robinson and Hardy reflect a broader historiographical 
consensus that the 'Mutiny' re-animated and entrenched a British tendency to view the 
Muslims as an implacably hostile, pan-Indian political community.29 That this consensus 
so closely corroborates post-1857 Anglo-Indian historiography seems to have been taken 
as no more than a confirmation of its validity.3o In order to fully understand the changes 
that overtook British representations of Indian Muslims during 1857-59, this untested 
congruence must first be problematised. Bayly's recent comments on the disjunction 
between formal Orientalist texts and the localised perceptions of Anglo-Indian 
administrators - drawn as they were from a close interaction with the Indian 
informational 'ecumene' - offers a useful path into that process. 31 It prompts the 
question first as to the extent to which the tendency in some of their more formal histories 
to postulate the common aspiration of the Muslims of India for a 'return' to paramountcy 
in India 32 actually impacted upon the local observations and administrative praxis of the 
Indian Civil Service; and secondly, as to what forms the interaction between the two took 
in 1857-59. These questions remain relevant despite Bayly's contention that the 
reactions of the British in 1857 represented, primarily, a failure of just those localised 
spheres of information (and thus ICS officers often fell back on broader Orientalist 
illustration of these strands of colonial thought through the fiction oflate nineteenth century authors such as 
Flora Annie Steel and G A Henty (Greenberger, pp 45-47). 
29 See MetcaIrs summary in Ideologies, pp 139-40. 
30 Perhaps the most consistent example of this validation is the way in which William Hunter's 
'sensational' (as one contemporary called it) and seminal text on Muslim 'conspiracy', Indian Musalmans 
(1871), has repeatedly been used by historians as an unproblematised guide to the mostly pre- 'Mutiny' 
insurrectionary activities of the Indian Muslim 'Wahhabi' movement. See, for instance, Robinson, 
Separatism, pp 99-100; for an instructive contrast, see Metcalf, Ideologies (p 141), where Hunter's text is 
contextualised within a growing British post-'Mutiny' 'obsession with [Muslim] conspiracy'. Hunter's text 
is discussed in detail in Chapter Three. 
31 In particular, Bayly argues for the re-examination of nuanced colonial 'knowledge' in the nineteenth 
century with regard to the Anglo-Indian understanding ofIndian Muslims; it is his contention that the 
transgeographical and transhistorical prejudices of 'formal orientalist texts' were generally eschewed by 
Anglo-Indians for the detailed local knowledge of the individual ICS officer. Bayly, Empire, p 326. 
32 J S Grewal, Muslim Rule in India: The Assessments of British Historians (Calcutta, Indian Branch: 
Oxford University Press, 1970), p 168. 
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theories of Indo-Muslim motivation).33 Their relevance derives from the fact that such a 
coordinated default position about Indian Muslim 'conspiracy' was not only 
unprecedented, it opposed all previous ICS praxis. As we shall outline in the following 
section, the administrative reactions, accounts and predictions surrounding the periodic 
'evidence' of apparently coordinated Muslim insurrectionary events and movements in 
the preceding hundred years contradict the idea of a day to day, pragmatic Anglo-Indian 
perception of the likelihood - or indeed, the possibility - of either inter-regional Indo-
Muslim agglomerative action or Indo-Muslim incorporative disaffection. Bayly's 
disjunction between the 'local' and the Orientalist would seem - in this scenario at least-
a choice of opposites. 
That such a choice is, in terms of historiographical assessment, untenable is 
perhaps indicated by Bayly's not delving more deeply into the question of why the 
British perception ofa Muslim revolt in 1857 was an 'official response out of all 
proportion to the threat' .34 Moreover, he appears to have no historiographical interest in 
the related question as to why the informational breakdown of the Company systems 
should have come to centre quite so forceably on the idea of Muslim 'conspiracy' (this, 
despite his observation that it was the not the more potentially oppositional 'purist' sects 
but the flexible 'syncretic' practices of Sufism that had always guided the ICS 
understanding of Islam in India).35 The 'default position' on which Bayly appears to rely 
is one previously endorsed by Eric Stokes, as the result of a British 'hankering' in 1857 
after a 'simplistic explanation' for a bewildering complex of processes taking place.36 
The counter-argument proposed here is that to overcome decades of exactly those 
accumulated, localised layers of information and praxis stressed by Bayly's recent 
33 In Bayly's view, it was the 'subtle change in the quality of infonnation coming in to colonial officials in 
the 1840s and 1850s' that was responsible for their inability to predict the 'Mutiny'. Bayly, Empire, pp 
316-17. 
34 Bayly, Empire, p 317. 
35 Bayly, Empire, p 321. 
36 Stokes, 'Nawab', p 150. 
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monograph, and reach such a dangerously generalised default position, required more 
than (though not excluding) an Anglo-Indian desire for simplicity. To hold on to that 
default position, as many ICS officers (including Alfred Lyall) did for decades after, and 
in the face of all available contemporary historiographical evidence, could only mean that 
the overwhelming conviction of Muslim 'conspiracy' that swept the Anglo-Indian 
community in 1857 must have operated in conjunction with other, undisclosed currents of 
thought - currents that mediated the broader 'mussulmanophobia' of Orientalist texts37 
and the localised knowledge evident in ICS praxis. Using secondary historiographical 
sources, the next section will outline the mechanisms involved in this conjunction of 
discourses, refining Bayly's thesis of a disjunction between the 'local' and the Orientalist 
discourses by seeing them as coming together in 1857 in literally revolutionary forms. 
The succeeding sections of this chapter will then attempt to excavate from particular 
'Mutiny' accounts, some of the undisclosed ideological elements involved in bringing 
about this conjunction. 
37 Bayly, Empire, p 326. 
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2.2 The pre-'Mutiny' discourse on Indian Muslims 
Two major related strands to what we might call the pre-'Mutiny' Anglo-Indian discourse 
of Muslim 'conspiracy' concern us in this section. They can be glossed here (and will be 
dealt with in tum) as the discourse of Muslim 'fanaticism'; and the discourse of Mughal 
'dispossession' . 
It is useful to begin the analysis of the early nineteenth century British view of a 
'fanatical' Muslim identity in India by noting that, while religion had always been a 
primary category in the British reading of Indian history (dividing it into Hindu and 
Muslim periods38), the meaning of that category with regard to social incorporation was, 
if not chimerical, then liable to frequent shifts, even in its most generalised usages. If, as 
Pandey has demonstrated, the 'colonial construction of Indian society' was in constant 
flux, only reaching its 'fixed and 'developed" form in the later nineteenth century, the 
role of religion in achieving that 'fixity' can only really begin to be demonstrated from 
the 1840s onwards, where it acted in conjunction with 'caste' to delimit rather than 
aggrandise, the pan-Indian political identity of the native social subject. For it was 
'caste' as a divisive socio-religious category - and not as the agglomerative unit of a 
larger religious constituency - that came to predominate and organise Anglo-Indian 
ethnography in the first half of the nineteenth century.39 
Pandey has argued that the construction of 'caste' typologies in British colonial 
records worked to obscure - or indeed obliterate - historical context.40 The 
characterisation of, for instance, the julaha ('weaver') communities in northern and 
central India as constituting a 'bigoted' and 'fanatical' Muslim caste shifted attention 
away from - and ultimately discounted - the economic motivations that drove their 
38 James Mill's History a/British India (1818) was the most influential example of this kind of 
&eriodization. 
Pandey, pp 66-68. 
40 Pandey, p 107. 
82 
participation in the civil disturbances of 1813, 1837, 1842 and 1849.41 'Fanaticism'in 
this instance was a retroactive characterisation that helped obscure the decisively 
interventionist colonialist role in destroying the market for locally-manufactured cotton 
goods in North India. Through the recasting of socio-economic grievances into the 
narrative of 'religious prejudices', the British officials gradually funnelled the issues into 
a narrative of' law and order': that is, caste-bound lawlessness and the corrective 
operations of a colonial state bent on preserving the integrity of the larger Indian social 
body.42 Activated in the description of particular 'caste' identities, then, the British 
perception of Muslim 'bigotry' was (paradoxically, given its essentialism) a moveable 
commodity in comparison to the potential pan-Indian affective capacity with which 
Anglo-Indian observers would invest it in and after 1857. Pandey's contention that in 
colonial accounts, 'caste' tended to construct 'mythic' stereotypes emptied ofhistory,43 
perhaps misses the dual movement here of 'caste' and 'fanaticism'. Both are essentialist 
descriptions destructive of socio-political identity; but where 'caste' isolates the native 
subject within the larger, changeless Indian social body, 'fanaticism' inflates the local 
and immediate to the global and the transhistorical.44 Together they perform a pincer-like 
operation that simultaneously locates the Muslim weaver within the Indian social body 
and makes of him an invasive, essentially foreign, presence. Moreover, at the same time 
as a supra-local Muslim 'fanaticism' is brought within Indian society, it acts as the 
catalyst for the disciplinarian structure of the British state to follow in its wake. 
We might usefully place this instance of the progressive (negatively defined) 
'Islamicisation' of these North Indian Muslim weaver communities by the British in the 
context of a wider process of the descriptive 'outcasting' of perceived criminal communal 
41 Pandey, Chapter 3. 
42 d Pan ey, p 70. 
43 Pandey, p 107. 
44 Since Hindu 'bigotry' towards Muslims is nowhere substantialised as an innate 'caste' characteristic 
during this period, we may safely assume that Muslim 'bigotry' was not conceived by the British as purely 
the product of its Indian environment. 
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identities in the 1830s and 1840s. Radhika Singha has argued that the British obsession 
with the labelling and stigmatisation of so-called 'criminal communities' during this 
period was linked to the extension and consolidation of colonial hegemony not just across 
the newly conquered territories of British India, but into the Indian states themselves.45 
These periodic 'drives' towards the extension of a British 'rule of law' commonly 
designated entire castes or tribes as 'criminal' and sought to set them outside of Indian 
society while at the same time drawing on their connections to it in order to justify the 
increasingly interventionist role of the colonial state and its self-definition as the 
preserver of the integrity of Indian society.46 In this respect, it could be argued that the 
construction of the 'bigotedjulaha' during this period bears comparison to the 
'systematisation' in colonial records of a 'criminal' thagi community. 'Thuggees' were 
conceived of as a form of 'fanatical' and supra-local caste, arising out of, and closely 
intertwined with, Indian society but nevertheless dedicated through their religion (seen by 
the British as a mixture of Hindu and Muslim rituals) towards its violent destruction. 
This dual location - within and without the Indian social body - justified and helped 
define the wide-ranging powers and disciplinarian role that the supra-local colonial state 
was carving out for itself.47 In this sense, thagi partially mediated the evolution of a more 
direct interaction between the colonial state and Indian society. Its progressive criminal 
characterisation underwrote the colonialist civilising narrative, while the colonial 
obsession with 'unknowable fraternities' and the criminalisation of peripatetic groups, 
45 Radhika Singha, "Providential' Circumstances: The Thuggee Campaign of the 1830s and Legal 
Innovation' in Modern Asian Studies, 27,1 (1993), pp 83-146. 
46 Singha, p 89, 119-23. It should be noted that although the 'systematisation' involved in these 'drives' 
represented a new, more comprehensive ambition for the extension of colonial authority, the 
essentialisation of criminal behaviour and its attribution to particular communities had always played a part 
in the construction of the colonial state. See for instance, Eugene Irschick on the British categorization in 
the late eighteenth century of certain South Indian 'tribes' as 'criminal by birth', in Dialogue and History: 
Constructing South India, 1795-1895 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), p 88. 
47 On the fascination that this dual location exerted on the colonial mind see Javed Majeed's excellent 
discussion of Meadows Taylor's novel Confessions of a Thug (1839). Javed Majeed, 'Meadows Taylor's 
Confessions of a Thug: the Anglo-Indian Novel as a Genre in the Making', in Bart Moore-Gilbert (ed), 
Writing India, 1757-1990: The Literature of British India (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 
1996), pp 86-110. 
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mendicants and lay preachers, helped construct the framework for the colonial conception 
of lawful Indian society. 48 
The colonial account of Muslim 'fanaticism' during the first half of the nineteenth 
century closely follows this criminalising rationale.49 It was represented in colonial 
records as a series of discrete though cognate 'conspiracies' located simultaneously 
within and without Indian society; it sought to explain these 'conspiracies' as resulting 
from the machinations of 'lawless' elements and as primarily destructive of the cohesion 
of Indian society. In this respect, the construction of Muslim 'fanaticism' during this 
period served to make the security of the colonial state coefficient with the preservation 
of Indian society. Most important of all, as Pandey has argued, it was a rationale that 
served to redirect the potential exposure of the larger socio-economic narrative of 
colonialist intervention in Indian society. Thus in Bengal from the 1820s to the 1850s the 
British characterised the agrarian Muslim reformist movements of the fara 'izis and the 
followers of Titu Mir as essentially marginal religious confederacies working towards 
communalist, 'fanatical' ends. Such a definition called forth from the colonial state a 
relatively circumscribed response centred on the issues of 'law and order' ,50 and 
obviating the more direct threat they posed to the state itself as movements of agrarian 
revolt.51 The fara 'izis were made up almost exclusively of illiterate Muslim cultivators, 
directing their protests against a largely Hindu landlord class and European indigo 
planters;52 the divisions and issues they struggled against were the result of the changes 
effected by the British in land distribution by the Permanent Settlement in Bengal 
48 This concern with peripatetic figures and groups was at the heart of the later 'Thuggee' campaigns 
(Majeed, 'Confessions', pp 87-88, 90). 
49 This is an argument touched upon in Robb, 'Impact', pp 145, 158-59. However, he fails to make the 
crucial distinction between pre and post-1857 colonial discourses on Indian Muslims with which this 
section is concerned. 
50 Hardy, p 56. 
51 Rafiuddin Ahmed, Bengal, p 44. The most comprehensive account of the Fara'izi movement is given in 
Muin-ud-din Ahmad Khan, History of the Faraidi Movement in Bengal 1818-1906 (Karachi, 1965). See 
also, Ahmed, Bengal, pp 39-50 and Kenneth W Jones, Socia-Religious Reform Movements in British India 
(New Delhi: Foundation Books, 1994), pp 18-25. 
52 Ahmed, Bengal, pp 46-47; Jones, Socio Religious, pp 20-21. 
(1793).53 The centrality of this agrarian base and its determining role in driving the 
movement also led to frequent clashes with Muslim landlords, and eventually with the 
British state itself. 54 Because of the British perception oftheJara'izis as primarily 
promoting 'fanatical', communal issues aimed at disrupting the status quo of native 
85 
society, colonial accounts commonly confused them with the followers of the tariqah-i 
muhammadiyah, the socio-religious reform movement of Saiyid Ahmad of Rae 
Bareilly.55 Yet despite this misperception colonial records before 1857 are distinguished 
by their complete disinterest in globalising these movements as threatening a pan-Indian 
infection (and it is significant in this respect that the language of Muslim 'fanaticism' as a 
contagious disease was a distinctly post-1858 development). British responses to the 
tariqah-i muhammadiyah were entirely localised. Even when, after the formal 
annexation of Punjab by the British in 1849, the mujahidin ofSayyid Ahmad turned their 
attentions away from the Sikhs and onto the British, they were still regarded as an 
insignificant threat and their militant activities treated as no more than border skirmishes 
(at the time of the first direct clash with British forces at Kotla in 1852, the mujahidin 
movement numbered approximately 600 men in total). 56 There is even the suggestion 
that the British may have been content to allow the movement to flourish before 1849 as 
a means of undermining the Sikh state. 57 This appears a likely scenario, given a not 
dissimilar Residency complicity over ajihadist movement in Awadh in 1856 which the 
British hoped might fuel their case for annexation (the short-lived movement eventually 
involved over four hundred combatants in open warfare with the state forces of Wajid Ali 
Shah).58 
53 Ahmed, Bengal, p 44.Hardy, p 56. 
54 Ahmed, Bengal, p 45. 
55 Ahmed, Bengal, p 41. 
56 Hardy, pp 54-55. Pearson, pp 54-55 It should be noted that until the annexation of Punjab, the tariqah-i 
muhammadiyah showed little direct interest in the European presence in India, Powell, Missionaries, pp 
103, 105. 
57 Pearson, p 50. 
58 Robinson, Islam, pp 145-6; Michael H Fisher, A Clash of Cultures: Awadh, the British and the Mughals 
(New Delhi, Manohar, 1987), pp 228-234. This passive British encouragement took place, moreover, in 
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Although the records reveal a growing British interest in gaining accurate 
statistical measures and ethnographic information about these Muslim socio-religious 
reform movements that is reminiscent of the fascination with 'unknowable fraternities' so 
much a feature of the Thuggee panics,59 there is no evidence before 1857 of any real 
apprehensions by the British of either the spread of these movements outside of their 
immediate locales or of a connection made between them and any wider Muslim 
'conspiracy'. This is an important distinction for the argument being made here: their 
role in the self-definition and extension of the British state during this earlier period was 
primarily as outcasts from lawful Indian society. Though, like the 'Thuggees', there 
remained a fascination with their ambiguous links within Indian society (which certainly 
helped galvanise the perception of Muslim revolt in 1857), it is only in the post-'Mutiny' 
period that a tendency to link all these movements under the misnomer' W ahabi' , and the 
sensational uses made by the Anglo-Indian press of informer depositions from the State 
trials between 1865-71 (as well as the low rate of actual prosecutions), suggest a more 
direct parallel with the specifically pan-Indian preoccupations of the Thuggee 
campaigns.60 This earlier localising, circumscriptive inclination meant that the British 
before 1857 were able to recognise that, for instance, the mujahidin espousal of the 
eventual overthrow of the British state was a marginalised reformist rhetoric distantly 
aimed at 'purifying' a putative Indian Muslim ummah - and not the statement of the 
pandemic 'straight-pointed political designs' into which it was absorbed in the wake of 
the 'Mutiny' .61 
While the language of criminalisation and the legal framework that accompanied 
the British 'drives' towards labeling and stigmatising particular groups began to be 
the knowledge of open and pan-regional support for the 'jehadis' by important Muslim leaders in North 
India (including the Begum of Bhopal). 
59 Singha, pp 117-19. 
60 For the British 'the thugs were 'Citizens ofIndia' and not of any 'particular division" (Singha, p 89). On 
the problems of prosecuting thagi crime, see ibid, p 135; for the British fascination with thagi 'informer' 
testimonies, see Majeed's excellent analysis in 'Confessions', 
61 Lyall, 'Islam', p 239. 
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constructed in earnest in the 1840s, the process of marginalising Muslim 'fanatical ~ 
involvement in disruptions of colonial authority can be seen at work as early as 1806, in 
the accounts of the Muslim sepoy revolt that took place in the South Indian garrison town 
of Veil ore. Although the impetus for the mutiny appeared to have originated in Mysore 
and drawn on the ideology of the recently deposed Muslim ruler Tipu Sultan (whose 
capital Sriringapatam had fallen to the British only seven years previously) as a 'warrior 
pir', the British administration in Madras focused their accounts on identifying the 
'faqirs' and 'wandering sufis' who had spread the message as isolated, criminal elements 
who had no institutional affiliation and stood outside of orthodox Indo-Muslim society.62 
The Madras Surgeon General at the time, Edward Balfour, decribed the 'faqirs' as 'a low, 
profligate set of men, held in great disesteem by all classes of the community.' 
Anticipating the later official discourse on 'criminal tribes' and drawing on the supposed 
idiom of 'orthodox classes', he pronounced these perceived instigators of the mutiny as: 
'Be-sharra literally, without law, i.e., they do not act up to the precepts of Mahomed.,63 
Though we may detect here an element of the desire to deflect the possibility of a 
wider regional insurrectionary movement based around the 'spiritual' authority of the 
defeated ruling dynasty of Mysore (reflective of the relatively recent British paramountcy 
here),64 the guiding rationale of this narrow focus accords more obviously with the 
process of the criminal outcasting of Muslim 'fanaticism' from Indian society that was to 
become a more noticeable feature of the ensuing decades. In this instance, the power of 
that rationale can be gauged by the lack of urgency shown by the British in the aftermath 
of the Vellore mutiny in restructuring their regiments to reflect a potentially volatile 
62 Susan Bayly, Saints, Goddesses and Kings: Muslims and Christians in South Indian Society 1700-1900 
(New Delhi: Cambridge University Press" 1992; 1989) pp 226-28. 
63 Quoted in Bayly, Saints, p 228. 
M This 'spiritual' authority was perhaps not as straightforward a matter as Susan Bayly's description of 
'warrior pir' cults indicates, given the cross-communal ethos built up by Sultan Tipu Ali in his 
predominantly Hindu kingdom (on which, see Kate Brittlebank, Tipu Sultan's search/or legitimacy. Islam 
and kingship in a Hindu domain (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997). 
Muslim element.65 Similarly, although the mutiny in Java in 1816 by Indian Muslim 
sepoys shook the British complacency about its officers' ability to control the native 
ranks, it did not precipitate any significant administrative innovations.66 This contrasts 
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strongly with the changes in army practice introduced immediately after the Barrackpore 
Mutiny of 1824, for which insensitivity towards Hindu rituals had been perceived as the 
prime motivation. Indeed the introduction of , Maul vies' to the North Indian regiments 
was only effected after the Barrackpore Mutiny (a rebellion exclusive to Hindu 
regiments), and then only to balance the necessity of appointing' Pandits' to help 
assimilate the disorders attendant upon the British construction of a new Hindu military 
'high-caste' army67 - for it was the mutiny at Barrackpore, and not those in Java or 
Vellore, that had 'alarmed the Company most. ,68 This apparent imbalance between a 
desire to placate potentially rebellious Muslim and Hindu contingents in the Indian army 
is less reflective of the larger percentage of Hindu sepoys in the North Indian regiments 
than it is indicative of the British approach to religion as a category deconstructive of, 
rather than incorporating, Indian society: it was not pan-Indian Hindu rebellion that was 
feared, it was the breakdown of the British attempt to use a high-caste Hinduism to 
isolate and organise a British army ethos that was at stake in the Barrackpore Mutiny. 
In general, in terms of military recruitment, the focus of army administrators had 
always centred on caste and region, as opposed to the larger religious blocs. This had 
been the practice since the inception of army recruitment in the mid-eighteenth century, 
when Robert Orme first demarcated the 'martial races' of India 'according to their 
climatic environment and dietary habits' .69 These criteria - caste and climatic 
65 Roger Beaumont, Sword of the Raj: the British Army in India 1747-1947 (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 
1977), p 104. Although Bayly notes some 'interesting parallels' between the Vellore and 1857 army 
revolts, he does not follow this through with speculations as to their differences in terms of British 
responses. See Bayly, Indian, p 179. 
66 Bayly, Indian, p 185. 
67 Seem a Alavi, The Sepoy and the Company: Tradition and Transition in Northern India, 1770-1830 
(Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1998; 1995), pp 90-94. 
68 Alavi, p 282. 
69 Alavi, p 37. 
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environment (drawing on the example of the agricultural base of the British army) - had 
been the exclusive considerations behind the large-scale recruitment of a mainly high 
caste Hindu 'peasant army' in Bengal and Upper India. Where consideration of the Indo-
Muslim character did playa part in the British ordering of army regimental life, it was as 
a component of a wider concern with continuity in a secularised Mughal military 
culture.7o This is not to suggest that Indo-Muslim typologies were ignored in 
characterisations of potential native recruitment, but more often they centred on questions 
of finance rather than religion. In the late eighteenth century, for instance, Colonel 
Pearse of the Madras army had speculated in a letter to Warren Hastings that Muslims 
rather than Hindus, should be targeted for the army, since: 
The Mussulman will live well whilst he can; is seldom worth a rupee, and therefore 
has a tie upon the service that the other has not ... For this reason, and for this only, I 
must give it as my opinion, that all possible encouragement ought to be given to 
Mussulmans; and that we ought to cease to seek for tall smooth-faced Hindoos , 
and to get shorter and rough-faced Mussulman soldiers.71 
Ironically, at the tum of the century when desertion had ceased to be a problem and a 
high-caste Hindu peasant army was deemed inappropriate for the newly Ceded and 
Conquered Territories, the army made financial solvency the key criteria in recruitment of 
the Muslim Rohilla-Afghan cavalry.72 Fifty years later, it was their reliance on these 
predominantly Muslim army regiments - particularly those from Rampur73 and Madras 74 
- that proved crucial to the suppression of important strategic rebellious areas in North 
India. 
Before 1857, then, Islam as an incorporating, pan-Indian category finds little 
practical application within Anglo-Indian administrative praxis. It remains in this earlier 
70 For instance, in the recruitment of the Rohilla cavalry regiments. See Alavi, Chapter 5. 
71 'A Memoir of Colonel Thomas Deane Pearse', in Bengal Past and Present, April-June 1909, Volume 3, 
No 2, Serial No 8, (Calcutta). 
72 Alavi, pp 229-30. 
73 Alavi, p 231. 
74 Bayly, Indian, p 183. 
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period, mainly a broad ideological compass and enumerative tool. ICS officers appeared 
rarely to have acted on the perception of a strong causal link between the mass of Indian 
Muslims (and particularly those who served as Company employees) and either Muslim 
'disaffection' or an essentialised Muslim 'fanatical' character. This argument can be 
carried through into all other areas of British administration in pre-'Mutiny' India. In the 
Residency system, for instance, Michael Fisher has proved that there was no correlation 
between postings and religion. Muslim officials 'do not seem to have been either 
favoured in or disbarred from service in Residencies attached to Muslim rulers.' 75 This 
de facto cross-communal policy appears to have operated in posts up to and including the 
senior position of the Mir Munshi, who facilitated all important exchanges between the 
Resident and ruler as well as between the Resident and his Residency staff (up to 1835, 
three-quarters ofMir Munshi posts were in fact held by Muslims).76 Indeed, Fisher 
concludes that until 1857 'the Muslim service elite played the prominent role within the 
Residencies' .77 
Fisher's study of the communal makeup of the Residency system in this period is 
based on his own 'aggregation of thousands of isolated references drawn from the day to 
day records of each Residency.' 78 The statistical analysis under communal divisions of 
government employment records was begun by the British only in the 1840s; but where 
such analyses were undertaken, they pointed towards a similar Muslim predominance in 
the direct administration of British territories in North India.79 This Muslim command of 
government patronage demonstrates the extent to which the Company had absorbed and 
relied upon for its infrastructure just those official classes of the Mughal service gentry 
75 Michael H Fisher, Indirect Rule in India: Residents and the Residency System 1764-1858 (Delhi: Oxford 
University Press, 1998; 1991), P 318, 364. 
76 Fisher, Indirect, p 321, 323. 
77 Fisher, Indirect, p 362. 
78 Fisher, Indirect, p 317. 
79 For instance, see the figures compiled by Robinson for the subordinate, judicial and executive postings 
for the North-West Provinces in 1857; and for the whole of the United Provinces in 1887 and 1913. 
Robinson, Separatism, p 46. 
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which it was thought in 1857 had risen up for what Alfred Lyall called 'that last desperate 
spring after the shadow of a lost empire'; and for whom, after 1857, the opportunities for 
the 'higher subordinate ranks of the civil and military classes' were to fall sharply 
away.80 More specifically it was the relationship between these elite Muslim classes and 
a perceived wider Muslim 'fanatical' constituency, that the Mutiny was considered to 
have originated and spread. That connection proved difficult for British historians to pin 
down in the succeeding decades; indeed, the triangular relationship of the Muslim landed 
and service elites, Muslim reformist movements such as the 'Wahabis' and the Muslim 
'masses' would form the core of disputation among Anglo-Indian observers for the next 
half-century.81 1857-59 was considered the moment at which they had coalesced, and the 
repetition of that event was, until the 1880s, seen as not only plausible, but immanent. 
For William Hunter, it was the elites ('the best men') who were 'not on our side', and 
thus ripe for inflammation by the 'fanatical' elements; for Alfred Lyall, it was the 
'inconsiderate and uneducated mass of them' who were 'against us' .82 What animated 
both officials, however, was the same understanding of an implacably oppositional and 
corporate community that had revealed itself in 1857. 
The process of circumscribing and criminalising Muslim 'bigotry' that took place 
in the first half of the nineteenth century had far-reaching consequences in 1857. The 
widespread perception by res officers at that time that 'fanaticism' had broken out all 
over North India entailed a seismic reevaluation of what constituted 'lawful' Muslim 
society. In effect, the mutually-reinforcing ideas 'criminal' and 'lawful' society had been 
80 Lyall, 'Islam', p 240. Note how Lyall's judicious phrasing for the passage from which this is taken 
implies, but does not explicitly state, a government policy of communal discrimination in recruitment after 
1858. Lelyveld divides the Mughal service gentry broadly between a largely Hindu zamindari and an 
official and military class drawn mostly from among Muslims (Lelyveld, Aligarh, p 25). Eric Stokes' study 
of the Bulandshahr district in which Lyall served demonstrates that in general neither class nor religious 
affiliation ultimately determined the response of these Mughal service elites during the 'Mutiny' (Stokes, 
'Nawab'). 
81 These are in fact the main arguments that drive Hunter's Indian Musalmans, as well as Lyall's rebuttal to 
them in 'Islam'. 
82 Lyall, 'Islam', p 246. 
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turned inside out, so that after 1857 the rationale behind the criminalisation of Muslim 
'bigotry' - that is, its role in defining a 'lawful' Indian society - was brought to bear on 
the wider Muslim community. The acceleration of instances of perceived communal 
rioting after 1857 (and its reading back into past accounts of civil disturbances) was 
partly a result of this dramatic reversal of idioms. What before was isolated outside of 
Muslim society, was now brought firmly within its constitution; the idea of Muslim 
'bigotry' was no longer to be confined to caste typologies or sectarian influences. This 
globalisation of the criminalising rationale had a twofold consequence. The first was that 
the dual process of placing the Muslim 'fanatic' within Indian society, but segregating 
him there as an essentially foreign, invasive presence, was from 1858 onwards, implicit 
in all British representations of Indian Muslims; and it is precisely this rationale that 
organises Steel's portrait of Indo-Muslim society almost fifty years later in India. The 
second consequence of relevance here - and it is one that has been oddly neglected in 
histories of the period - is that bringing the 'criminal' characteristic of 'fanaticism' 
within Muslim society meant also seeing it rooted in the very structure of the pre-
'Mutiny' British Indian state. However, this perception - entirely novel to British 
administrative ideology - should not be seen as either accidental to, or solely consequent 
on, the widespread explanation of Muslim 'conspiracy' in 1857. As will now be argued, 
the two are interdependent features of British thinking during and after the 'Mutiny'. 
British dispossession of the Muslim service elites from their predominant role in its 
administration, and the accompanying rhetoric of a general Muslim 'backwardness', must 
be regarded as part of the process of the redefinition of the relationship of the newly 
emergent imperial British state to Indian society: as a part, that is, of the shedding of its 
own incarnation as a continuum of Mughal rule. 
With these observations in mind, we can tum to the second strand of the pre-1857 
discourse of Muslim 'conspiracy', that of the idea of ' Mug hal dispossession', and address 
more precisely the question of the actual mechanism by which the inflation of Muslim 
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'conspiracy' in 1857 took place in Anglo-Indian perceptions. This strand represents a 
formalised, textual discourse about the dispossessed Muslim rulers of pre-colonial India, 
a rhetoric that derives its force from the common British historiographical division of 
Indian history into Hindu, Muslim and British periods.83 However, in relation to the 
Mughal emperors and successor states of the eighteenth century, it is one that, 
paradoxically, only occasionally entailed specifically religious considerations. In his 
History of British India (1817) James Mill draws a crucial distinction between 
'sovereign' and 'priest' under 'Mahommedan' rule, arguing forcefully that there was 
little alliance or confluence of interests between the two. In making this point, he goes as 
far as claiming that under the Mughals the Muslim 'priests' were themselves 
dispossessed oftemporai power.84 Javed Majeed has usefully redirected critical attention 
to the 'self-reflexivity' of Mill's History in its use of British India for 'fashioning a 
critique of British society itself. 85 Mill's perception of Mughal secular rule should thus 
also be seen in the context of his arguments for a uniform 'rule of law' , as opposed to the 
'tyranny of priestcraft' that he saw at work in both Britain (in its 'Common Law') and 
India (in the codification of Hindu and Mohammedan laws). 86 Nevertheless, despite its 
preoccupation with the reform of Metropolitan legal structures, the History became a 
'standard work for English officials' in India and eventually a textbook for candidates for 
the Indian Civil Service, as well as a textbook of the Company's college at Haileybury.87 
The influence of Mill's distinction between 'sovereign' and 'priesthood' under Mughal 
rulers was thus an integral component of the Anglo-Indian official conception of Muslim 
rule formed in the first half of the nineteenth century. Alfred Lyall- himself a graduate 
83 See for instance James Mill's The History of British India (abridged edition: Chicago: University of 
Chicago, repro 1975; 1817) and Mountstuart Elphinstone's The History of India: the Hindu and 
Mahometan Periods (London: Murray, repro 1843; 1841). 
84 Mill, pp 306-7. 
85 Javed Majeed, Ungoverned Imaginings: James Mill's The History of British India and Orientalism 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), p 128. 
86 For a discussion of these issues, see Majeed, Ungoverned, Chapter 4. 
87 Javed Majeed, Ungoverned p 128. 
of Hailey bury in 1856 - places the distinction at the heart of his characterisation of 
Mughal rulers in his essay, 'Islam in India' (1872). 
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Historians have perhaps failed to give due attention to the changes that overcame 
post-1857 British representations of Indian Muslims on exactly this point. With regard to 
India's 'dispossessed' Muslim rulers in Anglo-Indian historical discourse, conceptions 
before and after 1857 differ significantly on the relationship between the mass of Muslim 
'believers' and the Mughal state. Where in the half-century before the 'Mutiny' the 
notion of Muslim disaffection seems to have referred consciously to the Mughals, and to 
an impicitly secular idea of Mughal rulers, during and after 1857 'dispossession' is seen 
as a peculiarly religious grievance among Indian Muslims in general. Hinged between 
the two periods (receiving his education and first year of experience before the 'Mutiny'), 
Alfred Lyall usefully illustrates this shift of emphasis. While he agrees with Mill's 
assessment of the (comparative) secularity of Mughal rule, he redirects the argument 
towards the larger paradigm of a transhistorical, peculiarly Muslim relation to temporal 
power, of which the Mughals are only 'bad' examples.88 Thus Mill's positive assessment 
is effectively reversed and thrown aside as a poor predictive tool when dealing with 
'Islam' in India. The true guide to the future of Muslims in India becomes the supra-
local model of global Islamic history - a model in which the Mughals can appear only 
insofar as they performed as better or worse Muslim rulers. 
After 1857, then, a new will to conflate enters the historiography regarding the 
temporal and religious in Indo-Muslim rule; and the axiom that in Islam, religion and 
politics represent 'two sides of the same medal,89 is one earnestly enforced by later, 
rather than earlier, nineteenth century Anglo-Indian writers.9o The novelty of this post-
1857 element can best be illustrated by comparison to the writings of Bishop Heber as he 
88 Lyall, 'Religious', p 289-90; Lyall, 'Islam', p 238. 
89 L yall, 'Islam', p 236. 
90 Bayly gives William Muir as one such example ofthis (in Bayly's view, 'disappointing') development. 
Bayly, Empire, p 326. 
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travelled through Upper India in 1824, a year after his appointment as the Bishop of 
Calcutta. Though new to the country, Heber's journals display a remarkably nuanced 
ability to absorb and reproduce a variety of entrenched Anglo-Indian attitudes towards 
religion. Given the frequent citation by historians of Heber's observations regarding the 
seditious usages of religious communication in early nineteenth century,91 his sober 
assessment of the potential for Muslim disaffection is instructive. Following Mill's 
distinction, Heber is keen to explain precisely those distortions attendant upon the 
slippage between the temporal and religious ambition of Indian 'Mussulmans' that Lyall, 
fifty years later, conflates and re-directs into an altogether different paradigm. Thus 
Heber reproduces the nostrum that 'if a fair opportunity offered, the Mussulmans, more 
particularly, would gladly avail themselves of it to rise against us', but then explains that 
'this is from political, not religious feeling.,92 Though the two can be combined, in that 
the insensitivity towards deposed Muslim rulers, might have' awakened questions and 
scruples among the fierce Mahommedans about obeying an unbelieving nation', he 
regards those questions as a 'digression', quite separate from Government 'interference 
with their religion' .93 The Mughal emperor is clearly cast here as a 'political' rather than 
a 'religious' figurehead. While the boundaries between the two spheres are not 
impermeable, there is neither anxiety attendant upon their violation nor any impetus 
towards their removal. More importantly, the only channel between them involves a 
dialogue between the British and the deposed rulers. 'Mahommedan' religious scruples 
are thus relegated to the role of an affect of British diplomatic miscalculations; they 
possess no autonomous potential. The only way that the channel between the deposed 
Muslim rulers and the mass of 'fierce Mohammedans' can be accessed is through the 
91 See, for instance, Bayly, Empire, p 315. 
92 M A Laird (ed), Bishop Heber in Northern India: Selections From Heber's Journal (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1971), pp 144-45. 
93 Laird, p 145. 
blundering Anglo-Indian official (in Heber's journal, it is Lord Hastings who is held to 
account).94 
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It should be remembered that Bishop Heber made these remarks only twenty 
years after the Company had annexed the territories of Upper India through which he 
travelled, and had neutered the last vestiges of Mughal power in Delhi. By 1857, as Peter 
Hardy remarks, Anglo-Indians had long since decided that 'the Mughals in Delhi were an 
anomaly and their existence a matter of indifference even to the Muslim population of the 
East India Company's territories. ,95 The effective deconstruction in the Anglo-Indian 
official mind of the potential of the Mughal emperor as a figurehead to a pan-Indian 
Muslim (as opposed to cross-communal) constituency was accompanied in these years by 
the gradual disinvestment in Mughal rituals, administrative structures and forms of 
communication, a process most visibly marked by the Company's decision in 1837 to 
supersede Persian as the language of administration. Bayly argues that this withdrawal 
from the Indian (and particularly, the Mughal96) informational order and the 
accompanying tendency to fall back on European-derived statistical analyses and modes 
of communication, accounted for the degree to which the British in India found 
themselves unprepared for the events of 1857-59.97 He does not, however, draw any 
lines of affect between this process and the 'disproportionate' perception of Muslim 
'conspiracy', which the British saw as being centred on the apparently restored 
figurehead of the Mughal emperor. 
94 It is worth considering here whether the British manipulation of the symbol of what Mujeeb calls 'the 
degenerate and un honoured figure seated on the throne of Delhi' may have played a part in reinforcing the 
continued lip-service paid to him during this period by some of the orthodox ulama, such as Shah Abdul 
Aziz (who continued to call him the Imam al-Muslimin, while describing him as utterly without power or 
influence beyond Delhi. M Mujeeb, The Indian Muslims, New Delhi: Mushiram Manoharlal, repro 1995; 
1967, pp 390-391). 
95 Hardy, p 33. 
96 For a fascinating account of the early, often competitive interaction of Mug hal and Company 
administrative and informational institutions, see Michael H Fischer, 'The Office of Akhbar Nawis: The 
Transition from Mughal to British Forms', in Modern Asian Studies, 27 (1993), pp 45-82. 
97 Bayly, Empire, pp 315-17. 
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But if such a line is drawn, and then placed against the background of Heber's 
(altogether typical) remarks thirty years earlier, it becomes clear that the missing link of 
the occasionally blundering but nevertheless decisive, Anglo-Indian official opens up the 
possibility that Muslim 'conspiracy' represented for the British more than proof of the 
'obscurantist' and 'traditional' character of the uprising.98 For the figure of the British 
official preserving the rituals of Mughal power (or threatening their disruption, as Heber 
castigated Lord Hastings) was integral to the representation of British authority in early 
nineteenth century India. By seeing the threatened abrogation of that role through the 
symbolic restoration of authority to the Mughal emperor, the idea of Muslim 'conspiracy' 
may have, at first sight, presented itself to the British in the recognisable but estranged 
lineaments of the 'uncanny'. The aspect of the 'uncanny' that appears to apply here is 
given 'special emphasis' by Freud in his 1919 paper on the subject: 
An uncanny effect is often and easily produced when the distinction between 
imagination and reality is effaced, as when something that we have hitherto 
regarded as imaginary appears before us in reality, or when a symbol takes over the 
full functions of the thing it symbolizes . .. 99 
It is precisely this symbolic aspect that characterised the British attitude towards the 
Mughal emperor and his relationship to Muslim disaffection. Like the 'uncanny', which 
always 'leads back to what is known of old and long familiar', 100 the earlier British belief 
in the decisive role of the Anglo-Indian administration in controlling a channel between 
the symbol of the Mughal ruler and the Muslim masses (and as effectively damming it), 
can be seen returning in 1857 as its familiar opposite: the apparently religiously-marked 
image of political disempowerment represented by the autonomous Muslim rebel 
bringing to life the symbol of Mughal authority. This crucial element of estranged, often 
98 Bayly, Empire, p 320. 
99 'The Uncanny', in Sigmund Freud, Art and Literature, Vol. 14 (London: Penguin Freud Library, 1990), 
P 367. Emphasis added. 
100 Freud, 'Uncanny', p 340. 
terrifying, 'recognition' structures many of the accounts of the time, and is forcefully 
recreated by Lyall when he wrote in 1872: 
As all can recollect who were in Northern India in 1857-8, ... the English turned 
fiercely on the Mahomedans as upon their real enemies and most dangerous 
. I 101 rlva s ... 
The transposition here of the epithet 'fierce' so commonly applied to Muslims (as in 
Heber's 'fierce Mohammedans') onto the Anglo-Indian avenger and the disturbing 
element of self-revelation it appears to signal are issues that will be discussed in more 
detail in the following sections. What needs to be emphasised here is not only the 
manner in which Muslims are both separated from Indian society and made to serve as 
the exclusive expression of its rebellion - a dual process immanent within the 
criminalising rationale discussed above - but that it is a process predicated on that fatal 
sense of recognition. Indeed, in Lyall's uncanny locution, it is an event precipitated by 
recognition. 
98 
The tropes of recognition and revulsion that pervade British descriptions of 
Muslim activity in 1857-59 stem, then, partially from the 'uncanny' reversal of the 
symbolic function of the Mughal emperor; and the sense of dispossession that permeates 
these accounts of 'Mahomedan pretenders' often resonates with what Freud identified as 
the uncanny feeling of 'repetition' and the 'helplessness experienced in some dream-
states' .102 Just as revealing are the attitudes displayed towards the Mughal emperor in the 
Anglo-Indian press in the years succeeding the 'Mutiny', where a form of exorcism 
appears to have taken place, hollowing out the symbol of Mughal authority on precisely 
those points that had so horrifyingly seemed to come together during 1857-59. The 
emphasis here is strongly (and bitterly) laid on the Mughal emperor's puppet-like 
101 Lyall, 'Islam', p 239. Emphasis added. 
102 Freud, 'Uncanny', pp 358-59. See for instance, the sense of helplessness in the face of the mounting 
and repetitive catalogue of betrayals by the 'Mahomedan pretenders' in 1857, recalled by Sir George 
Campbell in his Memoirs of My Indian Career, vol 1 (London, 1893), pp 243-44 (cited in Hardy, p 66). 
99 
qualities (his diminutive stature; the manipulation by others) alongside an anxiety to 
bring out the perceived 'Muslim' character that he had suddenly assumed in British eyes 
(typically taking, in the cartoons, the form of a European caricature of 'Semitic' features: 
thickened lips, hooked nose and Islamic skull caplO3). Alongside the idea of puppetry is 
the portrayal of the rebel Mughal court as a theatrical Muslim mockery of British rule, 
what one cartoonist referred to as the 'topsy turviness of Empire.' 104 This 'theatricality' 
has its origins in the depiction of Mughal rule in British writing of the eighteenth century 
in which the British are implicitly figured as the 'real thing' against which the empty 
Mughal image is animated.105 The implication of the hollowness of Mughal power was 
designed to substantiate the emerging sense of British pan-Indian authority at that time; 
similar figures of comic theatricality were invoked against the Muslim rulers of A wadh in 
the mid-nineteenth century as a rhetorical preparation for the annexation of the state by 
the British.106 The marked difference to be noted here is the way in which the Mughals 
uncannily embody and destabilise the British self-image: their rhetorical separation is, in 
1857-59, disrupted; their roles momentarily confused. The campaign of vilification 
conducted by the Anglo-Indian press against Lord ('Clemency') Canning in 1859 often 
displaced these disturbing reverberations onto a common Metropolitan target, who could 
then serve as a means of reinforcing an Anglo-Indian sense of community. Canning was 
103 See, for instance, the cartoon in which the childlike emperor is dangled between two huge British 
sailors. The Indian Punch, 1 January 1859, p 6. 
104 The Indian Punch, 1 February 1859, No 2, p 69. In Kaye and Malleson's widely-respected later history 
of the 'Mutiny', this idea of hollow theatricality is reproduced in the figure of the Mughal emperor as 'a 
pensioner, a pageant, and a puppet. .. a reality and a sham at the same time.' John W Kaye and George B 
Malleson, Kaye and Malleson 's History of the Indian Mutiny, 1857-8, 2nd edn (London, 1892), ii, P 4 
(quoted in Cohn, 'Representing'). The 'reality' here, of course, refers obliquely to the now obscured role 
of the British in the construction of the 'political paradox'. In Steel's 'Mutiny' novel On the Face of the 
Waters (1896), the Mughal court is portrayed almost solely through the conceit of theatrical deception. 
lOS Teltscher, pp 112-13. 
106 See in particular, William Knighton, Nawab Nasir-ud-Din Haider of Oudh: His Life and Pastimes (New 
Delhi: Northern Book Centre, repro n.d.; 1855). 
thus constantly set up in comparison with the ludicrous pretentions of the Mughal 
emperor, and equally as an abettor of bloody Muslim deeds.107 
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Despite this early attempt at displacement, however, there remained in the Anglo-
Indian press a recurrent and horrifying sense of the 'uncanniness' associated with the 
reanimation of the symbol of Mug hal authority by Muslim 'fanaticism'. It is lucidly 
illustrated in this description of a coat of arms imagined in 1859 for the 'Ex-king of 
Delhi': 
A naked arm, sable, clutching musket and bayonet with English child impaled 
thereon splashed with blood, all (as the Ex-king would say) quite proper. Child 
surrounded by a halo, or; - the whole ufheld by a cobra, sable, being fed by a white 
hand; this being decidedly improper. 1 0 
This typically confused, contemporary Anglo-Indian view of the restoration of Mughal 
rule, revolves around the disturbing placement of the British within the Mughal image - a 
horrifying juxtaposition symptomatic of uncanny recognition ('the naked, sable arm' 
impaling the child; the 'white hand' feeding the cobra that 'upheld' it).I09 Its central icon 
is one of Christian martyrdom, a form of rhetoric that, as we shall see in the following 
sections, was linked in particular to the Muslim rebel and his holy war of persecution 
(Flora Annie Steel would later use the image of a child about to be impaled on the lance 
of a Muslim 'fanatic' to bring together the hero and heroine in the climactic scene at the 
centre of her 'Mutiny' novel).110 Thus Muslim 'conspiracy' becomes the animating 
107 See, for instance, the cartoon comparing 'The Great Mogul' and 'The Great Po-gul' ('madman': ie 
Canning) in The Indian Punch, 1 September 1859, pp 102-3; and the cartoon depicting Canning in a 
harlequin hat, condemning an Englishman while pardoning a 'Mahomedan offender' (who has killed 
'twenty Christians') in The Indian Punch, 1 August 1859, pp 90-91. Both cartoons rely for their effect on 
the satirical combination of hollow theatricality and Muslim 'conspiracy'. 
108 The Indian Punch, 1 January 1859, p 20. 
109 The snake as a (treacherous) symbol ofthe Mughal emperor is used by Flora Annie Steel in her 
description of Muslims of Lucknow, inhabiting the 'lees of a dead Mughal court' with 'the slackness of a 
sleeping snake which has still poison in its fang, is still ready to strike if it finds the opportunity' ( Steel, 
India, p 77-78). It is, of course, an intensely charged Christian symbol which, as with the category ofthe 
'uncanny', centres on the idea of dispossession and exile from 'home'. 
110 'the old man ... followed fast on the child with long lance in rest like a pig-sticker's. An old man in a 
faded green turban with a spiritual relentless face.' Steel, Face, p 208. 
101 
presence within the Mughal'coat of arms'; the implicitly Muslim 'sable' arm enacts the 
bloody deed. At the same time, however, the 'white hand' succouring the Mughal 
'cobra' becomes closely interwoven with that idea of Muslim 'conspiracy'. Indeed, the 
British appear, on one level, to be figured as both the impaled child and the cause of its 
martyrdom; through the succoured Mughal, the point of recognition has shifted 
uncomfortably on to the Muslim 'fanatic'; and in effect, the martyrdom becomes a 
collaborative enterprise. 
The suggestion of collaboration, however, in a 'satire' produced as late as 1859 
(in other words, at some distance from the initial reactions of horror at Muslim 
'treachery') necessitates further contextualisation with regard to the uncanny feelings of 
recognition and revulsion produced by the reanimation of the symbol of Mughal 
authority. As the next two sections will argue with reference to the 'Mutiny' 
correspondence of Alfred Lyall, the intervening location of the Christian halo is here 
neither accidental, nor solely a matter of heightening the melodramatic effect. In the first 
instance, as indicated above, it adverts to the Muslim nature of the Mughal treachery. 
But its usage in a determinedly Anglo-Indian journal such as the Indian Punch (whose 
cartoonists were by no means tardy in the martyrdom of the Metropolitan autocrat Lord 
Canning) carries another, secondary implication: that the 'white hand' and the 'English 
child' may be different in kind, if not in colour; and that consequently the collaborative 
martyrdom is not as straightforward as Muslim and British. The key is to be found in the 
Christian identity of the victim which offers a contrast to the abetting 'white hand', and 
suggests that the latter is intended to represent the secular hand of Government. The 
absence of reference to a cheroot or other distinguishing feature (beloved and invariable 
Canning props of the Indian Punch satirists) suggests that Government is not specifically 
thought of here in terms of the post-'Mutiny' treacheries of Canning, but refers 
specifically to the pre-'Mutiny' Company Government and its policy of propping up the 
treasonous Mughal authority (literally feeding, through its pensions to the Mughal 
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emperor's family). I II The secondary effect of the halo, then, is to begin the process of 
distancing Anglo-Indian identification with the pre-'Mutiny' dispensation. Pre- and post-
'Mutiny' identifications, 'white' and 'English', are here differentiated by a Christian sign, 
just as the pre- and post-'Mutiny' Anglo-Indian communities were to be differentiated by 
a renewed and fiercely demonstrative private faith. I 12 
That this distancing effect is also allied to - indeed dependent upon - the enabling 
presence of Muslim 'conspiracy' is an important clue to its appeal during the events of 
1857-59. But it does not entirely explain the extension and inflation of that appeal 
beyond the exile of the Mughal emperor to Rangoon and his subsequent death in 1862. 
For that we must understand the British construction of Muslim 'conspiracy' in 1857 - as 
an alternative (criminalised) religiously sectarian Indian state centred on the figurehead 
of the Mughal emperor - as a form of rhetorical revolution in the discourse of Muslim 
disaffection: the beginnings, that is, of a rhetorical conflation of the elements of Muslim 
'fanaticism' and pan-Indian political authority, elements previously held apart in the 
Anglo-Indian mind by the figure of the British Indian administrator. In this reading, 
however, the events of 1857-59 should not be seen as overturning the British belief in the 
comparatively secular nature of the former Mughal state (in all future representations the 
aspect of puppetry would predominate over the initial element of Semiticisation). Rather, 
they precipitated the circumstances for finally and irrevocably supplanting the symbolic 
authority it held within a British conception of the Indian state - first, by investing it with 
a determining religious element; and then by holding the Muslim 'community' to account 
111 This conclusion is also drawn from the observation that throughout 1859 the Indian Punch consistently 
represented Government on 'Muslim' issues through the (cheroot-smoking) figure of Lord Canning. If the 
post-'Mutiny' government is intended here by the reference to the 'white hand', it would be primarily in its 
continuity with the pre-'Mutiny' policies of succouring the Mughal court. As well as a Metropolitan figure 
for displacement, it could be argued that for the Anglo-Indian press at this time Canning became a useful 
channel for implicitly villifying the Pre-'Mutiny' Company policy - and that in this regard, his constant 
association with the deposed Mughal emperor was a way of distancing prior Anglo-Indian associations. 
112 Metcalf, Ideologies, pp 47-48. 
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for its failure to bind together a pan-Indian polity: 113 in effect, holding them to account 
for perverting what the British had from James Mill onwards regarded as the only source 
for the legitimacy of the former Mughal state: its potential for a cohesive pan-Indian 
dispensation. 114 The subsequent, disproportionate rhetorical violence enacted in the 
'aftermath of revolt' by the British upon the Muslims - alongside the physical destruction 
of the royal Mughal cities ofShahjahanabad in Delhi and ofnawabi Lucknow - bears 
some comparison to the kind of parricide that all such revolutionary creative acts 
require. II5 It was followed in the ensuing decades by the acceleration of the systematic 
abolition of all inherited Mughal institutions of government, and the massive reduction of 
its Muslim personnel in every department, actions now requiring no further justification 
than an essentialised Muslim 'disloyalty' and a supporting rhetoric, developed in this 
period, of Muslim 'backwardness' - a language that was quickly adopted by other native 
government officers. I 16 The new British state would henceforth be defined partly by the 
distance it put between itself and a disgraced, regressive - and now repudiated - Mughal 
inheritance. 
The logic consequent on the violent conflation in 1857 of previously discrete 
rhetorical elements had thus begun the process of refashioning the self-identification of 
the British in India. However, its stability as a discourse safely quarantined from the 
reborn British Indian state was by no means assured. For if 1857-59 was the moment at 
which the British in India began to lay to rest their fictive Mughal persona, their failure to 
113 Cohn's' desacralization' of the Mughal emperor which he locates at the heart of the British declaration 
of an 'insider' Indian imperial identity, took the form in 1858 of a British ritual predicated on precisely the 
reinforcement of this conjunction of elements, Mughal and 'Muslim' - the eating of pork and drinking of 
wine by British army officers in the Mughal Red Fort in Delhi. Cohn, 'Representing', pp 165,209. 
114 In this respect, James Mill's qualified valorisation of the Mughal empire (in contrast to its predecessors) 
emulates earlier histories such as Alexander Dow's The History of Hindostan (1768) and Francklin's The 
History of the Reign of Shaw Aulum (1798). On this point see Hardy, p 32. 
115 Harold Bloom, The Anxiety of Influence: A Theory of Poetry (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1973). 
For the bewildered reactions of the Mughal service gentry during this period, see Frances W Pritchett, Nets 
of Awareness: Urdu Poetry and its Critics (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), pp 3-30. On 
the destruction of the 'old city' of Lucknow, see Oldenburg, pp 21-61. 
116 Robinson, Separatism, pp 99-103. 
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complete the task is partly attested by its repeated resurrection during the next quarter 
century as the now apparently autonomous afreet of Muslim 'conspiracy' inflated to the 
role of a spectral rival to British paramountcy - a role in which it would function as an 
integral component of the definition of the new imperial state. And a role, as the 
following sections will now take up in detail with regard to the local mechanics of its 
genesis in 1857, that problematically cemented the persecuted Christian into the 
reconstruction of an integrative, secular Anglo-Indian official identity.117 
117 The remaining four sections of this chapter will explore the specific characteristics of the new discourse 
of Muslim 'conspiracy' in 1857. Further, more direct reflections on the pre-I857 discourse on Mughal rule 
and its relationship to the post- 'Mutiny' rhetoric of 'conspiracy' are pursued in Section 3.2 below. 
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Section 2.3: A writer of 'the known and the knowable,1l8 
The following two sections will concern themselves principally with the 'Mutiny' 
correspondence of Alfred Lyall. In this section, it will be argued not only that Lyall's 
perception of the question of Muslim 'conspiracy' during the events of 1857-59 was a 
typical product of his generation of ICS officers. But that the development from the 
intemperate language of the besieged young official of the correspondence to the 
judicious prose of the senior elder statesman may be taken, in regard to his descriptions of 
Indian Muslims, as symptomatic of that generation. In this respect, Lyall's later 
reputation for reasonable analyses of Indian society casts a useful retrospective light on 
his characterisations of Indian Muslims in 1857. Since his views formed on this subject 
during the 'Mutiny' 'remained with him to the end of his life', the lurid rhetoric of the 
correspondence may well conceal a fundamental framework not only for his own mature 
considerations on the Muslim constituency of Indian society. 119 They would seem 
additionally to indicate a similar consistency of investments and assumptions by his later, 
approving contemporaries as well. Following on from the reflections made in this section 
on his later reputation, this point will be taken up again in detail in Section 3.3 through 
situating those essays as part of a broader progression in Anglo-Indian discourse from 
'Mutiny' to 'Wahabi conspiracy'. In order to further argue their relevance to a wider 
spectrum of Anglo-Indian opinion in 1857, Sections 2.5 and 2.6 in this chapter will carry 
forward some of the conclusions derived from Lyall's 'Mutiny' correspondence into other 
official accounts of the period. 
Alfred Lyall was one of the last generation ofICS officers turned out by the East 
India Company college at Haileybury. He left for India in 1855, two years before the 
118 Mortimer Durand, The Life of the Right Honourable Sir Alfred Comyn Lyall (London: William 
Blackwood & Sons, 1913), p 461. 
119 0 urand, p 68. 
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final demise of the college and the irruption of the 'Mutiny' .120 His elder brother had 
been through Haileybury and joined the Indian army; his younger brother, James, would 
shortly follow him out to India, later rising to the position of Lieutenant Governor of 
Punjab. 121 Lyall himself served in a variety of senior postings in the ICS, eventually 
being appointed Lieutenant-Governor of the North-West Provinces and Oudh; and finally 
returning to London to serve as a member of the Council of India from 1888 until his 
official retirement in 1903. He continued to advise the government on Indian affairs in an 
unofficial capacity, most notably during the agitation for separate Muslim electorates 
between 1907 and 1909.122 Like most 'civilians' of the period, Lyall's background 
combined a staunch Anglicanism with a history of family service in India. His father, 
Alfred, was Rector of Harbledown, Kent;123 one uncle had been the Dean of Canterbury, 
another a Director of the East India Company, and a third a Lieutenant Colonel in the 
Indian Army. 124 In this combination of Anglican Protestantism and Indian service Lyall 
conforms to the typical ideological mould of the Anglo-Indian official in the second half 
of the nineteenth century outlined in Section 1.5 .125 This sense of speaking from within a 
particular ideological constituency is confirmed by the phenomenal success of his Asiatic 
Studies: Religious and Social, which were reprinted five times between 1882 and 1903, 
and a selection of these essays made in 1907 sold more that eight thousand copies within 
six years, many of them in India. 126 Indeed, it was through the estimation of these essays, 
most of them first published in the preceding decade, that his career was primarily 
advanced within the ICS;127 according to his friend and colleague Mortimer Durand, as 
120 Durand, p 27. 
121 Durand, p 17. 
122 Robinson, Separatism, p 432-33. 
123 Durand, p 8. 
124 Durand, p 4. 
125 Ali, p 23. 
126 Durand, p 419. For a selection of newspaper reviews of Lyall's work, see Papers of.4./fred Lyall, British 
Library, MSS Eur Fl32/98 and MSS Eur1321157. 
127 Dewey, Mind, p 116. 
107 
early as 1873 his reputation had spread widely throughout the official community.128 The 
success of Lyall's literary work among Anglo-Indians can in part be attributed to his habit 
of reflecting back to them essential, though often unspoken, 'truths' that they held both 
about Indian society and their role as administrators and rulers in India. 129 Durand signals 
this perception in his conclusion that: 
The main characteristic of Lyall's work, both in verse and prose, is its truthfulness, 
its careful regard for the realities of life. Though he had to an unusual degree the 
gift of imagination, he never allowed himself to be tempted too far from the region 
of the known or the knowable. 130 
As well as flagging Lyall's membership ofa shared (Anglo-Indian) community of 
knowledge and acceptable opinion, the 'known or the knowable' here adverts in 
particular to the kind of ethnographical observation on which the ICS officers of the 
period prided themselves. In this respect, Durand is keen to emphasise that the essays in 
Asiatic Studies originally grew out of the dissertation on 'sects and religions' that Lyall 
appended to his Berar Census Report (1868), a region in which he served as 
Commissioner between 1867_82.131 It was certainly this quality of disquisitions formed, 
as one of his editors praised them, from 'observation in situ', that impressed his 
Metropolitan readers. 132 
This apprehension of arguments drawn from the verities of Anglo-Indian civilian 
opinion and ethnography needs to be emphasised against the more recent characterisation 
of his writings by Clive Dewey as 'lonely peaks in the history of British understanding of 
India.,133 Section 3.3 will attempt to re-Iocate his essays on Indian religions - and in 
particular, his writings on Islam - as often covert disquisitions on the role of colonial 
128 Durand, p 170. 
129 Durand wrote of his uncollected papers that the distinguishing feature was their presentation of 'clear 
ideas of things hitherto unseen, or seen in a glass darkly.' Durand, p 478. 
130 Durand, p 461. 
131 Durand, pp 138-39. 
132 Durand, p 173. 
\33 Dewey, Mind, p 115. 
government and the potential relationships towards religious identity which it might 
adopt. Whether pursuing the mechanics of state-sponsored religion in China, the 
missionary prospects of Hinduism, or the strengths of community within Islam, it is 
colonial governance and Anglo-Indian official identity that remains their central 
preoccupation.134 Moreover, while Lyall was certainly unusual among his 
contemporaries in the length and frequency with which he treated the question of 
relations in Asia between religion and the state - and particularly after 1858, that of 
church and state in India - it is important to recall that there was considered nothing 
either unreasonable or beyond the bounds of received Anglo-Indian opinion in his 
analyses of these issues. Indeed, it was through the quality of reasoned and reasonable 
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argument that his reputation was won within the ICS. On appointing him to the sensitive 
post of Indian Foreign Secretary in 1878 Lord Lytton commented favorably on 'the Lyall 
habit of seeing both sides of a question'; l35 and in 1888 Lord Dufferin wrote that: 
He will not give you a very strong opinion on any subject, nor is he always constant 
in his views, but he will put before you in a very clear manner everything that is to 
be said on one side or the other. 136 
This was a reputation that, as we shall see, Lyall appears consciously to have traded on, 
pouring scorn on the 'sensational' polemics over Indian Muslims indulged in by other 
Anglo-Indian writers. l37 
Lyall's struggle with the Christian element to Anglo-Indian official identity 
should similarly be understood as anchored within that same popular and officially-
sanctioned body of Anglo-Indian opinion. Like most of the writings emanating out of the 
134 The essays here referred to are, respectively: 'Relations Between the State and Religion in China', 
'Missionary and Non-missionary Religions', and 'Islam in India', all reprinted in Lyall, Asiatic Studies: 
Religious and Social (London: John Murray, 1882). 
135 Quoted in Ali, p 20. One of Lyall's most important tasks in this post was to negotiate with the Amir of 
Afghanistan, and then to help administrate the military campaigns there in 1879-81 (Durand, pp 216-25). 
136 Quoted in Ali, p 22. 
137 This is the basic strategy pursued against W Nassau Lees and William Hunter in Lyall's review of their 
contributions to the debate, 'Islam in India' in Asiatic, pp 228-257. 
ICS during this period, it evolved not only within the prevailing political strictures 
concerning the impossibility of an officially-sanctioned Christian element to colonial 
109 
governance, but was driven by a genuine perplexity as to the precise interrelations of faith 
and empire. As mentioned earlier, throughout his career Lyall, along with other 
prominent contemporaries, such as Sir Bartle Frere, showed a preference for privately 
supporting Christian missions in colonial India, but publicly advocating Indian 
Government neutrality. 138 Despite this private encouragement, Lyall was far from being 
uncritically committed to his Anglican faith, and even further from a commitment to the 
institutional policies and structures of the Anglican Church. On the contrary, there was a 
strong measure of doubt about his faith, evident in his early letters but gaining a 
momentum in the 1870s, that led him increasingly towards the reputation of a 'notorious 
free-thinker' .139 As early as 1864, he had written to his sister about the 'dreary desert of 
scepticism' in which he was 'wandering' .140 His often rhetorically covert manipulation of 
a Christian ethic in his analyses of colonial governance should thus not be confused with 
a fanatical, or even ardently religious purpose. Rather, in common with many ICS 
officers, faith in his writings is always at the service of governance; or to be more precise, 
the primary utility of faith in Asiatic Studies, as in most Anglo-Indian thought of the 
period, lay in its unifying ethos for imperial structures. The idea of a Christian 
'providence' at the service of an imperial sense of identity was given its most direct and 
influential expression in J R Seeley's The Expansion of England (1883); but as Studdert-
Kennedy has recently argued, in the Anglo-Indian community of the later nineteenth 
century it was an article of faith that ran 'right across the political spectrum,.141 If Lyall 
was rare in his willingness to publicly debate the religious policy of the colonial 
138 Ali, pp 39-40. 
139 Dewey, Mind, pp 115-16. 
140 Durand, p 109. Behind much of his pessimism about the future of the church was the belief that 
'dogmatic theory' was headed for extinction; and that, 'without the dogmas you can't hold a faith together' 
(from a letter of 1874, quoted in Durand, p 174). Lyall's admiration for the effects of dogmatism are 
implicit to all his considerations of Islam in India. 
141 Studdert Kennedy, p 143. 
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government, his growing 'scepticism' helps point up the paradoxically secularised 
orientation of his enquiries as, time and again in his essays and letters, he attempts to 
envision a marriage of almost cynical convenience between state and religion in which 
the goal is never evangelical conversion and enlightenment, but the longevity and above 
all, the cohesiveness, of dominion. 
Lyall's reputation for even-handedness was gained in particular for his treatment 
of the subject of indigenous Indian religions in his essays.142 Given the apparent 
immoderation of his 'Mutiny' correspondence with regard to Islam, it is therefore all the 
more surprising that he should have come to be regarded by his contemporaries (as well 
as by later historians) as a force of reason and tolerance on the all-important question of 
Muslim 'disaffection'. 143 In fact though, both the apparent 'mussulmanophobia,144 of the 
letters and the markedly moderate and reasoned arguments of the essays coincided with a 
persistent vein of scepticism typical of the development of Anglo-Indian officials on the 
subject of Muslim' loyalty' between 1857 and 1882, when Asiatic Studies first 
appeared. 145 During this period Lyall was to become Foreign Secretary to the Indian 
Government, playing a key role in the diplomatic and later military campaigns against the 
Amir of Afghanistan. Later he served as Lieutenant-Governor of the North-West 
Provinces, presiding over the early genesis of the Aligarh Movement in the 1880s, the 
forum for the first generation of Indian Muslim politicians. Some of his obituaries hinted 
that he had been unfairly 'passed over', for the succession to the Viceroyalty; but the truth 
would seem to be that a Lieutenant-Governorship was at the time the highest office to 
which an ICS officer could aspire. 146 In view of the later official consequence to his 
142 The Pioneer Mail (Allahabad), 13 June 1913, Lyall Eur MS F132/98. 
143 K K Aziz, Britain and Muslim India: A Study of British Public Opinion Vis-a-vis the Development of 
Muslim Nationalism in India, 1857-1947 (London: Heineman, 1963), p 27. 
144 The term was coined by ICS officer E A Reade in Agra in 1857 to describe a form of mass hysteria that 
overtook the British there in the first two months of rebellion. Bayly, Empire, p 326. 
145 On this later tacit persistence of scepticism among key Anglo-Indian officials, see Robinson, Separatism, 
Chapter Three. On the gradual emergence of the idea of the 'loyal Muslim', see Aziz, Chapter 2. 
146 Durand, p 254. For a selection of obituaries, see Lyall MS F132/98. 
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opinion within the Indian government, as well as his close involvement in Muslim-related 
affairs, the relationship between the birth of the idea of Muslim 'conspiracy' in 1857 and 
the development, a quarter of a century later of the British policies of co-opting Indo-
Muslim elites is perhaps nowhere better demonstrated than in the continuity between 
Lyall's earlier and mature writings. It was during the 1880s that the concept of the 'loyal 
Muslim', which became a cornerstone of British political strategy for the next thirty 
years, was first consciously mooted among Anglo-Indian Civilians, who in tum helped to 
introduce it into policy-making bodies in Britain.147 Though he fell short of a full 
endorsement of this perception, Lyall was a repeated spokesman in the 1870s against 
impassioned rhetoric over the issue of Muslim 'disaffection' .148 The publication of his 
essay, 'Islam in India' (1872) first took place in England, and was intended as an 
intervention in that debate on the side of moderation. The carefully marshalled theories 
and exempla in that essay (later revised for inclusion in his Asiatic Studies in 1882) were 
a specific refutation of the arguments for the continued relevance of Muslim 
'disaffection' set forth by W W Hunter in Indian Musulmans: Are They Bound in 
Conscience to Rebel Against the Queen? (1871). 
This brings us to the second point by which the retrospective argument for some 
degree of generalisation of the processes of representation in the earlier correspondence 
becomes relevant. As Section 3.3 will explore in detail, the strategies of representation in 
Hunter's book draw upon precisely the same models as those of Lyall's essay. The 
representations of Indian Muslims in both works are remarkably congruent, and the 
processes by which they are constructed, almost identical. Lyall's arguments against the 
possibility of a pan-Indian rebellious Indo-Muslim community and Hunter's insistence 
upon just this apocalyptic spectacle, are drawn from the same sources; though seemingly 
147 Aziz, pp 14,24. 
148 Lyall's hesitancy over the 'myth of the loyal Muslim' (as K K Aziz phrases it) was in fact fairly typical 
of serving Civilians in India at the time, despite the efforts of Syed Ahmad Khan (in particular) to influence 
the official Anglo-Indian mindset. See Robinson, Separatism, p 127. 
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ranged on opposite sides of opinion, together they can be taken to represent an 
undisclosed Anglo-Indian communal consensus. The patterns that begin to organise 
Lyall's thought on Indian Muslims in 1857 are thus found to be, in 1871, globalised 
among Anglo-Indian officialdom, despite the exact stripe or drift of the various positions. 
Paradoxically, then, the question of 'disaffection' they so hotly contest can be seen as, to 
some extent, irrelevant to the strategies of representation that structure its production. As 
it is just these strategies that link the earlier letters to the later essays, their genesis in the 
rhetoric of Lyall's 'Mutiny' correspondence is at least suggestive of a similar earlier 
communal consensus. Moreover, it can be posited at this point (the next two sections 
will elaborate in detail on this proposition), that as with later Muslim 'disaffection', the 
actual question of Muslim 'conspiracy' in 1857-59 was partly an adjunct to, rather than a 
primary cause of, its widespread appeal. 
Although there exist extensive collections of 'Mutiny' archives, Lyall's letters 
are a unique survival from the period in terms of relatively uncensored, immediate 
Civilian responses. 149 The vast majority of British 'Mutiny' sources come from military 
personnel, the wives of Civilians caught up in the events, official Civilian 
communications and evidential narratives, and later reconstructed Civilian memoirs. ISO 
The genesis of the language surrounding the actual emergence of the idea of Muslim 
'conspiracy' among Civilians is in fact poorly represented in comparison to the seeming 
wealth of documentation available - but it is in the language itself that the explanation for 
its birth partly lies. This important distinction between the language of construction and 
reconstruction can be readily confirmed by a brief comparison to, for instance, Mark 
Thornhill's later memoir of his 'Mutiny' experiences as a Magistrate at Muttra, published 
149 Papers of Alfred Lyall, British Library MSS Eur F132/3, containing letters sent to his family between 
1857-60. Unless otherwise indicated, all quotations are taken from this archive. 
150 For non-official communications during the 'Mutiny', see the useful bibliography of material available in 
the India Office Library (London) and Centre for South Asian Studies (Cambridge) collections set out in 
Christopher Hibbert's The Great Mutiny: India, 1857 (London: Penguin, 1978). For a more 
comprehensive listing, see Rosemary Seton, The Indian 'Mutiny' 1857-8: A Guide to Source Material in 
the India Office Library and Records (London: British Library Publishing, 1986). 
in London in 1884. Thornhill's deployment of the epithets of'ghazee' (Muslim holy 
warrior), 'fanatic' and descriptions of their (otherwise unmotivated) attacks on 
'Christians' requires, in 1884, no further explanation. They are intended to build up, 
through their simple repetition, the effect of the idea of Muslim 'conspiracy' without in 
any way entailing its specific justification; the language is, literally, its own 
explanation. 15i The narrative thus serves the requirements of sensational detail and 
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popular Metropolitan expectations, while neatly circumventing the problem of the official 
discountenancing (and disproving) of the theory of Muslim 'conspiracy' by the 
Government of India in Bowring's report of 1859.152 In contrast, Lyall is forced to build 
up the picture of Muslim sectarian persecution by justification from one cause to the next. 
The confusion and comparative prolixity of such justifications is uniquely a characteristic 
of the moment of the construction of the discourse. Though we will see some of its 
patterns at work again in the mature rhetoric of both Lyall and Hunter, the historian is 
easily misled by a now entrenched sociology in which Muslim 'conspiracy' appears to 
constitute its own explanation. The only question then to be asked is one that is confined 
to the realms of pure historiography (did it in fact take place) - and to which Thornhill's 
rebuff is the repeated, and seemingly unanswerable, epithet of 'ghazee/fanatic' .153 
151 Mark Thornhill, Personal Adventures and Experiences of a Magistrate during the Rise, Progress and 
Suppression of the Mutiny (London, 1884), pp 185-86,266-68,283,287,301-2,318-20. 
152 A more detailed analysis of Thornhill's text is made in Section 2.5. 
153 We can see the partial submission to such parameters by modem historiography in its own catechistic 
recitation of the incidence of' ghazis', without trying to analyse the local applications of the word. This 
word is a commonplace in most popular accounts of the 'Mutiny' today, and remains similarly without 
further explanation or interrogation (see for example, Hibbert, p 162). More surprising, however, is its 
unproblematised repetition by many academic discussions of this period. See for instance, Eric Stokes in 
his chapter on Bulandshahr District, Peasant, pp 140-158. Stokes' failure to subject the term to some form 
of textual interrogation doesn't only occur when he draws it from British sources; he seems to adopt the 
expression from communications with the Delhi court as well, but equally without attempting to explain the 
nature and contextualised meaning of terms such as 'infidel' and 'ghazi' when they routinely crop up in 
court correspondence (see for instance, p 147). More recently, in Bayly's excellent analysis of the modes of 
rebel communication in 1857-59, the use of the term 'Muslim holy warriors' by the Delhi newswriters 
remains comparatively free of critical interpretation, despite his brilliant re-contextualisation of other forms 
of terminology in late eighteenth and early nineteenth century Persian newsletters (Bayly, Empire, p 329). 
This lack of analysis of the language of rebel communications and propaganda across the range of' Mutiny' 
historiography has left the field open to some dangerously polemical appropriations. For recent examples, 
see Niall Ferguson. Empire: How Britain Made the Modern World (London: Allen Lane, 2003), in which 
Alongside his restless desire to elucidate justifications for his perception of 
Muslim 'conspiracy', the problematic nature of self-identifications in Lyall's 'Mutiny' 
correspondence (as well as in his later essays) flags an often overlooked aspect of the 
correspondence that separates it out from contemporary official communications, and 
connects it more firmly to the essays that were later to make his reputation: that is, its 
pervasive sense ofhybridity, split between colonialist site of enunciation and 
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Metropolitan site of address. In almost every other letter, we find Lyall either proudly 
attestifying to, defensively re-negotiating, or often having simply to justify, his newly-
acquired role as an Anglo-Indian and a colonialist. Throughout the correspondence -
even when under dire threat - he remains deeply conscious of what he seems to consider 
the prejudicial preconceptions of his often disapproving, family 'at home' .154 
Contemporary official communications (such as that of Charles Currie on the 
insurrections in the Bulandshahr district in which Lyall served 155) lack this crucial, 
intensely conflicted quality in their accounts of Muslim 'conspiracy' in 1857. But it is 
precisely this element that imparts to Lyall's letters (and later to his essays) their unique 
and comparatively unrestrained impulse towards explanation and exculpation. It 
therefore not only opens them up to a depth of analysis often otherwise unavailable, but it 
does so on precisely the fault-line between colony and Metropole that lies behind so much 
of the energy and commitment put into Muslim 'conspiracy' by the ICS cadre. 
Lyall was ironically dismissive of the motivations at work in the rush to publish 
narratives and memoirs, which he predicted in a letter to his sister Sybilla as early as 22 
November 1857, declining himself the suggestion that he should seriously consider 
bringing out his own narrative. In fact though, he appears to have been acutely sensitive 
the 'Mutiny' is reduced to a 'war in the cause of religion' - a generalisation Ferguson feels free to make on 
the 'scant Indian testimony which has survived' (p 147). 
154 See for instance: 25 January 1856; 2 June 1856; 25 June 1856; 17 January 1857; 12 May 1857; 18 May 
1857; 24 November 1858; 26 December 1858; 20 January 1859. 
155 Eric Stokes makes extensive use of Currie's correspondence, especially with regard to Muslim 
'conspiracy', in his detailed chapter on the Bulandshahr district in 1857. Stokes, Peasant, Chapter 6. 
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even during the' Mutiny' to the literal value of his insights and descriptions for a 
Metropolitan audience. For instance, writing to his mother on 26 November 1857, he 
mentions a letter he had written to Mr Holland and subsequently shelved as more suitable 
for possible journal publication at some later date. In many of the letters, his self-
conscious generalisations on India and Indian governance have the ring of someone 
posturing for a future, wider audience (referring earnestly to 'the Indian question,156). 
There is even occasionally a remarkable similarity between the letters and certain 
passages of the later essays, suggesting that Lyall himself saw an essential continuity 
between the opinions he expressed privately and those that would characterise his public 
persona as an Anglo-Indian official. 157 Several letters bear evidence of his own editorial 
hand, neatly repeating some of the passages obscured by his handwriting or the 
deteriorating paper, adding dates, place-names, and even occasional contextualising 
commentary. These editorial interventions indicate that he was later keen to preserve the 
collection, and may even have seen it as a valuable (and therefore presumably to some 
extent, typical) source for future historians. They would certainly seem to indicate an 
awareness - and one might even conjecture, approval- of a homology between his earlier 
and later opinions, reinforcing the impression his essays often give that his understanding 
of Indian Muslims is based substantially on the events of 1857-59. In this regard, it is at 
least significant that the internal evidence of the collection as a whole suggests Lyall did 
not withdraw or censor any letters. 
The unusual integrity of the archive bring us to the final points that can be made 
in arguing for the relevance of Lyall's 'Mutiny' correspondence to the wider responses of 
the official Anglo-Indian community in 1857-59. These are historiographical issues 
concerning the typicality of Lyall's experience of and responses to, the issue of Muslim 
'conspiracy' during the 'Mutiny'. There are three points that need to be emphasised. The 
156 Letter to Mr Holland, 27 March 1859. 
157 On the subject of Muslim 'discontent', compare for instance, the letter to his mother of 21 May 1858, 
with the arguments (and even some of the phrases) of' Islam in India'. 
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first is that the sheer size of the archive (88 letters between January 1856 and mid-l 860), 
the frequency of despatch (at least two letters sent every month in 1857-58), as well as its 
preservation as an uncensored body of communications, make the correspondence a 
uniquely coherent text among British 'Mutiny' sources. There is literally no 
contemporary archive of Civilian correspondence home to which they can be cross-
referred as a means of confirming the kind of analysis of language and structure that 
follows. For that reason, the conclusions reached must to some extent remain tentative. 
Ultimately, they rely for corroboration on the comparison with themes found in published 
accounts undertaken in Section 2.5; and on their relevance to the subsequent essays which 
will, in Section 3.3, be compared both to Hunter's volume and to late nineteenth century 
Anglo-Indian fiction. The second point to be made here is that while the comprehensive 
analysis that follows is unique in treating the correspondence as a complete text, 
individual letters have frequently served as typical examples of Anglo-Indian perceptions 
of Indian Muslims during this period. 158 In this sense, the following analysis may be 
regarded as an expansion, rather than a revision, of the current historiographical 
perception of 1857-59. The most forceful illustration of the importance of the letters in 
that historiographical record can be found in Thomas Metcalf s comprehensive and 
cogently argued account of the ideologies of the British rule (recently reissued as Volume 
4 of the authoritative New Cambridge History of India series), in which the letters are 
adduced and quoted as typical reproductions of British perceptions of Muslim perfidy at 
the time, comparable, for instance, to the attitudes of other contemporary Anglo-Indian 
officials such as John Lawrence and William Muir. 159 
158 See for instance: Robinson, Separatism, p 102; Stokes, Peasant, Chapter 6; Metcalf, Aftermath; E C T 
Chew, 'Sir Alfred Comyn Lyall: a Study of the Anglo-Indian Official Mind' (unpublished PhD thesis, 
Cambridge, 1969), passim; and Ali, passim. 
159 Metcalf, Ideologies, pp 139-40. Metcalfs explanation for this phenomenon is that it was drawn from a 
common British pool of stereotypes ofIslam as a belligerent religion given to sectarian 'animosity', and that 
this was fuelled among Muslims in India by a resentment ofthe usurpation of Mug hal rule by the British. 
While the following section seeks to expand on the relevance of stereotypes of Islam, as we have already 
outlined in Section 2.1 and 2.2, the notion of a predominant element in earlier Anglo-Indian perceptions of 
a rebellious pan-Indian Muslim constituency is somewhat teleological. 
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The final point to be made concerns the specific local historical context of the 
correspondence. Eric Stokes' illuminating reconstruction of the events of 1857-8 in the 
Bulandshahr district, and his insistence on the typicality of those events with regard to 
Muslim 'conspiracy' at the time, offers perhaps the most forceful extra-textual argument 
for considering Lyall's responses both as part of a common Anglo-Indian spectrum, and 
as an invaluable instance of the misfit between event and interpretation that is the 
hallmark of Muslim 'conspiracy' during the 'Mutiny' .160 Stokes demonstrates that 
Lyall's perception of Muslim activity in his district was entirely in accord with those of 
his colleagues, such as Charles Currie, and typical of the British throughout India who, he 
writes, 'hankered after a simplistic explanation of the revolt and found it in the theory of a 
general Muslim conspiracy.' 161 Superficially, Lyall's perception appears to have been 
shaped by the attempts ofNawab Mohammed Walidad Khan of Malagarh to secure 
leadership of the variety of rebellious groups in Bulandshahr in mid-1857. The Nawab's 
main source of legitimacy sprung from the Mughal throne in Delhi; and although it is not 
specifically mentioned in either Stokes' account or in Lyall's' correspondence, it is 
possible that he may have periodically utilised Islamic symbols as one of the means by 
which he tried to secure consent to his leadership (among, for instance, the Muslim 
Gahlot and Rajput Chauhan peasant communities). However, Stokes' meticulous 
account also makes clear that by far the largest and most active group of local rebels in 
the district, and those responsible for key attacks on British power in Sikandarabad and 
the town of Bulandshahr (from which they ousted the British briefly on 10 June) were in 
fact the caste of (Hindu) Gujars. We can gather as much from Lyall's own account, in a 
letter to his father dated 12 May 1857, in which he puts down 'all mutinous acts' in the 
district to the 'criminal caste of Goojurs' .162 One of many such (to use Bayly's 
160 Eric Stokes, 'Nawab' pp 140-58. 
161 Stokes, Peasant, p 150. 
162 Lyall's observation in this regard appears to have been corroborated at the time. See N A Chick (ed), 
Annals of the Indian Rebellion containing Narratives of the Outbreaks and Eventful Occurrences, and 
description) 'robber-bands' on the margins of rural peasant, and the lower echelons of 
urban, society, the Gujars appear to have played a haphazard, though prominent, role 
across Northern India at this time, plundering Muslims and Hindus indiscriminately.163 
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In Bulandshahr, they proved wholly unreliable allies to the Nawab, eventually deserting 
him entirely after his flight across the Ganges to Rohilkhand on 28 September. l64 Lyall 
could have been under no misapprehension that a religious sectarian cause of any kind 
would have had any appeal to them, let alone the call for a Muslim 'holy war'. He 
appears to signal as much when, on 30 August, he wrote to his father that the (Hindu) Jats 
are 'held by us, Goojurs by the Mahometans', making a revealing equation that appears to 
separate out the question of 'loyalty' from religious ideology, while still maintaining the 
typology that 'Mahometans' are self-evidently disloyal. In general it seems that the 
Nawab's use of even his nominal (and disputed) license from the Mughal court appears to 
have had little influence with any of the factions that briefly allied with him; and among 
the magnate class he found at best a 'malevolent neutrality' in their attitudes to the 
British. 165 This situation prevailed until after the British (including Lyall) were driven 
from the town of Bulandshahr and all instruments of their rule in the District had seemed 
to fail. It was then that some of those Muslim (and at least as many Hindu) landed 
fami lies who had suffered most from the reassignment of land revenues in the last twenty 
years, fell in with the Nawab. Even here, though, Muslim magnate families divided their 
loyalties according to the extent to which branches had been expropriated by the British, 
rather than through any obvious religious motivation. The largest Muslim landowner of 
the district, Abdul Latif Khan, prevaricated fatally, declaring for the mutineers only after 
the flight into Rohilkhand - and even then, hastily withdrawing support and making a 
Stories of Personal Adventures During the Mutiny of 185 7-8 With an Appendix Comprising Miscellaneous 
Facts. Anecdotes etc (Calcutta: Sanders, Cones and Company, 1859), pp 279-81. 
163 C A Bayly, Rulers. Townsmen and Bazaars: North Indian Society in the Age of British Expansion 
1770-1870 (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, repro 1992; 1983), p 364. 
164 Stokes, Peasant, pp 147, 157. 
165 Stokes, Peasant, pp 150, 156. 
dash back to his fort in Khanpur, from where he sent in his revenue payment to the 
B 't' h 166 rt IS , 
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Thus the picture that emerges from Bulandshahr from May to late September 
1857, (when the district was secure again), and which would have presented itself to Lyall 
at the time, is of pockets of various competing groups, only a few of whom may have 
openly espoused a Muslim affiliation, Stokes writes that the Sheikh and Bahlim revenue-
free grantees, 'raised the green flag .. ,and directed the Mussulmen to rebellion'; and the 
Saiyids of Shikapur declared 'holy war' (though only once the Nawab and his forces had 
been ejected from the district, and, as we shall see, two months after Lyall had already 
come to see the Muslim hand behind the 'Mutiny'); but this seems to be the sum total of 
such examples, 167 Stokes' conclusion, that Muslim rebellious activity in the district was 
'to a large degree incidental', is echoed by the survival throughout the Lyall 
correspondence, and long after he first globalises Muslim 'conspiracy', of a parallel, if 
contradictory, perception that within Bulandshahr 'every man does what is right in his 
own eyes', 168 and that far from participating in a 'national revolt', each 'plunders for 
themselves' ,169 On one level, then - the level at which he participates in the complex of 
events and motivations at work in Bulandshahr - he remains conscious of an endemic 
pattern of atomisation; and is, in his correspondence, keen to emphasise just those 
elements of disunity, But at the same time, and not infrequently within the same letter, 
Lyall returns repeatedly to focus his attention on and aggrandise the role of what he calls 
'Musulman patriots,170 in organising and orchestrating the 'Mutiny' as a vicious 
crescentade against the British. Since it is only this factor that appears in his accounts to 
give the idea of a 'national revolt' any cohesion, we may wonder that his desire for simple 
166 k 3 Sto es, Peasant, pp 152-5 . 
1~ 5 Stokes, Peasant, pp 154-5 . 
168 Stokes, Peasant, p 151; Lyall's letter to his father, 30 August 1857. 
169 Letter to his mother, 26 November 1857. 
170 This phrase appears in the letter to his mother, dated 26 November 1857. The concept of 'patriotism' is 
never linked to Hindu rebels - a point that is taken up in the next section. 
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explanations should entrench so perilously on his worst nightmares. As regards his 
overarching perception of the 'Mutiny', part of the answer may well lie in a predictable 
need to fragment the idea of a civil rebellion through the notion that Muslims were 
pursuing their own agenda. Such an explanation is, however, tendentious in the case of 
his observations in Bulandshahr, since the value of a Muslim 'holy war' within the 
religiously-disparate bodies that made up the rebel causes in the district was demonstrably 
minimal, and its application at best haphazard (and in this regard it is no surprise that 
nowhere in the correspondence is a local example of Muslim-Christian persecution 
adduced). Moreover, as the preliminary discussion which will be undertaken now 
indicates, the relationship between Civilian and 'Mahometan' in the correspondence is 
clearly a deeply distressing and dangerous one, transcending either the unconscious need 
for 'simple explanations', or indeed any consciously-structured, Machiavellian intention 
to overlay the politics of 'divide and rule' onto a local narrative of the 'Mutiny'. If 
Lyall's correspondence replicates a typical Anglo-Indian perception of Muslim 
'conspiracy', and ifhis district is itself typical of the events of 1857-59, then it is 
plausible to conjecture that the dynamics behind the dangerous appeal of Muslim 
sectarianism within the correspondence are at the very least comparable to those of his 
contemporary Civilian community. For the Muslim 'conspiracy' that Lyall refers to was 
not local, but globalised: the exempla he cites all derive from outside of his own 
particular experience; and the uses to which those perceptions were eventually put helped 
make his reputation within the service. 
Before we tum in detail to Lyall's correspondence in the next section, it is useful 
first to sketch out a rough framework for his apprehension of Muslim 'conspiracy' in 
1857. While Christianity is one of the starting points for his reflections on native 
hostility, and a rhetoric of fanaticism quickly comes to shape his descriptions, the 
characterisations constructed during this correspondence are far more complex than the 
simple essentialised hostility towards Indian Muslims perceived both by his biographer 
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and more recent historians. 17I These characterisations frequently operate within a 
common comparative map of 'Hindoo', 'Mahometan' and 'Christian', often rearranging 
these elements in a curiously consistent triangular constellation whereby the 'Hindoo' is 
relegated almost to the role of communicant between the two monotheistic lines of 
opposition. It is a configuration most cogently expressed by Lyall in a letter of 1857 in 
which he considers characteristics of insurgent native responses: 
There is always something very laughable to me in the way these Hindoos will walk 
off with their enemy's property the moment that he is down. Plunder always seems 
to be their chief object, to obtain which they will perform any villainy, whereas the 
Mahometans only seem to care about murdering their opponents, and are altogether 
far more bloody-minded. Those last hate us with a fanatical hate that we never 
suspected to exist among them, and have everywhere been the leaders in the 
barbarous murdering and mangling of the Christians. 172 
There is in these stereotypes, the common stages of paranoiac reversal to which, 
according to Bhabha, all colonialist representation is liable. First comes the narcissistic 
colonialist demand from the native 'Other' for a narrative that affirms the integrity of the 
identity and role of the colonialist. I73 Using Lacan's formulation, this might be expressed 
as the recurrent complaint of all 'misrecognition', in which the 'Other' is called upon to 
return an (impossible) unfractured, idealised image of the self: You never look at me from 
the place from which I see you. 174 The apparent refusal of that recognition by the native 
(which Bhabha problematically reads as 'resistance' 175) is then followed by its 
reconstitution as the declarative and oppositional, an expression of pure aggressivity: he 
171 Durand, pp 68-69,80,86; Metcalf, Ideologies, pp 139-40. 
172 Papers of Alfred Lyall, British Library MSS Eur F132/3. Unless otherwise indicated, all Lyall's letters 
from India are taken from this archive. 
173 Bhabha, 'Sly', pp 97-98. 'Narcissism' here refers to the paranoiac regression to a 'fixation at the stage 
of [primary] narcissism', first noted by Freud. This entails a detachment of the libido from a particular 
object, and its reattachment to the ego, often involving 'traces of megalomania', which can 'by itself 
constitute a paranoia'. Sigmund Freud, 'Psychoanalytic Notes on an Autobiographical Account of a Case of 
Paranoia (Dementia Paranoides)', in Angela Richards (ed), Case Histories II, Penguin Freud Library 
Volume 9 (London: Penguin, repro 1979; 1955), P 211. 
174 Jacques Lacan, The Four Fundamental Concepts of Pyschoanalysis (London: Hogarth Press, repr. 
1977; 1973), p 103. 
175 See Bhabha,'Sly', pp 93-101. 
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hates me. 176 Ifwe read this into Lyall's above description of the 'Mutiny', we find that 
apparent refusal and its return as the declarative, split clearly between 'Hindoo' and 
'Mahometan'responses. The 'Hindoo' insurgent refuses to engage in the British demand 
for an affirmative narrative of rebellion and counter-insurgency: the minute his opponent 
is 'down', the 'Hindoo' turns away to plunder. There is not even the suggestion here that 
he has engaged to the extent of putting his opponent 'down'; the 'Hindoo' rather wanders 
on almost as a passive observer after - or parallel to - the scene of action. But if the 
'Hindoo' refuses his oppositional identity, the 'Mahometan' exceeds it. His is an 
opposition that not only precedes its object (any specific engagement during the 'Mutiny'; 
any local or immediate cause); but one that can never be satisfied by its attainment. 
While the 'Hindoo' is expressed in direct relationship to the underlying economic 
determinant of the 'Mutiny' - 'property' - the 'Mahometan' is encoded with a sign whose 
only material referent is the body of the Christian colonialist, which itself fails to satisfy 
(inciting not just 'murder', but 'mangling'). 
Lyall's expression here of the tripartite relationship of Hindu, Muslim and British 
thus offers us two interconnected paradigms. The first is that of the Hindu who refuses to 
engage with the British narrative desire for the affirmation of its identity as a counter-
insurgent, and is distracted instead by the immediate economic rewards - a child-like 
'wandering' off after baubles. In contradistinction to this failure to engage with the 
British narcissistic demand, the Muslim appears disconnected from the economic motive; 
instead, the destruction of the body of the Christian Anglo-Indian becomes his sole 
motivation (a point made even clearer in a letter written by Lyall a year later in which 
Muslim participation in the 'Mutiny' is represented as a 'war of extermination' 177). The 
juxtaposition of these responses suggests a rhetorical connection between them, whereby 
the incommensurate aggression of the Muslim seems to compensate for the tendentious-
176 Bhabha, 'Sly', pp 98-100. 
177 Durand, p 80. 
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and psychologically disengaged - response of the Hindu; irritation and bewilderment on 
the part of the colonialist with Hindu disengagement appears to return as the furious and 
insatiable appetite of the Muslim for murderous combat. 
That element of insatiability is by no means accidental to the portrait. Lacan' s 
formulation of the narcissistic demand entails a dialectic between the subject and the 
imaginary realm of the Real which, it is conjectured, lies beyond all systems of 
articulation. Returning from that imaginary realm, the response to the narcissistic 
demand is thus inevitably enmeshed and distorted by its formulation in a symbolic 
system, and so registers an inevitable 'lack' - that which it cannot properly signify. That 
'gap' between the Real and its symbolic articulation is what maintains the system of 
desire, ensuring the continual circulation of representations. 178 Identity formation is 
predicated on exactly this 'circular play between lack and identification,;179 and it is the 
promise of closing this gap - between the Real object and its representation - that fantasy 
holds out (even a horrifying fantasy is preferable to the unbearable doubt signalled by the 
disclosure of that 'lack' 180). But at the same time, it should be noted that fantasy holds 
out only the promise of closure; by its very nature, it prohibits its realisation. 181 Ifwe 
understand that Lyall's descriptions of Hindu and Muslim insurgents represent an 
identificatory investment, a creation of 'Others' predicated on the subject's own identity-
formation, then the element of insatiability manifested in the murderous Muslim 
corresponds to the kind of deferral of satisfaction thatkeeps alive the system of desire and 
representation. Thus in Lyall's fantastic depiction of the murderous 'Mohamedan' 
insurgent, the Muslim 'Other' will necessarily never be satisfied by the simple destruction 
of the body of the Christian Anglo-Indian: his insatiability is that which upholds the 
representation - just as the fantasy of his murderous appetite paradoxically holds at bay 
178 Stavrakakis, pp 1-35. 
179 Stavrakakis, pp 34-35. 
180 Stavrakakis, p 151. 
181 Stavrakakis, p 47. 
the other, more troubling and complex questions of the revolutionary movements of 
1857-59. 
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We can detect in Lyall's early representation of Indian Muslims as slaves to a 
murderous unassuageable fury, a link in the chain that unites Alain Grosrichard's self-
pleasuring oriental despot of the late eighteenth century and Flora Annie Steel's early 
twentieth century economy of 'galling' enacted by the dispossessed Indian Muslim (see 
above, Section 1.4). But while both the 'jouissance' of the despot and the inexhaustible, 
self-destructive 'galling' of the later Indian Muslim take place in an apparently self-
enclosed system of representation - one in which the Muslim acts as a spectator by proxy 
for a distant British audience - in Lyall's more immediate despatches from the 'Mutiny' 
frontline the Christian bodies are placed squarely within the economy of insatiability. 
Indeed those bodies are quite clearly figured as the prime instigators of that economy -
the indivisible units of desire that propel the Muslim's actions. Nevertheless, the effect 
of circumscription is broadly comparable, since the narcissistic demand for recognition 
which produces the pure aggressivity of the Muslim simultaneously seals him in an 
economy of representation located, like that of the despot and Steel's dispossessed, 
beyond the immediate historical narrative. The preoccupation of the 'Mohamedan' with 
'mangling' Christians effectively lifts him out of the immediate revolutionary context of 
1857-59. His response thus fails to address the crucial but unspoken, question of power, 
while at the same time his over-compensatory engagement with the Anglo-Indians (as 
Christians rather than colonials) prevents the disclosure of the larger 'Mutiny' narrative 
by re-routing it into the, by then familiar, report of a communal riot. Within this 
historically occlusive interpretation, the murderous aggressivity of the Muslim becomes 
not only a means of answering the Anglo-Indian narcissistic demand for recognition, but 
of containing the Muslim potential for threatening the hegemony of the British Indian 
state - for it is the Christian Anglo-Indian, and not the British state, that is apparently 
under attack. 
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There are, then, three preliminary conclusions we can draw from this early 
representation of Indian Muslims in Lyall's writing. The first point to be made is that 
their representation is figured as a response to - indeed a compensation for - a certain 
passivity, or lack of engagement portrayed in the representation of Hindus. We might 
here also make the cognate observation that 'Hindoo' passivity is linked to the material 
referent of 'plunder', so that the elusive figure of the 'Hindoo' is wholly constructed 
through the underlying economic motive of colonial rule; and it is this conjunction which 
produces his disengagement and thus acts as a secondary incitement to mortal combat 
between Muslim and Christian. So while Muslim and Christian are apparently figured on 
a plane divorced from material referents, in fact their engagement is propelled by the 
prophylactic obsession of the 'Hindoo' with precisely those economic rewards. A quarter 
century later, in Asiatic Studies, this tripartite tableau is frequently reproduced, with the 
material referent of the 'Hindoo' body serving as a passive object of conversion, but 
operating in a strikingly similar manner of incitement to the two monotheistic 
combatants. However, now conflated with the Indian landscape against which the 
Muslim-Christian struggle takes place, the 'Hindoo' himself becomes, in a sense, an 
object of 'plunder' .182 The suggestion must therefore be made here that there exists a 
strong correlation between 'conversion' and 'plunder' in Lyall's symbology for which the 
lines are first clearly drawn in the connections between moral and material planes made in 
1857. 
The second conclusion that can be drawn from this early illustration of Lyall's tri-
partite perception of mutinous native society, is that the oppositional aggressivity of the 
'Mahomedan' is bound up with colonialist fantasy: that is, it sustains a system of 
representation that lies outside of history and that helps forestall a direct engagement with 
its problematics. This is something that must be borne in mind we come to consider the 
182 This tripartite conceit in particular organises Lyall's essay, 'Our Religious Policy in India', with its final 
apocalyptic battle-lines of conversion in which the Hindu is conflated with the landscape as both the 
background to, and the prize of, British-Muslim conflict (p 276). 
language surrounding Wahabi 'conspiracy'. The markedly apocalyptic language later 
employed there by Lyall (as well as on the subject of conversion) serves essentially 
conservative purposes. As Steven Goldsmith has pointed out, apocalyptic rhetoric in a 
political context is always an 'attempt to arrogate power by speaking in/of a voice that 
originates outside of history.' 183 At the same time, he writes, 'as a rule of thumb, this 
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wishing away of history reflects extraordinary, and seemingly insurmountable historical 
pressures.,184 The transhistoricising tendencies at work in Lyall's later reflections on the 
role of religious communities in Asia, and especially of the agency of Islam, thus have 
their roots firmly in the kinds of political needs served by Muslim 'conspiracy' in 1857. 
The third point to be noted here, is that at the heart of this representational system, 
circulating its economy, lies the Christian Anglo-Indian. This final observation needs to 
be underscored for the analysis that follows in the next section. At the same time as 
Lyall's typical mid-century 'revaluation' of Muslim-Christian persecution lifts the Anglo-
Indian beyond the contingencies of history, it retroactively authorises the renewal of an 
historically-contextualised Christian 'Civilian' (Indian Civil Service) identity - but one 
that is predicated on the presence and unappeasable demands of the Indian Muslim: 
predicated, that is, on the call to fantasy. For if we return to the narcissistic demand for 
authorisation as it is expressed by Lyall's embattled Civilian of 1857, we can detect a 
secondary, unspoken question prompted by that same element of 'insatiability' - or we 
might call it uncertainty - that seals the 'Mahometan' in an economy of desire and 
aggression. That question can be simplified as the classic Lacanian formulation of doubt: 
What does he really want from me?185 In seeking to defer the uncertainty it opens up, the 
young Civilian's implicit, necessary response - He wants me to be a Christian - promises 
to recreate his Christian identity as an irreducibly fantasmatic construction. 
18) Steven Goldsmith, Unbuilding Jerusalem: Apocalypse and Romantic Representation (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1993), p 21. 
184 Goldsmith, p 32. 
185 This is the Lacanian demand, Che Vuoi?, the response to which invariably represents the beginnings of 
fantasy (Zizek, Sublime, pp 110-29). This concept is given a fuller treatment in the next section. 
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In short, we can conclude that for Alfred Lyall, at the founding moment of its 
reconstruction in 1857, the Christian Civilian identity is based on - as with all 
fantasmatic constructions - a necessarily deferred realisation; and that both the incitement 
to its public reappearance and the agent of its deferral, is the representation of the Indian 
Muslim. In this respect, it could be said that the transcendence of that Christian identity 
- its ability to rise out of its Indian circumstances - is made possible by the presence of 
the murderous' Mahometan'. Here, we might refer back to The Indian Punch cartoon of 
the coat-of-arms for the 'ex-King of Delhi' by noting that the destruction of one (the 
Christian child) is precisely what serves to bring the other (the 'sable' Muslim hand) into 
visibility. Conversely for the young ICS officer, the Christians come into being through 
the over-determining presence of Muslim aggression, appearing only on the margins of 
'Mahometan' fanatical pursuit, and only as lifeless bodies - on the very point, that is, of 
their disappearance from Indian soil. It is this repeated ambiguous trope of occlusion, 
each protagonist produced and at the same time effaced by an over-determination of the 
other's representation, that should be borne in mind as we tum now to a fuller 
consideration of Muslim sectarian persecution in Lyall's correspondence. 
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Section 2.4: Fantasy and Civilian identity 
In Lyall's description of the Muslim insurgent in his letter of 11 July 1857, we have 
noted that the discovery of murderous Muslim aggression recasts the colonialist as 
persecuted Christian. At the same time, it also implies that the motivation of the 
'Mahometan' is not exhausted - or fully explained - by the attainment of the Christian 
body: 'murdering' the Christian will drive the Muslim on, but 'mangling' implies that it 
will not satisfy him. As suggested in Section 2.3, the secondary question entailed in this 
note of uncertainty corresponds to the Lacanian formulation' che vuoi?': 'what does the 
'Other' really want from me?' 186 It is a question brought on by the disjunction between 
the symbolic and imaginary ('Real') identifications perceived in the 'Other'; it seeks an 
impossible total identification between them, one that would erase the uncertainty 
contained in the act of representation. However, it is precisely this disjunction between 
representation and object (symbolic and Real) that circulates the economy of desire and 
necessitates further representation. Since the closure of that disjunction is itself an 
impossible desire, che vuoi? is a question that cannot finally be answered (and this 
follows the fundamental assumption in Lacanian thought that 'the politics of the subject, 
the politics of identity formation, can only be understood as a politics of 
impossibility' 187). For Lyall, then, what the 'Mahometan' actually wants from the 
Christian Anglo-Indian is only the starting point; it is his role as the 'Other' posing the 
question to the traumatized colonialist that is important. For it is at this point - at the 
emergence of the question che vuoi? - that ideological fantasies are constructed.188 
Ideologies, it has been remarked, are, effectively, social promises; they promise 
the restitution of 'a lost state of' harmony, unity and fullness'; 189 and in so far as all 
186 Zizek. Sublime pp 110-29. 
187 Stavrakakis, p 35. 
188 Zizek, Sublime, pp 114, 118. 
189 Stavrakakis, p 52. 
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ideologies posit the potential existence of an undivided social body - 'society' - they are 
essentially 'corporatist'. Indeed, as Slavoj Zizek has written, 'society as a Corporate 
Body is the fundamental ideological fantasy' .190 Just as individual fantasy aims at the 
restitution to the subject of a lost, pre-symbolic wholeness, collective ideological 
fantasies can be seen as the masks - or 'screens' - necessary to preserve the fiction of 
undivided social incorporation. 191 In Lacanian terms, fantasies mask the 'gap' that 
reveals the contingency of the Other, the misfit between the symbolic and the Real in all 
representations - and thus they seek to mask the contingency of the subject's own 
identity. In this sense, they are only an oblique response to the question 'che vuoi?': the 
uncertainty over what the 'Other' wants is transmuted through fantasy into what the 
subject needs. In the case of ideological fantasy, that need is for the effect of purposive -
indeed, utopian - social cohesion. 
On one level, then, it would be reasonable to characterise the implied imperative 
of , Mahomet an' aggression in Lyall's letter as the call to the reconstitution of a fractured 
Anglo-Indian sense of identity and motivation through the idea of Christian community. 
As discussed in Section 1.3 above, Homi Bhabha has located the primary fault-line for 
the colonialist sense of identity as lying between a liberal and 'enlightened' Metropolitan 
identity and an unpalatable colonialist rapacity, a paradox contained in his description of 
the colonialist as both 'father and oppressor'. Some historians have argued that although 
the events of 1857-59 may have briefly disclosed the self-image of despotism to the 
British in India in the vacuum left by the apparent repudiation of their liberal mission, it 
was a possibility quickly 'obscured' in the rush to decisive and terrifying retributive 
action. 192 The appeal of the ideology of Christian community as a means of swiftly 
190 Zizek, Sublime, p 126. 
191 Zizek, Sublime, p 126. 
192 Metcalf, Ideologies, p 44-46. Recent critiques of the subsequent literature of rebellion that came to 
preoccupy Anglo-Indian writers over the next fifty years, have suggested that the violence of that response 
by the British appears to have re-inscribed, rather than erased, the disjunction between despot and 
progenitor of liberal values. See Maire ni Fhlathuin, 'Anglo-Indian after the Mutiny: the Formation and 
Breakdown of National identity' in Stuart Murray, ed, Not on Any Map: Essays on Postcoloniality and 
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incorporating such a fractured colonialist identity during that initial period of extreme 
crisis, and redirecting its focus outward towards just such a retributive course of action, 
undoubtedly plays a part in explaining both the perception of Muslim 'conspiracy' in 
1857-59 and its early and widespread acceptance. We may recall here Geertz's 
explication of the' extrinsic theory' of ideology formation. The construction of cultural 
symbol-systems, he points out, 'come most crucially into play where the particular kind 
of information they contain is lacking, where institutionalized guides for behavior, 
thought, or feeling are weak or absent.' 193 It is this sudden absence of ideological 
guidance that prompted a turn towards a language of Christian solidarity in 1857. More 
particularly, the appeal of the perception of sectarian persecution which lies at the heart 
of Muslim 'conspiracy' in 1857 is reinforced by Geertz's conclusion that it is the attempt 
of such ideologies at a time of crisis 'to render otherwise incomprehensible social 
situations meaningful, to so construe them as to make it possible to act purposefully 
within them, that accounts both for the ideologies' highly figurative nature and for the 
intensity with which, once accepted, they are held.' 194 The sudden destruction of all 
institutional ideologies in 1857, and the problem of future meaningful action, would 
seem, superficially at least, to be key to the Civilian attachment to, and refusal to 
relinquish, the particular ideology of Muslim-led communal persecution. 
In its simultaneous linking of Muslim 'conspiracy' and Christian persecution, and 
its emphasis on the centrality of this perception to all subsequent events, Lyall's 
correspondence certainly bears out this proposition. The first mention of rumours of a 
sepoy mutiny occur in his letter to his mother, 7 April 1857; and the first concrete reports 
of an uprising in his letter to his father, 12 May 1857. Although he refers here to the 
'greased cartridges' (objectionable in their use of pig and cow fat, to both Hindu and 
Cultural Nationalism (Exeter: University of Exeter Press, 1997), pp 67-80; see also, Wurgraft. pp 68, 95-
100. 
193 Clifford Geertz, 'Ideology as a cultural system', in Robert Bocock and Kenneth Thompson (eds), 
Religion and Ideology: A Reader (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1985), p 81. 
194 G 82 Th . ,. . eertz, p . e Ita ICS are mme. 
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Muslim communities) as the cause of sepoy 'disaffection', there appears to be at this 
point no differentiation between Hindu and Muslim grievances. A month later, even after 
the outbreak of open rebellion in his own district of Meerut and the observation that a 
'Mussulman Nawab' has 'proclaimed himself commander of the district under the 
authority of the King of Delhi' , there is still no mention of a sectarian Muslim 
'conspiracy'. Indeed Lyall specifically exonerates the Mughal emperor - without 
glossing any religious affiliation - as an unwilling figurehead to the (again communally 
undifferentiated) 'mutineers' .195 It is only in the letter of 11 July - in which the tripartite 
tableau quoted in the preceding section is constructed - that the first references both to 
Muslim 'conspiracy' and to specifically Christian-orientated persecution occur (we may, 
for instance, compare it to the 14 June letter to his father, wherein the 
'murdered ... women and children' are only glossed as 'English'). From this point 
onwards in the correspondence, all atrocities (including the massacre at Cawnpore 
[Kanpur] by the followers of the Hindu rebel leader, Nana Sahib) are specifically put 
down to Muslim sectarian aggression towards the Christian British in India; 196 and the 
retrenchment of British paramountcy in India becomes, in part, a defence of Christian 
community in the face of sectarian hostility. The (often, self-) accusation of the despotic 
Civilian which had so preoccupied Lyall's pre-'Mutiny' correspondence home, and had 
called forth elaborate and indignant defences of the role of the British in India, is all but 
absent from the ensuing two years of correspondence. Indeed, it could be argued that the 
terms of those youthful defences (predominantly, employing the arguments of liberal 
patemalism l97) are transmuted exclusively, in all of Lyall's later published writing, into 
195 Letter to his father, 14 June 1857. 
196 Letter to his father, 30 August 1857; letter to Mr Holland, 13 March 1858; letter to his mother, 19 March 
1858; letter to his father, 14 May 1858; letter to his mother, 26 September 1858; letter to his father, 24 
November 1858; letter to Mr Holland, 27 March 1859. Lyall's rhetorical conversion of Nan a Sahib's 
followers should by no means be regarded as isolated: for his highly successful 'Mutiny' play, Jessie 
Brown; or the Relief of Lucknow, Dion Boucicault converted the Nana himself. Patrick Brantiinger, Rule of 
Darkness: British Literature and Imperialism, 1830-1914, (Ithica: Cornell University Press, 1988) p 206. 
197 See for instance, the letter to his mother of 25 June 1856, MSS Eur F 132/2; and the letter to his brother-
in-law Mr Holland, 17 January 1857. 
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the language of communal arbitration, where the only despotism recognized is religious -
and thus the object of Anglo-Indian scrutiny, rather than the subject of Civilian actions. 
If we take Lyall as, in this regard, a typical instance of the psychology of colonial 
governance in India at the time, the immediacy of this shift in focus not only indicates the 
centrality of the 'Mutiny' in the development of the 'communal narrative' which 
Gyanendra Pandey has argued for as the commanding centre of the colonialist mindset in 
nineteenth century India. 198 It also begins the task of replacing the question of colonialist 
religious identity as a complex and dynamic factor in the genesis of the language of, and 
the growing preoccupation with, 'communalism' and religious fanaticism, as the central 
issues of governance in late colonial India. 
The revolutionary nature of the conjunction of Christian Civilian and Muslim 
persecutor that appears in the letter of 11 July, is further emphasized by the fact that the 
possibility of an Indian Muslim impulse to rebellion is unprecedented in Lyall's 
correspondence up to this point. Indeed, between his arrival in Calcutta in January 1856 
and 11 July 1857, there are only two other references to Indian Muslims in the previous 
35 letters. 199 The first occurs on 22 February 1856, in which the 'Musulman' is preferred 
over Hindu servants as more trustworthy and worthy of 'respect'; the second appears in 
the letter of 7 April 1857 alongside, but not linked, to the first rumours of sepoy 
disaffection. In this letter, Lyall describes a visit to the 'Great Mosque' in Delhi which 
he abandons due to the 'disapproving countenances' of the 'true believers' there (their 
disapproval appears to be of his status as a non-Muslim tourist), and later details further 
gossip of a poster in the city calling on all Muslims to 'revolt' - but despite their textual 
juxtaposition he makes no connection between the two, and considers the possibility of 
an open rebellion only in terms of 'natives' coming together in 'combination': in terms, 
198 Pandey, p 17 
199 Papers of Alfred Lyall, British Library MSS Eur F 132/2, containing letters sent to his family in 1856; 
and MSS Eur F132/3. 
133 
that is, of the unity imparted to 'sepoys' by 'our army discipline'. The 11 July revelation 
of a specifically Muslim 'conspiracy', stemming from an unsuspected Muslim aggression 
towards the Christian British, must therefore be regarded as the creation of a new and 
paradigmatic understanding of Indian Muslims in Lyall's thought - a micro-instance, 
then, of the paradigm formation that has been (in Sections 2.1 and 2.2) posited in Anglo-
Indian perceptions of Indian Muslims during this period. 
The use of the word 'paradigm' here is deliberate. The sudden change that occurs 
at this point in Lyall's correspondence - as in Anglo-Indian discourse in general- bears a 
striking parallel to Thomas Kuhn's account of the way in which new paradigms are 
created in scientific revolutions, marking off the development of a scientific field from 
the previously encyclopaedic and inchoate groups of observations and recondite 
information that formed its only structure. In such revolutions in scientific knowledge, 
the new paradigm changes the manner and direction of all subsequent research; it 
narrows down the field and re-directs its focus, which is hereafter always dependent on -
either leading towards or emerging out of - the further 'articulation' of that paradigm?OO 
For Lyall, the change in direction, focus and understanding of Indian Muslims that occurs 
around the time of his letter of 11 July is nothing less than just such a revolution, 
organising all previously loosely-structured knowledge and re-focusing it in a novel 
direction that would endure for the rest of his Indian career. Only two months earlier he 
had assured his mother that his sister-in-law, Mary Jane, would be perfectly safe in the 
Indian hill district where she was currently staying, since there she would 'have no 
dealings with the Hindoo' (18 May 1857). By 'dealings' with 'the Hindoo', Lyall refers 
to the barbarities of the rebels in general, indicating that at this point 'Hindoo' and 
'mutineer' were for him entirely interchangeable descriptions. After 11 July, however, 
200 Thomas S Kuhn, The Structure o/Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, repro 
1996; 1962), pp 10-34. The connections that are made below between Lyall's early correspondence and his 
later published writings illustrate just this relationship of a revolutionary paradigm to its dependent field of 
'knowledge' . 
the focus turns swiftly to the Muslims, so that for the next four months every letter is 
punctuated by a reference to Muslim treachery, bloodthirsty behaviour (almost never 
specifically detailed) or sectarian aggression. 
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The creation of a new paradigm for Indian Muslims does not occur in isolation. It 
is in fact a dual revolution, in that the revelation of the treacherous Muslim appears 
effectively to engender Lyall's discovery of a Christian component to the identity of the 
Civilian. For, as with the now linked trope of Muslim/persecutor, the Civilian is here 
considered for the first time in Lyall's letters, as a visibly Christian identification (one 
that appears to be bestowed - indeed, insisted upon - by others). Although the 
propagation of Christianity has been discussed with his brother-in-law, Mr Holland, it is 
talked of purely under the provenance of unsponsored (and in his opinion, misguided) 
missionary activity; the state plays no part in any of his deliberations on the subject.2ol 
The notion of the Anglo-Indian bureaucrat being perceived as a Christian is thus born 
into the correspondence as a whole only at the point of Muslim sectarian aggression-
again, a forceful micro-instance of the larger process sketched in Section 2.2, and 
illustrated there by the cartoon of the 'ex-King of Delhi's' arms, where Christian and 
Muslim are produced as interdependent icons. If we concede that Christian incorporation 
acts as an ideological foundation for the re-integration of a fractured Anglo-Indian 
Civilian identity, we might then plausibly conclude that, in Lyall's writing at this time, 
the idea of Muslim 'conspiracy' is at least integral to, if not partly at the service of, its 
construction. However, the precise nature of that identification, and its role as an 
ideologically cohesive foundation for psychologically cogent, punitive action, is perhaps 
less straightforward than may at first appear. As we shall see, these complexities in 
201 Letter of 17 January 1857. The only other mention of his own Christian identity comes in his letter to 
his sister Sibylla, 24 February 1857, when he relates how the native staff in his office had to remind him of 
Ash Wednesday, and upbraid him for neglecting his duty to observe it. We might even regard this as a 
proleptic instance in the correspondence of Civilian religiosity being 'discovered' at the hands of native 
insistence. 
Lyall's correspondence have important consequences for the kind of representations of 
Indian Muslims on which the Civilian-Christian identification is primarily dependent. 
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Not the least part of the appeal of such an identification was the potential it 
contained for re-soldering Anglo-Indian connections to Metropolitan Britain. As Linda 
Colley makes clear in her recent study of the narratives of British subjects captured by 
Muslim polities from the seventeenth to nineteenth centuries, the British Protestant 
identity that was forged in this period, came about not only in contradistinction to 
Catholic Europe, but partly through periodic, orchestrated 'Islamaphobic' campaigns, in 
which the Church of England played a leading, and formative, role?02 Fears of forced 
conversion, mutilation and execution were played up and disseminated throughout the 
local parishes - often taken door to door by the parish priest in search of campaign 
contributions towards ransom demands.203 Indeed, some of the narratives of returned 
captives were composed specifically as re-affirmations of Protestant faith, and were 
frequently brought out by Anglican publishers.204 During the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries in particular, then, the spectre of Muslim sectarian persecution had formed an 
important element in welding together a specifically Protestant British public. 
Colley's observations extrapolate the point made by Norman Daniel, in his 
seminal study of European discourses on Islam during the mediaeval period, that 
polemical arguments about Muslims and Islamic doctrine, even when nominally 
addressed to Muslims, were always primarily aimed at the formation of European 
Christian communities of opinion.205 In reflecting on the later career of mediaeval 
conceptions of Islam, Daniel points out that the literature of the enlightenment period was 
largely structured by the content of earlier mediaeval concepts, such as the essentialised 
202 Colley, p 76. 
203 Colley, p 78. 
204 C olley, p 92. 
205 Norman Daniel, Islam and the West: the Making of an Image (Oxford: Oneworld; 1960, 1997), P 304; a 
similar point is made in Maxime Rodinson, Europe and the Mystique of Islam, trans Roger Deinus 
(London: I B Tauris, 1988), pp 8, 18. 
violence of the religion, and Mohammed's 'hypocritical' nature;206 and that among 
nineteenth century Europeans, 'the English Christians ... exhibited more clearly the 
continuing influence of an unmodified mediaeval tradition at its most 
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.. , 207 N h I h' h h uncompromIsmg. . evert e ess, t e eIg teent century may also be seen as a turning 
point in Britain in the manner in which the mediaeval notion of Islam as a misguided, and 
foredoomed, schism of Christianity came to be largely re-figured as a means of attacking 
a perceived decadence in British Protestantism.208 This was nowhere more apparent than 
in Gibbon's influential history, The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire (1776), in 
which the advent of Islam itself is figured as a response to the disarray of the Christian 
Church, sealing Islam and Christianity into reciprocal patterns of decay and 
'revolution' .209 Gibbon clearly intended his historiographical conclusions to reach out as 
exempla to a contemporary audience, at times making direct comparisons between 
zealous Muslim societies and the 'the present decay of religious fervour' among British 
Christians.2lo His descriptions of a fanatical, protestant Muslim rebuke to Christian 
apathy were then rephrased in the nineteenth century by popular historians such as 
Charles Mills, who saw Muslim-Christian confrontations throughout history increasingly 
in terms of the moral probity of the latter, especially in the early Crusades, in rising to the 
challenge of and confronting a belligerent and territorially voracious Muslim polity.2Il 
206 Daniel, pp 310-13. 
207 Daniel, p 326. 
208 Daniel, p 304; Albert Hourani, Islam in European Thought (Cambridge: University of Cambridge Press; 
1991,1996), pp 19-22. 
209 Edward Gibbon, The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, (London: Chatto and Windus, repro 1992; 
1960), P 649. Lyall's perception of contemporary decadence in the Anglican church is certainly influenced 
by his reading of Gibbon's portrait of the early Christian church -letter to his mother, 21 May 1858. 
210 Gibbon, Decline, p 669. 
211 Elizabeth Siberry, The New Crusaders: Images of the Crusades in the Nineteenth and Early Twentieth 
Centuries, (Aldershot: Ashgate Pub, 2000), pp 10-11; Charles Mills, An History of Muhammedanism 
comprising the life and character of the Arabian prophet and succinct accounts of the Empires founded by 
Muhammedan arms (London: 1817); Mills, History of the Crusades (London: Longman, 1820). It is worth 
noting here that Mills' History of Muhammedanism was dedicated to and encouraged by the Orientalist and 
Governor of Bombay, Sir John Malcolm, marking one instance ofthe permeable boundaries running 
between popular Metropolitan literature, the specialised world ofthe British Orientalists, and Anglo-Indian 
governance. Others that may be cited with reference to Crusade historiography during the first half of the 
nineteenth century include: the biography of the seminal seventeenth century poet of crusader lore, 
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By the mid-nineteenth century it was this view that had come to dominate the British 
perception of past Muslim-Christian confrontations, appealing broadly to the popular 
imagination, often through Church-sponsored publications such as that put out in 1851 by 
the Library of Useful Knowledge, entitled The Soldier of the Cross, or Scenes and Events 
from the Times of the Crusades, in which the incursions of the Crusades had become 
simpler parables of zealous Christian defense against a 'growing Moslem menace' .212 
Throughout the nineteenth century the figure of the Crusader was reproduced as a model 
of Christian endeavour, described and eulogized in such mass-reproduced works as 
Kenelm Digby's The Broad Stone of Honour (1822); and it was these' hugely popular' 
manuals of chivalry that largely determined the British public apprehension of Muslim 
conduct - and appropriate Christian response - in far-flung lands.213 
Lyall's own recourse to a language of Muslim sectarian persecution should be set 
against this background of Metropolitan expectations of Muslim-Christian rivalry. The 
conjunction of Muslim 'conspiracy' and the ideology of Christian community represents, 
in part, an attempt to offset the anxiety that is manifested time and again in his letters that 
his experiences during the 'Mutiny' have isolated him further from his Metropolitan 
background; and that the public 'at home' have utterly failed to understand or sympathise 
with the horrendous experiences of besieged Anglo-Indians in 1857_59.214 In this regard, 
the resurrection of the language of the Crusades in figuring the possibility of purposive 
(that is, retributive) Christian action is at least a predictable element of the 
correspondence.215 Lyall's use of it marries his cause and circumstances to a common 
Torquato Tasso, by the Bishop of Calcutta, R Milman; and James Burnes, the Physician General oflndia, 
who published A Sketch of the History of the Knights Templar, (Edinburgh: Blackwood, 1837). 
212 Siberry, p 20. 
213 Siberry, p 38; see also, Mark Girouard's useful survey of the popular literature that drove the 
nineteenth-century reconfiguration ofthe Crusading legends in The Return to Camelot. 
214 This anxiety appears to reach a climax with the return of one of his letters home in 1857, whose content 
he feared had utterly alienated him from his family. Letter to his father, 30 August 1857, MSS Eur FI32/3; 
see also his letter to his sister, Catherine, 20 January 1859, in which he continues to apologise for the 
'bloodthirsty' words that caused the earlier rift. 
215 See for instance, the letters to his father on 24 November 1857 and 14 May 1858. 
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source of British national imagination, one that, as Colley convincingly illustrates from 
the fall of Tangiers in the seventeenth century to the retreat from Kabul in the 1840s, had 
brought together the British public at home and their colonialist compatriots imperiled in 
distant lands by Muslim aggression. 
What is perhaps less amenable to this broad level of explanation, is the way in 
which that element is repeatedly articulated in the correspondence in terms of deferral 
and displacement. For instance, on 24 November 1858, Lyall writes to his father: 
The Mussulmans have always been the deadly enemies of Christians, and always 
will be. You will never convert them, and had better make up your mind to 
extirpate them from Europe. I declare that nothing would give me greater pleasure 
than to join in a regular crusade against every Mohametan in any country where 
Christians dwell, and to try in fair fight the battle of the Cross against the Crescent. 
[letter 24 November 1858] 
The conjunction of Christian and Muslim under the rubric of retributive action is here 
displaced outside of colonial India (with the suggestion that such a course of action might 
well be pursued in Europe), and into the conditional future ('Nothing would give me 
greater pleasure'). Lyall's frame of reference here of course, is to the continuing reality 
of Ottoman power as an obstacle, both militarily and financially, to European trading 
ambitions in the first half of the nineteenth century?16 The symbolic power that it held 
for Britons in this period is well captured by the popular reception and enduring appeal of 
Byron's Turkish Tales (which Lyall cites in his letter to his father, 24 July 1857), which 
re-interpreted the idea of Christian and Muslim in armed, chivalric conflict, re-Iocating 
the scene, for a Romantic readership, from the Middle East to the borders of Europe and 
updating it to more recent times?17 Nevertheless, it is significant that Lyall turns away 
216 C A Bayly, Imperial Meridian: The British Empire and the World 1780-1830 (Harlow: Longman, 
1989), pp 229-33; Martin Lynn, 'British Policy, Trade, and informal Empire in the Mid-Nineteenth 
Century, in Andrew Porter (ed), The Oxford History of the British Empire, Volume 4: The Nineteenth 
Century (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp 111-12, 117-20. Hereafter cited as OHBE 4. 
217 Nigel Leask, British Romantic Writers and the East: Anxieties of Empire (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1992), Chapter One; Mohammed Sharafuddin, Islam and Romantic Orientalism: Literary 
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from the immediacy of the colonial encounter to draw on this more distantly felt scene of 
conflict, for the pattern here of displacement, temporal and geographical, is one common 
to Civilian accounts of the Muslim-British encounter in 1857?18 Within colonial India 
itself, Lyall's locution appears to suggest, a 'regular crusade' and 'fair fight' is not 
possible. When the prospect of carrying out such a religiously-sectarian course of action 
in India is occasionally brought up in his correspondence, it is either to be prosecuted 
solely in terms of lawful political retribution (that for instance, 'they' - as implicitly non-
denominational Civilians - should be left alone by the 'philanthropizing' Metropolitan 
public to 'settle accounts well and fully with the Mussulman and sepoys,219); or the 
Christian element to the equation is displaced onto an impersonally-expressed 
subordinate consequence, semantically divorced from the direct actions of Civilians: 
As for the Mahometans they may appeal to our generosity and mercy, but they 
cannot complain of injustice, whatever we may do ... Ifthe Mussulmans could by 
any means be entirely exterminated, it would be the greatest possible step towards 
civilizing and Christianizing Hindostan.22o 
Effectively, there is no instance in the correspondence of the proposition that Anglo-
Indian Civilians as Christians would be capable (or desirous) of joining in a retributive 
crusade against Muslims in colonial India. 
The most immediate historiographical explanation for this repeatedly circuitous 
locution is that while a de facto 'confessional state' may, as Bayly contends, have been 
operating before 1857, the sociology of the Raj described by Washbrook, and entrenched 
well before the 'Mutiny', foreclosed the option of the open declaration of a Christian 
sectarian government. Even at the height of the Mutiny, it appears to have only been 
considered by a few - an extremist, evangelical element - among the Civilians in 
Encounters with the East (London: I B Tauris, repro 1996; 1994), pp 214-74. The significance of Lyall's 
reference to 'The Giaour' is discussed in more detail below. 
218 See below for a further discussion of this kind of displacement in other Civilian accounts. 
219 Letter to his mother, 19 March 1858. 
220 Letter to his father, 14 May 1858. 
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India?21 In the preceding half-decade, at the level of policy-making the only effect of 
Christian evangelical pressures on colonial governance in India would seem to have been 
the gradual devolution by the state of powers and properties pertaining to native religious 
institutions 'directly to authorities - priests and trustees - constituted within them. ,222 
Although there was an increase in official toleration of missionary attacks on their 
religious traditions and customs throughout the 1840s and 1850s, during and in the 
immediate aftermath of 1857-59 these were widely seen as the (reprehensible) key to 
native disaffection.223 While there is no direct reference in Lyall's letters to Christian 
evangelism as a cause of native disaffection, we can reasonably assume a certain level of 
self-censorship as a member of the ICS, and one to whom the future of British rule in 
India was always a pressing concern.224 And yet, as we have argued above, a Christian 
Civilian identity within the letters is first expressed as an affect of Muslim persecution. 
How then can we understand this identity as an ideological promise of cohesion, and 
more particularly, as a basis for future action, if it cannot be expressed as a common 
vehicle for retribution? 
We can begin to answer this question by testing out the distinction between a 
generalized language of morally-enjoined Biblical retribution that pre-dates Lyall's 11 
July revelation of Muslim 'conspiracy', and a specifically Christian Civilian language of 
victim-hood that structures his subsequent thoughts on Muslim involvement. This 
apparent differentiation can be initially characterized in Lyall's correspondence as the 
language of the Old and New Testaments; that is (for the purposes of this discussion), as 
the languages of, respectively, punishment and martyrdom. We may take as an example 
of the former, his letter to his father of 14 June 1857, anticipating the revenge which he 
thought would soon be enacted upon the Delhi mutineers: 
221 See for instance H B Edwardes, Our Indian Empire: Its Beginning and End (London: Young Men's 
Christian Association, 1861). 
222 D A Washbrook, 'India, 1818-1860: The Two Faces of Colonialism', in Porter (ed), OHBE 3, P 416. 
223 Washbrook, 'India', pp 416-417, 420. 
224 Letters to his mother, 26 December 1858,27 February 1859. 
At any rate, I trust that our soldiers will kill all in Delhi. I was greatly struck by the 
appropriateness of the First Lesson of last Sunday, which told how Joshua went up 
against the royal city of Ai, and smote all the inhabitants with the edge of the 
sword. I intend to draw my morality from the Old Testament for some time to 
come. I never until now thoroughly appreciated the wholesale slaughters and 
cruelties of the Jewish chiefs. But this is a horrible country ... 
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This reference to the Old Testament, and its morally-sanctioned codes of vengeance, are 
entirely typical both of the writings of British protagonists of 1857-59, and of the 
nineteenth century historians who later attempted to explain the violence of the British 
during this period (Kaye, for instance, wrote in 1864 of Englishmen who were ready 'to 
strike at once, smiting everywhere, hip and thigh, like the grand remorseless heroes of the 
Old Testament'225). Lewis Wurgraft refers to this language as the 'scriptural framework' 
used to contain an unpalatable British savagery, which was otherwise routinely displaced 
on to the native rebels.226 This observation needs some qualification. In Lyall's use of it 
here, the Biblical language of retribution has a twofold, paradoxical effect of morally 
aggrandizing British violence, and at the same time sealing it within a barbaric pre-
modem context - and so implicitly equating it to a peculiarly Indian, rather than British, 
circumstance, since India was commonly figured as a primitive and ancient phase of 
civilization frozen in time by the mediaeval Muslim invasions. For Lyall, as for many of 
the British at that time, the savagery of 1857-59 was a reversion brought about by an 
eternally barbaric Indian context.227 The accession to a language of Biblical retribution 
thus signals the rupture of the 'liberal mission' and the ensuing sedimentation in British 
perceptions of Indian society in the latter half of the nineteenth century as a mediaeval 
and intransigent feudal construct, one that insists upon, and incites, a similar response 
from the Civilian. But as Lyall's letters repeatedly demonstrate, this accession also 
225 John William Kaye, History of the Sepoy War in India. 1857-8 (London: W HAllen, 1864), Volume 2, 
f: 208, quoted in Wurgraft, p 97. 
26 On the historiographical dichotomy of the savage 'mutineer' and the 'emotional control' ofthe 'stem 
and resolute Englishman' constructed after 1857, see Wurgraft, pp 95-100. 
227 Letter to his father, 30 August 1857; letter to his mother, 19 March 1858. For another contemporary 
example, see Thornhill, p 115. 
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displaces the British as Christian avengers - into the past, and onto others. In this regard, 
the language of Old Testament retribution is as much the negation as the revelation, of a 
modem Anglo-Indian Christian identity. This is an important aspect of the Biblical 
language of retribution, one that makes it comparable to the New Testament rhetoric of 
Christian martyrdom associated with Muslim sectarian persecution. In terms of self-
representation, both displace rather than access, the idea of an immediate Christian-
Civilian identification, the one into a pre-Muslim past, and the other, as we shall explore 
below, into an impossible, post-Muslim future. 
Before we tum to the language of martyrdom, there are two further points to be 
made about the inter-relationship of the two Biblical languages. They concern the 
specific displacement here onto the' Jewish chiefs'. It is necessary to bear in mind that in 
European historiography of the Middle Ages, Islam and Judaism were often conflated as 
cognate Semitic forms of idolatry; more recently, in the wake of William Jones' 
philological divisions of language and civilisation into Indo-European (Aryan) and 
Semitic categories, the idea of the' Semitic spirit' lay behind much of Orientalist thinking 
in the nineteenth century.228 The first point to be noted, then, is that the language of 
atrocity used here - 'wholesale slaughters and cruelties of the Jewish chiefs' - anticipates 
the kind of rhetoric that Lyall later comes to confine exclusively to Indo-Muslim acts.229 
The second observation, is that in making his larger point about the barbarous 
divisiveness of Indian society through reference to the wars of the 'Jewish chiefs', Lyall 
accesses a latent mode of anti-Semitic discourse still prevalent in the first half of the 
nineteenth century. This line of thought in popular British culture continued to 
characterise Jews as radically unassimilable, a people apart who were to be contrasted 
with - and were thought of as pernicious to - nationalist cohesion.23o Such a form of 
228 Rodinson, p 12; Hourani, pp 27ff. 
229 This point is made in more detail below. 
230 Frank Felsenstein, Anti-Semitic Stereotypes: A Paradigm of Otherness in English Popular Culture, 
/660-/830 (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1999) pp 246-47. 
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anti-Semitic discourse should be borne in mind as potentially immanent to the later 
deployment of the Semiticised Indian 'Mussulman' in Lyall's letters as a figure divisive 
to the coherence of a pan-social insurrection in India in 1857 - as, essentially, an insular 
group within the body of insurgents, but responding to an extra-national agenda. As the 
Reverend Cave-Browne, stationed in the Peshawar valley in 1857, signals when he 
describes the effect of Muslim 'conspiracy' on 'native' Indian society as 'the flame 
which was brought from without' , the perception of a renewed relationship of the Indian 
Muslim to his non-indigenous Semitic origins was a pervasive, if often latent, by-product 
of 1857_59.231 Indeed, by the late 1870s it had become a commonplace of 'Mutiny' 
historiography.232 Both these points - Semitic violence, and the suggestion of a divisive, 
extra-national Semitic agenda - must be understood as stereotypical signs of 
identification brought forward by the British revision of their perception of Indian 
Muslims in 1857-59. It is partly for this reason that the Old Testament language of 
retribution falls away after 11 July in Lyall's correspondence: the framework of 
'Semitic' codes of revenge is displaced on to the 'bloodyminded' Muslims; the disunity 
of 'native' society encapsulated by their separate agenda. In other words, the language of 
the Old Testament is already partially present in their representation; to have invoked 
those codes of tribal revenge in reference to British interaction with Indian Muslims 
would have thus brought the Civilian within the system of representation constructed 
precisely to mask his complicity, and to preserve his apparent independence (this point is 
taken up in more detail below). In this sense, the shift from a Biblical language of 
231 Rev J Cave-Browne, The Punjab and Delhi in 1857. Being a Narrative of the Measures by which the 
Punjab was Saved and Delhi Recovered During the Indian Mutiny (Edinburgh: William Blackwood and 
Sons, 1861) P 7. My italics. 
232 We can hear it in, for instance, The Story of the Indian Mutiny (Edinburgh: Nimmo, Hay and Mitchell, 
1878), as the author describes the effects on the 'Mohammedans' of a prophecy foretelling the demise of 
the British: 'They, with Shylock-expressiveness, washing their hands with invisible soap, noiselessly 
laying the one palm on the other; while they flashed an Oriental resolve on blood from their amber eyes, 
did something more than intend that upon [the foretold day] a merciless centenary should be held. They 
would, at whatever cost of blood and treasure expel from their country the Nazarene intruders, and restore 
the power of the followers of the Prophet.' (p 20). 
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retribution to one of martyrdom should be regarded as more apparent than real. It could 
almost be said that in his representations of Indian Muslims, Lyall employs both 
languages at once, the one, as it were, persecuting - and thus inciting - the other. 
In the light of the multiple forms of displacement evident in the Old Testament 
rhetoric of retribution, we can now consider more precisely the language of Christian 
martyrdom at the hands of Muslim 'fanatics'. It is here that Zizek's observations about 
the connections between the element of impossibility at the heart of the Lacanian politics 
of identity, and the idea of deferred fulfillment inscribed into all social ideologies, can be 
utilized to complicate our understanding of Muslim 'conspiracy' in Lyall's writing. We 
can begin to unpack this insight with reference to a particular aspect of the deferral of 
purposive Christian Civilian action: the element of parity that it appears to signal 
between the representation of Christian Civilian and 'Mahometan' desires. From 11 July 
when the idea first enters the correspondence, Lyall's perception of Muslim persecution 
is immediately and repeatedly linked to the question of retribution, which is in tum 
characterised as an unfulfillable fantasy, balked by the impossibility of ever adequately 
carrying out such a revenge.233 In this immediate sense, the fantasy of Christian Civilian 
identity represents an ideological promise that can never be realized. 'Christian' reaction 
is deferred as soon as it is voiced, whereas a more generalized and secular language of 
retribution finds unrestricted expression throughout Lyall's letters. For instance, writing 
to his father on 1 June 1857 describing the lawless actions of local villagers, Lyall boasts 
that: 
I have been instrumental in causing some of them to be hanged and shot and 
flogged, and I never feel the slightest compassion. These cowardly villains have 
robbed and murdered hundreds of travellers and others, and I intend to shoot them 
down wherever I meet them. I flatter myself that I have done much against them 
already. I have burnt two villages to the ground and intend to bum twenty more. 
233 See in particular, letters of 11 July 1857; 13 March 1858; 14 May 1858; 24 November 1858. 
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In contrast to such straightforward assertions, on 11 July Lyall immediately follows up 
his observation that it is the 'Mahometans' who have led the way in the 'barbarous 
murdering and mangling of the Christians', with the conjoint, and consecutive, 
observation that 'I'm afraid we shall never repay them as they deserve' .234 This, the first 
mention in his correspondence of the theory of Muslim 'conspiracy', is immediately 
coupled with the idea of a revenge that, like the insatiability of the' Mahomedan' , can 
never be consummated. At the very outset of Lyall's perception of a united Muslim 
opposition, then, the reader is struck by a curious parity between 'Mahometan' and 
'Christian' desires. The element of balked fulfillment, it seems, engenders the parametric 
terms of their representation. Indeed, an undisclosed measure of reciprocity could be said 
to exist between the limits imposed on those representations. Not only are both reliant on 
the element of deferral for the continuing forms of their interaction, but the (necessarily 
incomplete) representation of either infers, and depends upon, the simultaneous presence 
and frustration of the other. Moreover, because, from 11 July onwards the Christian 
vocabulary of Old Testament retribution is gradually replaced by a language of enforced 
martyrdom (of, that is, the impossibility of Christian revenge )235 centred on Muslim 
'conspiracy', the very idea of a Christian Civilian ideology is only thereafter ever fully 
accessed in the letters in the form of the murderous but forever frustrated, Muslim. In 
other words, it exists purely through its own repeated, endless destruction. 
234 Letter to his father 11 July 1857. 
235 The enforced martyrdom of Lyall's letters should be distinguished from an Evangelical Protestant 
rhetoric of Christian martyrdom that emerged soon after the outbreak of the 'Mutiny'. The terms of that 
rhetoric were partly a response to the more generalised usage of Christian 'martyrdom' commonly 
circulating among the Anglo-Indian community. In this regard, see for instance the attempts made by the 
Reverend William Owen to separate out his own accounts of 'Mutiny' martyrdom as evincing the requisite 
criteria of public confession and adherence to the Christian faith, and a willingness to die for that 
adherence. His specific disavowal of the mass of victims at Cawnpore as true martyrs is made for precisely 
those reasons (Owen, Memorials o/Christian Martyrs, and other Sufferers/or the Truth in the Indian 
Rebellion (London: Simpkin, Marshall, 1859), p 26-27, 180). Owen's concern is to articulate a Christian 
'victory' over 'sin and satan'; Lyall, on the other hand, draws no such doctrinal conclusions or distinctions 
from his accounts. As discussed below, the idea of Christian 'martyrdom' is here (and in other 'Mutiny' 
accounts) conscripted into a wider Anglo-Indian cultural rhetoric of victim-hood forged during the 
'Mutiny'. 
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If we tum these observations inside out, we can initially conclude that the entire 
system of representation of Muslim 'conspiracy' - and along with it, the ideology of 
Christian martyrdom - is structured through the mutual incitement of what we might 
think of as Christian Civilian and Muslim 'insatiability'. In this regard, it is unsurprising 
that the parameters of impossibility that determine both are the only stable coordinates 
that accompany the trajectory of Muslim 'conspiracy' in the letters. All other tropes 
surrounding this rhetoric seem to accumulate value and attach themselves more or less 
gradually, and more or less exclusively, to its emergent forms. These two elements, on 
the other hand, appear and remain fixed in relation to each other from 11 July onwards, 
reproduced only under the auspices of Muslim 'conspiracy'. Whenever Muslim 
'insatiability' is flagged (through a recurrent declension of 'fanatical hatred,236), deferred 
Christian retribution (most frequently signaled by Lyall's use of the conditional tense237) 
is quickly, and often immediately, brought into view.238 Moreover, that reciprocity can 
be inferred even when it is not specifically invoked. In other words, a Civilian ideology 
of communal solidarity and (deferred) purpose becomes the invisible partner to the 
progress of Muslim 'insatiability'. In terms of the representation of Muslims, this 
conjunction becomes over the course of two years, quite literally, catastrophic. Muslim 
'insatiability' is globalised through a rhetoric of apparently meaningless blood-lust that 
spills out beyond the bounds of Muslim-Christian encounters and comes to organise all 
other forms of representation in the letters.239 We can chart the fleshing out of this 
236 11 July, 30 August 1857; 19 March 1858; 24 November 1858; 18 September 1859 
237 For instance: 'I would see any number of Mussulmans cut to pieces' (30 August 1857; or 'I could go 
every day and glut my eyes with the sight [of dead Musulmans), but ... ', (23 October 1857); or 'Ifby any 
means the Musulaman could be entirely exterminated ... ' (14 May 1858). Italics added. 
238 See in particular, 11 July, 30 August 1857; 13 March, 14 May, 24 November 1858 
239 On Muslim 'bloodthirstiness', see in particular the letter to his mother, 19 March 1858: 'the Indian 
Mussalman is beyond comparison the most obscenely bloody monster that ever was created ... Nearly every 
act of peculiar turpitude that has been done by the low Mahometan mob, set on by the higher Mussulmans, 
and especially by the Moulvies etc etc [ sic). And if [to) the bloody nature of anyone atrocity there be 
superadded a dash of obscenity, you may safely attribute it to a Mussulman.' The' etc etc' would here 
seem to flag the ways in which Lyall appears to be drawing on common discourses, both within the Anglo-
Indian and Metropolitan communities. 
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process by examining its effect on the parallel role of the 'Hindoos' over the course of the 
year before and after 11 July. What we find is that as the language of Muslim 
'bloodthirstiness' inflates, the references to caste (for instance, 'Goojur') outrages abates 
and becomes subsumed under the swiftly solidifying - and cleansing - category of 
'Hindoo'. So revolutionary and comprehensive is this parallel process of globalisation 
that not only does caste disappear for a while as a meaningful descriptive category from 
the correspondence, but by 30 August, the category of 'Hindoo' itself appears cleansed of 
complicity in what is by now an exclusively 'Mahometan conspiracy', leaving Lyall free 
to tell his mother that: 'I do not bear any spite against the Hindoos (excepting the 
sepoys) and I am always rather sorry to see them killed ... '. By 13 March 1858, in a letter 
to his brother-in-law, Mr Holland, he confidently describes the rebels as 'Mahometans 
and sepoys' only. By 26 September 1858, the revolution in paradigms is complete: 
Lyall avows to his mother that even 'Hindoo sepoys' are 'guiltless' of all atrocities. 
Given the reciprocity that we have already noted between the two forms of 'insatiability', 
we can see how, effectively, representations of the 'Mutiny' as a whole in the 
correspondence are increasingly organised by an implicit ideology of Anglo-Indian 
communal solidarity - but one that is crucially dependent on the management and 
globalisation of Muslim 'conspiracy' .240 
We can press this point about reciprocity further by returning again to the 'Ex-
King of Delhi's Coat of Arms'. We may recall how the interdependence there of Muslim 
and Christian iconography becomes meaningful only within the overarching Mughal 
framework of the whole. The clarity of the Christian symbol (the child's 'halo') is not 
matched by the 'sable hand'; it is the determining framework of the deposed (Muslim) 
monarch that invests their coexistence with meaning. In literal terms, neither Mughal nor 
240 We may note too a forceful illustration here of the larger process discussed in Section 2.2 in which, 
during the 'Mutiny', the discourse centred on caste (here, the Gujar caste) is literally overwhelmed and 
absorbed into the previously loosely perceived larger affiliative religious identities - even though the two 
discourses might seem irreconcilable (as here with the rebellious 'Goojurs' and the exonerated 'Hindoos'). 
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martyred child can generate their full meaning without the other. Thus the Mughal is 
invested with an Islamic sign by the 'halo', which in tum brings to life the 'sable hand' as 
a sectarian element driving the whole system of meaning. Similarly, even as they appear 
to engender it, both 'halo' and 'hand' are themselves only made meaningful by the 
Mughal-Muslim framework. This reciprocity is the source of the tension that Lyall's 
correspondence viscerally draws out, and which the element of deferral holds in such 
precarious balance. Even as Muslim 'conspiracy' supplies the political meaning of the 
'Mutiny' as a whole, it must, in representational terms, evoke, and draw its own rationale 
from, the trope of Christian Civilian martyrdom. In other words, like the 'sable hand', it 
can never fully take its place as a self-generating system of representation. Conversely, 
however, it is the invariable presence of the murderous Muslim that is required to invest 
the emptied Civilian identity with (Christian) meaning. The role of deferral, then, is not 
simply tangential to the system of representation by which Muslim 'conspiracy' operates 
in the letters. It is in fact crucial to its continued functioning since, by acting as a 
prophylactic between the Christian, Civilian and Muslim elements, it forestalls the 
immediate disclosure of the paradox of reciprocity by which the system as a whole is 
upheld. Just as the Muslim must be forever striving for, but never reaching, his desired 
genocidal goal, the Christian Civilian can not even begin to plumb the depths of 
communal retribution. The moment he does so, the system of representation collapses. 
In this regard, then, we may say that within the correspondence the idea of 
Muslim 'conspiracy' can have coherence only so long as it remains immanent to, but not 
actually coexisting with, the representations of the Christian Civilian. Deferral and 
displacement act to preserve that immanence, so that, like the 'Coat of Arms', it is always 
maintained as the outer framework lending coherence to the representations (for instance, 
Muslims attacking Christians) within - even as, paradoxically, its own meaning is 
entirely constituted by them. If we briefly tum again to the letter of 11 July in which 
Muslim 'conspiracy' is first figured, we can begin to perceive some of the other means by 
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which that immanence is preserved. For the tableau of 11 July is literally as well as 
figuratively, a staged encounter. The letter in fact describes Lyall's participation in a 
British attack on a local fort in which some insurgents who had been 'plundering' the 
countryside had taken refuge. He boasts about having helped in the killing of 'about 130 
men', and then goes on to describe how 'after taking the fort we let loose a crowd of 
people who had been plundered and harried by these miscreants and they went to work 
with a will, stripping bare every house in the most artistic manner.' There then follows 
the passage in which the 'plundering' 'Hindoo' and 'mangling' 'Mahometan' make their 
conjoint appearance. Set 'loose' upon the insurgents for precisely that purpose by the 
British, and following on from a massacre by the British in which Muslims seemed to 
have played no part,241 the characteristics of the avaricious Hindu and murderous Muslim 
are then evoked in an isolated schema of comparison apparently distinct from the British 
frame of reference. It is into this seemingly Indian tableau that Lyall introduces for the 
first time the Anglo-Indian Christian victim ('us'). That Christian figure therefore is set 
at two removes from the Civilian action of the letter: first by the comparison to the 
plundering 'Hindoo'; and secondly, displaced in time and scene - for the actual 
interaction of Muslim and Christian has no literal place in the British encounter 
described; it happens elsewhere, beyond the immediate purview of the narrative. 
This displaced staging of Muslim-Christian interaction literally instances the 
deferral inscribed into all representations of Muslim 'conspiracy' in Lyall's 
241 There is in fact an interesting recension of 'bloodthirstiness' in this letter that would seem to expand 
upon Wurgraft's point regarding the British displacement of violence. The scene begins with Lyall's own 
actions: 'I have an English rapier, sharp as a needle at the point. This I drove through the breast of one 
man, completely blunting the fine point on his backbone.' It later moves on to describe the loyal, 'perfectly 
staunch' Gurkha soldiers, 'always to be seen in the foremost rank with their faces smeared with their 
enemies' blood, as is their custom, and hewing away with their long knives.' Both British and Gurkha are 
linked through the concern with weaponry and tactics (though the 'Goorkha' is separated out through the 
reference to 'tradition'; whereas Lyall is concerned to detail the modernity of his 'English rapier' against 
the Indian 'merely cutting sword'). Outside of these two warrior-encoded figures lies the apparently 
method-less 'Mahometan' butchery of civilian corpses, which has neither a traditional nor a modem 
rationale and takes place without reference to time or place or warfare. For another example ofthe 
methodless fanatic in contrast to the British techniques of warfare, see Thornhill, pp 267-68. 
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correspondence. We should therefore think of it as another means by which the 
representations of Christian Civilian and Muslim are maintained as discrete elements, and 
the system as a whole preserved and extended. It would be useful here to widen out the 
frame of reference for a discussion of some of the other common prophylactic devices 
with which other Civilian narratives seek to enclose Muslim 'conspiracy', separating it 
out from the Christian Civilian through whom it is initially engendered. For as we shall 
see in the next section, the 'elsewhere' of Lyall's letters - the displaced staging of 
Muslim 'conspiracy' - is a common feature of almost all Civilian 'Mutiny' narratives 
contemporary to, as well as those published at some remove from, the events of 1857-59. 
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Section 2.5: Forms of prophylaxis in Civilian 'Mutiny' accounts 
This section will expand upon the notion of the 'displaced staging' of Muslim 
'conspiracy' in Lyall's' Mutiny' Correspondence by analysing the forms of its incidence 
in a variety of contemporary ICS accounts. We can start this process by locating one 
such instance of displacement in a narrative published in The Delhi Gazette in December 
1857, by J F Kitchen, Head Assistant to the Collector of Goregaon. Kitchen begins his 
account with the news received by the Magistrate that a body of mutineers from the '3rd 
Cavalry' were headed towards the city with the intention of 'polish[ing] off Goregaon 
Christians ,242 - but it is largely characteristic of the narrative as a whole that the rebel 
'sowars' (cavalrymen) are not glossed according to their religious affiliation. The only 
signs of any peculiarly Muslim disaffection are confined to the mention of some disquiet 
among the 'Moslems of the force' accompanying his flight from Goregaon to Delhi, and 
a 'green flag' carried by some insurgents from the 'Gwalior Contingent' ?43 The signs of 
disaffection among the troops are apparently removed by 'a change of locality'; and the 
rebels carrying the 'green flag' pose no immediate threat. In short, like Lyall, Kitchen 
has little direct experience of Muslim 'conspiracy'. Quite the reverse, in fact: the 
narrative ends with a testimonial by the author on behalf of the (Muslim) Nawab of 
Jhujjur for his protection of 'Christians', and particularly for sheltering the author's 
family.244 Nevertheless, following directly on the heels of this testimony, Kitchen 
concludes and summarises: 
The future is still hidden from us; but I hope to see the whole of India gradually 
calm down, as the Goorgaon [sic] District is gradually doing and I trust that the 
242 'Narrative of the Outbreak in the Goorgaon District. To the Editor of The Delhi Gazette by J F Kitchen' 
in Extractsfrom Indian Journals (Cheltenham: 1894), p 2. 
243 K· h ltc en, pp 8, 10. 
244 K· h Itc en, pp 12-13. 
firm Christian foundation upon which our empire should rest for the future, will 
defy all the assaults of infidel treachery and rebellion.245 
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Aside from its indication of how quickly the idea of Muslim 'conspiracy' took hold 
among Civilians during the 'Mutiny', Kitchen's testimony provides a seemingly casual 
and commonplace instance of the displacement at work in all Civilian accounts - that is, 
the way in which Muslim 'conspiracy' almost always takes place beyond the bounds set 
by the narrative itself. Thus Kitchen's summary literally bears no relationship to the 
foregoing account; the 'Christian' persecution it adduces happens (we must conjecture) 
'elsewhere'. It should come as no surprise that that 'elsewhere' points, like Lyall's 
insatiable 'Mohammedan', towards a Civilian communal future dimly descried. It is 
almost as if the mention of one, by necessity, brought about the sudden and abrupt 
presence of the other in the narrative. 
This 'elsewhere' seems to operate equally between, as well as within, Civilian 
narratives. Which is to say, that Muslim 'conspiracy' can be displaced between two 
apparently congruent accounts of the same events. For instance, if we look at the 
exhaustive compilation of - amongst others - Civilian 'Mutiny' narratives entitled 
Annals of the Indian Rebellion and edited by N A Chick in 1859, we find that time and 
again the question of Muslim 'conspiracy' is elided between source material (the original 
Civilian account) and the common narrative of Chick's compendious text. This is starkly 
demonstrated in his precis of the narrative of William Edwards, Judge and Collector of 
Budaon in Rohilkhand at the time of the outbreak of the rebellion. Already in its third 
London edition by December 1858, Edwards' narrative is a striking example of the 
swiftness with which 'Mutiny' accounts were absorbed into what we might, borrowing a 
contemporary euphemism, describe as a Metropolitan economy of 'info-tainment' ?46 
245 Kitchen, p 13. 'Infidel' here, as throughout Civilian discourse during the 'Mutiny', implies Muslim, as 
opposed to Hindu (generally designated 'pagan' or 'heathen'). This was its common usage by Europeans 
throughout the nineteenth century. Rodinson, p 59, n120. 
246 William Edwards, Personal Adventures during the Indian Rebellion in Rohilcund, Futtehghur, and 
Oude (London: Smith, Elder and Company, 1858). By the time of its publication, the publishers Smith, 
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More importantly, alongside the dozens of other narratives listed by Chick, it 
demonstrates both the inter-textual nature through which the histories of the 'Mutiny' 
were later constructed, and the way in which the personal and the demi-official were 
promiscuously intertwined in the genesis of Muslim 'conspiracy'. (Chick's Annals was 
to become a key reference work on the subject of the 'Mutiny' for all later historians in 
the nineteenth century;247 it seems also to have been the source for many reconstructions 
of 'Mutiny' events in novels, and even in later memoirs248). For the apparent misfit 
between the Metropolitan publication of Edwards' narrative, and Chick's demi-official 
encyclopaedic volume ultimately proves no obstacle to the translation between them of 
the idea of Muslim 'conspiracy'. 
Unlike the positivist recitation of figures and events in the Annals, Edwards 
account turns on the ambiguity of perception into which he as an eyewitness enters as he 
tries continually to penetrate the question of loyalty and treachery in all of his encounters. 
Since he is forced soon after his flight from Budaon to rely upon native protectors, this 
question of perception provides much of the narrative interest. Indeed, in keeping with 
both the immediacy of the narrative (which frequently contradicts itself, reinforcing the 
literal day-to-day progression of his understanding of events) and the topsy-turvy 
mutinous world it recreates, those encounters are often left unresolved as to the true 
intentions of his captors and guides. Thus we are left unsure by the end whether the 
'Thakoors' who give him shelter acted as his captors, ready to denounce him should the 
tide of events tum, or whether they were loyally shielding him from the murderous plans 
of their neighbours (fearing the worst at one point, Edwards bitterly complains that '[the 
Thakoors] are always ready to give credit to sinister rumours, and never to any in our 
Elder and Company already had five 'Mutiny' narratives in its back-catalogue (for details of which, see the 
listings in the end-pages ofthe Edwards volume). 
247 And continues to be so even now. See for instance, the Introduction to Salim AI-Din Quraishi (ed) Cry 
For Freedom: Proclamations of Muslim Revolutionaries in 1857 (New Delhi: Sang-e-Meel Publications, 
1999). 
248 Thornhill, for instance, appears to have borrowed some of his rhetoric directly from Chick. Compare his 
account of the massacre of 'Christians' in Agra (p 201) and that of Chick, p 767. 
favour' 249). All information within the narrative is, in this way, infected with doubt, 
relying on the many, often lethally, unreliable native informants through whom his 
picture of the rebellion is largely built up. However, when occasionally Edwards does 
put forward an, in his view, incontrovertible assertion, it usually runs counter to the 
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narrative of Muslim 'conspiracy'. For instance, he insists that he is 'full satisfied that the 
rural classes [who joined rebellion with the sepoys] ... could not then have been acted 
upon by any cry of their religion in danger' (p 17); and that despite rumours of unrest 
during 'Ede', the 'Mohammedans' of Burdaon were easily manipulated by him, 
'knowing as I did that a bitter animosity existed between several of them' (p 4). Indeed, 
Muslims figure in the narrative almost uniformly as faithful guides,25o 'friends' ,251 and 
protectors (see in particular, the 'Shaikh of Shikooporah' 252). Where reference is made 
to the possibility of Muslim 'conspiracy' (on only two occasions), it comes in the form of 
potentially misleading information given by natives, neither approved nor denied by the 
narrator. 253 In short, Muslim 'conspiracy' is at best a marginal feature of the atmosphere 
of disinformation that drives the narrative forward. In its relatively concrete examples of 
individuals tried and tested as to loyalty (wherever this is possible - see, in this regard, 
the chequered career ofNawab Ahmed Yar Khan254), the Muslims of the narrative are 
almost invariably shown in a favourable light; and needless to say, given the dubiety that 
informs the structure of Edwards' account, no single encounter is made the basis for any 
larger generalisations. Nevertheless, when it is absorbed by Chick into his larger 
narrative of the Budaon district in 1857-59, Edwards' account undergoes a radical 
transformation: 'Whether Oudians or not,' Chick writes, 'everywhere [Edwards] found 
249 Edwards, Personal, p 159. 
250 See for instance, Sooltan Mahommed Khan (Edwards, Personal, p 23). 
251 In reference to Mooltan Khan, who takes Edwards into his house at one point (Edwards, Personal, pp 
53,57). 
252 4 Edwards, Personal, pp 21-22, 2 . 
~J 56 Edwards, Personal, pp 146-47, 1 . 
254 He first takes in Edwards, then seemingly betrays him, and then later appears to save him from betrayal 
(Edwards, Personal, pp 44, 47, 56-57). 
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the Mohammedans more hostile to the British than the Hindoos' ?55 Made to serve as the 
principal source for the history of the district in 1857-59, Edwards' account is here 
haplessly forced into a narrative of Muslim 'conspiracy' that had by 1859 gained its own 
momentum and consistency. The evidence for the 'conspiracy' itself-as with Lyall's 
staged encounter, and Kitchen's abrupt irruption of Muslim and Christian - falls outside 
of Chick's text. Indeed, it seems to take place in an 'elsewhere' lost in translation from 
Edwards to Annals. In this literal sense, the encounter between 'hostile' Muslims and 
persecuted British, in Budaon, as in the districts of Meerut or Bulandshahr, occurs 
beyond the narrative. 256 
But it is in Mark Thornhill's later memoir of the' Mutiny' that the projection of 
Muslim 'conspiracy' from outside of the narrative field of vision is most readily apparent. 
Here, as with Lyall's letters, the Christian Civilian is safely quarantined from direct 
exposure to Muslim sectarianism even as the narrative itself becomes entirely subsumed 
by the idea and descriptions of Muslim 'conspiracy'. As discussed in the previous 
section, 'conspiracy' as such is never explicitly stated by Thornhill; instead, it is built up 
through the pervasive representation of Muslim 'fanaticism', which as we will now see, 
becomes a unifying motif for the narrative.257 The irruption of Muslim sectarianism into 
Thornhill's account is signalled both at the level of content and of form, dividing it 
almost exactly into two distinct and equal halves. The first half of the narrative develops 
a strictly linear sequence of events and perceptions, in which Thornhill recounts the 
outbreak of hostilities in Muttra (in the Meerut district) and his flight from there to Agra. 
In terms of content, there is no mention in this first section of either Muslim 'fanaticism' 
or the suggestion of sectarianism; indeed, Muslims appear to figure within it exclusively 
255 Chick, p 348. 
256 It is worth pointing out that it was in precisely these kinds of districts - all lying relatively close to the 
Delhi throne - that the heartland of Muslim 'conspiracy' was thought to be located. 
257 As suggested in the last section, the line separating 'conspiracy' and 'fanaticism' is a highly deceptive 
one. See, for instance, his summary of the causes ofthe rebellion, in which he describes 'Mohammedan 
fanaticism' as induced partly because 'our rule, never popular with them, had of late become the object of 
their aversion'. Thornhill, p 333. 
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in the role of loyal companions and, not infrequently, saviours.258 Nor does the high 
incidence of Muslim loyalty (and especially of the tireless fidelity of his principal guide, 
Dilawar Khan) prompt the narrative to relate it to, or contrast it with, the idea of Muslim 
'treachery'. Similarly, where, for instance, a perceived Muslim predisposition to unity of 
purpose is cited, it is only brought in as a counter-example to the disunity of caste-bound 
'Hindoo' society in Muttra, and is not commented on in regard to the larger 'Mutiny' 
narrative.259 In other words, like Kitchen's narrative, or the letters of Alfred Lyall up 
until 11 July 1857, there appears to be almost no overt trace of Muslim sectarianism, or 
indeed perfidy, in the first half of the narrative. 
The introduction of the suggestion of Muslim 'conspiracy' into Thornhill's 
narrative occurs with his arrival in Agra just after the outbreak there of the open rebellion 
which he has already encountered in Muttra and the intervening countryside. The 
uprising in Agra takes place in the town outside the fort in which the British have already 
barricaded themselves. It entails the mutiny of the armed (and mostly Muslim) police 
force, destruction of the Civil Station and Cantonment, and the apparently sectarian 
murder of several 'Christians' there and in the city by a mutineer-led mob. It is at this 
point too that the form of the narrative undergoes significant revision, abandoning the 
relatively strict linearity of the first half for constant, although mostly undisclosed, forays 
into knowledge that could only have been gained after the narrative has come to an end. 
Past, present and future come together in Agra at precisely the point when narrative and 
narrator are literally stalled - that is, imprisoned within the besieged walls of the fort. 
Thus Muslim 'conspiracy' comes into being for Thornhill as a series of events taking 
place in the cantonment and civil station of the town outside the fort walls, garnered it 
would seem from the retrospection of the - sometimes published - accounts of others. 
258 Thornhill, pp 45,54,69, 134, 137, 141, 144, 149, 150, 151, 156, 160, 163. 
259 Thornhill, p 80. The concept of a peculiar Muslim genius for 'unity of purpose' was a common theme 
of European discourse from the late eighteenth century onwards. Hourani, pp 25-27. 
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Thornhill's own eyewitness account, then, does not feed into the larger narrative of 
events at Agra, so much as it is literally subsumed by them. Monologue gives way to 
polyphony, and it is between these competing, though often unsourced, 'observers' (such 
as Chick's Annals), that Muslim 'conspiracy' is constructed. In this sense, within the 
narrative, 'conspiracy' can only be accessed through the staging device of later, 
alternative narratives. It is thus both the means by which the narrative first transcends its 
own linear, monologic limitations, and the object of that transcendence. On another 
level, it is also the means by which Thomhilljoins his own story to that of the larger 
'Mutiny' narrative: Muslim 'conspiracy' literally welds him into the Anglo-Indian 
community. 
As well as time, the advent of Muslim 'conspiracy' is also destructive of the 
limitations of place to which the foregoing narrative has submitted, allowing it to 
transcend the confined and partial circumstances of its viewpoint. For Thornhill the 
narrator is made to see precisely what Thornhill the protagonist of the memoir could not 
- the actual event of Muslim sectarianism; that is, the murderous encounter of Muslim 
with Christian. This transcendence of the unity of time and place by the idea of Muslim 
'conspiracy' is vividly brought out in the abrupt introduction at this point of a series of 
ghostly stories in which figures from the fort's Mughal past manifest themselves to 
British witnesses (Chapter XXV 'Ghost Stories'). The first tale concerns the ghost of the 
Emperor Akbar who, on being told by a sepoy that the building is now a 'Company Fort', 
rises up and declaims: 'It is false! The house is mine! mine!! mine!!!,26o The scene is 
then expanded to take in the history of Mughal rule, and the importance attached to 
Akbar 'by the natives' .261 No attempt is made to spell out the significance of this 
juxtapositioning of Mughal rule with the massacre of 'Christians' beyond the walls. But 
the history here seems to refer back to a proleptic conversation between his office peons 
260 Thornhill, p 236. 
261 Thornhill, p 243. 
before the outbreak of the 'Mutiny', in which the importance of the symbol of the 
Mughal throne is first disclosed to the author: 
As I listened, I realised as I had never done before, the deep impression that the 
splendour of the ancient court had made on the popular imagination, how dear to 
them were its traditions, and how faithfully all unknown to us they had preserved 
them. There was something weird in the Mogul Empire thus starting into a sort of 
phantom life after the slumber of a hundred years.26 
This proleptic, uncanny feeling becomes manifest in the narrative - in the form of 
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Akbar's ghost - at precisely the moment at which the treachery of the 'Mohammedan 
officials' in the Civil Service and Police appears to reveal itself, encouraging the mob 
outside the fort walls to riot, and to set about murdering 'Christians' (like Lyall, Thornhill 
is keen to emphasise the exclusivity of Muslim bloodthirstiness: 'In every instance the 
murderers were the mutinous [Muslim] police,263). Separated literally by the walls of the 
fort, and metaphorically by the different time-zones of the narrative that here intrude, 
Christian Civilian, Mughal pretensions to power, and murderous Muslim are brought into 
an unmistakable - and unglossed - alignment. But - crucially - they never coalesce. 
In terms of both form and content, then, we can say that Thornhill's account as a 
whole is partly structured by the problem of how to represent Muslim 'conspiracy' while 
simultaneously preserving its immanence to, rather than collision with, representations of 
Musl ims and Christian Civilians. By maintaining the linearity of the sequence of events 
and perceptions in the first half of the narrative, and by rupturing that integrity only once 
he as a protagonist is removed from the field of narrative vision, Thornhill is able to 
preserve a barrier between himself and the event of Muslim sectarianism every bit as 
effective as Lyall's staged encounter. 
Nevertheless, that rupture is also partly deceptive, for it involves the implicit re-
casting of Muslim 'conspiracy' backwards into the key events of Thornhill's flight from 
262 Thornhill, p 7. 
263 Thornhill, p 197. 
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Muttra. We have noted one such instance in the recovered prolepsis of the peons' 
conversation about the Mughal empire. Other re-readings include: the mysterious flight 
from the house of the 'Seths' who had been protecting him, now explained on his arrival 
in Agra (though the explanation by the Seths must have actually occurred long after the 
narrative ends), by the revelation of a 'plot' by the Seths' 'Mohammedan guards' to 
'murder us all' - which Thornhill retrospectively perceives was 'our greatest peril';264 
and the explanation for the terrifying and ghostly parade of convicts which had blocked 
their road to Agra265 as the work of the treacherous 'Mohammedan official' who had 
thrown open the Agra gaol at a pre-arranged signal. 266 Indeed, these retrospectively re-
cast events can be seen as links in a chain that leads inevitably towards, and is ultimately 
given meaning by, Muslim perfidy. For instance, the earlier 'phantom' of the Mughal 
Empire is connected to the convicts by their presence as 'phantoms from another world' 
who render the British 'invisible' by their refusal to take note of (or indeed even to look 
at) them,267 becoming in effect, as they rattle their broken British chains, uncanny 
apparitions of the loss of British power - just as Akbar's ghost later returns to haunt the 
dispossessed British imprisoned within 'his' fort, discountenancing their claims to 
authority or ownership. A similar continuum of associations can be unearthed with 
regard to the earlier reference to Muslim unity of purpose triumphing over native 
disunity. This motif is echoed later by an almost identical reference to British cohesion 
as the secret to their first conquests over a divided Hindu societi68 - which in tum, in 
the second half of the narrative, finds a larger echo in the emphasis laid upon the disunity 
of the British officials of Agra in the face of a cohesive Muslim-led uprising within the 
city, purportedly coordinated by Muslim 'officials' with the army mutineers encamped 
264 Thornhill, p 163. 
265 Thornhill, pp 145-48. 
266 Thornhill, pp 195-96. 
267 Thornhill, p 147. 
268 Thornhill, p 126. 
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outside the city ?69 Thus Muslim unity of purpose becomes an uncanny usurpation of a 
now dispossessed British virtue. 
In this way, the apparently senseless events of the first half of the narrative are 
given meaning by the perceptions of the second - which are themselves structured 
principally by what is learnt outside of the narrative of the determining hand of the 
'Mohammedans elsewhere' who 'had shown that they were as a body bitterly hostile to 
our rule. ,270 Even in Agra itself, the determining events take place beyond the insulating 
walls of the fort, and as with the plot by the 'Mohammedan guards', are only given 
coherence by later reconstruction. Thus the operations of that sectarian 'bitterness' are 
consistently displaced outside of the narrative, even as they provide the means by which 
the text as a whole can be drawn together and infused with meaning. As with the other 
narratives discussed, these centripetal, unifying effects of Muslim 'conspiracy' occur 
only after the events themselves, they are always accessed 'elsewhere'. Similarly, their 
primary effect is to point the narrative forward towards an undisclosed future, from the 
vantage point of which the conspirators have already been unmasked; and towards whose 
retributive justice the narrative may soon advance?71 Most important of all with regard 
to this discussion, is that they act effectively and invariably to segregate the author from 
any actual encounter with the workings of Muslim 'conspiracy'. In this regard, the 
otherwise puzzling disjunction between the two modes of narrative in Thornhill's memoir 
can only be explained by the observation that in the first half of the narrative, what his 
protagonist self didn't know -literally, as well as effectively (through retrospection)-
269 Thornhill, p 262. 
270 Thornhill, pp 179-80. 
271 The final chapters of Thornhill's account describe his service with the volunteers who accompanied the 
military column that followed from Agra in pursuit of the 'rebel army'. It should come as no surprise, 
given the above discussion, that even there the protagonist serves only as a witness to a partial revenge that 
takes place outside the immediate scope of the narrative, leaving only the mutilated Muslim bodies for him 
to discover (the mutilation, he is told, being the work of over-zealous Sikhs). Thornhill, p 313. 
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couldn't harm him. And neither, of course, could it disturb the necessary integrity of the 
concept of Muslim 'conspiracy'. 
We can begin to see how this pattern of the segregation of Christian Civilian from 
the staging point of Muslim 'conspiracy' works on a variety of levels, between as well as 
within texts, and is endemic to Civilian accounts of the' Mutiny'. Because Muslim 
'conspiracy' is invariably a retrospective affect (never immediately present), deferral 
must be understood in those narratives as an organising principle for all systems of the 
representation of Muslim-British encounters in 1857-59. Given both these factors - the 
omnipresence of Muslim 'conspiracy', and its keynote of deferral- we can further see 
how it holds the potential for deflecting the question of the representation of the 
interaction of colonialist and insurrectionary colonial society as a whole. Where 
'Mutiny' occurs, the 'fanatic' Muslim intrudes; and his intrusion entails the 
deferral/displacement of the insurrectionary event - through himself, as it were, to 
'elsewhere' . 
In comparing the prophylaxis employed by Lyall to preserve Muslim 
'conspiracy', there is one further point we can make using Thornhill's narrative. It 
concerns a tendency that also recurs in Lyall's later arguments surrounding the future of 
British governance in India, and it entails the destabilisation of the category of 'Christian' 
itself - in the 1870s a not altogether unpredictable rhetorical outcome, given the strict 
code of secularity that had come to prevai1.272 But in 1857-59, when confronted with a 
Muslim-led 'war of religion' (to borrow Niall Ferguson's reprisal of nineteenth century 
rhetoric), the opacity of meaning that comes to attach to the label 'Christian' is perhaps 
less easily understood, since it was precisely that descriptive epithet which the British 
were claiming as one of the principal determinants of the course of the events at hand. 
Nevertheless, across a range of Civilian accounts of this period, from the Metropolitan-
212 I·" P I" , See in particular, Lyall, 'Our Re IglOuS 0 ICY" 
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published memoir to the demi-official Anglo-Indian conspectus of events, the category of 
'Christian' often appears to contain several possible definitions (such as 'native', 
'Eurasian', 'Anglo-Indian', 'European' and 'Civilian') but to frequently elude direct 
conflation with any single constituency, and direct contact with any British variant in 
particular. Indeed, for most accounts, there is no one definition of the category, from the 
most generalised to the most specific, that is consistently maintained throughout. Of 
especial relevance here, is the variety of means by which this opacity consistently 
maintains the separation of the categories of 'Civilian' and 'Christian' at the immediate 
lexical level, even though their conjunction might be signaled on a deeper semantic level. 
In this regard, the role of the Muslim 'fanatic' is conspicuous, both, it would seem, as an 
incitement to that lexical separation and, paradoxically, as the primary means by which 
its import is negated. 
This particular paradox can be located in Lyall's letter of 11 July 1857, in which 
the Civilian is first identified as a Christian object of Muslim murderous intention. In one 
sense, the unwonted attention of the Muslim 'fanatic' relates to the only previous 
occasion in which the idea of the Civilian possessing a Christian persona has occurred in 
the letters. On that occasion, as it is described in a letter of24 February 1857, Lyall's 
identity as a Christian had also been disclosed - and in part, constituted - through native 
eyes, when his office staff had upbraided him for forgetting an important 'festival' day in 
the Christian calendar (Ash Wednesday). In other words, a Civilian-Christian 
identification first appears in the correspondence as dependent on native affirmation. On 
11 July, however, the nexus drawn by Indian Muslims between 'Christian' and Civilian 
is, in a more literal, semantic sense, incomplete. Lyall writes that: '[The Mohametans] 
hate us with a fanatical hate that we never suspected to exist among them and have 
everywhere been the leaders in the barbarous murdering and mangling of the Christians.' 
As it stands, although 'the Christians' at first appears to refer directly to the English 
('us'), in fact it may literally refer to native 'Christians' only - or indeed, to native and 
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British. The grammatical ambiguity is left unresolved, even though, at least on a 
secondary level of meaning, a link appears to have between made between 'us' and 'the 
Christians'. But if we do parse 'the Christians' as referring to natives only, the category 
itself becomes, retrospectively, an obstacle intruding between 'fanatical' Muslim and 
Civilian ('us'). In this immediate lexical sense, the Muslim could be said to incite a 
separation of the category of the British as rulers from the potential category of the 
British as Christians. This brings up the paradox that, on the one hand, 'Christianity' as a 
constituent of British identity may here be read as an affect of native (Muslim) actions-
that is, we know the 'us' to characterise the British as 'Christians' only because of the 
Muslim disclosure (through persecution) of native ('the') 'Christians'. But on the other 
hand, we may say that the separation of British church and state, at least linguistically, is 
brought about by precisely that 'fanatical' Muslim presence (intervening between 'us' 
and 'the Christians'). It is in the light of this kind of linguistic ambiguity, that the 
category of British 'Christian' in the correspondence can be said to be both dependent on 
and at the same time, partially effaced by, the Muslim 'fanatic'. 
The tension surrounding this ambiguity can be seen in Lyall's letter to his father, 
dated 30 August 1857. Describing the intensity of feeling 'against' the British felt by the 
Indian Muslims, he deletes 'us' from the phrase, 'us Christians'; then, in reference to the 
opposing 'fury' it has summoned up in the British, he deletes another epithet (most 
probably, 'Christians') and replaces it with 'us'. In other words, precisely how the 
Civilian is to be labeled in the context of Muslim sectarianism has become a matter of 
conscious (and decidedly problematic - the correspondence as a whole is remarkably free 
of emendations) debate. What follows is a definite pattern of what we might describe as 
displaced description, whereby the British are always, and only, 'Christians' by a process 
of adjacent, and for the most part secularised, epithets, apparently enjoined by the 
presence of Muslim 'conspiracy'. Thus in his letter of 19 March 1858: 'Now if [the 
Mohammedans] will do such [barbarous] things [to Hindoos] what will they do to our 
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people, whom they hate and fear so intensely.' Or in his letter of27 March 1859: 'I am 
surrounded by a population of deadly enemies - 1 speak of the Mahometans, who inhabit 
all the towns, and 1 imagine how delicious it must be to breathe freely among my own 
people.' Or, perhaps most conspicuously, in his letter to his father, dated 24 November 
1858: 'the Mohamedans ... are a set of bloodthirsty fanatics who hate us to a man, and 
who will never be reconciled to us ... perhaps the recent outrages upon European consuls 
may in some degree open the eyes of the English. The Mussulmans have always been the 
deadly enemies of Christians, and always will be. ,273 In this last example, not only does 
the secular (third-person) denomination 'European consuls' intrude between 'us' and the 
sectarian imagery of Muslims and Christians in open conflict, but that image is itself 
translated into the third person and abstracted geographically and temporally from the 
colonial encounter. At a superficial linguistic level, then, the effect of Muslim 
sectarianism in the correspondence seems to be to open out the potentially problematic 
category of British 'Christian' to a series ofre-negotiations. Each instance ofre-
negotiation in the letters, however, tends towards the cumulative opacity of the 
relationship between ruler and faith. The more sharply defined the role of the 'fanatical' 
Muslim becomes, the more the Civilian retreats into a variety of, sometimes disavowed, 
non-Christian classifications. In this regard, we may say that, in Lyall's letters, even as 
he incites their separation, the Muslim 'fanatic' effectively becomes the most visible link 
between the Civilian and his 'Christian' identity. We might therefore further suggest that 
it is the radical uncertainty in the one category - 'Christian' - that may partly account for 
the over-determination of the other: for in Lyall's letters, as in other Civilian accounts of 
1857-59, no comparable sense of ambiguity attaches to the Muslim rebel: he is always, 
and visibly, 'fanatical'. 
273 . h· d h . t t Emphases added In t IS, an t e prevIous wo quo es. 
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Although published almost a quarter of a century later, the opacity that surrounds 
the category of 'Christian' is still apparent in Mark Thornhill's memoir of 1857. The 
denomination itself is introduced lat~!in the narrative, in reference to two 'Christian 
clerks' taking refuge in the house of some 'Seths' and being warned that 'the feeling 
against Christians was so strong that if their presence was suspected it might cause the 
mob to attack it. ,274 Although no specific explanation is imparted, it would seem that 
'Christian clerks' refers either to native converts or Eurasians275 ('clerks' being a grade of 
civil service generally beneath Anglo-Indian employment);276 while the conjoint 
reference to the 'feeling against Christians' then implicitly expands the category to 
include the British. Since it leaves these assumptions unexplained, the narrative appears 
to split itself in terms of audience. For a Metropolitan audience unversed in the structure 
and jargon of the Indian Civil Service (and perhaps misled by the reference to the clerks 
being made to change out of their 'European clothes'), insurrection is for the moment 
eclipsed by religious sectarianism - even though, on another level, it may have been 
thought that 'Christians' is a term synonymous with the British in India. However, for an 
Anglo-Indian readership, the idea of 'Christianity' as an object of sectarian hostility is 
here first introduced - at the commonplace level of terminology - through the bodies of 
native 'clerks'. Insurrection and sectarianism are in this way conflated and 
simultaneously displaced onto a native conduit. From the start, then, beyond its broadest 
religious definition, a certain opacity attaches to the category of 'Christian' in the 
274 Thornhill, pp 88-89. 
275 In the nineteenth century the British in India commonly referred to those of mixed European and Indian 
heritage as 'Eurasians'. The terminology has been adopted here for convenience {to distinguish them from 
the then British Anglo-Indians}. 
276 In the two decades prior to the 'Mutiny', and following on from Bentinck's era of reform in Indian Civil 
Service employment, Indians faced increasing obstacles to the path of higher office in the ICS. The most 
recent of these was the Charter Act of 1853 introducing competitive examinations. Since these were held 
in London, most native applicants now found themselves effectively shut out of covenanted service. While 
they continued to fill subordinate posts, particularly in the revenue and judicial departments, very few rose 
into the higher administrative levels. During this period, the percentage of Eurasians employed in these 
subordinate posts increased disproportionate to the aggregate of native recruitment and to their own 
percentage of the population. R P Sikka, The Civil Service in India: Europeanisation and Indianisation 
Under the East India Company (1765-1857) (New Delhi: Uppal Publishing, 1984), pp 109-10, 154-86. 
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narrative. For a Metropolitan audience, it extends to a variety of potential social, political 
and ethnographic readings - are the 'Christian clerks' native converts, Eurasians, 
Europeans or subaltern British? For its Anglo-Indian audience, it exists at the level of 
sectarianism and insurrection. That is, it defers the issue of whether hostility to 
'Christians' arises out of British political or purely native communal sources, obscuring 
the question as to what extent 'Christians' is simply a political denomination. However, 
in obverse proportion to the extent to which these sources of antagonism are confused, 
for Anglo-Indians its primary result would seem to be an incipient distancing - through 
the native object - of the category 'Christian' from colonialist. If for the Metropolitan 
readership the opacity of the category seems to achieve an almost diametrically opposite 
effect - that is, bringing colonialist and 'Christian' closer together - its issue is 
remarkably congruent. The clerks are not - at an immediate linguistic level- being 
persecuted for being British government servants; consequently, later on when the British 
are under attack, at one level it will not be clear whether they suffer more or less or for no 
other reason than, the same sectarian hostility under which 'Christians' (native or 
otherwise) have first been produced as targets. Of importance here is the fact that this 
confusion will exist whether or not they - the British - are specifically labeled 
'Christians'. In other words, the idea of the British as sectarian objects of persecution has 
been established without having to include them definitively within a religious communal 
category. The division between Anglo-Indian and Metropolitan readership is thus more 
apparent than real. In this respect, we may note again how J F Kitchen's narrative, 
originally intended for an exclusively Anglo-Indian audience, begins with the the 
approach of' 80 rebel so wars of the 3rd Cavalry' who intended to 'polish off Goregaon 
Christians,277 - an unexplained description that would have been imprecise as to ethnicity 
even among its own community of readers. For to describe the British in Goregaon as 
277 K' h Itc en, p 2. 
167 
'Goregaon Christians' would have been unthinkable; and to suggest that all Christians 
except the British in Goregaon were under threat would have been equally absurd. 
Effectively, 'Goregaon Christians' interposes 'native Christians' between the British and 
the 'rebel sowars'. For Anglo-Indians as much as for any Metropolitan audience, then, 
opacity would seem to be the point. 
This phenomenon, observable in Thornhill, Kitchen and Lyall, as in other Civilian 
accounts, can be partly explained by a desire to reinforce, both to themselves and to the 
Metropolis, the supposedly reactionary 'religious' nature of the multiplicity of rebellions 
faced in 1857-59. By widening out the category of 'Christian' from its common pre-
1857 usage as a synonym for BritishlEuropean,278 so that it now included, and often 
failed to differentiate Europeans from, native converts and Eurasians, the perception is 
reinforced that it is primarily religion, and not secular colonial rule, that is under 
attack.279 By then, as it were, losing themselves within the category, the British can both 
de-escalate the nature of the attacks into a communal riot of sorts, and simultaneously 
278 In official discourse before and after the 'Mutiny', converts were invariably termed 'native Christians'. 
(Gauri Viswanathan, Outside the Fold: Conversion, Modernity, and Belief, (New Delhi: Oxford University 
Press, repro 2001; 1998), P 81); the earliest provincial censuses listing 'Christianity' as a category were 
always concerned to maintain distinct 'Native' and 'European' subdivisions (Jones, 'Religious', p 79). 
279 It should be emphasised here that it is not being suggested that such sectarian attacks on 'native 
Christians' did not take place. Indian Christians were certainly on occasion the targets of sectarian hostility 
in 1857-59 - although this can to some extent be put down to their perceived roles as symbols, and not 
infrequently as employees, of colonial rule (on this viewpoint, see Avril A Powell, 'Muslim-Christian 
Confrontation: Dr Wazir Khan in Nineteenth Century Agra' in Kenneth W Jones, ed, Religious 
Controversy in British India: Dialogues in South Asian Languages, (Albany: SUNY Press, 1992), pp 77-
92). There have been no detailed statistical studies or analyses undertaken in this area. But for a more 
general, if anecdotal, discussion of Christian persecution in 1857-8, see Stephen Neill, A History of 
Christianity in India: 1707-1858 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), Chapter 18; and Jeffrey 
Cox, Imperial Fault Lines: Christianity and Colonial Power in India, 1818-1940 (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2002), pp 30-31. The main point to be made here, however, is the marked disparity 
between the occasions for these attacks and their incidence and importance in Civilian accounts. In this 
regard, it should be noted that despite more than a half-century of an expanding missionary presence, native 
converts in northern India in 1857 formed a negligible percentage of the population (Powell, Missionaries, 
pp 162, 286; Viswanathan, p 78); for instance, one estimate puts the figure for 'Native Christians' in the 
whole of Punjab province in 1852 as no more than 2000 (Avril A Powell, 'Processes of Conversion to 
Christianity in Nineteenth Century North-Western India' in Geoffrey A addie, ed, Religious Conversion 
Movements in South Asia: Continuities and Change, 1800-1900, (Richmond: Curzon Press, 1997), p 17. 
This disparity is registered in Thornhill's account when he admits that, notwithstanding the fact that they 
are made to account for the entire course of the uprising in Agra, 'not many were, indeed, killed' 
(Thornhill, p 201). 
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attempt to escape the very category of communalism by means of the smokescreen of 
native 'Christians', who - as here - invariably become the immediate object of 
descriptions of sectarian assaults. However, the contradictory nature of these impulses-
to bring the narrative of the 'Mutiny' in line with a communal riot, but requiring at the 
same time to escape being identified as the cause of such an event - makes of the 
category a potentially dangerous site of representation. In this sense, as both lure and 
snare, the narrative is caught between seeking clarification (that, for instance, 'Christians' 
other than themselves were under attack) and seeking to defer, at least for the moment, all 
question of clarity (that they, as Christians, may be the inevitable cause and focus of a 
concerted, potentially proto-national, communal rebellion). 
As in Lyall's correspondence, the figure of the Muslim 'fanatic' works in 
Thornhill's narrative to challenge, but ultimately to reinforce, precisely this ambiguity in 
the self-representation of the British 'Christian'. He incites the introduction and repeated 
presence of the 'Christians' in the narrative, while his sectarian intentions are thwarted by 
an increasingly nebulous British component to that presence. So effective is this process, 
that the category is rendered opaque equally to Metropolitan and Anglo-Indian reader: 
from the moment of his entrance, there is literally no privileged position from which its 
meaning can be accurately gauged. Aside from the 'clerks' (and as in the Lyall 
correspondence), the narrative contains no mention of 'Christians' until the first 
rumblings of Muslim 'conspiracy'. They are then apparently introduced initially as a 
counterweight to the 'Mahommedan police', because of whose prejudice their 'volunteer 
corps' is unfairly disanned by the misguided Civilian officials.28o At this point, we may 
interpret the category as referring only to natives, a perception underlined when the 
narrator describes the retreat into Agra fort of the 'English and Christians' ?81 It is only 
when a 'jehad' is declared by the 'Mohammedans' of the city, and the subsequent 
280 Thornhill, p 181. 
281 Thornhill, pp 188, 198. 
murders are described, that a marked degree of confusion begins to surface in the 
category?82 The narrator, now drawing on - unnamed - sources other than himself 
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(under the Chapter XIX heading, 'Prior Events'), records that the 'jehad' was to be 
prosecuted against 'Christians only' (as opposed to, presumably, Hindus). He then 
clarifies that: 'Many of the victims were women, many were children; with one or two 
exceptions, all were natives.,283 Until this clarification, not only might 'Christians' have 
been assumed to be a purely native denomination, it appeared to have been one that did 
not even account for the 'Eurasians'. This group had been earlier brought into the 
narrative alongside with, but distinct to, the 'Christians'. Here they served as a 
counterweight to the delusive 'trust' placed in 'Mohammedans' by the Agra Civilians, 
being one of the groups who were discriminated against in the active prosecution of that 
prejudice ('Christians and Eurasians,)?84 Nevertheless, the single example that Thornhill 
cites to illustrate the massacre of the 'Christians' in Agra city, turns out to be - though is 
here not specifically referred to as - a 'Eurasian' ('Major Jacobs,).285 The category 
'Christian' which had begun its life in the narrative alongside the potential 
'Mohammedan' conspirator and had been invested with a meaning distinct from the 
'English' and 'Eurasians', becomes at the outbreak of Muslim 'conspiracy', inclusive of 
both. However, where it is necessary to point out that the actual victims of the 
'jehad ... against the Christians only' were, with 'one or two exceptions', not British, the 
narrator avoids making any such stipulation as to the - previously demarcated - group of 
'Eurasians'. The Muslim 'fanatic' is here not only a catalyst for the introduction and 
expansion of the category of 'Christians' , but at the same time appears to necessitate the 
sequestering of the British from its definition. In other words, in terms of representation, 
the potentially dangerous clarity he brings to the category 'Christian', disclosing and 
282 Thornhill, pp 199-201. 
283 Thornhill, p 201. 
284 Thornhill, pp 179-80. 
285 Thornhill, p 201. 
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constantly re-interpreting its presence in the narrative, ultimately works to exclude rather 
than define the colonialist; as in Lyall's correspondence, the result is the effective 
uncoupling of colonialist from his visible religious identification. As if to underline this 
shift in focus, having dismissed the 'one or two' British 'exceptions', the narrator goes on 
later to refer to the 'entire Christian population' who had 'taken refuge within the walls 
of the fort' - bringing the category, at the close of the murderous Muslim-led uprising, to 
an apparently inclusive, but now largely impenetrable and effectively destabilised, 
statuS?86 What happened in Agra cantonment, civil station, and city during the 'riots' of 
1857, has been established: a sectarian murder-spree. By whom, it couldn't be more 
clear: the 'Mohammedan' police force, inflaming, leading and directing the citizenry. 
But against whom, is now, at an immediate linguistic level, all but opaque, for the only 
category offered, 'Christians', has lost most of its social, ethnic, and political 
connotations. That loss in the definition of the object of rebellion is fed back into the 
narrative in the form of a lethal strain of uncertainty over rebel motivations - beyond, that 
is, the self-fulfilling, rampant sectarianism on display. The ultimate effect of this 
climactic scene, then, is the bold relief of the Muslim 'fanatic' in contradistinction to the 
near-complete effacement of the British 'Christian'. 
In short, then, one must conclude that here again Muslim 'conspiracy' redirects 
the supposedly motivational communal categories of the 'Mutiny' (,British', 'Christian') 
to an 'elsewhere' beyond the reach of narrative scrutiny, and so preserves its own system 
of representation intact. The distance in time separating Thornhill's narrative from the 
'Mutiny', as well as the different strategies available to the genre of the memoir (able, for 
instance, to draw on other sources of narrative and temporal schema), means that the 
devices used to separate Muslim 'fanatic' and British Christian lack the more visceral, 
improvised air of the constant, fraught re-negotiations of self-representation seen in 
286 Thornhill, p 201. 
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Lyall's letters. The memoir should not, however, be regarded as distinct in kind. This 
can be more directly inferred by reference to the very contemporary official and demi-
official sources from which Thornhill appears to have gained some of his information for 
the chapter entitled 'Prior Events'. For some of these sources, directed at an exclusively 
Anglo-Indian audience, are themselves impregnated with a remarkably similar ambiguity 
rendering the category 'Christians' problematic in much the same way, and producing-
as in Thornhill's narrative - the curious result of a consistent omission in the published 
informational record: that is, the precise number of British who were killed through 
sectarian aggression in the three days of rioting in Agra in 1857.287 In this regard, and by 
way of concluding this discussion of the destabilised category of 'Christians', we can 
briefly compare the official 'Narrative of Events attending the Outbreak of Distubances 
and the Restoration of Authority in the Agra District in 1857-8', compiled in 1859 by the 
then Magistrate of Agra, A L M Phillips, for the records of the Commissioner, Agra 
Division.288 Phillips' sources for his narrative included both military and Civilian official 
memoranda, as well as Anglo-Indian journalism, and regional Civilian reports - in other 
words, he drew on a variety of communal and official resources to stake his claims to an 
authoritative and comprehensive statement and explication of events in Agra.289 
Nevertheless, we find in his narrative precisely the same disparity between the definition 
of the persecutory Muslim 'fanatic' and the opacity of definition attending his 'Christian' 
287 For instance, see the 'List of murders committed in the city during July 1857, with notes of rewards 
recommended for the apprehension of criminals', published in 1859 in Chick, pp 788-89. Most of the 
names on the list are of European origin, with no apparent indigenous inflection; presumably a proportion-
perhaps as low as the 'one or two exceptions' mentioned by Thornhill- were in fact British. Yet there is 
not a single classificatory sign to mark them out. For example, 'Major Jacobs', whom Thornhill describes 
as of mixed French and Indian parentage, appears on the list alongside of, but not distinguished from, Mr F 
C Hubbard, whom the magistrate, Phillips, describes in his own narrative (also reproduced in Chick) as a 
British 'professor ofliterature' at Agra College (Chick, p 766). See also the standard 'Mutiny' history of 
Kaye, pp 391-393; and William Muir's compendious two volume Records of the Intelligence Department 
of the Government of the North-West Provinces of India During the Mutiny of 1857 (Edinburgh: T & T 
Clark, 1902). The omission of these details in Muir's selection is all the more conspicuous, since Muir was 
himself stationed in Agra at the time of the uprising. 
288 Published in full in Chick, pp 756-68. 
289 Chick, p 756. 
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victims, which later organises Thornhill's account. The first mention of the latter 
category refers to an official order that all the families of 'Christians' repair to the fort for 
safety. Since it simultaneously refers to the 'native garrison' to be withdrawn from the 
fort, it might seem that 'Christians' begins life in the narrative as a potentially exclusive 
category (a reversed model for Thornhill's 'English and Christians,)?90 However, at the 
same time, a note of ambiguity to the category would seem to be sounded by the 
observation that on receiving news of the open rebellion at 'Allygurh', 'great alarm was 
felt by the Christian population' .291 As with the early reference to the threat to 'Goregaon 
Christians' in Kitchen's narrative, the phrase 'Christian population' must here include the 
British while at the same time having the secondary effect of disclosing, if not 
interposing, a native constituency. That neither the exclusive nor inclusive definitions 
bespeak a commonly understood mode of Anglo-Indian discourse - and one therefore 
requiring no qualifications - is signaled by the reference to a separate order made later 
for 'the admission of Native Christians into the fort' .292 Even at the level of official 
informational communications, then, the term 'Christians' represents in British 'Mutiny' 
accounts, an unstable descriptive category. This instability is quickly diffused throughout 
Phillips' narrative which, while pointing (like Bowring in his contemporary report) to 
several factors indicating the absence of an orchestrated Muslim 'conspiracy' ,293 comes 
to rest entirely on the idea of a 'fanatical' 'Mohammedan' campaign motivated precisely 
by that single, and here irreducible, object, 'Christians': 
From the time of the proclamation [of the reign of king of Delhi] the property of 
Christians wherever they could be found in the city was plundered and themselves, 
both men, women and children ruthlessly murdered.294 
290 Chick, P 757. 
291 Chick, P 757. 
292 Chick, P 762. Italics added. 
293 For instance, Phillips defines the proclamation of the 'reign of the king of Delhi' by the Muslim 
'Cotwal, Murad Alee' as 'an act spontaneous on the part of the Cotwal and the police, and not t~ be 
imputed to any impulse from the rebel force' (Chick, pp 766-67). From the safe distance ofretlTement, 
Thornhill implies - though he does not insist upon - quite the opposite, Thornhill, pp 188-89. 
294 Chick, P 767. 
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As in Thornhill, the uprising in Agra is focused on a category that is by this point all but 
impenetrable. Thus when Phillips records 'the number of Christians who 
were ... murdered' , the precision with which he divides the figures into 'men', 'women' 
and 'children', stands in stark contrast to the lack of any other identifiable classifications 
(such as 'English', 'European', 'native' or 'Eurasian'). We can further contrast the 
absolute opacity of the category with the care which is taken to describe the Muslim 
constituency: 'the [Mohammedan] police ... were joined by the butchers, and Mewatees 
of Wazeepoorah and other places, and by the low Mahommedan rabble' - though not by 
any 'Mahomedan ... of any repectability' or 'leaders of the Mahomedan citizens. ,295 In 
this way, a similar linked imbalance occurs in the official script, between the recession of 
the British 'Christian' and the occlusive and self-explanatory presence of the Muslim 
'fanatic'. The result, even at this official and purely explanatory level of narrative, is the 
preemptive deconstruction of all explanation beyond the categorical, and irreducible, 
description of Muslim-Christian sectarianism. At the same time, of course, here as in 
Lyall, Kitchen, Thornhill and ChicklEdwards, the one event that eludes description is the 
actual Muslim encounter with the British 'Christian'. 
295 Chick, pp 766-67. 
Section 2.6: Some Preliminary Conclusions 
We can begin to summarise the effects of the system of representations denoted in this 
chapter as Muslim 'conspiracy', by underlining the most immediate import of the 
destabilisation of the category 'Christian'. In contrast to the lack of reciprocity seen in 
the disinclination shown by Lyall's 'Hindoo' to engage with the colonialist demand for 
recognition, one potential consequence of this destabilisation is the suggestion of 
'indigenisation' that it seeks to attach to the British 'Christian'. In this regard, the now 
inclusive category 'Christian' acts as a partial defence against the vacuum of motives 
disclosed by the events of 1857-59: that is, as one means by which the idea of colonial 
despotism is held at bay, and a renewed understanding of British relations to Indian 
society constructed. The briefly resurgent, and as the narratives demonstrate, deeply 
conflicted desire to present themselves as, and to bind themselves to, an indigenous 
community, is (ironically enough, after the free usage that his own narrative makes of 
174 
them) given bitter expression by Thornhill in his concluding chapter, when he argues that 
'the only class on whose fidelity it was found we could rely was the one whom our policy 
had discountenanced, and whose increase it had prevented, namely, the native 
Christians. ,296 Similarly, it can be heard in W J Shepherd's A Personal Narrative of the 
Outbreak and Massacre at Cawnpore (1879), when he speaks of the 'Eurasians and 
Anglo Indians' as 'essentialy [sic] a new nation in embryo' .297 In the narratives 
discussed above, however, such 'indigenisation' is only possible to the extent to which 
the presence of the Muslim 'fanatic' can be demonstrated and described, for the clarity of 
296 Thornhill, p 334. 
297 W J Shepherd, A Personal Narrative of the Outbreak and Massacre at Cawnpore During the Sepoy 
Revolt of 1857 (2nd Edition, Lucknow: London Printing Press, 1879; 1862), pp 66-67. For the brief 
flirtation with Eurasians in 1857-9, see Ballhatchet, p 100. The preceding half-century was characterised 
by a gradual - and from the 1830s onwards, inflexible - social distancing from them by the Anglo-Indian 
official comm unity. See Ballhatchet, pp 96-111; and C J Hawes, Poor Relations: The Making of a 
Eurasian Community in British India, 1773-1833 (Richmond: Curzon, 1996). 
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that figure masks the slippages, fissures and contradictions that would otherwise be 
exposed. Necessarily, then, the Muslim 'fanatic' in most Civilian accounts becomes an 
over-determined figure, one whose presence requires constant re-inscription. 
At the same time, as we have seen in these Civilian accounts, there exists a 
remarkable multi-variety of forms of prophylaxis that shield the presence of the Muslim 
'fanatic' from that of the Civilian. Whether it be through Lyall's motif of deferred and 
displaced 'revenge'; or by means of the inter-textual 'elsewhere' from which 
'conspiracy' often occurs; or through the multiple layers of narrative time and geography 
that separate it out in Thornhill's account; or indeed, the ways in which the British 
'Christian' slips in and out of definition as the clarity of the 'fanatic' approaches: time 
and again, Muslim 'conspiracy' shows itself to be an organising presence in Civilian 
'Mutiny' narratives, but one whose very elusiveness preserves its functional role. If, as 
argued above, we are to understand this organising function as motivated primarily by the 
need for a cohesive ideology of community, we must approach the figure of the Muslim 
'fanatic' in 1857-59 as effectively bearing the burden of colonialist ideological desires: 
in short, as being drafted into the project of carrying forward the very idea of their 
survival as a governing community in India. 
For this reason, it is useful briefly to underscore some of the features of the 
continuous re-inscription that we have come across in this chapter. For it is in the 
revaluation of these specific stereotypes, available from a vast range of such resources in 
British discourse about Islam in the nineteenth century, that we can see for the first time 
the peculiar features that would now mark the colonial discourse on Indian Muslims in 
the succeeding decades, features that are more than a little familiar, since they represent 
precisely those qualities that had suddenly become so necessary and disturbing to the 
colonialists themselves. There are three interdependent elements which we can highlight 
in order to bring into focus the outlines of the figure of the Indian Muslim in post-
'Mutiny' Civilian discourse, and the crucial function of the prophylaxis involved in his 
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maintenance. The first of these elements is one that we have already underlined in our 
discussion of Steel's India text fifty years later: that is, the descriptive separating out of 
the Indian Muslim from Indian society in general. In this chapter we have seen it most 
obviously at work in terms of Semiticisation, whereby the Indian Muslim is discovered to 
be responding to an influence from 'without'. Thornhill draws explicit attention to it in 
his conclusion that 'Mohammedan fanaticism', one of the (in his view) prime causes of 
the 'Mutiny', was itself 'born during the present century in Arabia, [and] had some few 
years previous to the mutiny become diffused throughout India. ,298 But it is also implicit 
in Lyall's relentless temporal and geographical displacement of Indo-Muslim 
sectarianism onto the Middle East, mediaeval Spain, and the Ottoman fringes of modern 
Europe?99 That displacement is itself a covert means of preserving the system of 
representation (Muslim 'conspiracy') through which the Christian Civilian is maintained 
as an immanent self-representation within colonial India, always on the point of 
extinction but equally held in view, at the point of a Muslim dagger. In the same manner, 
and as we have just seen, the very 'fanaticism' that pushes the Muslim out of colonial 
India appears to have the equal and opposite effect, of indigenising British 'Christians' -
again, as a fragile presence, slipping in and out of reach in an unstable category. This 
hidden reciprocity, for which the opacity of the category 'Christians' and the elusiveness 
of Muslim 'conspiracy' are both defensive and preservative mechanisms, is one that 
becomes in the ensuing decades an important rhetorical element in the self-definition of 
the renascent, secularised British state. In some respects, we may say that the failure of 
the state to recreate itself in an indigenous idiom, and the consequent vacuum created in 
terms of self-representation for the governing Anglo-Indian community, is partially 
inscribed in their discourse after 1857 on to the increasingly Semiticised and isolated 
Indian Muslim. His presence carries forward the reciprocal idea, at least at the 
298 Thornhill, p 333. 
2Q9 See in particular, his letter of 30 August 1857. 
representational level, of a potential binding of Briton to Indian society - a potential 
partly kept alive at the sharp point of a perceived, omnipresent Semitic belligerence. 
177 
The second, interdependent, feature that can be brought forward from the 
foregoing discussion of Muslim 'conspiracy' is the perception of unity through which it 
operated in Anglo-Indian discourse. We have mentioned this perception with regard to 
Mark Thornhill's narrative, in which the supposed cohesiveness of the Muslim invaders 
is contrasted with the disunity of 'native' (meaning Hindu) society, making of it an easy 
conquest. Later in the memoir this idea of unity resurfaces - revealingly - in precisely 
the same terms, but now with the British seen in the role of conquerors whose cohesive 
military might in the eighteenth century overwhelmed the fragmented caste Hindu 
polities. The two points of comparison are again further brought together by the contrast 
of the unity of Muslim revolt outside Agra fort and the divided, bickering British 
officialdom within. The idea of Indo-Muslim unity is in this way in Thornhill's narrative 
always in an undisclosed comparative relationship with the British in India. We have 
also argued that in Lyall's correspondence a similar theme can be discerned. Alongside 
the Semitic idea, it is caught, for instance, in the phrase 'Mussulman patriots', suggestive 
of foreign allegiances and of unbreakable solidarity. This idea is specifically seen as 
destructive of the possibility of a 'national revolt' .300 However, if, apart from Muslim 
'conspiracy', the 'Mutiny' in Bulandshahr district is a fragmentary affair in which 'every 
man does what is right in his own eyes, villages [ ... ] fighting against village' ,301 it 
nevertheless contains the possibility of solidarity through the British; as he writes to his 
mother on 7 April 1857: 'our army discipline has taught the sepoys the art of 
combination.' Thus the 'patriotism' of Indian Muslims appears to link up in the 
correspondence with the earlier example of British unity. Significantly, this too has the 
effect of indigenisation, since the former is destructive of 'national' cohesion, whereas 
300 Letter to his mother, 26 November 1857. 
301 Letter to his father, 30 August 1857. 
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the latter, British, influence is said to impart its specific prototype. The notion of Muslim 
unity is thus for Lyall, as for Thornhill, a covertly comparative constituent. Ultimately, 
its effect in Anglo-Indian discourse is that the 'Mussulman patriot' emerges from the 
events of 1857-59 inscribed with the very idea of community, one that, as an example to 
the British, is ambiguously marked. At once an incitement to, and destructive of, its 
national variant, it represents at the same time an uncanny version of the kind of supra-
national territorial unity so attractive, and elusive, to the troubled British Indian state. In 
this regard, the very perception of Muslim 'conspiracy' can be seen as caught up with an 
attempt to contain the intolerable and contradictory pressures placed on the British sense 
of unity during the 'Mutiny'. This is vividly brought out in Lyall's statement that the 
'Mahometans' and 'sepoys' alone were responsible for the 'Mutiny' ,302 making a direct 
equivalence in terms of militancy consonant with that notion of unity in British discourse 
about Islam which had, at least from Gibbon onwards, fixed it as reliant upon ever-
expanding, militant territorial conquest. Without such military 'enthusiasm', it was 
believed Islamic society necessarily reverted to its former tribal disunity.303 Thus the 
unity of the sepoys and Muslims, reliant on a decisively defeated military imperative, was 
seen to be re-appropriated to the British Indian state - even as the suggestion of military 
despotism was displaced on to them. In terms of the representations of Indian Muslims in 
Anglo-Indian discourse, that notion of a despotic militant unity became in the next two 
decades an omnipresent counterpoint to the peaceful extension of the powers of the 
renascent, secular state. It could be said that the unity of the latter was, in 
representational terms, dangerously reliant on the renewal and constant re-deployment of 
the former. 
302 Letter to Mr Holland, 13 March 1858. 
303 Gibbon, pp 653-654, 678; on Hegel and the 'triumph of enthusiasm' behind the 'unity' of early Islam, 
see Hourani, pp 26-27. 
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That these two revaluated stereotypical features of Indian Muslims, unity and 
'outsiderness', are also part of a self-referential discourse among the official community 
in India, can be usefully reinforced by reference to two adjacent contemporary British 
discourses: that of the evangelical wing of the Anglo-Indian community, and of what we 
might call a Metropolitan imperial evangelism. Our object in this comparison is to 
illustrate both the specificity of the forms of representations we have been examining to 
their immediate colonial context, and the ways in which they join with and influence the 
contemporary extra-colonial discourse. It has been argued that these forms arose partly 
through the erection in Civilian discourse of a dangerously porous set of boundaries 
running between representation and self-representation. The irradiation of these 
particular features of Indo-Muslim representation appears to result when those faulty 
boundaries are threatened with exposure. This chapter has therefore sought to illustrate 
and account for some of the variety of forms of prophylaxis that attempt to separate out 
the Civilian and his Indo-Muslim persecutor. It has been argued that by means of this 
prophylaxis Muslim 'conspiracy' was preserved and extended throughout the rhetoric of 
Civilian representations of 1857-59, and that such rhetoric carried forward - in a by no 
means unambiguously-marked discourse - the very idea of the British as a cohesive 
governing community in India. We should therefore expect to find that where the 
specific characteristics of contemporary Civilian discourse, with its peculiar restraints 
and elisions, are missing, the presence of the Indian Muslim would either be rendered 
unnecessary, or defused of the kind of stereotypical features we have seen in Civilian 
accounts. 
In this regard, and as an example of contemporary Anglo-Indian evangelical 
arguments, we may cite William Edwards expanded 'Mutiny' narrative, published in 
1866 with an accompanying, additional chapter on the 'facts' and causes of the 
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rebellion.304 Chick's earlier, over-hasty induction of Edwards' original account into a 
narrative of Muslim fanatical disaffection is here even further traduced by the way in 
which Edwards' now open espousal of the need for the 'evangelicization,305 of India is 
still almost entirely unaccompanied by the question of Muslim 'conspiracy' .306 Freed by 
retirement from the constraints placed on such public advocacy, Edwards is able to speak 
openly of the urgent need in colonial governance in India for the kind of unity that 
wholesale conversion might offer, and to make a direct connection between the absence 
of such a unifying factor and the problematic of governing Indian society from without: 
We are and ever must be regarded as foreign invaders and conquerors. and the 
more the people become enlightened and civilized the more earnest will, in all 
probability be their efforts to get rid of us. Our best safeguard is in the 
evangelization of the country; for, although Christianity does not denationalize, its 
spread would be gradual, and Christian settlements scattered about the country 
would be as towers of strength for many years to come, for they must be loyal so 
long as the mass of the people remain either idolators or Mahomedans. They could 
not desire any other than a Christian dynasty in India.307 
In other words, in the context of the events of 1857-59, he is able here to access the 
interdependent questions of community and alienation without recourse to the 
prophylactic presence of the Indian Muslim. Moreover, he is able to do so in the very 
Christian terms by which the fearful spectre of Muslim 'conspiracy' had itself apparently 
been constructed. This is a cogent illustration of the way in which, for Civilians, Muslim 
'conspiracy' is in reality not a religious question, but one primarily of political 
304 William Edwards, Reminiscences of a Bengal Civilian (London: Smith, Elder & Co, 1866), Chapter 
XX, pp 305-340. 
305 Edwards, Reminiscences, p 336. 
306 For instance, while he notes the longstanding 'hope' ofIndian Muslims for the return of Mughal 
ascendancy, he also points to the equal sympathy for this notion in the majority of 'Hindoo subjects'. He 
concludes: 'I have good grounds for believing that the King of Delhi was the centre ofa feeling of 
nationality in their minds, as well as in those of the Mahomedans. Indeed no one, who has had the 
opportunities I have possessed of judging ofthe real sentiments of the natives, can doubt that a feeling of 
nationality has sprung up in India ... As years have rolled past, the Mahomedans oflndia have become 
gradually Hindoo-ized in thoughts and habits. The ancient antipathy between the races has, to a great 
extent, disappeared, and they are not much more separated now from their Hindoo fellow-countrymen, than 
different castes of Hindoos are by caste from each other.' Edwards, Reminiscences, p 307. 
307 d E h . . h .. I E wards, Reminiscences, p 336. mp aslS m t e ongma . 
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paramountcy. Moreover, it is a question specific to a particular location and set of terms 
and restraints - those that pertain, that is, within what Mary Louise Pratt has called the 
'contact zone' .308 Edwards' insistence on a Christian solution from the safe distance of 
England in 1866, does not require an occluding (foreign and unified) Muslim presence 
precisely because he is free to name his real protagonists?09 
In his popular course of lectures, published as The Expansion of England, the 
historian J R Seeley accesses an apparently different, but as we shall see, cognate form of 
freedom. 310 He does so on behalf of a very un-Civil constituency, the Metropolitan 
evangelists of imperialism. From the seemingly more secure distance of Cambridge in 
1883, Seeley summoned up the frank vision of British imperialism in India as 
representing, for all intent and purposes, 'the greatest Mussulman Power in the world', an 
'Asiatic conqueror' usurping the' succession of the Great Mogul' .311 This 
characterisation is placed at the heart of his arguments over the British Empire in India. 
Since dominion in India is itself characterised as the 'greatest of the anxieties of 
England', the notion of the British Indian state as effectively a continuation of Mughal 
rule must be read partly as a means of straddling, and suppressing, the central 
308 Pratt defines 'the contact zone' as 'the space of colonial encounters, the space in which peoples 
geographically and historically separated come into contact with each other and establish ongoing relations, 
usually involving conditions of coercion, radical inequality, and intractable conflict' Mary Louise Pratt, 
Imperial Eyes: Travel Writing and Transculturation (London: Routledge, repr. 1995; 1992), p 6. 
309 Comparison to Reverend J Cave-Browne's 1861 narrative is instructive. Still a serving member of the 
Anglican chaplaincy that had accompanied the Bengal army in 1857-59, Owen neither openly advocates an 
evangelical crusade nor hesitates to point the finger squarely at Muslim sectarianism. Indeed, it is 
interesting to conjecture whether, in the almost comically splenetic terms with which he denounces the 
'wily Mohammedan', we are not hearing the sublimated tones of an already forestalled evangelism. While 
remaining just this side of the official barrier, the idea appears to be invariably implicit to his formulations 
of 'conspiracy: 'Ofthe view [the author] has taken of this sturggle for life or death, he still retains the 
opinion which he advanced from the first - it was Mohammed or CHRIST for India's future - the former 
represented by the Mussulmans of Hind os tan, with their Hindoo dupes, and the latter by their Christian 
rulers.' Cave-Browne, p XV. Emphasis in the original. 
110 Expansion sold half a million copies in the 1880s, and until the mid-twentieth century remained in print 
as one of the most influential history textbooks in British schools during this period. (J R Seeley, The 
Expansion of England: Two Courses of Lectures (London: Macmillan & Co, 1886». E H H Green, 'The 
Political Economy of Empire, 1880-1914' OHBE Volume Two, p 346; John M Mackenzie, Propaganda 
and Empire: the Manipulation of British Public Opinion 1880-1960 (Manchester: Manchester University 
Press, repro 1994; 1984), pp 179-180. 
311 Seeley, pp 176-177. 
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problematic with which his book is concerned, that is, the unity of what he calls 'Greater 
Britain,.312 This is a startling proposition in the light of what we have seen of Civilian 
rhetorical struggles with the problem of the unity of governance in India, and the ways in 
which the British are invariably separated out from precisely that perceived Indo-Muslim 
relationship with, and pretensions to, power. Far from deploying prophylactic devices, 
Seeley appears free to reinvent the British in India as Muslims - a similar kind of 
freedom, then, to that which allows Edwards to point the way forward, without the 
prophylactic presence of the Muslim 'fanatic', to the security of an India evangelised. 
For Seeley, like Edwards, the question at hand - and one addressed directly - is 
that of 'foreign domination' .313 In this regard, India poses the 'harder problem' for the 
potential stability of union in the Empire, that of' a ruling race of Englishmen in a 
country which they cannot colonize.'314 It is for this reason that he divides up his lectures 
into two courses, the second being devoted entirely to the question of India and the 
differential model it presents to the historian of empire (and the theorist of its future - for 
Seeley, the two roles should always be combined). His solution, partial and as we shall 
see, not without its own problems, is to realign the British as part of a process at first 
foreign to India, but now to be considered as a kind of (as he puts it) 'internal 
revolution' .315 In effect, he proposes that not only are the British successors to Mughal 
rule, they might actually bring about its natural development - the Christian means, 
paradoxically, by which the Mughal paradigm may be transformed into an indigenous 
polity. This is, essentially, a revolution in rhetoric. Seeley offers no new sources for his 
reinterpretation/16 neither does he eschew Civilian observations (Hunter's Indian 
Musalmans is a key text for his generalisations about contemporary Indian Muslims317). 
312 Seeley, pp 175-6. 
313 Seeley, Expansion, p 204. 
314 Seeley, Expansion, p 168. 
315 Seeley, Expansion, p 208. 
316 Mackenzie, Propaganda, p 179. 
m Seeley, Expansion, pp 275, 277. 
But in reading the British directly into the continuum of Muslim rule, his analysis of 
British Indian governance in the wake of 1857-59 exposes the kinds of investments in 
and covert comparisons with, Indian Muslims that constitutes the hidden bedrock of 
Civilian rhetoric. Thus Muslim 'fanaticism', and in particular, the idea of a Muslim 
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'conspiracy' behind the 'Mutiny', play no part in his understanding of either 1857-59 or 
its immediate aftermath.318 Consequently he has no need of any boundaries, permeable 
or otherwise, between the British in India and Indian Muslims: comparison - indeed, 
mimicry - is the point. In short, he is talking about power in ways that, in the wake of 
the 'Mutiny', were simply unavailable to Civilians. 
Which is not to say that his goals were entirely dissimilar from those of Civilians. 
In terms of the unity and alienation we have been discussing, Seeley's synthesis of 
Mughal and British rule has in fact at least one congruent aim: the rhetorical 
'indigenisation' - and thus strengthening - of British rule in India. Like Civilian 
accounts of the period, his emphases therefore ultimately fall upon Muslims as essentially 
a 'foreign domination'; but they do so in order to make the point that 'the English did not 
introduce a foreign domination into [India], for the foreign domination was already 
there.' In this reading, there is nothing novel about the British entry into India: the 
British 'were foreigners indeed, but ... this could make no difference in India, where most 
Governments were foreign, where the Great Mogul himselfwas a foreigner.,319 Having 
seemingly sidestepped the problem of alienation, he then completes the descriptive 
indigenisation of the British in India: 
[the British conquest of India is] not an event belonging to the foreign department. 
It is an internal revolution in Indian society, and it is to be compared to one of those 
sudden usurpations or coups de 'etat, by which a period of disturbance within a 
community is closed.320 
318 For Seeley, it was the pre-'Mutiny' decades of annexation that 'aroused a disquiet in the minds of our 
Hindu subjects which issued in the mutiny'. Seeley, Expansion, p 289. 
319 Seeley, Expansion, p 210. 
320 Seeley, Expansion, p 211. 
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Thus the problems of community and alienation which issue in Civilian accounts in the 
over-inscription of those features in the representation of the Indian Muslim, here results 
in the quite different spectacle of the MuslimlBritish rule as successive stages in the 
completion of a continuum of indigenous revolutions. Like the original Aryan invaders, 
they are 'foreigners indeed', but through that very 'foreigness' they are revealed as the 
consummate insiders; they are revealed, in effect, as the perfection of Indian society.321 
In order to bring the British within Indian society, then, Seeley's rhetoric turns 
that society inside out, making of it a society of foreigners. In this regard, the Muslim 
invaders are belated Aryans, and proleptic of the British usurpation. Thus the first 
invasion of Mahmud of Ghazni is figured as 'the practical discovery of India for the 
world ... [he] is to India, as it were, Columbus and Cortez in one,;322 and Christianity, a 
'product of the fusion of Semitic with Aryan ideas' , may ultimately serve in India as a 
'reconciling element between ourselves and these contending religions' .323 However, it 
must be recognised that this utopian possibility is offered not by way of moving India out 
of the past and into the future, but as a means rather of preserving what he perceives as 
the stasis - or as Seeley puts it, 'the political deadness,324 - of Indian society.325 For the 
conceit of what we might call the 'indigenous invader' by which Seeley attempts to 
remove the suggestion of novelty from British Indian paramountcy, carries with it the 
unstated, but deeply disturbing, possibility of a similar successive 'revolution', one that is 
now 'internal' to the British nationiEmpire itself.326 By bringing India into alignment 
with 'Greater Britain' through the rhetorical strategy of making it into a land of 
321 Seeley, Expansion, p 205. 
322 Seeley, Expansion, p 280. 
323 Seeley, Expansion, p 278. 
324 Seeley, Expansion, p 203. 
325 As discussed in Chapter One with reference to Flora Annie Steel's India, the perception oflndian 
society as essentially changeless is a common point of European Orientalist discourse (on this see lnden, 
Imagining, passim). Seeley's innovation in The Expansion of England was to utilise this stasis as a 
rhetorical prop for the preservation of 'Greater Britain' (see below). 
326 For Seeley, the British nation and Empire should be considered as coterminous (ibid, pp 45-46). 
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foreigners, Seeley has broached the possibility of contamination working its way back 
through the Empire and into the heart of the Metropolis. This is an immanent danger 
throughout the Expansion, that in searching for the unity of Empire, Seeley opens up the 
idea of English nationalism to the infection of foreign diversity. He guards against this in 
the first course of lectures dealing with Canada, the ' West Indian Islands', South Africa, 
Australia and New Zealand, by literally emptying them of any indigenous population, so 
that he can then describe these 'groups' as 'inhabited chiefly or to a large extent by 
Englishmen and subject to the crown.,327 India, set aside as in no way comparable, 
appears to become, in the second course of lectures, an uncanny double to the 'empty' 
colonies of Englishmen, threatening them with the spectacle of an indigenised population 
of English foreigners - and one, moreover, that is 'drawn every year for good or evil 
more closely together [with England].,328 Thus to describe them as a 'Mussulman power' 
implies on the one hand that in its Indian Empire, the British colonists - carriers of 
British nationhood - are made foreign to themselves; they appear to participate in a social 
dynamic internal to India and transformative of all its successive invaders. In this regard, 
they threaten the very idea of the integrity of the export of British nationality that drives 
Seeley's thesis. But it is also to distance them rhetorically from 'Greater Britain'; as with 
the separation out of the two courses of lectures, India and its colonists are, in a sense, 
descriptively quarantined. In contradistinction to the Civilian rhetorical boundaries 
drawn up and obsessively redrawn between Muslim and British, effectively what we get 
here is Muslims as prophylaxis, boundary-markers between the British and British Indian 
empires. Far from summoning up a British communal solidarity, they represent an 
attempt at enforcing a rhetorical dis-unity among the different quarters of 'Greater 
Britain' . 
327 Seeley, Expansion, p 10. 
328 Seeley, Expansion, p 305. 
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In effect then, their deployment in The Expansion of England is as ambiguously 
marked as that of the Civilian discourse on Indian Muslims. At once a perverse vehicle 
of in dig en is at ion (making of the British, indigenous invaders), they are simultaneously 
brought into playas a means of segregating the British colonists from British nationhood 
as a whole. However, there is an ironic reversal of terms at work here: where in Civilian 
accounts Indian Muslims are represented as disruptive of Indian unity and attaching 
themselves instead to a larger Semitic 'patriotism', the British colonist in India is figured 
by his imperial theorist as holding together an Indian unity while at the same time both 
segregated from and threatening to, a larger British imperial union. In a sense, Seeley 
configures the Anglo-Indian community in reference to the British Empire in much the 
same way as they had done to that of the Indian Muslim in 1857-59 in terms ofa 
potential Indian nationalism. Where the two discourses appear to coalesce is in making 
of the Indian Muslim a crucial boundary-marker in the quest for self-definition - making 
of him, that is, the point at which self-possession is both potential, and potentially lost. 
In this regard, Seeley's thesis links up with the third feature of British Indo-
Muslim representations that we have touched on in this chapter, one which can usefully 
point us forward to the post-'Mutiny' Civilian literature: the tropes of possession and 
dispossession, of Mug hal plenitude and loss, that recur in Civilian narratives. In one 
sense, Seeley's subject in The Expansion of England is loss itself. Fear of loss - of 
empire and of nationality - lie behind all the arguments put forward in the lectures;329 but 
its implications become most apparent in the second course of lectures on India. In 
particular, they do so in his attempts, running through each one of the eight lectures, to 
re-define the British possession of India in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries as 
anything but a process of 'conquest'. Here, the examples set by Muslim invaders, as well 
329 Peter Burroughs, 'John Robert Seeley and British Imperial History', in The Journal of Imperial and 
Commonwealth History, January 1973, Volume 1, No 2, pp 191-212. 
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as by Muslim polities outside of India/30 provide a crucial counterpoint.331 At times, 
they are figured as positive indicators (demonstrating, for instance, how invasion per se 
has failed to fuse the 'Brahmanists' into a national entity);332 at other points, they serve as 
counter-examples (for instance, in their being 'irresistibly impelled to the conquest of 
India by [their] Mussulman faith,).333 In the actual matter of 'conquest' - of, that is, the 
physical acquisition of and dominion over Indian territory - Seeley worries away at the 
duration, size and strength of Mughal rule until he can conclude that as an empire it 
constituted no more than 'a mere moment' in India's history, hardly constitutive of even 
'geographical' coherence. This then becomes a prolepsis of the equally brief British 
dominion, whose impact upon the subcontinent and potential as an empire is thus held 
open to the future, and even to future nullification.334 The net effect of these comparisons 
between British and Muslim rule is, in this way, always that of the maintenance of the 
fundamental stasis that Seeley perceives in Indian history and society. Ultimately, he 
seems to contend, Muslim intervention in India can never be productive of innovative 
change. Even where Seeley appears to actively argue for their interference - as with his 
contention that from the time of the Muslim invasions 'the tie of nationality was 
broken,335 - the force of this pattern invariably undermines the possibility of innovation 
(thus it turns out that the foreign importation of Brahmanism had already done as 
much336). When he comes to figure the role of Muslims in contemporary Indian society, 
it is again to see them as producing a direct and perfect counter-balance to any other force 
at work. For instance, he notes that the 'discontent' of the dispossessed Muslim 
government officials counteracts 'any gratitude' that the enfranchised 'Brahmin 
330 See for instance, his contention that the tributary paid by the Khedive of Egypt to the Ottoman emperor 
instances a counter-example to the British empire in India where no such tax is levied 'which does not in 
any shape return to the country.' Seeley, Expansion, p 182. 
331 See in particular, Lecture IV: 'How We Govern India'. 
332 Seeley, Expansion, p 226. 
m Seeley, Expansion, p 280. 
334 Seeley, Expansion, pp 223-24. 
335 • Seeley, ExpansIOn, p 204. 
336 • Seeley, ExpansIOn, p 205. 
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cultivator' might feel towards the British govemment;337 and conversely, the opposition 
which the 'Hindu population' might have been expected to show has been 'dragonnaded 
by foreign military Governments, until the very conception of resistance has been los1.,338 
Effectively, then, through the representation of Muslims in Seeley's lectures, the idea of 
substantive change in India, and therefore the possibility of substantive loss in terms of 
the British Empire in India, is consistently displaced. Equally displaced, of course, is the 
possibility of loss through the retention of dominion in India, with its calamitous risk of 
the infection of diversity spreading throughout the rest of 'Greater Britain' . 
We can say, then, that if loss is the true subject of Seeley's thesis, the 
representations of Indian Muslims in The Expansion of England act consistently to 
attempt to nullify its potential. By entering upon these imperial questions primarily 
through these representations, Seeley's text reveals itself as an indirect product of the 
events of 1857-59 and the Civilian discourse they generated. As in that discourse, they 
become a means of deferring the problematic of the future British state in India. 
However, the crucial distinction that needs to be drawn between the two discourses is the 
manner in which Civilian accounts during and in the aftermath of the 'Mutiny' invariably 
deploy forms of prophylaxis that seek to separate out the Muslim and British 
protagonists. Through these protective devices, the idea of Muslim 'conspiracy' and its 
resulting representations of Indian Muslims, ambiguously inscribed with the idea of a 
community of governance, are preserved and extended throughout Civilian discourse; 
they become a means of talking about a possible future British Indian state, without 
entering directly into the disturbing visibility of self-representation. In other words, they 
offer a mode of rhetoric that, at one level, displaces the possibility of dispossession. In 
contrast, Seeley's approach to the problem of loss is to see Muslim polities in India as 
having, in a sense, never had anything to lose. In his reading, they enable and are 
337 • Seeley, Expansion, pp 275-76. 
338 • Seeley, ExpanSIOn, p 276. 
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produced by, a similar state of inertia by which the British dispensation in India may be 
preserved. Thus he attempts to forestall loss by questioning the very possibility of 
possession. Ironically, he is able do this by freely possessing his representations of Indo-
Muslim history and society as open and visible points of comparison. 
To mark this key difference in the two discourses we can briefly underscore the 
very different manner in which possession and dispossession are figured in Civilian 
accounts of 1857-59. For it is here that the boundaries running between representation 
and self-representation in Civilian writings show themselves most exposed and liable to 
precipitous collapse. This is perhaps most obviously illustrated in Mark Thornhill's 
account, in which the tale of the appearance of the ghost of the Mughal emperor Akbar 
occurs at the moment in which the dispossession of the British, besieged in the fort at 
Agra, is mirrored by the narrative's own stalled progress. The recourse here to the 
plenitude of Mughal history brings with it the idea of loss and dispossession, frrst 
broached in the conversation between the clerks and overheard by the author in his own 
government office before the outbreak of 'Mutiny'. The suggestion there of the 
continuing power of the Mughal throne over the mind of the Indian native now returns as 
the uncanny demand by the emperor's ghost that: 'The house is mine! mine!! mine!!!'. 
It returns too in the 'phantoms' of British power, the prisoners of Agra jail released by 
the treacherous Muslim official, who later pass by Thornhill's party: 
They made no attempt to molest us, they did not appear to see us; they neither 
turned their heads nor quickened their pace. They moved on with the same slow, 
silent steps and vanished in the darkness ... at each step their chains rattled. They 
passed on as might phantoms from another world - diml~ seen, silent, regardless -
issuing from the darkness, gliding by, and re-entering it. 39 
That they are 'phantoms' of British power, returning as uncanny figures of dispossession 
who no longer 'see' their former gaolers, is vividly reinforced by the later sight of the 
339 Thornhill, pp 146-47. 
British bungalows at Agra which the ex-prisoners have set alight, turning them into 
ffi ,340 'cages 0 lre. 
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Thornhill's memoir of 1884 is able to utilise these kinds of uncanny tableaux to 
such literary effect precisely because the literal moment of potential dispossession had 
passed. The ghost of Akbar is, in the end, contained within a tale, and retailed as part of 
the pleasure that the genre offered up to its Metropolitan readers. Similarly, the 
subsequent description of British attempts within the fort to excavate a blocked up 
staircase to reveal hidden Mughal chambers, plays with the Romantic themes of vanitas 
common in nineteenth-century literature, leading to the contemplation of 'generations 
[that] had come and gone, dynasties [ ... ] reigned and past away.,341 They are 
nevertheless suggestive of the idea of an unreachable Mughal plenitude, a history of 
possession that both eludes and at points threatens to over-turn, the sense of mastery that 
the narrative wishes to re-establish over the events of the 'Mutiny'. In Alfred Lyall's 
correspondence, however, we can locate a far more visceral instance, in which the 
threatened dissolution of the lines of division running between self-representation and the 
representation of the Indian Muslim, offer up an altogether more disturbing and uncanny 
aspect of the trope of dispossession. They do so, predictably, at the only time in which 
Lyall attempts to recount his (more or less) direct encounter with a 'fanatical' Indian 
Muslim. Here, the recourse to literary containment as itself a form of prophylaxis is far 
more eloquent of the powerlessness inherent to the kinds of representations that we have 
discussed in this chapter. The incident occurs on an expedition to a 'Mussulman village' 
with the Volunteer Horse formed in Meerut. As he writes to his father in 24 July 1857: 
'Two Ghazis, or Mahometan fanatics, sworn to exterminate the enemies of the Faith, 
made a desperate resistance in a Mosque, but were overpowered and cut down.' Like 
Thornhill's encounter with the bodies of dead 'ghazis', Lyall appears to happen on the 
340 Thornhill, pp 155-56. 
341 Thornhill, pp 233-34. 
scene after the event; the third-person locution leaves it unclear as to whether he was 
involved in this particular killing or not. 342 He then writes: 
I took the opportunity, as I stood with bloody rapier over them, of favouring an 
excited audience with some lines from the Giaour [ sic], beginning "with sabre 
shivered to the hilt". They fought and died quite in the orthodox Mussulman 
manner, the Koran in one hand and the scimitar in the other much to my 
edification, as I like to see things done properly, and with a dash of romance about 
them. 
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Despite the gratuitous detail of his 'bloody rapier', Lyall here attempts to re-direct the 
disturbing immediacy of this encounter into the controlled cadences of a common 
Metropolitan literary genre343• His choice provides, however, an insight into the way in 
which this unprecedented - and as it were, unprotected - encounter cannot, despite the 
theatrical artifice and self-irony, be so easily disavowed. 
Lyall's reference here is to Byron's 'The Giaour', published to great acclaim in 
1813 as one of three Turkish Tales. Through these tales in particular, Byron played a 
central role in the first half of the nineteenth century in shaping British public perceptions 
of the 'East' .344 Recent scholarship has concentrated on the ways in which the Tales 
undermine the ruling dichotomy of occidental and oriental identities.345 They narrate a 
series of crossings between the two, and in particular between Christian and Islamic 
affiliations, using mUltiple narrators to destabilise the idea of a singular Europe or 
European perspective. Byron's own philhellenism gave to these poems a critical 
perspective with which to view both Ottoman and British imperialism, but also to test out 
342 Ifhe is actually responsible here, the third-person locution is worth noting given his lack of reticence 
and detail elsewhere in claiming hand to hand encounters (see for instance, letter to his father, dated 11 July 
1857). 
343 This is in fact the only occasion in the correspondence in which, while recounting to his family a scene 
of battle, Lyall seeks out a literary metaphor. 
344 Brantlinger, Rule, p 136. Byron was an evident influence on Lyall's later poetry; but from his 
schoolboy efforts the particular influence ofthe Turkish Tales are clear, especially in the ways in which 
they led him to reflect on the larger theme of the passing of cultures - themes which he tended at that time 
to portray through chivalrous Muslim figures (in for instance, his schoolboy poems 'EI Ultimo Suspiro Del 
Moro' and 'Boabdil's Farewell'). Durand, Lyall, pp 23-24. 
345 Leask, p 61. 
particular ideas on the mutability of nationhood. In this sense, the poems rehearse 
anxieties over the deformations attendant on the extension of a British identity into an 
imperial arena - anxieties that, as we have seen, continued to preoccupy and animate 
Seeley's text seventy years later. 
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As with the other two tales in the series ('The Bride of Abydos' and 'The Siege of 
Corinth'), 'The Giaour' is superficially a story ofvengeance,346 and for that reason alone 
might have presented itself easily to the young Assistant Magistrate rampant over the 
bodies of his fallen enemies. But in specifically identifying with the Giaour himself 
(whose murderous actions the lines he cites describe), he unconsciously draws attention 
both to an alienating sense of political dispossession, and to the secondary implied 
possibility of the dissolution of his own national identity, the central unifying motif of the 
poem.347 To summarise, the story concerns the love triangle between Hassan (a Turkish 
nobleman), Leila (a Circassian - Greek - maid in Hassan's harem) and the Giaour (a 
Venetian apostate to Islam). The infidelity of Leila with the 'Giaour' precipitates her 
death (drowned by Hassan), and the eventual murder of Hassan by the 'Giaour'. The 
fateful encounter between these two occurs in the middle of the poem and marks the first 
point in which direct speech is given to the 'Giaour' .348 The real name of the 'Giaour' is 
in fact never revealed, so that he is effectively constructed through 'Muslim' eyes - the 
denomination 'Giaour' is first given by the Turkish fisherman whose narrative begins the 
poem. In Byron's own notes to the poem, he cites its Arabic derivative as 'Jawr, a 
"deviating" or "erring'" .349 In this way, the poet seems to suggest that an original 
identity is beyond the reconstructive power of the narrative; the hero is to be defined, as it 
were, under the rubric of his own journey outwards from his Venetian island (the 
346 Sharafuddin, p 271. 
347 Sharafuddin, pp 260-61. The choice is significant in that it specifically undercuts the kind of 
expectations his family might have had from such an encounter. For instance, these themes play no part in 
the far more populist scenes of Christian-Muslim chivalric confrontation in Scott's The Talisman. 
348 Lines 655ff, Lord Byron, Ernest Hartley Coleridge (ed), The Poetical Works of Lord Byron (London: 
John Murray, 1948), p 270. 
349 Lord Byron, p 265. 
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coincidence of his maritime imperial origins would have been more than significant to 
Byron's English readership). Thus the attempted return of the 'Giaour' to his Christian 
faith, in the form of the monastery he haunts in the latter half of the poem, can never be 
complete; he may mutely witness, but never join in with its ceremonies. 
The murder of Hassan marks the effective self-dispossession of the Giaour, and 
his condemnation to wander' on earth as Vampire sent/Then ghastly haunt thy native 
place/ And suck the blood of all thy race' (Lines 765-67). By choosing this moment in 
the narrative, Lyall melodramatically summons up not only the figure of the Byronic 
hero, freely entering into his own tragic fate, but the more disturbing idea of the hero 
making of himself, as one critic has written, 'a foreigner, not only to England and the 
West, but also to ordinary piety and worship' .350 It is for this reason that 'The Giaour' 
has been called a 'vampire poem', and the Giaour a 'nationless' hero.351 As Ken Gelder 
has written, the representation of the vampire fixes him as 'unassimilated', as an 
'internationalised character who is excessive to national identities'. 352 The fatal instant 
of, as it were, de-nationalisation, occurs in the very lines that Lyall chooses to quote: 
Fallen Hassan lies - his unclosed eye 
Yet lowering on his enemy 
As if the hour that sealed his fate 
Surviving left his quenchless hate; 
And 0' er him bends that foe with brow 
350 Sharafuddin, p 266. 
351 Ken Gelder, Reading the Vampire (London: Routledge, 1994) pp 26-27. Gelder situates the vampire in 
the context of - among other discourses - British anti-Semitism (pp 13-17). This point is made in greater 
detail in H L Malchow, Gothic Images of Race in Nineteenth-Century Britain (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1996), pp 153-65. The plurality, and promiscuous application, of racial typologies in 
British cultural discourse during this period has often been remarked upon by critics (see for instance, 
Patrick Brantlinger, 'Race and the Victorian Novel' in The Victorian Novel, ed Deirdre David, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2001, pp 149-68; and C A Bayly, p 153). In proposing colonialist perceptions 
of the Indian Muslim as a vampire-like figure, the argument here implicitly suggests nineteenth-century 
British anti-Semitism as one such potentially plural discourse, occasionally exchanging Muslim and Jewish 
'Semitic' objects of censure. 
352 Gelder, p 23. 
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As dark as his that bled below.353 
It is a moment in which a ghastly identification is effected between Muslim victim and 
apostate killer, one that is echoed throughout the second half of the poem.354 Since, as 
Gelder describes it, 'the vampire is an Other who is 'disconcertingly familiar' to the Self 
- is, in other words, a manifestation of 'the uncanny' - we may think of this identification 
as entailing a form of dispossession.355 Through the murder of Hassan, the Giaour 
becomes the unholy spectre of a self estranged, haunting the cloisters of the monastery at 
the end of the poem, eternally separated from his origins: 'He passed - nor of his name 
and racelHe left a token or a trace' .356 
Given Seeley's later description of India as a land of foreigners, one in which the 
Anglo-Indian ambiguously threatens and throws into relief the racial, religious and 
communal integrity of both the other colonies, and the English nationality itself, Lyall's 
identification here with the unassimilable, vampiric Giaour is at least highly suggestive. 
As in the Giaour's encounter with Hassan, the here comparatively unmediated Civilian 
interaction with the Muslim 'fanatic' appears to expose a raw awareness of the fragility 
of the possession of his own self-representation, its liminal positioning with regard to his 
Metropolitan readers and his Indian circumstance. The asymmetry he attempts to enforce 
between himself and the 'ghazis' through reference to the 'Koran' and the 'scimitar' 
(neither of which feature in the scene in the poem), is belied not only by the suggestion of 
the uncanny consequence that awaits his actions, but by the equally uncanny fit between 
the fate of the Giaour and Lyall's own representations of the unassimilable Indian 
353 L' mes 669-74. 
354 For instance, a parallel is drawn between Hassan's palace, now turned tomb, and the ruin literally etched 
upon the Giaour's face (lines 288-351 and 861-82). Both are prefigured by a similarly ruined Greek 
nationality (lines 1-167). 
355 Gelder, p 43, 
356 L' mes 1329-30 
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Muslim.357 Ifwe may take the reference to 'The Giaour' as having some bearing on 
Lyall's self-representation in the correspondence, it is hard to evade the conclusion that 
the sacrifice between the two fictional combatants, of a European nationalist ideal,358 
discloses a peculiarly Anglo-Indian apprehension of self-dispossession in 1857-59. By 
citing Byron's own simultaneous working through of these questions upon the body of 
the Turk and the mind of the apostate, Lyall's representation of his relationship to the 
fallen 'ghazis' momentarily opens out the reciprocity running between the murderous, de-
nationalising Semites and the Civilian who has here run them to ground. In a sense, the 
poetic genre and the third-person locution of the encounter are all that remain of the web 
of prophylaxis that everywhere else cocoons and preserves the integrity of the Civilian's 
discourse on the Indian Muslim. 
This moment of self-revelation usefully points us back towards the idea of 
prophylaxis that this chapter has sought to demonstrate lies at the heart of all 
representations of Muslim 'conspiracy'. Although unusual for its apparently 
unintentional alignment of Civilian and Indian Muslim, we should not, however, think of 
it as essentially distinct, since 'The Giaour' is, like all vampire fiction, a 'fantasy ... of 
incompletion' .359 Gelder has convincingly demonstrated that the vampire's function is to 
be that which is always in excess of signification to the national identity, to be that which 
can never be assimilated into the national self. As such, the vampire is in reality only a 
promise of the continuing need for signification, a sign that the idea of communal 
357 Lyall's fear of the vampiric consequences associated with the Indian Muslim is echoed not long after 
this encounter in a letter to his mother (23 October, 1857): 'However, we hang lots of people, Musulmans 
especially, and I flatter myself that I have been the humble means of putting to death a good many of them. 
I could go every day and glut my eyes with the sight, but I hardly ever do so, as I have somehow got lately 
a strange fear of what the old Greeks called Nemesis, so just do my duty in hanging them, and nothing 
more. For this same reason I never insult or curse them, as many do, but am particularly polite and 
deferential to them up to their last moment, insomuch so that some have been deluded into the idea that I 
was going to let them off.' 
358 Byron's description of Leila as 'Circassia's daughter/The loveliest bird of Franguestan' (Lines 505-506) 
makes explicit his conflation of Greek and all other European national identities, 'Franguestan' meaning 
'the land of the Franks' (Europeans). See Byron's notes to 'The Giaour', p 269. 
359 Gelder, p 29. 
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cohesion - the basic pledge of all corporate ideology - is not completed, but momentarily 
deferred. In identifying himself as the vampire, Lyall shows up the confusion of his own 
relationship both to an English and to a potentially Indian, nationality. He places himself 
in the role of the liminal, the threatening. In short, he places himself in the role he has 
otherwise assigned to the Indian Muslim (it is one of the homologies of this self-
representation that the original model for vampires in nineteenth British literature was in 
all probability himself not only a Muslim warrior against the Crusaders, but thought to 
have been an apostate from Christianity).36o But this confused positioning in fact helps 
highlight the most important function of the vampiric (internationalised, bloodthirsty) 
Indian Semite in his, and in all Civilian accounts, of 1857-59. That function is the 
deferral of the realisation of a British identity in India; and what we might call the 
'Muslim uncanny' is none other than the endless resurrection of this moment of deferral. 
For as Gelder has argued, the vampire 'ceaselessly disturbs that identity by showing it to 
be always and at the same time foreign to itself.,361 He does this by being always in our 
midst, secretive, and working to secretly infect us, to tum us into his own uncanny image. 
We can see this mesmeric, duplicitous figure in the Reverend Cave-Brown's 
denunciation of the of the 'Mussulmans of Hindo stan , and their 'Hindu dupes,,:362 
Yet the Hindoo sepoy had also to be won over to insure success to the conspiracy, 
while its real ulterior object must be kept secret ... Thus, under the idea that an 
attack was being meditated on their religion, the great body of Hindoo sepoys, mere 
tools in the hands of their pundits, who had been first won over [by the 
Mussulmans], were caught in the trap laid for them by the wily Mohammedan, who 
himself also pretended to find in the same unhappy cartridge, with its fancied odour 
of hateful pig's fat, a religious motive for rebellion ... 363 
360 Gelder, p 24. 
361 Gelder, p 41. 
362 Cave-Browne p XV. 
363 ' Cave-Browne, pp 5-6. 
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Not only is Indian society as a whole - 'pundits' as much as 'sepoys' - the 'dupes' of the 
'wily Mahommedan', but his own religion is a matter of pretence. His secret purpose 
appears to be the similar alienation of India from its own true self. This same atavistic, 
secret presence can be found at work even in the formal assessment of the causes of the 
Mutiny made for Canning in 1859 by his Private Secretary, L B Bowring, when he writes 
that: 
Considerable prevalence has been given to the report that the Mahommedans were 
the prime movers of the revolts, that a conspiracy on their part of long standing has 
been concocted under the eyes of the Government and that the sepoys were their 
dupes and blind instruments. It is true that the Mahomedans in many parts of India 
are ill-disposed towards the British Government ... It is also true that every 
Mahomedan would gladly see the day when his faith should again be in the 
ascendant. . . But allowing this to be an accurate exposition of their secret 
aspirations, it cannot militate against facts which tend to show that the 
Mahommedans only took a partial share in the mutiny and that after its 
development. 364 
Thus Bowring concedes 'the facts', while leaving the larger context of conspiracy 
agonisingly open and awaiting further potential confirmation - awaiting, that is, the true 
moment of discovery. 
It is precisely this element of revelation, with its curious admixture of horror and 
felt relief, which we have seen in all the accounts explored above, and which is so clearly 
expressed by Lyall in his letter of 11 July 1857 in its denunciation of' a fanatical hate that 
we never suspected to exist among them' .365 The scene he later quotes from 'The 
Giaour', in which Hassan and the Giaour are locked in each others sights in death, is 
preeminently such a moment of revelation, when the secret enemy is disclosed, the 
estranged self first beheld ('his unclosed eye'Net lowering on his enemy'), and the 
transposition effected. This kind of revelation - the discovery of the secretive, venomous 
3M 'Note by L Bowring [1824-1910] on the causes of the Mutiny and on the part taken in it by the 
Mahommedans', No 362, Papers on Miscellaneous Subjects, Canning Papers, India Office Collections, 
British Library. Quoted in Hardy, p 69. Emphasis added. 
365 Letter to his father, 11 July 1857. Emphasis added. 
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Semite in the midst of and mirroring, the British Indian state - would become an 
important constituent of Anglo-Indian discourse on Indian Muslims for at least the next 
half century. As late as 1905, we can fmd the distinct echo of its fatal secrecy in Steel's 
account of a degenerated, fragmentary urban Mughal society, its torpor only the 'feigned 
slackness of a sleeping snake which has still poison in its fang, is still ready to strike if it 
finds the opportunity.,366 For the quarter century following the 'Mutiny' in particular, 
however, it would appear that the further away the British Indian state moved in its 
ability to define itself in any other than a legalistic sense, the deeper the 'vampire' 
penetrated its discursive fabric, and the more alarming its inevitable re-discovery. 
Perhaps the definitive text in this regard is Hunter's Indian Musalmans (1871), which 
will be taken up in Section 3.3. In that demi-official investigation, the Civilian author 
turns British India inside out to reveal a ghostly, second bureaucratic state attached to its 
infrastructure, sucking precious financial and moral resources through a network of 
'Wahabi' preachers and secret supply lines, and conveying them to the borders of British 
influence. There they nourish a monstrous growth of sectarianism determined to invade 
and overwhelm its host. As we shall see, by far the most monstrous aspect of this 
simultaneous invasion from within and without is its semblance of normality: its 
preachers undistinguished from any others in the subcontinent, its instruments of 
communication set up and run by the British, its headquarters uncannily mocking those of 
a local government building. 
Gelder's 'reading' of the vampire brings us back to the Lacanian terminology 
with which, in Section 2.4, we sought first to explicate the role of fantasy and deferral in 
the Civilian discourse on Muslim 'conspiracy'. For what is revealed by this inquiry into 
the mUltiplicity of forms of prophylaxis by which Indian Muslims were constructed in 
1857-59, is the essential function of what Lacan has called the 'Symptom' (in Gelder's 
366 Steel, India, p 78. 
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analysis, the implicitly Semitic vampire is the Symptom par excellence).367 The 
'Symptom' always offers itself as a paradox (as in, for instance, the living-dead vampire), 
a piece of non-sense at work in an otherwise apparently functioning ideological space. 
Its irruption into that 'rational' space calls attention to the limits of the ideology to signify 
a given reality. 368 In Lacanian thought, however, it is not an anomalous element. Rather, 
the' Symptom': 'far from announcing the' imperfect realization' of [ ... ] universal 
principles - that is, an insufficiency to be abolished by further development - functions 
as their constitutive moment.,369 Paradoxically, it is by embracing the 'Symptom' 
(through its misrecognition) that the subject interpellates themselves into the ideology. 
For the irrationality of the 'Symptom' is constitutive of the founding irrational premise of 
ideology, which offers itself as a universal principle capable of resolving all the tensions 
at work in a given social field. The irrationality of the 'Symptom' is, in this respect, a 
motif of senselessness through which the insufficiency of the ideological is made 
manifest.37o But ifit brings that insufficiency into a disturbing visibility, the 'Symptom' 
also acts as a timely reminder of the necessity for ideology as a defense against the 
originary lack in all systems of signification.371 It therefore - paradoxically - offers an 
opportunity for the subject to confirm the very ideology it seems to threaten. Thus the 
Semitic vampire brings to life the divisive corruption at work in the national soul, but 
presents the opportunity for it to cohere again in his exorcism. In this regard, assenting to 
the irrationality of the' Symptom' is the prime means by which the subject becomes 
ideological. 372 
367 Zizek has located its workings in that later European image of Semitic menace, the National Socialists' 
Eerception of Jewish conspiracy in Germany in the 1930s. Zizek, Sublime, pp 48-49, 114-15, 127-28. 
68 Zizek, Sublime, p 21; Stavrakakis, p 64. 
369 Zizek, Sublime, p 21. 
370 Zizek, Sublime, p 23; Stavrakakis, p 65. 
371 Stavrakakis, p 34; Zizek, Sublime, pp 127-28. 
372 This assent is achieved through its consistent misrecognition (Zizek, Sublime, pp 43, 75-79). Despite 
the apparent difference in emphasis, there is an essential agreement between Zizek's discussion of the 
centrality of the 'Symptom' and that ofStavrakakis, who implies a reciprocal process when he describes 
the 'Symptom' as a key signifier for lack within ideological systems and then refers to the necessity for the 
re-institution of the harmony of social fantasy through its stigmatisation (Stavrakakis, pp 64-68, 109). The 
This is the paradox that Zizek has in mind when he writes that the 
'internalization' of ideological state apparatuses, 
by structural necessity, never fully succeeds ... there is always a residue, a leftover, 
a strain of traumatic irrationality and senselessness to it, and [ ... ] this leftover, far 
from hindering the full submission of the subject to the ideological command, is the 
d· . if't 373 very con ltlOn 0 l. 
Ifwe consider this in relation to Washbrook's description of the model of the Raj 
sociology of competing multiple ethnicities, the symptomatic strain of the irrational is 
immediately manifest. That model, developed throughout the nineteenth century but 
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given its most important restatement in Victoria's proclamation in 1858, was predicated 
on the British maintaining the state as an equidistant, disassociated mediator between 
themselves and all native socio-religious communities. In his essay, 'Our Religious 
Policy in India' (1871), Lyall summed up the paradox inherent to this doctrine of what he 
ironically termed 'perfect neutrality', when he referred to the glaring fact that it was 
imposed and administered by 'Christian rulers': in other words, he knowingly placed the 
Anglican ICS officer at the centre of the web of colonial interrelations. Having pointed 
out the kernel of non-sense that structured this particular ideological fantasy, Lyall then 
goes on to throw in his own illustration of Zizek' s argument for the key role and 
necessity of 'senselessness', by giving to the ideology, finally, his own reaffirmation. 
Muslim 'conspiracy' reproduces precisely this paradox by embodying that point 
at which the state could not be disconnected from the play of communal relations. It is an 
example of the hysterical symptom, that which is repressed returning to tell of the act of 
logic of 'stigmatisation' is implicit to the analysis of the post-'Mutiny' Anglo-Indian discourse on Indian 
Muslims that follows in the next chapter. For a fuller - if more playful- account of the operations of the 
'Symptom', see Zizek, Enjoy Your Symptom (London: Routledge, repro 2001; 1992); and also, Colettte 
Soler, 'The paradoxes of the symptom in psychoanalysis', in lean-Michel Rabate (ed), The Cambridge 
Companion to Lacan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp 86-101. For a lucid exposition 
of the catastrophic processes potential to all cultural stigmatisation in modern societies, see Zygmunt 
Bauman, Modernity and the Holocaust (Cambridge: Polity, repro 2002; 1989). 
373 Zizek, Sublime, p 43. Emphasis in the original. 
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displacement.374 Here, it is the knowledge of the contingency of the colonial state - its 
place within the play of communal relations - that had been displaced, and which had 
returned in 1857 as Muslim 'conspiracy'. That contingency, as discussed in Section 1.5, 
was nowhere more apparent than in the Anglican nexus of religious and political 
identities, now exposed, misrecognised, and stigmatised, in Muslim 'conspiracy'. In this 
regard, Muslim 'conspiracy' could be said to be the purest expression of the founding 
inconsistency that, by mid-century, constituted the ruling colonial ideology in India. In 
universally taking it up and assenting to its truth, the ICS were at once misrecognising 
and re-affrrming their faith in, the ideology of the neutral state. That they did so through 
its symptomatic irrationality (the secret nexus of persecuted Christian ruler and sectarian 
Muslim subject) is perhaps the most cogent demonstration that the 'perfect neutrality' of 
the state was an ideological fantasy, and not simply a matter of pragmatic policy.375 As 
Zizek has demonstrated, ideological fantasy is most clearly shown in the misrecognition 
of its constitutive irrationality by the continued act of its performance - that is, in the 
subject attempting, through that very irrationality, to enact and create its social reality as 
ideological fantasy.376 In this way, by acting out the 'fact' of Muslim 'conspiracy' the 
ICS effectively - non-sensically - re-affirmed its fantasy of disconnection from Indian 
society, as though the truth of the latter were somehow embodied in the perception of the 
former, rather than traduced by it. Zizek calls such paradoxical action - enacting that 
which, on another level, we know to be untrue - the 'cynical reason' which upholds all 
ideological fantasies. 377 Paradoxically, then, assenting to Muslim 'conspiracy' was a 
prime means for the ICS official of showing his (irrational) belief in the (fantastic) truth 
374 Zizek, Sublime, p 26. 
375 In contrast, we may usefully recall Edwards' memoir in which both neutrality and 'conspiracy' were 
absent. Ironically, he later stated his own - evangelical - fantasy in precisely the pragmatic terms that 
characterised arguments upholding 'perfect neutrality' (see above). That more than pragmatism was at 
stake for him, is perhaps indicated by the unusual frequency with which, in his original account, he had 
recourse to prayer and the Bible (Edwards, Personal, pp 23,55,57,94,99, l39-40, 143, 147, 149-51, 165-
66,178-79,185,206). 
376 Z' k lze ,Sublime, pp 32-34. 
377 Z' k lze ,Sublime, pp 29-30. 
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of the ruling state ideology. In other words, it was a vital, unreasoning, constituent in the 
reconstruction of that ideology. Its future prominence in Anglo-Indian discourse in one 
form or another - conspiracy, communalism or even conspicuous co-option - was not 
only assured, but necessary. 
In Lacan's late works, he went even further in his valuation of the 'Symptom', 
seeing it as the only point that gave consistency to the subject.378 Misrecognising the 
inconsistency of the 'Symptom' time and again was, in this reading, the only way that the 
subject could remain ideological. Lacan's insight is suggestive in the context of the 
representations of the Indian Muslim that emerged in 1857, opening out as it does a 
valuable aspect of their future interaction with the self-representation of the state. This 
nexus concerns the precarious effect of stasis upon the latter; and it points us finally back 
to the principal consequence of the variety of forms of prophylaxis that we have 
encountered in Civilian narratives of 1857-59. Ultimately, as we have seen, those 
devices operated to preserve Muslim 'conspiracy', holding back the fatal encounter of 
Muslim 'fanatic' and Civilian victim (or indeed, avenger). If, as suggested above, the 
proper function of that 'conspiracy' was as the 'Symptom' of an embattled - indeed, 
disintegrating - ruling ideology of the British in India in 1857, then far from precipitating 
its final, apocalyptic destruction, prophylaxis acted to maintain - indeed, to momentarily 
secure - the entire system of colonial self-representation. In this regard, we may note 
how Muslim 'conspiracy' during the 'Mutiny' partially reproduces the effects of the 
inexhaustible economy of self-pleasuring that we have described as the hallmark of the 
late eighteenth century European discourse on the 'Oriental despot', and which we have 
also compared to the 'self-galling' of the Indian Muslim in Steel's India over a hundred 
years later (Section 1.4). That is, it acts to induce the effect of stasis in the economy of 
378 To distinguish this renewed interpretation, Lacan designated this signifier as sinthomme. For an 
excellent discussion of which, see Zizek, Sublime, pp 75-79. 
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representation through the illusion of a self-enclosed and self-perpetuating system.379 
Just as the despot is eternally self-pleasuring, and the later Indian Muslim forever galled 
by his own unappeasable appetite, the British state attempts to make of itself the subject 
of an inexhaustible action of destruction, the final effect of which, in terms of self-
representation, is a similar stasis. Like the martyred child in the Indian Punch cartoon, it 
is produced eternally at the moment of its extinction; it can never grow into its mature 
state; but neither can it finally be extinguished.380 
The essential destructiveness of the 'Symptom' of Muslim 'conspiracy' is thus 
itself a potential mechanism for the preservation of the stunted experience of late colonial 
ideology. It enacts the paradox of a deadly saviour, threatening a final extinction which 
never arrives, but which holds back an even more devastating reality. For, as Zizek so 
lucidly puts it, the 'Symptom' 
is an element clinging on like a kind of parasite and 'spoiling the game', but if we 
annihilate it things get even worse: we lose all we had - even the rest which was 
threatened but not yet destroyed by the symptom.381 
At a time of unprecedented change, during and in the aftermath of' Mutiny', the 
discovery of this potential for preservation in the figure of the vampiric, ravening Semite 
diverted British self-representation into a cycle of ambiguous victories over an ever more 
elusive foe. It opened out a seemingly self-sustaining economy of representation that 
took the place of self-description, even as the state set about its most radical innovations 
in its pan-Indian forms of institution. However, it should not be seen as an inviolate 
system impervious to the contingency of its colonial situation. On the contrary, as with 
Seeley's co-option of Indo-Muslim history in order to preserve a vulnerable imperial 
379 This kind of representational 'deathlessness' was built into nineteenth-century British anti-Semitic 
discourse about the 'wandering Jew', and reproduced in the cursed immortality ofBram Stoker's Dracula. 
Malchow, p 161. 
380 Rudyard Kipling's Kim (1898) is built around precisely this tension between youth and maturity. For a 
useful discussion of these metaphors of arrested or unnatural ageing in colonial discourse from the late 
eighteenth century, see Suleri, Rhetoric, pp 32-36. 
381 Z' k lze ,Sublime, p 78. 
stasis (here again, echoing Anglo-Indian discourse), it should be understood as, pre-
eminently, a strategy of powerlessness, threatening at any moment (as instanced in 
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Lyall's Giaour speech) to collapse and confront the colonialist with the fractured image 
of his own ruling epistemology. 
This is the underlying instability that we will explore in the next chapter through 
the later writings of Alfred Lyall, and in William Hunter's Indian Musalmans. While 
Muslim 'conspiracy' produced a - perversely reassuring - point of consistency for the 
colonial ideological subject, the keynote of the discourse that followed 1857-59 is 
predominantly one of ambivalence. For what emerged in the wake of the 'Mutiny' was a 
Semiticised, corrosive figure comparable to that of Zygmunt Bauman's conception of the 
'stranger' .382 'Strangers', Bauman writes, 'are the true hybrids, the monsters - not just 
unclassified, but unclassifiable. They do not question just this one opposition here and 
now: they question oppositions as such, the very principle of the opposition, the 
plausibility of dichotomy it suggests and feasibility of separation it demands. ,383 
'Strangers' move incongruously across the barriers erected by the legislating authorities 
of modem polities; like the 'Symptom' they expose their contingency.384 In entrenching 
upon the paradox of the ruling dichotomy - that of secular legislator and religiously-
determined subject - the British construct of Muslim 'conspiracy' engendered just such a 
'stranger' in the midst of the late colonial state. Volatile, secretive, paradoxical and, 
ultimately, demanding of segregation, the Indian Muslims of colonialist discourse had 
become figures of terror and ambivalence, vitally linked to its fragile ability to order and 
maintain its own identity. 
382 Zygmunt Bauman, Modernity and Ambivalence (Cambridge: Polity Press, repro 1998; 1991), pp 1-75. 
This concept will be taken up in more detail in the next chapter. 
383 
Bauman, Ambivalence, p 58. 
384 
Bauman, Ambivalence, pp 59-60, 67. 
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Chapter Three 
Section 3.1 The Indo-Muslim 'stranger' 
This chapter will concern itself with the problem of representing Indian Muslims that 
emerged in Anglo-Indian discourse in the wake of the 'Mutiny'. It has been 
suggested that a useful starting point for understanding this discourse can be found in 
Zygmunt Bauman's concept of 'the stranger', a figure that challenges the legislating 
powers precisely in their constitutive function to construct boundaries within and 
around social knowledges and formations. Bauman's reflections on the ordering and 
classificatory imperatives of the modem polities that produce these phenomena are 
aimed primarily at the rise of the European nation state. 1 Nevertheless, his definition 
of the remit of the 'intellectuals' who guide the legislating hand is one that can 
usefully be extended into the colonial domain. Following Foucault's formulation of 
the close fit between knowledge and power, Bauman posits the sociology of modem 
societies as comprised of the' dominating' and the 'dominated', whereby the former -
in his terms, the 'intellectuals' - are possessors of the knowledge through which the 
'uncertainty' generated by the latter may be contained.2 These are forms of 
knowledge about the 'dominated' that, either by their very ('primitive') nature or by 
their lack of 'education' the 'dominated' cannot attain, and without which they cannot 
function in a modem society. Moreover, for the 'intellectuals'; 
the intensity and the scope of their domination depends on how acute is the 
sense of uncertainty or deprivation caused by the absence of knowledge in an 
area serviced by a given group of sages, teachers or experts. More importantly 
still, it depends on the latter's ability to create or intensify such a sense of 
uncertainty or deprivation; to produce, in other words, the social 
indispensability of the kind of knowledge they control.3 
I For a fuller historical exposition of these developments, see Bauman, Legislators and Interpreters: 
On Modernity, Post-modernity and Intellectuals (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1987). 
2B . auman, LegIslators, pp 1-20. 
3 Bauman, Legislators, p 19. 
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This kind of 'uncertainty' was endemic to the colonial project, and was nowhere more 
apparent than in the structure of the colonial state in India. There the radical 
'uncertainty' consequent on (to use Suleri's phrase) the 'absence of precedence' in the 
founding of the British Indian state unleashed the energies behind the vast 
bureaucratic assembly of colonial knowledges on, and over, 'primitive' Indian 
society.4 At the centre of that project, and standing as a bulwark against the 
'uncertainty' of India within the British Empire, was the ICS officer. 
Indeed, in Bauman's incisive reading of the self-constitution of the 'expert' we 
appear to have something of a blueprint for the ICS official from at least the early 
nineteenth century, both in terms of how he represented himself in India, and how he 
came to be perceived in Britain.5 In regard to the marshalling of knowledge in the 
consolidation of the colonial state itself, we can detect an analogous process to that 
which took place in the emergence of modernity that Bauman has analysed in 
northwestern Europe, when there was forged: 
a new type of state power with resources and will necessary to shape and 
administer the social system according to a preconceived model; and the 
establishment of a relatively autonomous, self-managing discourse able to 
generate such a model complete with the practices its implementation required. 6 
This was from the start a far more ambiguous process for empire than Metropolis. 
From the late eighteenth century the autonomy of that model in British India was 
precariously wrested from the increasing interference of Metropolitan authorities; and 
the knowledges that structured its new 'imperial archive' , particularly in their reliance 
on native informers, always carried with them the potential 'hollowness' and 
4 Suleri, Rhetoric, pp 46-48. On the colonial project of information-gathering, see Cohn, 'Census', pp 
224-254; and idem, Colonialism; Bayly, 'Knowing', pp 3-43; and Thomas Richards, The Imperial 
Archive: Knowledge and the Fantasy of Empire (London: Verso, 1993). 
~ The success of that self-representation by the second half of the nineteenth century may be gauged by, 
for instance, reference to the figure of Murthwaite in Wilkie Collins' The Moonstone, who is able to 
supply the crucial information on the genealogy of the deadly, and elusive, intruders from India into 
British Metropolitan society, and whose 'superior knowledge of the Indian character' is unquestioned. 
Collins, The Moonstone, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, repro 1998; 1868) P 318. 
6 
Bauman, Legislators, p 2. 
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collaborative fragility of the colonial project. 7 Liable to collapse into little more than 
a sliding chain of signifiers, behind the endless proliferation of information there 
always lurked (again, to quote Suleri) the possible 'sublime failure of lists', unable 
fmally to fix upon their object. 8 Here again, according to Bauman, we are dealing 
with a symptomatic modem anxiety, for the 'territorial and functional separation' that 
articulated the new modem polities were themselves reflective of the anticipation by 
the legislating authorities of problems in meaning. They were, in this sense, 
illustrative of its (necessarily) contingent state: 
As long as the segregation remains continuous and closely guarded, there is 
little chance that the probability of misunderstanding (or at least the anticipation 
of such misunderstanding) will ever diminish. Persistence and constant 
possibility of hermeneutic problems can be seen therefore as simultaneously the 
motive and the product of boundary-drawing efforts. As such, they have an in-
built tendency to self-perpetuation.9 
In drawing up and guarding those boundaries, the legislators of the colonial Indian 
state, following their Europe-based counterparts, were involved in a process of 
'sociation', establishing the dichotomous definitions of 'friends' and 'enemies', 
'natives' and 'foreigners' by which colonial society would be fixed. As with the 
national entity, enforcing such 'cosy antagonisms' was a foundational activity of 
colonial ordering, and policing their borders maintained that crucial 'classificatory 
ability' by which the legislators were themselves defined. 1o 
Within the mature colonial state in particular, all border-crossings between 
those definitions inevitably threatened the self-constitution of the legislators; and with 
the potential failure of their classificatory ability ensued the possibility of a 
7 On the 'hollowness' of the colonialist project, see in particular Suleri's analysis of Burke's use of the 
concept of 'the sublime' in order to guard against its revelation (Suleri, Rhetoric, Chapter Two). On 
the perceived instabilities underlying the collaborative nature of Anglo-Indian knowledges about India, 
see Javed Majeed's excellent account of the late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century debates 
between Orientalists and Utilitarians in Ungoverned Imaginings, especially Chapter One. These 
concerns about the collaborative nature of colonial knowledges of India intersected with what was seen 
as a debilitating financial dependency on Indian society - on which see in particular, Bayly, Indian, 
Chapter Two. 
: Suleri, Rhetoric, p 30. 
Bauman, Ambivalence, p 57. 
10 
Bauman, Ambivalence, pp 55-56. 
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commensurate 'behavioural paralysis,.11 In other words, like the nation, the colonial 
state existed partly through its will to self-defmition; any inability to define its 
structures of sociation struck at the roots of its ability to function. If, as has been 
argued in Chapter Two, the perception of Muslim 'conspiracy' that emerged in 1857-
59 was inscribed with the idea of colonialist communal cohesion and self-
representation, then the Indo-Muslim figure that followed in its wake was one 
irradiated with the ambivalence that now more than ever attached to that identity. The 
primary point of ambivalence, as we have already suggested, lay in the lethal 
connections made between a colonialist Christian identity and a perceived 
ontologically-hostile native communal category. The multiplicity of forms of 
prophylaxis that we have examined in the previous chapter aimed simultaneously at 
preserving that Christian identity so crucial to the reconstitution of colonialist 
purpose, and holding at bay its mortal implications for British rule in India. The 
consequence, it has been argued, was the production of the Muslim 'fanatic' as the 
Symptom by which the colonialist sought - paradoxically - to repossess the 
ideological fantasy of colonial secular neutrality. Inscribed with an unmistakable 
religious connection, but whose presence nevertheless holds in place a secular neutral 
ideology, the Indo-Muslim Symptom spoke to the heart of a conflicted colonialist 
identity. The second, related point of ambivalence lay in the marks of foreign 
allegiances destructive of Indian national aspirations which were 'revealed' in the 
'Mussulman patriot' of Civilian 'Mutiny' discourse, marks that held both the traces of 
a repUdiated colonialist despotism and the desire to transcend their liminal Indian 
circumstances. On both these points we may recall Suleri's interpretation of Burke's 
rhetoric of 'the sublime' preserving India intact as an unreadable spectacle precisely 
in order to avoid the mutual unmasking of the spectator complicitous with the 
invasive colonial project. 12 Denied the option of a Metropolitan willed blindness, 
II Bauman, Ambivalence, p 56. It is this kind of knowledge failure that lies behind the 'information 
panics' that Bayly has described as one of the key characteristics of the post-'Mutiny' British Indian 
state (Bayly, Empire, Chapter Ten). Two interesting recent attempts to examine the colonial state's 
r:reoccupation with securing its knowledge borders can be found in Viswanathan and Shodhan. 
2 Suleri, Rhetoric, pp 38-39. 
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here it is the very (misrecognised) legibility of the Indian Muslim that is required to 
forestall the reciprocity running between representation and legislator. 
Seen in part through the lens of a specifically colonialist ambivalence, the 
Indian Muslim of Anglo-Indian discourse thus embodied during the 'Mutiny' a 
crossing of exactly those boundaries by which the legislating powers conceived of and 
policed its relationship to Indian society. It is in this regard that we may say they 
emerged in 1859 as figures of incongruity comparable to Bauman's 'stranger'. Their 
very presence threatened to expose the paradoxes behind the defining categories 
through which the state constituted itself as both separate from, and the integrator of, 
Indian society - both caught within and arbitrating from without, the perceived deadly 
play of communal relations. For, as Bauman describes him, the 'stranger' 
stands between friend and enemy, order and chaos, the inside and the outside. 
He stands for the treacherousness of friends, for the cunnin~ disguise of the 
enemies, for fallibility of order, vulnerability of the inside. 1 
To place the Indian Muslims on one or the other side of those categories, and to 
resurrect impenneable barriers, had thus become imperative to the 'restoration' of an 
uncontaminated and secure colonial self-identity. Given both the violence with which 
the colonialist paradox had marked them in 1857-59 and the less palatable realities 
that they now - Symptom-like - held at bay, inevitably it was to prove an impossible 
task. The logic of this failure is inescapable; threatening the very plausibility of 
legislation - of that is, constructing and maintaining the boundaries of the ordering 
process - the 'stranger' must ultimately, in Bauman's words, be 'tabooed, disarmed, 
suppressed, exiled physically or mentally - or the world may perish. ,14 This is, of 
course, the same catastrophic logic of 'stigmatisation' visited upon the Symptom; and 
its aim, as with the revelation and exorcism of the vampire, is the maintenance of an 
ideology under attack from an intractable and invasive social reality. IS Marking the 
13 Bauman, Ambivalence, p 61. Emphases in the original. 
14 
Bauman, Ambivalence, p 58. 
IS On stigmatisation of the Symptom, see Stavrakakis, pp 65, 100-109; Zizek, Sublime, pp 110-13, 127-
28. The connection between Bauman's 'stranger' and the stigmatised Symptom in ideological systems 
has been pointed out by Stavrakakis, p 101. 
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Symptom with an indelible and visible difference becomes, under this logic, an 
. 'bl 16 lfreversl e process. 
There is, then, an explicit connection being made here between the emergence 
of the Indo-Muslim 'stranger' in 1859 and the descriptive isolation enforced upon the 
Indian Muslim of Steel's India almost fifty years later. This chapter will concentrate 
on the interim period, and particularly on the first quarter century following the 
'Mutiny', in which the attempts to 'legislate' the Indian Muslim into visibility are 
most furiously in evidence in colonialist discourse. In place of the stigmata of 
visibilityl7, it will be argued, what we are confronted with is an over-abundance of 
contradictory inscription that hollows out the subject of representation and carries 
across into the colonialist's self-identity a similar element corrosive of meaning. For 
as Bauman has demonstrated, all such attempts to press distinctions upon the 
'stranger' are doomed to under- and over-determination, exposing 'the failing of the 
opposition itself.' 18 Section 3.3 will take up this theme in reference to the later essays 
of Alfred Lyall and W W Hunter's Indian Musalmans. Before we explore the 
phenomena of indeterminacy in post- 'Mutiny' discourse, however, it is useful first to 
tum to a peculiarly Anglo-Indian representation of an earlier moment in British Indian 
history which bears some interesting parallels to the period now under discussion. In 
particular, the object in making this comparison is to destabilise the ostensible subject 
of the later discourse as centred on religious fanaticism, by making clear some of the 
connections between British representations of Mughals and later, Muslims, on 
precisely this theme of indeterminacy outlined above. For while the logic of 
stigmatisation is specific to the representations of a pan-Indian Muslim constituency 
that emerged in 1859, it is important to bear in mind their partial genealogy in an 
earlier discourse of dispossession centred on, and entailing comparisons with, Mughal 
figures of authority - a discourse that, as we have already sketched out in Section 2.2, 
16 Stavrakakis, P 65; Bauman, Ambivalence, pp 67-68. 
17 Using Goffinan, Bauman points out that stigmatisation - whether of the Symptom or the 'stranger' -
is primarily aimed at making visible, and fixing, a 'virtual social identity'. Bauman, Ambivalence, p 
67. 
18 
Bauman, Ambivalence, p 59. 
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was reanimated in 1857.19 Especially in the period prior to the confrontations with 
Tipu Sultan of My sore in the 1790s, these earlier representations often eschewed any 
particular, or over-riding, concerns with religious affiliation, revolving instead more 
directly around questions of power and producing at moments of crisis, as in the 
instance we will now examine, a marked over-inscription of difference that opens up 
disturbing implications for the self-representation of colonialist authority. The 
comparison detailed below, then, is intended to point up the central problem of 
representing power and authority that lies at the heart of the post-'Mutiny' 
'Musulman' question, and which is the implicit context for all productions of the 
ambiguous figure of 'the stranger' . 
19 The use here of the phrase 'Mughal figures of authority' will be discussed in the next section. 
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Section 3.2 Framing the Mughal: Warren Hastings and the problem of 
'dependency' 
This section will explore certain aspects of the conflictual relationship that obtained 
between the nascent colonial state in India in the late eighteenth century and what will 
be here designated as 'Mughal figures of authority' with whom it came into contact. 
The section does not propose to revisit specifically the relations between the 
Company and the Mughal emperor, whose military power had been so decisively 
curtailed in 1757, but whose nominal political influence was an important, if 
troubling, source of legitimation for at least the next century. Instead, taking Bernard 
Cohn's seminal analysis of those relations as a starting point, this section will discuss 
some of the ways in which British rule attempted to represent its authority over the 
major Mughal successor states through and against whom, it was struggling to secure 
and extend its trading monopolies, and its control over land revenue resources.20 As 
will be seen in Section 3.3, the strong elements of ambivalence that characterise these 
attempts bear direct comparison with the problematic of representation in the post-
'Mutiny' discourse on Indian Muslims. This comparison is therefore also a forceful 
instance of the circularity of colonial discourse, in which the question of the 'transfer 
of power', as Suleri has pointed out, is always close at hand, charging every encounter 
with the 'precarious condition of the present tense. ,21 More importantly, it 
underscores the argument that will be made in Section 3.3 that religion - and 
specifically, the 'fanaticism' of the Indian Muslim - should be approached as a 
language primarily centred upon British paramountcy. 
In particular, two related points arising out of Cohn's essay 'Representing 
Authority in Victorian India' concern us here. The first is his argument that the 
paradox of Mughal nominal over-lordship was central to the dilemma of the 
20 Cohn, 'Representing'. 
21 SUleri, pp 6, Ill. Suleri's insight is discussed in Section 1.5 above. 
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legitimisation of British power - and with it their ability to represent their own 
authority - until at least the vesting of sovereignty in the British monarch in the India 
Act of 1858. The second is his cognate observation that all related ceremonies and 
representations until then had about them the nature of what Sir John Kaye, referring 
to the 'political paradox' of the Mughal emperor, called 'a reality and a sham at the 
same time' .22 Through the detailed analysis of a particular representation of the 
interaction of Mughal and British figures of authority, this section will further explore 
the notion of the theatre of colonial self-presentation and the disturbing contradictions 
it gave rise to. 
By opening out the definition of 'Mughal' to include the more substantial 
successor states who though independent, nominal fellow' diwans' of the Mughal 
emperor,23 were in fact tied into coercively collaborative relations with the British, it 
is intended to expand the context of British political self-representation. In 
eighteenth-century colonial discourse these states were understood as part of a wider, 
if now fragmented, Mughal paradigm;24 the connections made in 1857 between a pan-
Indian Muslim community and the history of the Mughal empire therefore included 
the discourses arising out of the relations with these successor states.25 Nominal 
'Mughal' sovereignty here becomes more than a matter of theatrical confusion; it 
enters into the problem of representing a position of paramountcy when those 
relations allowed for no such clarity. In this wider context, the discourse of 
22 Quoted in Cohn, 'Representing', p 171. 
23 The Mughal emperor formally conferred on the British the status of'diwan' for the province of 
Bengal in 1765. 
24 [t is just this understanding that kept British historiography of India in the eighteenth century in thrall 
to the idea of centrifugal chaos emanating out of and determined by the disintegration of Delhi 
structures of command. For the classic statement of this perception, see Percival Spear, Twilight of the 
Mughu/s: Studies in Late Mughu/ De/hi (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1951). For more 
balanced, recent reassessments, see Richard Barnett, North India Between Empires: Awadh, the 
Mugha/s and the British, 1720-1801 (Berkeley: University of California, 1980); and Bayly, Rulers, and 
idem, Indian. 
25 Cohn emphasises the point that in the eighteenth century British self-representation took place 
'Within' the Indian state system (Cohn, 'Representing', p 170). The political negotiations between the 
Company and the A wadh state under discussion in this section were in fact brokered by the son of the 
MUghal emperor, Prince Jawan Bakht. In a sketch that may have served as the basis for the painting I 
will be examining, Warren Hastings and Nawab Asaf-ud-daulah of Awadh are depicted seated on the 
ground in front of the arbitrating figure of the Mughal prince (see Appendix, p.366). 
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powerlessness and dispossession which is the most prominent feature of the colonial 
depiction of the monarchies of Mughal successor states can be understood as, in part, 
a negative form of self-representation, a process of over-inscription aimed at 
rhetorically extricating the British from political paradoxes far more debilitating than 
that which maintained the fiction of centralised Mughal power. In reference to its 
'Mughal' political environment, then, British self-representation in the late eighteenth 
century was not so much implicated in 'sham' theatre as unable at any point safely to 
take the stage. As we shall see in Section 3.3, it is this problem of indeterminacy and 
the urgent need for legibility that makes this earlier period salient to the post-'Mutiny' 
discourse. 
Although I will concentrate on a particular moment in the history of the 
Awadh state, the aspects of the discourse of dispossession under consideration here 
are broadly applicable to other successor states such as Arcot, Mysore and Hyderabad. 
For instance, the broad impetus towards representing the monarchy of Awadh as 
fatally divorced from its polity can be seen at work from the late 1760s in the more 
frankly propagandist attempts to separate out the Muslim dynasty of Haidar Ali and 
Tipu Sultan from what was described as the 'ancient' and 'Hindoo' constitution of the 
Mysore state.26 These strategies of representation, moreover, crossed religious and 
racial boundaries.27 Ronald Inden has convincingly argued, for example, that from 
the early nineteenth century the British had sought to undermine Rajput state 
monarchies on the grounds that they were themselves a foreign Aryan imposition on a 
prior Dravidian tribal base.28 Despite the concentration here on the representation of a 
Muslim monarch, and the comparisons that will be drawn from this analysis for the 
post-'Mutiny' discourse on Indian Muslims, it should therefore be kept in mind that 
the strategies under discussion are not dependent on religious affiliation. On the 
contrary, as we shall see, monarchy and not 'Muslim-ness' here alone concerns the 
26 Bayly, Indian, pp 81-82; Fisher, Indirect, p 403. 
27 Michael H Fisher (ed), The Politics of the British Annexation of India, 1757-1857 (Delhi: Oxford 
University Press, repro 1996; 1993), p 29. 
28 
Inden, Imagining, pp 176-80. 
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British. Tied to a specifically British agenda that after 1857 narrowly identified 
Muslims with the Mughal figurehead, the strategies earlier deployed against Mughal 
figures of authority are rather the outcome of a much wider problem - that of 
conceiving of an unprecedented form of paramountcy within the Indian 
environment.29 Cohn has aptly described this problematic as a process of the 
translation of a British 'outsider' into an 'insider', status?O In this sense of 
transgressing the boundaries between spectators and actors, the metaphor of the 
'theatre' of possession and dispossession, and its conflicted scene of staging long 
before the enthronement of Victoria as Empress of India in the 'Imperial Assemblage' 
of 1877, merits further exploration. 
The particular representation of a Mughal successor state authority we will 
here explore occurs in a painting by John Zoffany (1733-1810), commissioned by 
Warren Hastings, at the time Governor-General of Bengal (1773-1785), and entitled 
Colonel Mordaunt's Cock Match (1784-1786).31 The scene depicted is of a contest in 
the foreground between two gaming cocks whose attitudes partially echo those of 
their owners, Colonel Mordaunt, an 'aid-de-camp,32 to the Nawab Asaf-ud-daulah, 
titular ruler of kingdom of Awadh, and the Nawab himself, both of whom are placed 
in the centre of the composition. The scene is set outdoors beneath a vast tent, and a 
large and apparently tumultuous amphitheatre of spectators, Indian and European, is 
described around the similarly lively figures of Mordaunt and Asaf-ud-daulah. On the 
29 Fisher sees this lack of a model for colonial rule in India as the single most important factor in 
generating the ambivalence that characterised British policies towards Indian states, see Fisher, 
Politics, p 7. 
30 Cohn, 'Representing', p 16S. 
31 See Appendix, p.36S. 
32 'Memoirs and Remains of Eminent Persons: Biographical Anecdotes relating to the late Lieutenant-
Colonel John Mordaunt, of the Honourable East India Company's Madras Establishment' in The 
Monthly Magazine; or British Register, March 1, 1808, p 140. Mordaunt was formerly ADC to 
Hastings (Mildred Archer, India and British Portraiture 1770-1825, (London: Sotheby Parke Bernet, 
1979), p 148). Joachim Bautze and Martin Myrone have recently described him as commander of the 
bodyguard to Asaf-ud-daulah - though he cites no source (Joachim K Bautze, Interaction of Cultures: 
Indian and Western Painting 1780-1910, (Alexandria, Virginia: Art Services International, 1998), p 
144; and Martin Myrone, Representing Britain 1500-2000: 100 Worksfrom Tate Collections, 
(London: Tate Publishing, 2000), p 49). This may well reflect a confusion in the record between John 
and his brother Captain Henry Mordaunt (see Major V C P Hodson, Officers of the Bengal Army 1758-
/834, Part 3, (London: Phillimore, 1946), P 327; and East India Company's Military Officers 1788-
1792, pp 8, 2S). 
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right-hand side (from the viewer's perspective) the Nawab's throne has been vacated 
as he has run towards Colonel Mordaunt with both arms outstretched, apparently 
pleading an urgent point of gamesmanship with the Englishman. In the distance on 
the left-hand side can be seen an elephant and rider and behind them, another large 
tent. Although the centre of gravity of the painting is shifted on to the figure of 
Mordaunt through both the stillness of his posture and the brightness of his 
contrasting white outfit, it is in fact the Nawab who is placed at the geographical 
centre of the frame and who is, despite the naming of the painting, its ostensible 
principal object (a copy was in fact made of the Cock Match for Asaf-ud-daulah by 
Zoffany - and later copied by Robert Home - in which this centrality is only slightly 
further emphasised33). 
There are three main reasons behind the selection of this particular painting as 
a structured text through which we can examine the stereotype of the Mughal ruler 
that was being created in colonial discourse in the late eighteenth century. The first 
lies in its situation - as with all the texts selected in this thesis - within an intensely 
Anglo-Indian milieu, negotiating relations between that milieu, its Indian 
environment, and the expectations of a Metropolitan audience. The second related 
consideration is the role which British portraiture during this period played in the 
diplomatic economy of Indian states, becoming objects of exchange and propaganda 
both between the Company and Indian rulers, as well as among the native states 
themselves.34 In this respect, as with MUghal 'newswriters' of the period, and later 
Anglo-Indian journalism, British portraiture was enmeshed in an Indian economy of 
information and representation.35 The third reason for its selection here is the first-
hand involvement of Cock Match with an unprecedented moment of crisis both for the 
future of British rule in India and for the British Empire as a whole. As an artistic 
33 See the 'Ashwick version' in Appendix, p.367. 
34 Archer, Portraiture, p 149 and passim. 
35 Zoffany's copy of Cock Match (which has not survived) hung in the Daulat Khana of the Nawab's 
palace in Lucknow (on history of the various versions of this painting, see Archer, Portraiture, pp 148-
150). On 'newswriters', see Fisher, 'Office', pp 45-82; and on the interaction of Anglo-Indian with 
Indian journalism in the late nineteenth century, see Majeed, 'Narratives'. 
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representation of that crisis, one that appears to depict the interaction of British and 
Mughal figures of authority, it remains a unique text, as yet untouched by critical 
analysis outside of a somewhat restrictive art-historical discipline.36 It would be 
another fifty years before Anglo-Indian fiction emerged as a forum for such 
comparative artistic projects.37 In terms of British painting in India, Cock Match was 
the first and last foray into a moribund genre; henceforward, artists would confine the 
representation of British and Indian society to separate quarters. In its simultaneous 
attempt to both figure and rise above the problem of political interaction it therefore 
offers a potentially innovative insight into the production of the signs of ambivalence 
which, it will be argued, structured colonialist discourse on its collaboration with 
existing indigenous regimes as it moved into its 'mature' phase at the end of the 
eighteenth century. As will be explored in the next section, this kind of indeterminacy 
strikingly pre-figures some of the issues that occur in the post-'Mutiny' period. I will 
take up these points in more detail below, but before I do so it is necessary to sketch 
in some of the historical background to the painting that lend it to comparison with 
the crisis that precipitated the evolution of the nineteenth-century British Indian state. 
The occasion for the commission of Cock Match was the visit by Hastings to 
Lucknow in 1784 in order to re-negotiate the basis for the Company's relations with 
the Awadh state. Since being brought under effective British control in the Battle of 
Baksar in 1764 and the subsequent signing of the 'subsidiary' alliance with Clive in 
1765, Awadh had become an indispensable source for Company revenues, in the form 
of trade, loans and troop 'subsidies' for the maintenance of Company garrisons within 
the state.38 In particular, Awadh revenues were of crucial importance to the regular 
payment of all the Company's Indian troops elsewhere, a bureaucratic efficiency that 
36 One aspect of the deficiency of this approach is that the historical battle of wills between the Nawab 
and the Governor-General which is clearly the principal subject of the painting has gone all but 
unnoticed. The most authoritative study of ZofIany's Indian works can be found in Archer, 
Portraiture, pp 133-68. 
37 Moore-Gilbert, Kipling, p 18. 
38 Michael H Fisher, 'Awadh and the English East India Company', in Violette Graf (ed), Lucknow: 
Memories of a City (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1997), p 37. 
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underwrote British military supremacy at the time.39 Because its own revenues were 
drawn from the Mughal structures of farming land revenues, and were thus subject to 
a variety of intermediaries, such regularity could never be guaranteed; and as with 
many of the 'subsidiary' alliances, the state fell quickly into arrears of payment. 
Together with increased revenue demands, this necessitated constant extensions of 
Company interference in Awadh administrative affairs. These included using its 
power of veto to influence the Nawab's selection of administrators and advisers; the 
expulsion from the kingdom of all Europeans unless they secured specific exemption 
from the Company (thus giving it a virtual monopoly of European military technology 
and personnel); and in the 1770s increased, and sometimes direct, involvement in 
revenue assessment and collection. ,40 Indeed, it was the appointment of 'temporary 
collectors' by the British in 1781 that had led to a massive revolt by Rajput 
landholders in the south of the state. Asaf-ud-daulah's strategy of resistance to these 
encroachments on his sovereignty, as well as to the alarming drain of resources out of 
the kingdom, took the form of a pattern of passive non-compliance with Company 
demands, including strategies of decentralisation designed to hide the revenue 
resources of the state.41 As much of the direct responsibility for enforcing the 
Company's control devolved upon the British Resident to the court, it is illustrative 
both of the success of those manoeuvres and the urgency of the demands, that within 
the first twelve years of the alliance the Company was forced to make ten new 
appointments to the post. 42 In the decade prior to Hastings' visit, the Residency 
changed hands several times between John Bristow and Hastings' own protege, 
Nathaniel Middleton, whose recall in 1783 and the subsequent, unprecedented 
personal intervention of the Governor-General was itself an admission of the failure 
of the Company's aggressive policies. After six months of negotiations in Lucknow, 
Hastings finally agreed the start of a new, lessened financial burden on the A wadh 
39 Bayly, Indian, p 89; Arthur Wellesley, 'Memorandum on Marquess Wellesley's Government of 
India' (originally published in 1806), reproduced in Fisher (ed), Politics, pp 178, 180-81. 
4°F' h IS er, Clash, pp 82-83. 
41 F' h IS er, Clash, pp 83-85; Bayly, Indian, p 91. 
42 F' h IS er, Indirect, p 379. 
state and the curbing of the powers of the Resident, a set of agreements - indeed, 
capitulations by the Company - that would endure for the next ten years.43 
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Hastings' intervention has to be set within the context of an unparalleled 
period of crisis and change for the British state in India, as well as for the security of 
the Empire itself. Bayly has located 1776-1783 as a period of far-reaching turbulence 
within the empire presaging the sweeping changes that were fmally triggered by the 
French revolution and Napoleonic wars of the succeeding thirty years.44 The crisis 
was bom in part out of the American War of Independence and French wars of 1780-
83, the former especially playing into a wave of agitation in Ireland (leading to the 
Irish Settlement of 1782 and devolved legislative independence). Marked by bloody 
slave revolts in the 1770s as well as increasingly independent trade connections by the 
creole elites with North America and Canada, during this same period there arose in 
the Caribbean a comparable 'fractious provincialism' that sought to assert itself 
against imperial control. And in India, defeats in the west by a resurgent Maratha 
confederacy in 1779 and the disastrous incursions into British Madras by Tipu Sultan 
and Haider Ali in 1780, led some Parliamentarians in London to consider the 
possibility of the forced expulsion of the British from the subcontinent. At the very 
least, the Company began to feel itself dangerously over-dependent on its system of 
'subsidiary alliances' with Indian states. Ever since the seizure of Bengal in 1757 the 
Company's need for revenues to support its burgeoning military activities had left it 
all but insolvent. In tum, increased revenue demands on those states - the chief 
source for its revenue base - had forced native administrations to the edge of financial 
and administrative collapse. Some rulers attempted to stave off bankruptcy through 
territorial annexations (as the Nawab of Awadh had done to the Rohillas in 1774); 
others were forced to assign their lands to the Company (as the Nawab of Arcot had 
done in 1781-1782); and some even attempted outright revolt (as did the Raja of 
Benares in 1781, briefly besieging Warren Hastings himself). Since it was precisely 
41 F' h 
. IS er, Clash, pp 84-85. 
44 Unless otherwise indicated, the discussion below of the British imperial context is taken from C A 
Bayly, Imperial, pp 86-99. 
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such urgent needs for revenues that had led the British to 'ratchet up' taxation in the 
Thirteen Colonies, and had thus precipitated the War of Independence, these events, 
combined with the military defeats in India of 1779-1780 and the financial failure of 
states like Arcot and Awadh, were more than a cause for anxiety in Calcutta and 
London. In the wake of the loss of the American colonies in 1776, they seemed to 
signal the breakdown of the imperial project in Asia as well. 
Hastings' visit to Lucknow, commemorated by Zoffany in the Cock Match, 
was therefore at the very centre of a British imperial crisis of a scale that would not 
recur on the subcontinent until the 'Mutiny' almost seventy years later. Subsequent 
developments in fact were to prove this period one of transition to new imperial 
formations. Spurred on in particular by the trial of Warren Hastings over alleged 
corruptions in Awadh and the perceived mismanagement of revenue collection there, 
Parliament forced the Company Board of Directors to re-organise its fmancial 
structures leading first to the India Act of 1784, and in 1793 to the far-reaching 
changes of the Bengal Land Revenue Settlement. The succeeding administrations of 
Cornwallis (1786-1793) and Wellesley (1798-1805) began to sweep aside the 
'subsidiary' alliances, and the foundations of the 'mature colonial systems' and its 
administrative apparatus were set in place.45 Reflecting similar changes in Ireland, 
the Caribbean and Canada, East India Company officials were barred from private 
trade and increased powers ensured that the Indian markets were now ring-fenced for 
more direct supervision from London. In particular, the new Board of Control created 
by Pitt's India Act of 1784 meant that the disputes over the allocation of powers 
within India, and between India and London, that had been the chief characteristic of 
the early phase of British rule, were to some extent neutralised.46 Hastings' six month 
stay in Lucknow (27 March to 27 August 178447) was thus not quite the stage for the 
implacable reassertion of Company authority to which Zoffany' s depiction of the 
45 Bayly, Indian, pp 76-78. 
46 Rajat Kanta Ray, 'Indian Society and the Establishment of British Supremacy, 1765-1818' in Oxford 
History of the British Empire, Volume 2, pp 513, 520. 
47 'Lucknow Diary' of Warren Hastings January 1784 to 7 September, 1785, British Library Add MS 
39879. 
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calm and resolute figure of the Englishman (Mordaunt) in the face of Indian mayhem, 
partly aspires. At best, the negotiations of the first Governor-General of British India 
had proved equivocal, and his departure for England and calls for his impeachment -
developments for which he had already begun his defence from Lucknow48 - were to 
mark the passing of an intensely embattled phase in the consolidation of colonial 
administration. He must therefore be regarded at the time of his arrival in Lucknow 
as a transitional figure, staving off the threat of institutional collapse presaged by 
Fox's East India Bill (1783) and the breakdown of relations with the Awadhjewel in 
the 'subsidiary alliance' system's crown. In short, he should be seen as, pre-
eminently, a figure of the sudden and unexpected prospect of British powerlessness. 
Zoffany's own arrival in Lucknow in June 1784, may have been due to advice 
he had received when he visited Hastings in Calcutta earlier that year.49 From 
Hastings' diary it would seem that his presence at meetings between the Nawab, his 
ministers and Hastings was a fairly routine occurrence, probably because they were 
often held as his sitters, both European and Indian, posed for their portrait. 50 In one 
instance, at least, Zoffany appears to have recorded the negotiations themselves in a 
quick sketch, done at night around a campfire, in which Hastings is seated with his 
back towards the viewer and the Nawab is featured importuning him in a not 
dissimilar manner to that shown in the Cock Match. 51 In this way, Zoffany had 
unique access to the drama as it unfolded in Lucknow and must have been able to 
fonn at least some idea as to the kind of importance that the Company attached to 
those events, as well as to some of the issues involved. The very form of the Cock 
Match, aiming at a kind of conspectus of Lucknow society, from Company officials to 
European traders, local Indian landowners and financiers, and down to the 
48 See Hastings, A Letter from the Honourable Warren Hastings, Esq, Governor-Generalo/Bengal, To 
the Honourable Court o/Directors o/the East-India Company. Datedfrom Lucknow, April 30. With a 
Postscript, Dated May 13,1784 (Pamphlets Volume 233, London; 1784). 
49 Entries dated 3 February and 3 June, 1784, in Hastings' 'Lucknow Diary'. 
so See entries for June 4, 6, 12, 16,23; July 3,5, 7, 15, 16; August 10, and passim. 
51 See Warren Hastings meeting Jawan Bakht (1784) in Appendix, p.366. A 'euphonic quickness' at 
sketching was, according to Archer, one of Zoffany's 'more astounding attributes' (Archer, 
Portraiture, p 135). 
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incongruoUS assembly of townsmen and soldiers, suggests as much. Moreover, his 
careful attention to the activities of Europeans in the painting, and their predatory 
dispersal around the empty throne, show him to have been acutely aware of the wider 
competing mercantile interests that surrounded his patron's intervention.52 For it was 
in part the unruly trading activities of men such as Antoine Polier, Claud Martin, and 
British traders like Mr Taylor (importuned by a native with what may be intended as a 
note of credit),53 together with their Indian creditors, that had done so much to 
undermine the Awadh court and economy and encourage the monopolist intervention 
of the Company.54 Even the Resident Bristow (not pictured) had decamped under 
Hastings' threat of investigation for fmancial irregularities. 55 In fact, Zoffany seems 
to make explicit reference to the problem when he has Hastings' assistant in 
Lucknow, Mr Wheeler, face both the throne and the obtruding figure of Claud Martin, 
one of the leading European financiers in Awadh at the time,56 and places between his 
legs a cock aimed equally at throne and Frenchman (Zoffany's paintings often 
deployed such a Hogarthian kind of humour 57). In this regard, the central theme of 
the painting should not be seen as confined to the 'cock-match' between the Awadh 
administration and the Company, but the problem of how to rise above the 
'corruption' and dependency that European engagement with Indian society had 
seemed to bring in its wake. These were issues - particularly of the perceived 
'corruption' of 'Asiatic governments' - around which moves for Hastings' 
52 This is the subject that also structures his Colonel Antoine Polier with his friends Claud Martin, John 
Wombwell and the Artist, c 1786-1787 (illustrated in Archer, Portraiture, p 155). 
S3 See the key to the figures in the painting given in Appendix, p.368. 
54 Bayly, Indian, pp 46-47,52,60. On the trading activities of the European community in Awadh at 
this time, see also: P J Marshall, 'Economic and Political Expansion: the Case ofOudh' (originally 
published 1975) reproduced Fisher (ed), Politics of Annexation, pp 201-23; Jean-Marie Lafont, 'The 
French in Lucknow in the Eighteenth Century' in Graff (ed), Lucknow, pp 60-89; Fisher, Clash, pp 85-
86; and Fisher (ed), Politics, p 3. 
ss C Colin Davies, Warren Hastings and Oudh (London: Oxford University Press, 1939), pp 223-24. 
S6 Lafont, p 75. 
57 But Zoffany and Hogarth also shared a tendency toward the rendering of an unusual 'wealth of subtle 
meaning' in their conversation pieces that marked them out among their contemporaries (Ellen G 
D'Oench, The Conversation Piece: Arthur Devis and His Contemporaries, (New Haven: Yale Centre 
for British Art, 1980), P 26). On the influence of Hogarth's works on Zoffany, see Ronald Paulson, 
Emblem and Expression: Meaning in English Art of the Eighteenth Century (London: Thames & 
Hudson, 1975), p 138; and C H S John, Bartolozzi, Zoffany and Kauffman, with Other Foreign 
Members of the Royal Academy, 1768-1792 (London: P Allan, 1924), pp 30-31. 
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impeachment taking place at the time of the painting's composition (1784-86), would 
centre. 58 Ironically, it is a theme that is encapsulated in Hastings' instructions to 
Bristow on 23 October 1782 on the ideal relationship he wished him to have with the 
Awadh court, and the obverse of that ideal which he clearly feared was developing. 
'There can be no medium,' he wrote, 'in the relation between the Resident and the 
minister, but either the Resident must be the slave and vassal of the minister, or the 
minister at the absolute devotion of the Resident. ,59 In this regard, we may say that 
Cock Match is only ostensibly the depiction of the vital intermingling between 
European and Indian society that historians have most commonly taken it for. 6o At a 
more complex level its entire structure is an illustration of the problem of dependency 
endemic to the 'subsidiary alliance', and thus to the genesis of the early colonial state. 
Like the Company itself in 1784, it desires to figure a means of rising above, and to 
some extent resolving, the turbulent circumstances of its engagement with India. 
Conceived at a comparable moment of crisis and institutional change,61 and enmeshed 
in a similarly problematical comparative framework, it thus provides a useful figure 
of prolepsis to the issue of self-identity and its dangerous dependencies that 
underpinned the whole 'Musulman question' in post-'Mutiny' India. In particular, the 
Mughal figure that is produced at its centre in many ways predicts the kind of over-
inscription and elements of paradox that would make of the Indian Muslim in that 
latter discourse such a problematic, volatile and necessary presence. 
Zoffany's Indian work as a whole can be contextualised with regard to the 
colonial knowledge-gathering project outlined in Section 3.1 by seeing it in part as 
predicting the kind of 'para-ethnological' observation that nineteenth-century British 
artists and Company employees came to practise in India.62 In this regard, his trip to 
India can be characterised as belated compensation for his unsuccessful attempt in 
S8 Bayly, Indian, pp 76-78. 
59 Cited in Davies, p 194. 
60 Archie Baron, An Indian Affair: From Riches to Raj (London: Pan Macmillan, 2001), pp 111-12. 
61 The important institutional changes that took place in the 1860s and 1870s are detailed in Section 3.3 
below. 
62 p' 
mney, 'Colonial', p 254. 
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1771 to join Captain Cook's second voyage to the Pacific, in which he invested 
heavily, and which made the reputation of the successful candidate, George Foster.63 
Indeed, it was the artist who accompanied Cook on his fITst voyage, William Hodges, 
who most probably introduced Zoffany to Hastings, and whose own tour of India 
between 1780 and 1783 may well have provided him with a model for emulation.64 In 
tune with the expansionist phase of Empire-building, British art of the late eighteenth 
century was beginning to generate its own market for images of exotic lands captured 
and brought back to the Metropolis; and the search for new subjects, whether Maori 
'chieftains' or Indian nawabs, offered, it was thought, legitimate informational tasks, 
as well as picturesque subjects. Zoffany's Indian venture was made at a time when 
there was in England almost no 'visual idea' of India.65 Even a grand historical piece 
such as Francis Hayman's Lord Clive meeting Mir Jafar, Nawab of Murshidabad 
after the Battle of Plassey (1761-1762), while enjoying a notable success with the 
public, was in fact devoid of any first-hand experience of the subcontinent. 66 
Zoffany's tendency to incorporate carefully-delineated Indian subjects into even his 
Anglo-Indian society portraits, unusual among his portraitist contemporaries, as well 
as the profusion of his sketches of purely Indian scenes, suggests that he may have 
seen the venture partly as an opportunity to broach an as yet untapped market. 67 As it 
turned out, however, the few Indian paintings he eventually exhibited damaged the 
critical reputation he had built up with royal commissions such as the Tribuna at the 
Uffizi (1772);68 and despite the fame of the later Earlom engraving of Cock Match 
63 Archer, Portraiture, p 132. 
64 Partha Mitter, Much Maligned Monsters: A History of European Reactions to Indian Art (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, repro 1977; 1992), pp 123-24; Archer, Portraiture, p 134. 
65 Mildred Archer and Ronald Lightbown, India Observed: India as Viewed by British Artists 1760-
J 860 (London: Victoria and Albert Museum in association with Trefoil, 1982), p 8; G H R Tillotson, 
'The Indian Picturesque: Images of India in British Landscape Painting,1780-1880, in Bayly (ed) The 
Raj: India and the British 1600-1947, (London: National Portrait Gallery Publication, 1990), p 141. 
66 Bayly, Raj, p 99. 
67 
Archer, Portraiture, p 134. 
68 See for instance, the vicious review of his 'Hyderbeg on his Mission to Lord Cornwallis, with a 
View of the Granary erected by Warren Hastings, Esq at Patna' in Anthony Pasquin, A Critical Guide 
to the Royal Academy for 1796 (London: 1796), p 20. On Zoffany's early 'instant success' in Britain, 
from his arrival there in 1760 until his departure for India, see D'Oench, pp 25-31. 
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(1792),69 his hopes of creating an appetite for his Indian scenes in England were 
somewhat premature. It was in fact the books of prints of - most often, de-populated 
-Indian scenes, made for an expanding bourgeois market at the very end of the 
eighteenth and throughout the first decades of the nineteenth century, that were both 
fmancially and critically successful. 70 In something of a bitter coda to his Indian 
experience, his Pacific usurper, Foster, later borrowed and successfully retailed some 
of Zoffany' s Indian sketches and props to a Metropolitan public suddenly hungry for 
'Indian' scenes.71 
If Zoffany' s attempt to forge a relationship to an uncertain Metropolitan 
audience met with little immediate success, his rapid assimilation into, and financial 
reliance upon, an Anglo-Indian milieu leant to his paintings an ideological thrust 
comparable to much later writers such as Steel and Kipling.72 This was in part due to 
his relatively long residence in India (1783-1789), as well as his intimate involvement 
with European society, official and non-official, in Lucknow, Madras and Calcutta. 
But it also stemmed from his remarkable ability to identify, and identify with, the 
concerns of his patrons, instanced in India above all in his most important source of 
patronage, Warren Hastings. This identification with the colonial project in the form 
of its most zealous and at the time, most powerful, administrator (in 1773, fmal 
authority over all the Presidencies was vested in the office of the Governor-General of 
Bengal) can be seen even in a much later work, Hyderbeg on his Mission to Lord 
Cornwallis, with a View a/the Granary erected by Warren Hastings, Esq at Patna (c 
1795).73 Here Zoffany reverses the hierarchy that had come by then to structure most 
69 John, P 24; Bautze, p 145. 
70 Mackenizie, Orientalism, p 48. Financial success through Indian royal patronage also eluded 
Zoffany; but it seems to have been a lucrative venture for some of his contemporaries, notably Ozias 
Humphrys (pictured beside the artist himself in Cock Match). See Memoirs of the Royal 
Academicians; Being an Attempt to Improve the National Taste by Anthony Pasquin (London: 
Symonds, 1796), p 121. 
71 Archer, Portraiture, p 168. One of the artists to benefit from the new appetite for prints was the 
artist of Cook's first voyage, William Hodges (Archer, Observed, pp 8-10); but the real stimulus for 
f:rints of India came with the Daniells' Oriental Scenery (1796). 
2 For most British artists India ceased to be a popular destination by the mid-nineteenth century. 
Tillotson, p 141. 
73 See Appendix, p.369. For the sake of consistency, the titles of the Zoffany paintings used in this 
section generally correspond to those given by Mildred Archer. In the instance of Hyderbeck, the 
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European painting emanating from India, and especially the popular landscapes of 
William Hodges. There the European or Indian spectators add scale to the majesty of 
the Indian monuments in the background; and the irregularity of the landscape is 
harmoniously re-composed to complete a picture intended to allow the viewer to 
peacefully contemplatt! the transience of man in the face of an ancient and natural 
grandeur.74 In contrast, in Hyderbeck the foreground is swamped by the depiction of 
a procession disrupted by the violence of a rogue elephant, as Indians in various 
attitudes of alarm, terror, nonchalance, and curiosity, lead the viewer's eye in 
confusion among the crowd. The point of rest is provided in the calm and relatively 
empty landscape in the background, and in particular by the singular monument of the 
granary erected by Warren Hastings at Patna. This naturalised, almost phallic, 
building is melded with the landscape in just the manner in which Hodges might have 
chosen 'pagodas'. 75 It provides the framework within which the panic of Indian 
disarray (which despite their masterful responses threatens to infect the British figures 
in the procession) can be pleasurably enacted and contained. The transience lies 
entirely with the undermined pomposity of the Awadh royal procession (en route to 
petition the Governor-General); British rule seemingly belongs to another, atemporal 
and implacable, plane. Like Kipling's portraits of the barely-contained instabilities of 
British rule, Zoffany seems always to be seeking this narrative framework of 
implacability - the corrective 'steel frame' of the colonial machinery which operates 
from 'outside' of the perceived anarchy and disempowerment of colonial society. 76 
The Metropolitan success of Earlom' s engraving of Cock Match derived to 
some extent from the public fascination with the trial of Warren Hastings (begun in 
1788) and the whole question of the 'corruption' of Europeans abroad and 
original designation has been used (see Note 64 above) since the title itself proclaims the artist's 
intentions. 
74 Tillotson, p 142. 
75 See for instance, The Pagodas at Deogur by Hodges (c 1787), illustrated in Tillotson, p 143. 
76 On this point see, for instance, Kipling's 'On the City Wall' in which the treachery successfully 
enacted upon the British narrator is then corrected by the impersonal machinery of the state in the last 
paragraph. The state reaches in, as it were, from the historical framework outside of the actual 
narrative of the story, and restores the momentarily disrupted colonial ordering of society. This text is 
discussed in detail in the next section. 
227 
promiscuously mixing with 'Asiatic despotisms' , a scandalous situation which 
Zoffany appeared to have depicted with such relish.77 Although no contemporary 
reviews survive to testify as to the exact tenor of its popular reputation, the engraving 
would most probably have fed into the then common Metropolitan fear that through 
the Company's hitherto unchecked association with Indian society and its iniquitous 
practices, infectious forms of 'corruption' were being conveyed into British society.78 
The charge of despotic corruption was explicit in Burke's admonitory rhetoric to 
Hastings during the trial, and as with all 'conversation pieces' Cock Match contains at 
least an element of disapprobation in that the unruly behaviour of the principals, as in 
Hogarth's The Rake's Progress, is echoed throughout the society (dis)ordered around 
them.79 Thus the gaming dispute between Mordaunt and the Nawab is also figured as 
a mock romance played out between two lovers, arms spread to receive each other, 
the Nawab being portrayed in the beseeching feminine role with his eyes cast upwards 
as he rushes towards his 'aid-de-camp'. This is then linked to the rather more 
licentious embraces in the crowd behind them, including that between a seated 
courtier and courtesan. On the left hand side, the attitudes of water-carrier and the 
woman stretching imploringly towards him, eyes upturned and head inclined, Nawab-
like, again mimic the central pairing; and the spout of water he delivers into a young 
boy's hands may have its own sexual connotations (as has been suggested may be 
read into the dispute at the back of the crowd featuring a young boy holding a cock 
and being abused by an older turbaned man8<). Finally, in the top left-hand corner, 
beneath a spreading tree, a European man with his back turned to the viewer is 
pictured with his arm around an Indian woman. Since his red jacket and wig may 
have been partly intended to suggest a reference to the standing gentlemen (Colonel 
n On the trial itself, see P J Marshall, The Impeachment of Warren Hastings (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1965). 
78 On this debate, see Teltscher, Chapter Five; and Suleri, Rhetoric, Chapter Three. 
79 Admonition was frequently incorporated into eighteenth-century 'conversation pieces' (Ronald 
Paulson, Emblem, 1975, p 124). Questions of genre are taken up in detail below. 
80 
Myrone, p 49. 
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Potier) beside the throne who is looking down upon the courtesan and courtier,s1 the 
excited pairing of Indian ruler and European gentleman becomes a diachronic hall of 
mirrors that animates all levels of society and draws the disparate grouping of the 
painting into a more formalised tableau. Given that all the pairings are derived from 
the more primal interaction of the two cocks at the very front of the picture (a sport 
which in England was in the process of being recast as highly immoral and leading to 
more corrupt practices82), the tableau as a whole can be seen as subject to an 
admonitory gesture. 
This admonitory impulse, captured in the repeated licentious pairings, carries 
another more potent, and complex, message about luxury, 'dependency' and the 
problematic balance of 'credit' both between Empire and Metropolis, and between 
Europeans and Indians.83 The amatory exchanges, deriving from the primary motif of 
gaming, evoke a pervasive contemporary argument on, and ambivalence about, the 
idea of lUXury. This issue is made explicit through certain interactions between the 
Europeans, and more importantly between Europeans and Indians in the assembled 
audience. Thus again, the upturned eyes of the Nawab are echoed by those of the 
seated servant displaying what appears to be an empty money-box to Lieutenant 
Golding in the right-hand lower comer of the picture, who is in turn importuned by a 
well-known European trader, Mr Orr, his palm held open expectantly. This betting 
motif is picked up by the Indian who appears to have handed a note (perhaps of 
credit) to Mr Taylor in the upper right hand comer. Beneath them, Lieutenant Pigot 
looks warily over to an Indian gentleman who seems to have taken from him a golden 
object and with whom he appears - like the Nawab and Mordaunt - to be engaging 
with in dispute. In this way, the romantic motif that echoes outwards from the central 
pair is itself paralleled by the idea of monetary exchanges that cross between Indian 
81 Potier was himself married to an Indian woman. However, Zoffany may well have intended in his 
interest in the courtesan, a reference to an earlier painting by Tilly Kettle that shows Polier watching 
the performance of 'nautch' girls (a copy of which is illustrated in Archer, Portraiture, p 85). 
82 Robert W Malcolmson, Popular Recreations in English Society 1700-1850 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1973), pp 118-57; Roger Munting, An Economic and Social History of Gambling in 
Britain and the USA (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1996), pp 17-21. 
83 Bayly, Indian, p 65. 
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and European, and is formally inscribed in the larger balance between the right-hand 
grouping of European gamblers and the more excitable exchanges on the left-hand 
side (open palms, upturned eyes) between water-carrier and seated Indians. 
The British discourse on 'luxury' - which included the category of 'leisure' 84 
- underwent a significant transformation in the eighteenth century. For much of the 
seventeenth century it had been associated with a moral censure against trade deficits, 
particularly in regard to the East India Company and its involvement of England in 
substantial foreign trade.85 In this classical discourse, which was echoed by Whig 
arguments in the late eighteenth century, the conflation of luxury, credit and moral 
dissipation was contrasted against the virtue of landed property. The former was 
invested with a feminine duplicity, and the latter with the masculine qualities of 
solidity and durability.86 Foreign trade was feared for its emasculation of morality, 
encouraging a prodigality that undermined the individual and the nation at once, 
particularly in regard to military strength. However, some advocates of foreign trade, 
such as Thomas Mun, a director of the Company, began to argue that where the 
balance between import and export could be maintained, luxury was to be cautiously 
welcomed. It was only where that balance gave way to an iniquitous increase in, and 
growing dependency on, imports that' deterioration' was to be feared (an argument 
that is strikingly echoed by Seeley three centuries later in his fears over British Indian 
investments).87 By the mid-eighteenth century these new currrents of thought were 
taken up and expanded by, among others, Adam Smith and David Hume. Along with 
Adam Ferguson and William Robertson, these writers of the Scottish Enlightenment 
school of thought began to reformulate the terms of the relationship of the political 
idea of luxury in regard to trade and national benefits, and its hitherto civic humanist 
moral dimensions. In their advocacy of the benefits of luxury, they aimed specifically 
84 Christopher J Berry, The Idea of Luxury: A Conceptual and Historical Investigation (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp 5, 7. 
85 Berry, pp 101-lO3. 
86 Berry, pp 121,128; J G A Pocock, Virtue, Commerce, and History: Essays on Political Thought and 
History, Chiefly in the Eighteenth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp 113-14. 
87 Thomas Mun, England's Treasure by Forreign Trade (London: 1664). 
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at undermining the key connections between luxury, effeminacy and military 
weakness.88 In Hume's essay 'On Luxury' (1752), he described luxury as denoting an 
advanced stage of civilization and 'refinement', and as acting as a spur to the 
maintenance of good government in order to curb the natural avarice of men. He 
contended that a trading nation was a potent (as opposed to emasculated) one, an idea 
later taken up by Smith in his An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of 
Nations (1776). For Smith 'foreign commerce' provided an outlet for expense by 'the 
great proprietors' , freeing up those who would otherwise have been employed by 
them as 'retainers' to become themselves 'merchants' .89 Thus the 'market' becomes 
the structure of interdependence by which inequality is removed, a vision of 
'opulence' encouraging 'freedom' that sought to obviate the censure of the civic 
humanists who regarded all but a landed independency as subject to moral 
corruption.9o In this new vision of the free circulation of goods and credit through and 
between societies, good government consisted precisely in the neutral regulation of 
'free trade', curbing its natural excesses, and freeing it of the restraining vices of 
peculation and 'dependency'. Furthermore, this conception of a competitive but 
interdependent society was specifically contrasted with those in Asia and Africa, 
where a slavish 'dependency' and lack of 'self-command' was thought to be the 
rule.91 
However, one of the fault-lines exposed in these eighteenth-century currents 
of economic thought was in defining the precise relations of government to the new 
commercial society. Thus, in the writings of Adam Ferguson there inheres a 
continuing conception of a governing infrastructure of" dignities', institutions and 
88 Berry, pp 133-34. On the tensions surrounding the eighteenth-century political debate about the 
commercial emasculation of British military sovereignty, see J G A Pocock, 'Political Thought in the 
English-speaking Atlantic, 1760-1790: the Imperial Crisis', in Pocock (ed), The Varieties of British 
Political Thought, 1500-1800 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp 246-83. 
89 
90 
Berry, p 157. 
Berry, p 154. 
91 The 'private liberty' thought to be denied in 'barbarous nations' provides a vital contrast in Smith's 
arguments in An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth o/Nations (1776). Berry, pp 159. 
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'offices', which, if not timeless, are at least very ancient.' 92 There is a continuing 
appeal here to the solidity of an implicitly landed, and therefore 'virtuous' (because 
free of corrupting relations) body of officials, which at the same time he defmes as 
modernising 'informed professionals capable of scientific 'modelling' of 
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government. ,93 Through these contending ideas, he effectively replicates the classical 
republican division between the institutions of government and civil society; but 
exactly how the one was to arise out of the other, and thus break through the cycle of 
competition and corruption, remains an unresolved debate. Recent scholarship on the 
writings of Adam Smith has similarly detected a strong and persistent appeal to the 
class of small landed proprietors through which the dangerous appetites of self-
interest in commercial society may be restrained, and the idea of progress anchored. 94 
And in contradistinction, there remains in the Wealth of Nations a recurrent strain of 
polemicism against joint stock companies, in particular the East India and South Sea 
companies, whose unchecked and purely self-interested desires pose a substantial 
threat to the 'wellbeing' of the nation.95 There was, then, a continuing implicit notion 
in the arguments of the Scottish Enlightenment thinkers of what John Pocock has 
termed 'the ideal of patriot virtue' - that is, the unspecialised and therefore 
incorruptible antithesis of an agrarian, rooted foundation on which commercial 
society could be structured.96 Both within the new 'economical' theorists, and 
between them and the civic humanists, the shared admission that 'the political 
individual needed a material anchor in the form of property' carried with it the 
unresolved question of autonomy and self-government.97 How could an incorruptible 
government arise from the interplay of commercial relations; and how could self-
92 Fania Oz-Salzberger, 'Civil Society in the Scottish Enlightenment', in Sudipta Kaviraj and Sunil 
Khilnani (eds), Civil Society: History and Possibilities (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2001), pp 73, 77. Oz-Salzberger sees a similar appeal to 'governing institutions, ripe with age and 
wisdom' in the writings of David Hume and Adam Smith (Oz-Salzberger, p 59). 
93 Oz-Salzberger, p 64. 
94 John Dwyer, The Age of Passions: an Interpretation of Adam Smith and Scottish Enlightenment 
Culture (East Linton, Scotland: Tuckwell Press, 1998), especially Chapters Two and Three. 
9S 
Dwyer, pp 65-66, 71. 
96 Pocock, Virtue, pp 110-1 1 . 
97 • Pocock, Vrrture, p 1 1 1. 
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command and interdependency resist political compromise and moral degeneration? 
Transposed to a nascent colonial scene of sociation, this is the underlying issue in 
Hastings' advice to his (hopelessly compromised) subordinate, Bristow, in which he 
maintained the reassuring, but highly impractical, binary of 'slave' and despot in 
regard to the Company's political relations to the Awadh court. The problem of the 
impossible 'medium' was to return to haunt Hastings in Lucknow, just as the idea of 
corrupting intermediaries haunted the Scottish theorists of commercial society. For as 
Pocock writes of their engagement with eighteenth-century' commercial man': 
If all political relationships were mediated, [ commercial man] must in the last 
analysis be governed by intermediaries, whether these took the form of 
mercenaries, courtiers, clergy or representatives; and every theory of corruption, 
without exception, is a theory of how intermediaries substitute their own good 
and profit for that of their supposed principals.98 
This intractable strain of pessimism over the ability of commerce to foster civil 
authority bears the impress of the Hobbesian thesis of the natural state of humans as 
acquisitive and competitive beings requiring a 'powerful and independent 
sovereign' .99 But in the wake of the great Financial Revolution of the 1690s, in which 
the foundations of government were floated upon the tide of public credit, such 
absolutism - the estate of 'vassal' and master - was thought irrecoverable in 
Metropolitan Britain; government was now forever implicated in the giddy cycles of 
commerce. too In some ways, the trial of the arch-'nabob' Warren Hastings in the 
1790s can be seen as an attempt to enact a punitive resolution of this intolerable 
political dilemma upon a safely alienated body. As an interpretation of the colonial 
context of this debate, however, Cock Match suggests that long before Edmund 
Burke's inaugural speech, the colonialist camp had already come against its own 
failure to plausibly resurrect a disassociated British despotic authority.IOI Given the 
role it had come to assume in the economy and imagination of Metropolitan society as 
98 Pocock, Virtue, p 122. 
99 . Pocock, Virtue, p 107. 
100 Pocock, Virtue, pp 66-70. 
101 On the charge, and defense against, British despotic power during the trial of Hastings, see 
Teltscher, pp 163-72. 
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the prime intennediary for foreign trade, the East India Company was a predictable 
body on which to attempt to inscribe a measure of clarity in the debate between 
commerce and polity. As we shall see, Zoffany's choice for the public spectacle of 
alienation and punishment was no less a predictable and visible intermediary for his 
colonialist audience. 
Bayly has described 'Scottish Enlightenment' thought as crucial to 
understanding the new emphasis on 'independency' and 'self-command' that infused 
the late eighteenth century imperial ethos and began the process of civil service 
reform which inaugurated the 'mature colonial systems' .102 At the same time, 
however, he has located a contradictory and 'dominant tone' internal to colonialism in 
India that was 'agrarianist and aristocratic', shoring up iniquitous local institutions for 
the purposes of imperial security.l03 These tensions in colonial orientation mirror the 
contending Metropolitan currents of discourse around the related ideas of luxury, 
credit and healthy national commerce. Bayly's paradox of early colonialist praxis, 
entailing the vital question of 'dependency' and the problematic of political and 
commercial collaboration in India, was nowhere more apparent than in the subsidiary 
alliance system which, by the 1780s, was seen to be exposed to increasingly 
intolerable pressures. In this sense, the view from Lucknow, with its rapid turnover of 
disgraced Residents and the revenue frustrations imposed on the Company by a 
militarily impotent native ruler, could not be better narrated than through the charged 
subject of competition and fmancial exchange. Zoffany's choice of gaming and the 
interdependence of Indian and European society as his subject for the centrepiece in 
the set of commissions he executed for the departing Governor-General should thus 
be seen as more than fortuitous, offering as it did a chance to re-define the troubled 
102 Bayly, Imperial, pp 150-63. 
103 Bayly, Imperial, p 160. Again, there is a parallel here in the later discourse on Indian Muslims. 
This tension in ideological orientation was to resurface again most conspicuously in the immediate 
post-'Mutiny' period when widespread law reform was pushed through which aimed at extending 
colonial institutions deeper into Indian society, and thus bypassing as far as possible the perceived 
distortions of local practices and corrupt indigenous intermediaries. Simultaneous with these reforms 
there emerged an equally strong conservative impetus to shore up - if more through ritual than 
substantial powers - local aristocratic regimes that were now seen as a bulwark against a repetition of 
the events of 1857. Fisher, Politics, pp 24-25,33-37. 
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terms of the Company's own 'game' .104 Noting the entry for the fifth of April in 
Hastings' diary of a visit to Mordaunt on the occasion of a 'cock match', art historians 
have tended to see the scene as one directly selected or suggested by him, and as 
therefore narrowly memorialising his visit to Lucknow. In fact, Hastings was 
famously ambivalent about the joys of gaming. 'I neither drink, game, nor give my 
vacant hours to music,' he wrote later that year. 'And [give] but a small portion of 
my time to the other relaxations of society.' 105 As will now be argued, the interest 
that the painting held for him would have been less in the Indo-European 
licentiousness, than in its attempt to narrate an altogether more appealing message of 
Company independence and mastery encoded into the riotous crowd and the body of 
the Indian monarch. 
The gendered notion of 'credit' in the eighteenth century, and its relationship 
to political and military emasculation, explicitly ties together the two parallel 
economies of exchange - fmancial and sexual - in Cock Match. The potency of 
Mordaunt's martial figure, his spare torso and muscular legs emphasised by his close-
fitting gaming clothes, all too obviously mark him out here as the dominant partner in 
his exchange with the Nawab. 106 In contrast, the translucent, loose robes of the 
Nawab, gathered into what would have been perceived as effeminate drapes and folds, 
were a common means of depicting the passive femininity of Indian monarchs at the 
time. Before the fiercer engagements of the 1790s, and the taking of Seringapatam by 
the British in 1799, it had, for instance, been a routine practice of British artists to 
emphasise the 'effeminate flowing robes' of both Tipu Sultan of Mysore and his 
104 Zoffany charged Hastings 15,000 rupees for Cock Match, an enormous sum of money for an 
'Indian' piece at the time, and five times more than he charged for any of his other commissions for the 
Governor-General (Archer, Portraiture, p 152). 
105 Letter to J Scott, 24 November 1784, cited in P J Marshall, 'Warren Hastings as Scholar and Patron' 
in Anne Whiteman, J S Bramby, P G M Dickson (eds), Statesmen, Scholars and Merchants: Essays in 
Eighteenth-Century History Presented to Dame Lucy Sutherland, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973), p 
254. 
106 Mordaunt had the reputation of an astute and highly successful gambler in these exchanges with the 
Nawab. 'Memoirs and Remains of Eminent Persons', p 144. 
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army, against the tight breeches and jackets of the 'brutally virile' British. 107 Zoffany 
has underscored this contrast by inscribing the Nawab with shadows that emphasise 
pendulous breasts, and an improbable assemblage of cloth around his groin area that, 
in evoking a snail-like whorl, carries the equivocal suggestion of the classical motif 
for the vulva. lOS This insignia entails the possible influence here of a strand of 
antiquarian symbology that had entered European art in the seventeenth century and 
had continued throughout the eighteenth century to play an important role in the 
interpretation of Indian religious iconography. In the year of Hastings' visit to 
Lucknow, another beneficiary of his patronage, William Jones, published his seminal 
paper on the syncretism running between Indian and classical Western religions. 109 It 
marked a culmination of a burgeoning belief among scholars since the early 
eighteenth century that Indian and classical 'paganism' coincided, most especially in 
the practice of 'fertility cults'. Zoffany would certainly have been aware of these 
connections from an earlier commission for the celebrated antiquarian and collector of 
Indian 'erotic' art, Charles Towneley, a portrait he had executed by defining his sitter 
among and by, his private collection. l1O Given the increasing understanding of the 
interchange between Greek and Indian 'paganism' on the theme offertility (which 
Towneley himself propounded), it seems probable that satirised elements of the idea 
of fertility reside in Zoffany's central placing of the Nawab in his effeminised glory, 
and inform the manner in which the idea of commercial bounty flows from him 
outwards throughout the Indian and European crowd. These debased elements of 
Indian religious iconography are then implicitly joined with the eighteenth century 
idea of the 'East', and in particular, India, as a woman offering her 'riches' to Europe. 
This was an image driving Company ideology, and famously embodied in a fresco in 
107 Susan Seitzer, 'Representations of the Reign of Tipu Sultan', unpublished paper presented at the 
conference on "Places in the Past': The Uses of History in South Asia', (London: Centre for South 
Asian Studies, School of Oriental and African Studies, 15-18 April 1997), pp 8-10. 
108 Rubens, for instance, wrote in extensive detail on the connection between the symbol ofthe snail 
and the vulva. Mitter, p 76. The 'snail' is also a common icon of fertility in some Indian cultures (The 
Herder Dictionary a/Symbols, (Wilmette, Illinois: Chiron Publications, repro 1986; 1978), p 176). The 
'equivocal' nature of Zoffany's use of this icon in Cock Match is addressed below. 
109 William Jones, 'On the Gods of Greece, Italy and India' (1784). 
110 Paulson, Emblem, p 153; Mitter, pp 84-85. 
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East India House painted by Spiridone Roma in 1778, in which a dark, half-naked 
Indian woman, flowing robes swathed around her waist, offers up - head inclined, 
eyes upturned - to Britannia a velvet cushion from which necklaces of jewellery spill 
bountifully down towards the viewer. I II Cock Match can therefore be read on one 
level as a comic reprise of the problem of the 'wanton abandon of Indian wealth' 
which Fox's East India Bill had set itself the task - in direct competition with the 
Company - of constraining within a Parliamentary framework. l12 By casting that 
regenerative over-abundance in the figure of the N awab, Zoffany appears to put in 
question the substance of the charge of extortion that had begun to beset his patron at 
the time of the painting's composition. The Nawab is produced as a spontaneous and 
uncontrolled outpouring of wealth animating the economy of representation around 
him - an economy in which the accused is seemingly nowhere to be found. Because 
the painting as a whole envisions the framing eye of its patron, however, the idea of 
the proper containment of this outpouring is, in a sense, already wrested from the 
rhetoric of Parliamentarians, and quietly returned to its rightful authority. 
The figure of the Nawab, then, can be read as intending visibility, set at the 
heart of the composition and inscribed with an icon of regeneration and passivity. 
Financial and sexual legibility combine in him in a way that seeks to triumphantly 
recast the recent history of Hastings' negotiations and the Company's growing unease 
with its political collaboration. In bringing this panorama of Indian wealth within 
Hastings' home, 113 Zoffany literalises a common function of the 'conversation piece', 
one which he had already accomplished for Queen Charlotte in The Tribuna at the 
Ufjizi, wherein the wealth of the Uffizi gallery was copied and brought back for 
inclusion within the English royal collections. Legibility and ownership were cognate 
aspects of this genre. It was a pervasive feature of eighteenth-century Anglo-Indian 
• conversation pieces' to incorporate paintings of Indian life and landscapes into a 
drawing-room setting, thus retrieving and domesticating the Indian environment 
III Illustrated in Bayly (ed),Raj, p 28. 
112 Suleri, Rhetoric, p 25. 
113 Hastings' country residence at Daylesford was the final destination of Cock Match. 
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within a reassuring and proprietary European scene. 114 This was no more than a 
colonial translation of the essential purpose of the genre in rendering a narrative of 
power and in particular, power as vested in property.l1S We will take up the issue of 
property more directly in a moment; but fIrst it is necessary to return to the dangerous 
figure of credit the Nawab bodily encompasses in the painting. As mentioned above, 
ever since the creation of the Bank of England and the National Debt in the 'Financial 
Revolution' of the 1690s, the popular imagination in Britain had been wary of the 
potential corruption that credit now invested in government. ll6 It was feared that the 
virtuous independence of the classical civic ideal was fatally compromised by the 
infectious, courtesanal fIgure of credit; and such popular imaginings of the fantasy of 
credit and self-indulgence were even more readily invested in the image of Company 
collaboration with the effeminising corruptions of Indian wealth. Even as it presents a 
scene of vital commercial interchange, Zoffany would have been well aware that his 
message of bounty ran the risk of this perception of debilitating infection. For this 
reason, the gendering of credit as Indian feminine bounty delivering itself into the 
open, and barely restraining, gesture of the masculine fIgure of Mordaunt is further 
encoded with a complicating priapic suggestion. What we have described as the 
equivocal icon of female genitalia painted into the Nawab' s clothing is in fact 'fIlled 
out' with the paradoxically potent possibility of a very masculine stirring (it is this 
possibility that art historians have most tended to notice1l7). One possible source for 
this equivocation may lie again in the conflation of Indian and Classical fertility 
symbols that collectors such as Towneley had begun to advocate; in particular, it may 
114 See for instance, the plethora of Indian maps and paintings of Indian scenes and people in Zoffany's 
Colonel Polier with his friends Claud Martin, John Wombwell and the artist, Lucknow, 1786-1787. A 
more exclusively masculine variation on the drawing-room scene, the model for this painting is that 
embodied by, for example, Philip Reinagle's Members of the Carrow Abbey Hunt (1780) in which the 
paintings of country scenes, along with the guns and trophy heads on the walls, imply the casual 
posssession of the unseen land by the informally posed gentlemen 'hunters' (illustrated in Myrone, p 
48). 
lIS Ronald Paulson, Hogarth. Volume One: The 'Modern Moral Subject', 1697-1732 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1971), p 224; John Berger, Ways of Seeing (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 
1972), pp 106-109. 
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Pocock, Virtue, p 108. 
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Myrone, p 49. 
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advert to the coincidence long associated between Shiva and Dionysus. 118 
Towneley's own collection contained a miniaturised representation of a Hindu 
temple, featuring at its centre a Shaivite linga, towards which all the other icons are 
pointed.119 That Zoffany may have mockingly inducted the simultaneous 
symbolisation of male and female procreative forms in the linga, as well as its place 
of honour in the Towneley composition, adds to the appearance in Cock Match of a 
self-induced rape. But it also attempts to guard against - as it were, sheathe - the 
complicity of the desiring viewer. The equivocal marks of genitalia reinforce the 
essential difference of the Indian monarch, monstrously both generating and 
absorbing rapacity, the organ of violation being replaced in his own uncontrolled 
body. The message would appear to be given out that he may be distinguished from 
the (all but absent 120) Company in his lack of 'self-command', unable to harness his 
own wealth; and at the same time that he is, as it were, self-negating, stimulating, 
satisfying, and betraying, only himself. Thus the effeminate and emasculating 
infection of credit is, in a manner, confined to and absorbed by, its point of origin, 
leaving the viewer guiltlessly free to enjoy a self-enclosed economy of pleasure. 
Isolated from the Company, the Nawab is effectively produced - and in a sense, 
exorcised - as that classical motif of the loss of virtue, the dystopian figure of luxury 
feeding upon itself in an endless cycle of corruption and desire. 121 
Such a representation would seem to replicate Alain Grosrichard' s sealed 
economy of 'jouissance' in which the oriental despot is both 'enjoyed' and disavowed 
by the distant Metropolitan spectator (see Section 1.4). This would then account for 
the further representations of licentious exchange that the Nawab appears to unleash 
1\8 M' Itter, pp 86-97. 
119 F '11' . or 1 ustratlon, see Mltter, p 87. 
120 It is no accident that the only representative of Hastings' council- Wheeler - has his back squarely 
turned to the disporting Nawab. 
121 Berry, p 106; Pocock, p 112. The offending folds are all but lost within the rest of cloth in the 
Nawab's own copy of the painting (see the 'Ashwick version' in Appendix, p.367). 
among his audience. For as Grosrichard writes, the despotic relationship to 
enjoyment, its consumption and manufacture, 
is reproduced identically at every link in the chain. Whatever level he occupies 
the momentary holder of power desires simultaneously like a despot and like 
the despot. He is always simultaneously an absolute point of departure and a 
pure relay, all the way along the chain to its very end ... 122 
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This reading would then implicate the assembled Europeans partaking of the sport, at 
the same time as it disassociated the viewing Hastings and the governmental 
framework of Company involvement. Since, however, the painting as a whole marks 
a moment of interchange - of (to paraphrase Pratt) colonial 'contact' - the suggestion 
of a sealed economy of representation is inevitably misleading. The obvious problem 
set by the priapic-passive Nawab touches most immediately upon the figure of 
Mordaunt. As with so many British portraits of graceful virility in the eighteenth 
century his pose and physique is distantly derived from that of the Apollo Belvedere. 
It is intended to suggest a 'majesty' that at once includes and transcends 'mere 
manliness' .123 The reference is neither simply misplaced in such a scene of mortal 
vices, nor can it be considered as an unreflective piece of classicism. Rather, the note 
of aspiration it sounds - of, that is, a desire to transcend both its gender and its 
surroundings - marks the figure of Mordaunt as the troubled point at which the 
despotic economy reaches out beyond the frame and involves its viewer. What he 
seeks to transcend of course, is the Nawab's emasculating potential. Specifically, the 
priapic potency inscribed into the effeminate despotic figure opens up the possibility 
that the female-male pairing of the Nawab and Mordaunt cannot contain the gender 
codes of the painting; a surplus of (male) potency threatens to reverse the roles. 
Instead of the Apollonian disavowal of the Nawab's Dionysian invitation, Mordaunt's 
outstretched arms may then signify their own female passivity, receiving and being 
122 Grosrichard, p 74. Emphasis in the original. 
123 Chloe Chard, 'Effeminacy, Pleasure and the Classical Body', in Gill Perry and Michael Rossington 
(eds), Feminity and Masculinity in Eighteenth-century Art and Culture (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, repro 1997; 1994), p 150. 
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mastered by the 'wanton abandon' of Indian wealth. This in turn upsets the secretly 
gendered message of Company mastery that provides the main framework of the 
painting and which leant it, as with all of Zoffany's 'conversation pieces', to a private 
and personal reading of ownership. 
There are two figures that primarily convey this covert message, both of which 
have been oddly overlooked in past readings. They are figures of invitation and 
exhortation, and they are staring directly at the viewer (Hastings), the only characters 
in Cock Match to do so; 124 together they constitute the interlocking ideas of finance 
and sexuality. At the very back of the crowd, a bearded man dressed in white (and 
thus breaking up the darker Indian figures around him) points to a cock held by 
another man, and gazes out with half-open mouth. His message to the Govemor-
General is unmistakably that to Hastings belongs the winning 'cock' in this 
competition. The second figure is that of the courtesan seated behind the Nawab and 
being importuned by an Indian gentleman. Her coquettish gaze and equivocal smile 
repeat the promise of submission in Roma's fresco. Both staring figures, explicitly 
and implicitly, engender the viewer as male and as intimately involved with the 
tableau. In making the point about the Nawab's lack of 'self-command', and in 
seeking to confme the emasculating potential of credit to his body, the artist has set up 
within the painting a competing locus of masculine power. On the one hand, such an 
inscription partially defends the viewer against complicity with a desiring 
involvement for the Nawab's wealth. But equally, the Dionysian vitality that 
reverberates around the crowd, and thence outwards from the two frankly invitational 
characters, also threatens to draw within, and effeminise, its disavowed colonialist 
spectator. Secret mastery thus becomes not only licentious collaboration, but opens 
up precisely the image of Company corruption that the painting as a whole seeks to 
recast. 
Thus the signs of equivocation are etched into, but cannot be contained within, 
the body of the Nawab. If Cock Match seeks to transcend an historical collaboration 
124 The painter himself, archly placed above the vacant throne, is in fact looking off to one side. 
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by holding only one partner to representational account, the economy of sexual and 
financial interchange it creates instead spills over into, infers, and involves, its hidden 
partner. In short, the illusory comparative f~ade becomes disturbingly real. Zoffany 
deploys several strategies to forestall its fmal dissolution, each one itself becoming 
implicated in the very process it attempts to halt. We will take up three of these 
strategies, centred on the already over-determined figure of Asaf-ud-daulah. The first 
is perhaps the most bathetic. In addition to the double-inscription of signs of male 
and female characteristics, Zoffany has added a third specifically to undermine, and 
de-limit, the dangerous surplus potency flowing out from Nawab to Govemor-
General. This is narrated here in the appearance of baldness entailed by the 
monarch's ludicrously shrunken white headwear (the proportions are tactfully 
rectified in the Nawab's own version of the paintingI25). In eighteenth century 
painting baldness (unmediated, for instance, by the styling of the hair at the back and 
sides as a wig) was a sign of at the least, 'unmanliness', and as a general rule, it cast 
the aspersion of impotence. 126 Thus the Nawab becomes at once, a figure of female 
passivity, priapic danger, and a comic flaccidity. He becomes, in other words, a 
figure of radical sexual indeterminacy, a paradoxical absence out of which issues the 
vital sexualised world of the painting. 
The second strategy brings us back to the essential function of the 
'conversation piece' to narrate the power of its patron in terms of property. For Cock 
Match is above all a tableau of dispossession. While the 'conversation piece' is 
concerned to detail the relations between people and their milieu, its primary 
orientation is always dictated by the question of ownership. 127 This is one of the 
reasons why legibility is of such importance to the genre,128 and why any 
indeterminacy in Cock Match is lethal to its creator's purpose to return power to his 
balked employer. To understand how property is specifically drawn into the tableau it 
125 See the 'Ashwick version' in Appendix, p.367. 
126 Marcia Pointon, Hanging the Head: Portraiture and Social Formation in Eighteenth-Century 
England (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993), pp 117-20. 
127 P . 
omton, p 162; Paulson, Emblem, p 121. 
128 P . 
omton, p 161. 
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is necessary to conceive of the very limited design of which the 'conversation piece' 
invariably consisted in its outdoor setting. The lord of the manor, his wife, family and 
friends, are placed in the foreground to one side of the composition. Behind them, 
and filling out the rest of the painting in the background lies the manor, depicted in its 
natural surroundings. More often than not, the owner and his family are shown 
beneath one or more spreading trees, whose age and luxuriance symbolise the idea of 
landed property itself, durable, rooted and above all, providing continuity. 129 Owner 
and family; property and landscape; the symbolisation of rootedness: these form the 
essential groupings of the genre, whose 'guiding aim' it is to narrate the 'definitions' 
between them. 130 An earlier painting executed by Zoffany for Hastings, depicting the 
Governor-General and his wife in the grounds of their property in Calcutta, shows 
how the artist had already begun to translate these three principal structural 
components into their new colonial setting. 131 While Cock Match has been loosely 
described as a 'conversation piece' by art historians, they have not as a rule chosen to 
analyse its functions with regard to the formal features of the genre. This can be 
partly accounted for by the painting's ambiguous setting beneath an open-sided tent-
neither indoors nor outdoors - and by the lack of much in the way of obvious natural 
scenery. Yet Zoffany has made clear references both to the surrounding area and the 
elemental structure of the genre. Thus, instead of a formal manor, another tent is 
depicted in the background; and framing it, to one side of the painting, is a tall 
spreading tree. This last feature is of especial importance in the formal balance of the 
painting, for it is curiously echoed above the Nawab's vacated throne, in the form of 
the round green fan attached to a standard. The ideas of solidity, durability and 
continuity that the tree symbolises in the 'conversation piece' are thus hollowed out, 
first by the exposed artificiality of the shrunken symbol, and then by the almost comic 
juxtaposition of an empty seat beneath it just at that point where the locus of power in 
the genre is invariably placed. In this way, the Nawab is deprived of precisely the 
129 Paulson, Emblem, pp 154-55. 
130 Paulson, Emblem, p 121. 
131 See Appendix, p.370. 
qualities that he might, as the legitimate scion of the ruling family, have been 
expected to portray. 
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Furthermore, in the place of the expected landscape, Zoffany has chosen 
instead to fill up his canvas principally with a disparate array of Awadh society. In 
the handling of their composition, he follows the conventions of the picturesque as set 
out by William Gilpin in his hugely influential Observations on the River Rye 
(1782).132 In a subsection of Chapter VII, entitled 'Remarks on Painting a Crowd', 
Gilpin urges upon the artist the use of 'refractory materials', as in 'agitated water' 
such as may be found in a turbulent ocean, to produce the variety of surfaces that 
underpins the aesthetic. In advocating the ocean as a suitable model, he points out 
that if 'in any of these swellings, and agitations, could be arrested, and fixed, it would 
produce that pleasing variety, which we admire in ground. ,l33 The object is to 
juxtapose 'smooth' and 'rough' forms as in a picturesque landscape, since 'in 
managing a crowd, and in managing a landscape, the same general rules are to be 
observed.' l34 Under this aesthetic, then, crowds are not only resolved into elements of 
the landscape but can supplant it. Zoffany' s resolution of the Indian crowd, and the 
manner in which these darker 'rough' forms are set off against the bright and smooth 
white figure of Mordaunt, is further accentuated as a 'picturesque' effect by the way 
in which he deploys the 'elliptical form' to shape the composition. l35 The crowd 
become in effect a natural 'amphitheatre' in precisely the manner prescribed by Gilpin 
and achieved in landscape painting through the use of the 'Claude glass' .136 In this 
sense, despite the lively variety of forms, not only does the Indian crowd 'appear to 
belong to one whole',137 but they come to represent the landscape of the painting. In 
other words, they are situated within the narrative of ownership; they are, in effect, 
132 The picturesque was soon to become the dominant mode for all British painting in India. Tillotson, 
~}~illiam Gilpin, Observations on the River Wye and Several Parts of South Wales, etc. Relative 
chiefly to Picturesque Beautry; made in the summer of the year 1770 (London, 1782), pp 62-63. 
134 G.I . I pm, p 77. 
m G·I . I pm, p 93. 
136 G.I . I pm, p 65. 
137 G.I . I pm, p 77. 
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that which the Nawab, in vacating his place beneath the sign of continuity, has left 
masterless. 
The Dionysian figure of the Nawab should therefore be contextualised within 
a framing narrative of possession encoded into Cock Match. His lack of sexual self-
possession parallels this narrative of landed dispossession, and produces him as fatally 
divorced from the naturalised landscape of his subjects. But it also locates him as 
precisely that dangerously 'fluid' figure of 'credit' whose proper relationship to 
government had become so important to political debate in the eighteenth century. If 
we recall the terms of that debate as being set by the two opposed ideas of 'landed' 
and 'mobile' property, then it is possible to see that in retailing a narrative of 
dispossession Zoffany has necessarily invited into the painting an opposing form of 
stability, a balancing figure of the idea of the continuity of ownership. Without it, 
Cock Match would become a masterless vital world of appetites, a vision of credit 
rampant and feeding endlessly upon itself in a debilitating cycle of corruption. It 
would become, in other words, precisely that image of decadence narrated by William 
Knighton a generation later in his capacity as a member of the Oudh Commission, 
whose remit was to prepare the way for the annexation of the province of Awadh in 
1856. 138 In 1784, however, the artist's task was not to encourage the end of the 
'game' of collaboration, but to encode it with a message of implicit present mastery. 
Given both the contradictions of agrarian aristocracy and trading 'independency' 
within Company praxis, and the larger eighteenth century opposition of landed to 
mobile property, it is hardly surprising that ZofIany should have chosen the classical 
allegory of masculine landed possession to offset the potentially effeminising figure 
of credit. To this end, he has employed a diachronic narrative both within the 
painting, and between it and its principal viewer. For the European man seated 
beneath that ('real') tree in the background may on one level refer jokingly to Colonel 
138 In contrast, throughout his narrative Knighton's gaze all but empties the scenery of its European 
personnel; and where they do appear, they are unequivocally unmanned by the despotic economy_ 
Compare in this regard, the figure of Mordaunt and that of Jones, the ridiculed 'aide-de-camp' of 
Nawab Nasir-ud-daulah (1837-1842) in Knighton, p 16. 
Polier. But in the deeper narrative of property and possession, it refers to Hastings 
himself now simultaneously possessing the courtesan's invitation and the Awadh 
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'landscape'. This secret background tryst destabilises the primacy of the larger, 
central disporting Nawab and figures him instead as a passing phase in a longer 
perspective, an object of exchange between the Hastings-the-viewer and Hastings-the-
viewed, the future 'real' proprietor. Dispossessed of his throne, the Nawab becomes 
liminal in time as well, located - as with all para-anthropological subjects - on the 
point of extinction. 139 But it also seeks to make of him an outsider in terms of the 
imaginary spaces constructed between viewer and object. For in this reading, Asaf-
ud-daulah is not quite central to the painting, the courtesan is; and leading the viewing 
eye on from her, the private coupling that takes place beneath the symbol of 
ownership. Already obscured in terms of sexuality, the Nawab turns out to be lacking 
in any but peripheral focus; he is intended as that which the viewer must see through. 
Zoffany's secret message of ownership is, however, a problematical one since 
Cock Match is pre-eminently a tableau of exchange. The viewing eye travels giddily 
around its proliferating motifs of fmancial and amatory interaction, among which the 
coupling beneath the tree and the allegory of landed property are all but lost, 
discernible only to the knowing patron. Inducted under the sign of the motility of 
credit, it cannot reconstruct a narrative of mastery, only one of momentary possession, 
and a continuing plot of exchange. Beyond the seated figure, the diachronic plane of 
the painting implies, lies another tent and scene of bacchanalian dispossession. 
Moreover, the surplus potency of the Nawab overturns the meaning of male-female 
coupling itself, so that to be set within the scene of Cock Match is to risk falling 
simultaneously within the unmanning economy of the priapic N awab, and under the 
sign of the dangerous infection of his fertile passivity. In short, the radical 
indeterminacy of the figure of the Nawab deprives the genre of its cardinal points of 
139 Johannes Fabian, Time and the Work of Anthropology: Critical Essays, 1971-1991 (Amsterdam: 
Harwood Academic Publishers, 1996; 1991), p 193. For an interesting recent analysis of the 
connections between 'para-anthropological subjects' and extinction, see Patrick Brantlinger, Dark 
Vanishings: Discourse on the Extinction of Primitive Races, 1899-1930 (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 2003). 
reference; the attempt to resurrect its plot of masculine ownership and continuity 
produces only the farce of collaborative emasculation and potential dispossession. 
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The covert nature of Zoffany' s inscription is thus equally a prior admission of its 
inevitable failure. This point brings us to the third strategy through which Zoffany 
attempts to stem the infectious economy depicted. For the effigy of Hastings-Polier is 
symptomatic of the problem of figuring his patron's relationship to the world of Cock 
Match, a problem of secure identification that is -like the Nawab's repeated 
licentiousness - itself replicated across the face of the painting, but nowhere more 
crucially than in the form of Colonel Mordaunt. 
The identification of Hastings with the figure of Mordaunt is reflected to some 
extent in the Apollonian pose he strikes, inferring a quality of divinity - something 
more than 'manliness' - that betrays the need to extricate him from the debilitating 
sexual economy of the painting. It may also be reflected in the choice of the 
ambiguous political figure of Mordaunt himself, formerly a serving officer for the 
Company, now an aide-de-camp in an Awadh royal army that was itself under the de 
facto control of the Company administration. Moreover, in addition to his 
professional Company affiliations, Mordaunt was considered at the time to have 
operated as a spy for Hastings in the Awadh COurt. 140 But a more literal explanation 
might better apply here. According to at least one contemporary, the portrait of 
Mordaunt is strikingly inaccurate, his facial features in particular bearing no literal 
resemblance to those of the man so well known to Zoffany and Lucknow society. 141 
This is an unusual - and unusually prominent -lapse in a painter renowned precisely 
for his ability to create miraculous likenesses. This was the skill that made his 
'conversation pieces' so ardently sought after by patrons anxious to be recognisably 
enshrined for posterity, as well as for the cachet of instant recognition by and among 
their peers. From his sketch of Hastings' fireside deliberations with the Nawab and 
the Mughal prince Jawan Bakht, it is clear that Zoffany had at one point intended his 
140 'M . 
emolfS of Mordaunt', p 140-41. 
141 'M . 
emOlfS of Mordaunt', p 140. 
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Lucknow centrepiece to portray the Governor-General directly in the act of 
negotiation. It therefore requires little in the way of a conjectural leap to suggest that 
the passing resemblance of the figure of Mordaunt - in posture, stance and build - to 
that of Zoffany' s portrait of Hastings in the grounds of his Calcutta residence might 
be considered as more than coincidental. Moreover, the features ascribed to 
Mordaunt, including the high receding hairline and pigtail, can be recovered both 
from Zoffany's fIrelight sketch and from other more detailed portraits of the 
Governor-General. In particular, Hastings' facial characteristics as depicted in earlier 
portraits executed by Tilly Kettle in the mid-l 770s bear a notable similarity to those 
of' Mordaunt' , opening out the possibility that Zoffany may well have aimed at 
reproducing in the 'Colonel', a youthful and martial reprise of his patron. 142 At the 
very least, these considerations would imply that some sort of representational fusion 
- or equally, obfuscation - was intended by the artist, and that the resulting Mordaunt-
Hastings effIgy should be considered as analogous in its ambiguity to the kind of 
disavowal that his Apollonian attitude embodies. On one level, it literally infers the 
presence of the Company proconsul both within and external to, a relationship with 
the Nawab, and the painting as a whole. At the same time, of course, it makes of him 
a comparably paradoxical fIgure, an absent presence out of which the narrative of 
colonial mastery is at once constructed, and rendered dangerously insubstantial. 
This troubled question of presence brings us finally to the problematic of 
spectators hip that underpins the formal aesthetic of Cock Match. Essentially a 
depiction of ownership, the 'conversation piece' not infrequently omitted directly to 
represent its patron. Instead, the objects of his world, in a continuum that extended 
from his family to his mansion, were taken as representative of the absent patriarch. 
Their fixed, legible representation narrated the power of the viewer, the implied 
proprietor of the scene. The presence of Hastings within the framework of Cock-
match is thus not simply a tautology; it is a sign that the indeterminacy inscribed into 
the Nawab has infected the rationale of the painting. The reciprocal traces of 
142 
See Appendix, p.371. 
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equivocation that accompany the inferred presence of Hastings betray the artist's 
recognition that the spectacle of dispossession has replaced the theatre of ownership, 
that Company authority can neither remain outside of, nor can it be subjected to, the 
world of the painting. 143 Instead of the plot of ownership and immanence, the 
proliferation of the effigies of Hastings and their confused gender codings render a 
tableau in which the only consistent and coherent sign is that of theatricality - in other 
words, that each is playing an arbitrarily assigned part and that, depending on the 
point of view, all roles are open to negotiation. Such an admission of the contingency 
of representation and self-representation must amend Kate Teltscher's reading of the 
colonial production in the late eighteenth century of the 'safe colonial subject' as 
predicated on the increasing (if anxious) extension of British command over its 
representations. l44 Since the publication in 1763 of Robert Orme's History of the 
Military Transactions of the British Nation in Indostan, the presentation of Mughal 
rule as a form of theatrical masquerade had constituted an important rhetorical trope 
in the justification of British rule in India. 145 The 'sham' spectacle of eighteenth-
century Mughal rule was contrasted with the solidity of British paramountcy, a form 
of self-representation that Burke was shortly to turn against Hastings, figuring him as 
both despot and 'the great Master of the Machinery' who 'had so long dazzled the 
eyes of the world with the splendour of his pantomimical deceptions' .146 What 
Zoffany's painting exposes, then, is a prior and debilitating colonialist awareness not 
that they might be cast as despots, but that a despotic position within the canvas of 
colonial India is not available, and that what remains is only the farcical reproduction 
of the empty signs of despotic possession. The multiplication of effigies of Hastings 
- as the lover beneath the tree; as Wheeler facing the throne with a cock between his 
legs; and as the ambiguous figure of Mordaunt - only serves to produce British 
authority as its own form of masquerade, unable finally to fully represent possession 
143 
1« ~ the importance of theatrical conventions to the genre, see Paulson, Hogarth, pp 210,230. 
14S e tscher, Chapter Four. 
146 Teltscher, pp 112-13. 
Quoted in Teltscher, p 168. 
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of the object of power. Furthermore, it suggests that rather than arising out of but 
remaining separate from, the spectacle of an unruly civil society, the spectator is 
everywhere present within and compromised by, its scene of misrule. This problem 
of separation from and impartial sovereignty over, civil society was one that 
preoccupied all eighteenth-century British political theorists. More specifically, the 
fatal implication of the ultimate spectator of Cock Match - that is, the chief 
representative of colonial government in India - provides a telling parallel to the 
problematic of the 'impartial spectator' that so troubled Adam Smith. Initially located 
in the form of public 'opinion' through which propriety and justice were upheld, by 
the final edition of The Wealth of Nations (1790), Smith had shifted its potential locus 
to that of the private conscience of the individual.147 This retreat to the realms of 
private morality was an acknowledgement of the deepening deadlock in the debate 
between commerce and polity, and of the intractable problem of how an independent 
sovereign might arise out of and adjudicate commercial relations. Narrating a primal 
scene of commerce, Cock Match can in this regard be characterised as the limit-text of 
that debate. As such it offers a convincing illustration of the crisis of colonial 
government in its search for a paradigmatic articulation of its relations to Indian 
society. The terrifying 'absence of precedence' which Suleri has described as the 
symptomatic motif of colonial rhetoric is here reproduced in the near hysteria of the 
replication of the Hastings effigy. Unable to obscure the recognition that legitimacy, 
and with it, social propriety, can be established within the framework of the painting, 
his tautological reproduction further denies the possibility of a despotic position 
located outside of, and impartially adjudicating, its terms of reference. In other 
words, the representational dispossession of the Mughal both proceeds from and gives 
rise to, the impossibility of Company self-possession. In this sense, Mordaunt and the 
Nawab are equally bathetic figures of indeterminacy; far from lending a contrasting 
sense of solidity, they are representative primarily of mutually de constructing colonial 
narratives. As if in recognition of the public humiliation that they so farcically 
~~---------------­Dwyer, pp 38, 74. 
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portray, the interactive phase of Anglo-Indian historical painting briefly lived and 
straightaway died, with Cock Match. From now on, whenever an Englishman and a 
Mughal figure of authority shared the same pictorial space, the latter would either be 
·1· d 148 ~.c. 1 d ad 149 literally infantl lse, or scue Y e . 
The mutual deconstruction of the two narratives of Cock Match is the most 
important point that needs to be carried forward from this discussion into a reading of 
the post-'Mutiny' discourse on Indian Muslims. The events of 1857-59 had 
reanimated the symbol of the dispossessed Mughal in colonial discourse and had seen 
its unprecedented conflation with a pan-Indian Muslim constituency. At the same 
time, the perception of Muslim 'conspiracy' to which it was connected was itself 
cocooned in a variety of forms of prophylaxis holding apart Muslim and British 
protagonists. Because Muslim 'conspiracy' sought - irrationally - to repossess the 
founding self-conception of British rule in India as secular and neutral, it produced in 
the Indian Muslim a radically indeterminate figure, one who crossed the most 
important boundaries of the British sociation of its colonial habitus. Inevitably there 
followed a process of representational stigmatisation and segregation aimed at 
legislating the Indian Muslim into visibility; and inevitably given its provenance in 
British secularity, this process revolved around the primary motif of religious 
incontinence, culminating in the sensationalism surrounding the 'W ahabi' trials of the 
1860s and 1870s. The suggestion being made in this section is that both the need for 
legibility and the irredeemable indeterminacy of the Indo-Muslim figure in this later 
discourse, has a secondary rationale in an earlier scene of crisis, and the failure there 
of a colonial attempt to possess its own representation. This earlier scene witnessed 
the collapse of boundaries separating out the 'sham' spectacle of the Mughal figure of 
148 1 h' R n IS Lord Cornwallis receiving the sons ofTipu Sultan as hostages at Seringapatam (c 1792), 
obert Home may well have unconsciously taken Mordaunt and Zoffany as his models (for illustration, 
:'::Yly" ed, Raj, p 154). If so, it would be the completion ofa cycle, since it seems likely that 
L Y,hlmselfwas burlesquing the rather more majestic exchange of greetings in Francis Hayman's ror~Chve meeting Mir Jafar, Nawab ofMurshidabad, after the Battle ofPlassey (c 1761-1762), a 
.:Cltcal,replaYing that repeats at the level of form the recognition ofthe emptiness of available 
I eo oglcal content 14(l • 
The mos~ popular theme for historical depiction during the next fifty years was the discovery of the 
corpse ofTIpu Sultan by Major General Baird in 1799 (Bayly, ed, Raj, p 159). 
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authority and the desired - even despotic - solidity of Company power. It produced a 
figure of paradox, alienated from the Indian society around him, and unable to 
conunand the will to power which he represented. All of these features were directed 
by and at the same time deeply destabilising to, the covert representation of an 
emergent colonialist state. 
While there was a clear progression from this unruly figure of comparison to 
his final and literal dispossession in the form of the annexation of the state of Awadh 
in 1856, religion played almost no part in the system of representation that prepared 
the way for it. However, as William Knighton's lurid volume illustrates, by 1856 the 
problematic of British solidity had been decisively separated out of the frame of 
representation, so that what we are left with is a scene of self-despoliation not unlike 
that of Steel's hopelessly self-galled Muslim in 1905. What is being proposed here is 
not the inevitable progression of one process of stigmatisation to another, but the 
important parallels running between them. The conflation of Mughal and Indo-
Muslim discourses in 1857 should thus not be considered as a matter of self-evident 
substitution, but as mutually illuminating and cumulative discourses centred on the 
dynamics of representing British colonial power in India. The primary point of 
comparison that we will now take up resides in the way in which the indeterminacy of 
the Indo-Muslim 'stranger' acts upon the self-representation of a newly re-emergent 
figure of colonial paramountcy at a comparable moment of crisis. Briefly, the next 
section will argue that the over-inscribed theatricality of the Mughal is strikingly re-
played as a dangerously deconstructive figure of Indo-Muslim fanaticism, and that the 
connections between the two are therefore only superficially to be understood as 
drawn from a common religious affiliation. The real point of reference must rather be 
identified in the disorientated and elusive figure of a British administration still trying 
to place itself in respect to its colonial subjects. Still trying, in other words, to 
maintain its 'independency' outside of the socio-political canvas that is required to 
legitimate its authority. 
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Section 3.3 
'A wild and ardent faith': 149 Testing oppositions in the post-'Mutiny'discourse 
As Zoffany's Cock Match so vividly demonstrates, the colonialist crisis of confidence 
in the late eighteenth century was in part played out upon the representation of 
Mughal figures of authority. That process inevitably entailed a marked degree of 
over-inscription, primarily characterised by paradox and illegibility. Rather than 
rendering a visible portrait of disempowerment, Zoffany produced instead a figure of 
indeterminacy, an absence ordering the society around it. Caught both within and 
implicated from without that world, the British figure of authority is similarly 
invested with a disturbing illegibility, himself becoming a form of impersonation, 
unable finally to create and inhabit a stable persona of power. This section will argue 
the production of a similar corresponding illegibility in Indo-Muslim and colonialist 
figures in the wake of the 'Mutiny'. As suggested in Chapter Two, the events of 
1857-59 not only saw the exclusive conflation of Indian Muslims with the inheritance 
ofa British discourse on Mughals; they further inscribed a perceived pan-Indian 
Muslim community with highly ambivalent notions of Anglo-Indian communal 
solidarity and purpose. Much of that ambivalence derived from the way in which 
Muslim 'conspiracy' transgressed important lines of demarcation between a British 
religious and officially secular identity. The consequence, as has been argued in 
Section 3.1, was the production of the Indo-Muslim 'stranger', a figure of radical 
indeterminacy. Now tied into the colonialist need to re-inscribe the prime boundaries 
of their habitus, the Indian Muslim of colonial discourse had become in 1857 a site of 
representation comparable to that of Zoffany's Nawab; he had become, in other 
words, a means of transcending their implication within colonial society. As will now 
be illustrated with reference to the later published writings of Alfred Lyall and to W 
W Hunter's Indian Musalmans (1871), the visibility of the Indo-Muslim 'stranger' in 
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Section 3.3 
'A wild and ardent faith': 149 Testing oppositions in the post-'Mutiny'discourse 
As Zoffany's Cock Match so vividly demonstrates, the colonialist crisis of confidence 
in the late eighteenth century was in part played out upon the representation of 
Mughal figures of authority. That process inevitably entailed a marked degree of 
over-inscription, primarily characterised by paradox and illegibility. Rather than 
rendering a visible portrait of disempowerment, Zoffany produced instead a figure of 
indeterminacy, an absence ordering the society around it. Caught both within and 
implicated from without that world, the British figure of authority is similarly 
invested with a disturbing illegibility, himself becoming a form of impersonation, 
unable finally to create and inhabit a stable persona of power. This section will argue 
the production of a similar corresponding illegibility in Indo-Muslim and colonialist 
figures in the wake of the 'Mutiny'. As suggested in Chapter Two, the events of 
1857-59 not only saw the exclusive conflation of Indian Muslims with the inheritance 
of a British discourse on Mughals; they further inscribed a perceived pan-Indian 
Muslim community with highly ambivalent notions of Anglo-Indian communal 
solidarity and purpose. Much of that ambivalence derived from the way in which 
Muslim 'conspiracy' transgressed important lines of demarcation between a British 
religious and officially secular identity. The consequence, as has been argued in 
Section 3.1, was the production of the Indo-Muslim 'stranger', a figure of radical 
indetenninacy. Now tied into the colonialist need to re-inscribe the prime boundaries 
of their habitus, the Indian Muslim of colonial discourse had become in 1857 a site of 
representation comparable to that of Zoffany's Nawab; he had become, in other 
words, a means of transcending their implication within colonial society. As will now 
be illustrated with reference to the later published writings of Alfred Lyall and to W 
W Hunter's Indian Musalmans (1871), the visibility of the Indo-Muslim 'stranger' in 
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colonialist rhetoric narrates the desired invisibility of the rapidly changing and 
increasingly intrusive, post-'Mutiny' colonial state. His persistent illegibility, on the 
other hand, exposes the founding colonialist paradox of being at once a legislator and 
a spectator of the theatre of colonial neutrality. 
Lyall's situation within Anglo-Indian society as a writer of 'the known and the 
knowable' has already been discussed in Section 2.3. There it has been argued that 
his evolution from a young ICS recruit overtaken by Muslim 'conspiracy' in 1857 
into the mature and diplomatic senior bureaucrat in the 1870s, looking to re-frame a 
secular and neutral colonial dispensation in its wake, is one that may be taken as 
typical of the Anglo-Indian official experience of the period. In straddling 
journalistic, official and literary public arenas, as well as in his attempts to mediate 
between Anglo-Indian and Metropolitan audiences, there exists a conspicuous 
congruity between Lyall's Asiatic Studies and Hunter's Indian Musalmans. Like 
Lyall, Hunter's observations grew out of his official duties as an ICS officer and 
editor for the Government Gazette (of Bengal); and as with Asiatic Studies, Indian 
Musalmans was first published in Britain and provided a notable fillip to his 
reputation in India. ISO However, while Lyall's essays drove his subsequent meteoric 
rise through the ranks of the Civil Service, Hunter was actually approached by the 
Viceroy Lord Mayo to write his account of the so-called 'Wahabi,151 conspiracy and 
trials then underway in India, and drew copiously from official government 
documents supplied by the Home, Foreign, and Military Departments. 152 Indian 
Musalmans duly received the 'hearty approval' of the Viceroy and excellent reviews 
from the Anglo-Indian press, and its publication accompanied his appointment as 
Under-Secretary in the Home Department. IS3 On a return visit to London following 
150 Skrin 
lSI e, pp 199-204. 
The designation and spelling used here is taken from Hunter's text. As will be argued below, 
howe~er, the tenn 'Wahabi' as it occurs in colonialist discourse is not susceptible of anyone definition 
-. for Instance, as a reference to the tariqah-i muhammadiyah. The quotation marks used in this 
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Skrme, p 199. Hardy has suggested that Hunter acted as 'a receiving set' for official policy-makers 
~3the time (Hardy, p 88). 
Skrine, pp 200, 195. 
254 
its tremendous reception there, 'he was received by the magnates of the India Office 
d d · al . hE·' 154 as one who had ren ere SIgn servIce to t empIre. 
Indian Musalmans was reprinted early the following year and then once again 
in 1876. Although at the time of Hunter's death in 1901 it was no longer available in 
Britain, it has been since recognised by historians as 'highly influential' in shaping 
late nineteenth century British attitudes towards Indian Muslims. ISS On the subject of 
the 'Wahabi' movement, which had become for Anglo-Indians at the time 'chief 
among Indian causes celebres', its effect was 'prompt and lasting' .156 Nor was its 
influence confined to a solely British audience. In the late colonial period it appears 
to have been adopted by a Muslim readership and reprinted in 1945 'to meet a great 
demand' for its powerful account of 'the great Puritanic revival- the Wahabi 
Movement in Islam, and how it served to give expression to the agonies of a great 
nation who had just lost an empire and political power.,IS7 Given this later, as it were 
cross-communal, consensus it is perhaps not surprising that in terms of its 
historiographical legacy, scholars appear now to accept its narrative of the movement 
as a matter of fact. 1S8 Such an acceptance is not infrequently accompanied by a 
dismissal of its popUlist literary qualities. Francis Robinson, for instance, sees it as 
not 'particularly well-argued or well-written' and as too hastily pushed into a 
prominence it did not deserve. 159 Nevertheless, he uses it elsewhere uncritically as a 
history of the tariqah-i muhammadiyah (The Way of Muhammad) reformist 
movement, their insurgency on the border, their activities during the 'Mutiny' and 
their pan-Indian organisation (the facts of which are addressed below). He not only 
accepts the designation of this movement as 'W ahabi', but sees it - much as Hunter 
IS4 Skrin e, p 203 ISS • 
. Pe~on, p 221. Despite the importance it gained, David Lelyveld appears to be the only recent 
~~stOrt~ who has engaged with the text in any detail. Lelyveld, pp 10-12. 
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Urdu edition published in India around the same time: Hunter, Hamare Hindustani musalman Kya vuh 
aMP~e zamir ke muttabiq malikah ke khilaf baghavat par majbur hain?, trans. Dr Sadiq Husain (Lahore: 
1S811ne k patah, Iqbal Akadmi, 1944). 
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of the later Deoband school (founded in 1860), whose ulama (traditional scholars) 
saw themselves as carrying on the reformist revolution begun by Shah Waliyu'llah 
and later taken up by Shah Abdul-Aziz and Sayyid Ahmad. l64 Similarly, the Aligarh 
movement of Sayyid Ahmad Khan (founded in 1875), whose own emphasis on 
Western-style scientific education appeared to British observers entirely at odds with 
both the Deobandis and the 'Wahabis', was in fact rooted in the same Delhi-based 
background of reform out of which the doctrines of Sayyid Ahmad of Rae Bareilly 
had evolved. 165 It is on this continuum of a broad Indo-Islamic reformist impulse that 
the muhammadiyah must be situated. 
The extent of the influence of the muhammadiyah movement among Indian 
Muslims in the nineteenth century has never properly been ascertained. They 
encouraged and to some extent helped direct an explosion in vernacular religious 
publications that by the 1860s had at least made the Koran 'readily available to many 
if not most Indian Muslims' .166 Francis Robinson has argued that this media 
revolution should be considered the single most important event for Indian Muslims 
of the period, substantially altering their perception of a personal relationship to God 
by beginning the process of marginalising the ulama as its traditional mediators. 167 
But this wider process needs to be distinguished from the spread of more specifically 
muhammadiyah literature and doctrines, for which there seems to be little in the way 
of a solid evidential basis. 168 Moreover, despite their frequent conflation by British 
officials, the muhammadiyah movement differed in its aims, ideas and constituencies 
from other contemporary reformist movements such as that of the lara 'izi, 
maintaining distinctly separate organisational infrastructures even in the province of 
164 
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Bengal in which they were primarily situated. 169 At the height of its activities in the 
1840s it seems to have commanded only a circumscribed following for its jihadist 
(mujahidin) insurgency on the Northwest frontier; 170 and there is no evidence for any 
coalition of these movements in 1857. In fact, it would seem the muhammadiyah 
stood aloof as an organisation from the' Mutiny'; indeed, the leader of the 
Muhammadi of Bombay even provided assistance to British officials during the 
disturbances there. 171 
Immediately following the publication of Indian Musalmans, Sayyid Ahmad 
Khan (at the time a member of the Anglo-Indian judicial service I 72) pointed to the 
danger of conflating the reformist movement designated as 'W ahabi' with an Indo-
Islamic political imperative.173 He insisted that until the 1850s the movement had 
never been directed against the British; and that the very idea of a jihad against 
Christians in India had never at any time formed a part of the philosophy of its 
founder. 174 These are detailed refutations of specific charges made by Hunter. But in 
fact the charges were already something of an anomaly since the official records 
clearly show that the British had taken very little notice of the movement before the 
1850s. For the most part they had seen them as a useful diversion for the Sikh troops 
ofRanjit Singh before the annexation of Punjab in 1849.175 It was only with the arrest 
and subsequent trial of Maulvi Ahmadullah of Patna in 1863 that any popular Anglo-
Indian interest was taken in Wahabi activity. This interest was sustained throughout 
the next decade, even though it was becoming evident that the trials and investigations 
had during this period effectively ended the organised supply network of the 
Muhammadi within India, and entirely extirpated any active resistance on the 
169 
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frontier. 176 Sayyid Ahmad Khan's quarrel with Hunter was thus not entirely a matter 
of specialised knowledge, but also of re-presenting to the British in India their own 
record of events. 
Where his expert testimony as an Indian Muslim is drawn on in the article is in 
the implicit attempt to repossess the Urdu term wahabi itself. In order to do this he 
employs two concurrent strategies in his argument. The first involves a repeated 
insistence on the actual, and limited, dimensions of the movement as it then existed. 
He identifies 'Wahabis' as a group known as the 'Ahal-i Hadis', whom he locates as a 
purely Bengal phenomenon. 177 He denounces Hunter's apparent conflation of 
'Musalman' and 'Wahabi'; and points out that, for instance, on doctrinal grounds the 
'Ahal-i Hadis' could never have formed an alliance with the Pathan tribes on the 
frontier. 178 He then seeks to expose Hunter's apprehension ofa secret supply network 
throughout India as a fundamental misreading of the circulation of zakat, the 
distribution of alms enjoined on all Muslims, and its personnel on the border as a 
mixture of fugitive Hindu and Muslim mutineers. 179 In contradistinction, his own 
conception of the size and standing of the constituency of Indian 'W ahabis' is 
encapsulated in an image partly designed to appeal to his British audience, in which 
he likens their persecution by the majority of Indian Muslims to that of the early 
Christians by the Jews. 180 The second strategy he employs entails a point by point 
refutation of the aims of the 'Wahabis' as necessarily hostile to British rule. He 
condemns Hunter's synopses of 'Wahabi' doctrines, characterising it as derived from 
a highly misleading Judaeo-Christian interpretation which, he argues, seems to come 
armed with the implicit assumption that all references to 'infidels' must refer - and 
refer violently - to the British in particular. lSI On the contrary, he insists, current 
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Muslim public deliberations over the question of loyalty were provoked in the fIrst 
place by the Anglo-Indian press, and the aspersions and misinterpretations of the 
British in India. 182 He is also at a loss as to why the author should think 'Wahabis' in 
particular, and Indian Muslim reformers in general, should equate the planting of the 
. d· . h h 'b . , fth 'C ' 183 H . thi 
'Crescent' In In Ia WIt t e urymg 0 e ross. e carnes s argument over 
into a re-reading of Hunter's synopses of fourteen 'W ahabi' tracts. Here he 
demonstrates that either they pre-dated the 'Wahabi' movement; or they were aimed 
only at Sikhs; or they had nothing whatsoever to do with exhortations to 'Jihad' 
against the British (these last being distortions he identified as largely attendant on 
Hunter's mistranslations).184 
These two strategies of refutation, which between them occupy much of his 
article, are revealing of two key rhetorical emphases apparently at work in Hunter's 
definition of the 'Wahabi'. The fIrst is that despite Sayyid Ahmad Khan's 
specifications of the limited extent of the 'Wahabi' constituency, at times it can be 
seen expanding promiscuously in his text to fill out the contours of the 'Indian 
Musalmans' as a whole (this is discussed further below). The second, related 
emphasis concerns its consistent equation with - indeed defmition by - the British 
state in India. It is the combination of these elements that draws the arguments of 
Sayyid Ahmad Khan beyond his immediate remit of properly identifying the 
'Wahabis' and into a larger refutation of Hunter's contention that 'the reformation of 
the Musalman faith is inseparably linked with hatred against the Infidel 
conquerors.,185 In making this case, he is specifically locating Hunter's text as an 
attempt to appropriate Indo-Muslim history as an aspect of the British community. In 
order to retrieve the term wahabi he must therefore first sever it from its Anglo-Indian 
persona. 
182 Kh 
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There is evidence in the article, however, that Sayyid Ahmad Khan was 
unable, fmally, to fmd a way to perform this operation. This failure can be glimpsed 
in his comparison of the Indian 'Wahabis' to the early Christians, with its suggestion 
of both teleological aggrandisement and a tacit acceptance of the terms of exchange 
by which 'Wahabis' could be defined. Towards its conclusion, however, he makes a 
more concerted attempt to break free of the detail and enclose Hunter's annexation of 
the 'Wahabis' within his own critique, and it is here that the underlying terms of 
Hunter's success can be most clearly gauged: 
I cannot help thinking that Dr Hunter is describing an ideal race, whose 
standard of civilisation and whose patriotism have never yet been equalled in 
this world. Strength and firmness of mind, forethought, unity of purpose, 
reticence and secrecy, extraordinary skill in governing the minds of masses, 
without which an organization, such as Dr Hunter ascribes to the Indian 
Wahabis, could never have existed a week, have long been forgotten by the 
people of India. 186 
The marked ambivalence in this description is caught most by the use of the word 
'equalled' - as opposed to, for instance, 'achieved'. Along with the contradictory 
elision between the hypothetical and the historical that takes place between the two 
sentences, it suggests that the reviewer, consciously or otherwise, has to some extent 
entered into - indeed, partially appropriated - the conceit of an 'ideal race'. By the 
end of the passage, he almost agrees that such a 'race' may have once achieved the 
qualities he indicates, and that through those qualities, they might be identified as 
connected to the 'people of India'. Given the context, it is reasonable to infer that the 
'race' in question is not to be conflated with the whole of the 'people of India', but 
refers to an Indo-Muslim unit. Indeed, since the notion of a Muslim 'race' in India 
was then a common self-identification by the ashraf (ruling) class from which Sayyid 
Ahmad Khan descended,187 and since his remarks concern temporal governance, it 
would not be unreasonable to further infer that Mughal rule is at some level being 
186 Kh an R . 187 ,evlew, pp 40-41. 
Shaikh, p 79. 
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signalled. ISS Thus, despite his oppositional stance Sayyid Ahmad Khan concedes the 
very two rhetorical assumptions that his article had seemed explicitly intended to 
refute. Firstly that the veracity of Hunter's claims can be judged only against an 
inferred organic connection to a larger, racialised, Indo-Muslim unit;189 and secondly, 
that such a 'racial' unit is inimical - that is, runs counter - to the fact of colonial 
India. In conceding these terms, he neatly expresses the ruling idea at work in 
Hunter's rhetoric that, for Indian Muslims (in their 'ideal' state) it is the present that is 
a foreign country. This should be regarded as a formulation distinct from that which 
Hardy has argued, wherein 'India could be made by the reformers to feel not like a 
home, but like a habitat.' 190 Indeed, in its dismissal of an extra-Indian context, this 
contemporary informed Indo-Muslim perspective throws a doubtful light on the purity 
of the genealogy of Hardy's interpretation (itself a source for Robinson's description 
of the movementI91). No doubt drawing to some extent from his own 'passionate' 
interest in wahabi thought as a young man, Sayyid Ahmad Khan sees his only point of 
reference for this portrait within an Indian past.192 At no time in his article does he 
recognise, explicitly or by implication, Hunter's alienating strain of rhetoric as either 
wahabi in origin, or indeed as derived from a recognisable wahabi Arabian context. 
But neither does he appear to feel the need to deny its implications. As his statement 
suggests, he recognises that Hunter's 'Wahabi' is predominantly defined by a system 
188 However, in addition to its Mughal class connotations, the term 'race' should also be regarded here 
as a collaboration in the text not only between its author and translator, but between itself and Indian 
Musalmans, in which 'race' is often used to denote a coherent Indo-Islamic entity. Although the title 
page of the review describes it as being written in 'original English corrected by a friend', Sayyid 
A?mad Khan is known to have had at best a rudimentary grasp on the language (G F I Graham, The 
Life and Work olSir Syed Ahmed Khan, (Karachi: Oxford University Press, repro 1974; 1885), p 5; 
Lelyveld, p 33). Moreover, 'race' as a biological concept was not taken up with any consistency by 
IndO-Muslim writers until the early twentieth century; and even then, it interacted - as it most probably 
~as done here - with other Islamic concepts of community, such as qawm, millat, and 'umma (these 
ISsues are discussed in Javed Majeed, 'Pan-Islam and 'Deracialisation' in the Thought of Muhammad 
Iqbal' in Peter Robb, ed, The Concept of Race in South Asia, Delhi: Oxford University Press, Delhi, 
1995, pp 304-27). The word 'race' should then be read as reflective of the dialogic nature of the article 
as ~ w~ole, engaging with and appropriating, rather than merely denying the perceptions of its Anglo-
Indian Interlocutor 
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of power within India, but one which is nevertheless somehow incongruous to its 
Indian environment. 'Foreigness' is here a matter of chronology, not geography. In 
appearing to accept, however ambiguously, the premise that the subject of this system 
may, if only in a 'forgotten' past, have been the 'Indian Musalmans', he accedes to 
the proposition that they - or rather, Hunter's 'ideal' version of them - could not but 
be misplaced in colonial India. To this extent, he colludes with the text in agreeing 
that they are somehow integral to the definition of its parameters; but it is an 
agreement clearly undertaken with the recognition of the degree to which that textual 
state is both created and unmade, by their elusive presence. As his description 
illustrates, the discourse of governance in Indian Musalmans is primarily one of 
dispossession, in which the representation of the British Indian state is all but at the 
mercy of a secret, defining Indo-Muslim administration. For an advocate of the 
continued ruling prerogatives of a Mughal caste of administrators, this would have 
presented a field for negotiation rather than outright repudiation. 193 
Sayyid Ahmad Khan's ambivalent reaction essentially predicts, seventy years 
later, that of the anonymous Indo-Muslim editor. Both equate Hunter's 'Wahabi' 
with a lost Indo-Muslim past, expressly situating him within an Indian context. 
Conversely, Sayyid Ahmad Khan's recognition that such a figure cannot exist in a 
contemporary India is itself related to the kind of alienation by which the Indian 
'Wahabi' becomes in later historiography (such as Robinson's) a purely generic 
variation on an Arabian original. In a sense it mimics the effect of the consistent 
designation 'Wahabi' in Hunter's text (never 'Ahal-i Hadis' or'Tariqah-i 
Muhammadiyah'), by tacitly agreeing to excise the colonial context. In highlighting 
this homology of the chronological and geographical, it becomes apparent that the 
text's concern with a suddenly exposed alien infiltration primarily reflects an 
msecurity over the question of British immigration -literally, that is, its arrival at 
power in India. Thus the enforced semantic emigration in Hunter's use of the term 
193 
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'Wahabi' is imbricated with the crisis of representing British rule in the wake of the 
'Mutiny' , a crisis partly revolving around the question of its continuing idiom of 
expression, foreign or indigenous. This imbrication of 'Wahabi' and British as 
mutually-defining sources of representation needs to be aligned both with the 
arguments in the last section illustrating the symbolic dispossession and alienation of 
the Mughal; and in regard to the discussion in Section 3.1 of the post-'Mutiny' 
attempt to reveal and fix distinctions between what is endemic and extrinsic to British 
India. In these interconnected contexts, the kind of ambivalence reflected in Sayyid 
Ahmad Khan's review indicates a failure within Indian Musalmans (as in Zoffany's 
dispossessed and dispossessing N awab ) to direct and delimit this discourse, one that 
has catastrophic implications not only for its subjects, but for the all too visible 
legislating colonialist hand. As we shall now explore in detail, in the colonial theatre 
of representation sorting the 'insider' from the 'outsider' can be a doubly lethal game. 
Both Lyall and Hunter drew on their understanding of the events of 1857-59 to 
characterise the perceived hostility of the contemporary Indo-Muslim community. In 
particular, and along with most of their British critics, they insisted upon the fact of 
Muslim 'conspiracy' during the 'Mutiny', and the organic link between that 'fact' and 
the subsequent revelations of an extensive Wahabi network of conspirators within the 
borders of British India. 194 However, in his review of Hunter's volume, originally 
published in The Theological Review in April, 1872, and republished in Asiatic 
Studies a decade later, Lyall makes a curious attempt to draw distinctions between 
their interpretations of Indo-Muslim history by first taking his colleague to task over 
the question of rhetoric. Noting that 'the author is very well known in England as a 
writer on Indian topics', and that he has 'reached a grade of literary reputation 
perhaps never before so fully attained by an Anglo-Indian official', 195 he nevertheless 
condemns 'certain peculiarities in the style and manner of this spirited historical 
I~~----------------IQ~ LyalI. 'Islam', p 239-40,246-47; Hunter, p 89; W Nassau Lees, p 5. 
o Lyall, 'Islam', p 238. 
5ketch.,I96 Hunter, he writes: 
rejoices in strong lights, .in highly-~mish~d episodes .... ~e excels in.the art of 
lively scenic representatIons of IndIan history by artIstIc and effectIve use of 
European metaphors and phrases for Asiatic events and institutions, whereby 
his ideas and allusions are made to appear quite luminous and suggestive to 
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Consequently, Lyall complains, 'the similes and historical illustrations in which Dr 
Hunter luxuriates are often more striking than exact ... and, moreover, the author is at 
time sorely vexed by an hyperbolic fiend which he would do well to cast out.' 198 In 
short, by alluding to Metropolitan genres and tropes Lyall is drawing up and exiling 
Hunter from, the more perspicacious and inflected Anglo-Indian official context; and 
thus Hunter's rhetoric conveys 'some notion of the truth, but not the whole truth' . 199 
Given their common roots within this official milieu, and Hunter's unprecedented 
command over the most relevant and recent official documentation in India, it is an 
oddly overstated accusation. Stranger still from within the self-appointed ranks of 
'experts and specialists' (to use Bauman's terminology), is its insistence on the 
question of veracity as to a great extent, a matter of style. The objection is 
encapsulated by Lyall's implied suggestion that Hunter's talent lies in 'imparting' to 
his 'personal knowledge of India' a 'style and shape demanded by the high standard 
of even popular literature these days. ,200 This sly put-down by one ICS aspirant to 
another bears further scrutiny, for it echoes a specific and consistent feature of many 
of the more informed reviews of Indian Musalmans. W Nassau Lees, a former 
Principal of the Muhammadan College in Calcutta, had picked up on precisely this 
point when he deplored its 'too sensational character' .201 But it was Sayyid Ahmad 
Khan who spelt out the objection most clearly when he wrote not only that 'Dr 
1% 
Lyall, 'Islam' p 230 197 ,. 
198 Lyall, 'Islam', p 230. 
199 Lyall, 'Islam', pp 230-31. 
200 Lyall, 'Islam', p 231. 
201 Lyall, 'Islam', p 229. 
Lees, p 12. 
265 
rIunter's work has made a great sensation in India', but that key aspects of his 
. hi' , d' I ,202 U'gument were, 10 s vlew, as true as any mo em sensatIon nove. 
Lyall's attack on Hunter's 'strong lights' has been echoed in later 
listoriography,203 but the more pervasive and timely accusation of 'sensationalism' 
las until now received no nuanced critical attention. For its reviewers in 1871, the 
word would have been loaded with specific connotations that drew attention to the 
situation of Hunter's text within a literary paradigm strongly wedded to journalistic 
and official sources - here, in the shape of the ongoing 'W ahabi' trials, and the 
articles about them fust published by Hunter in the Calcutta Englishman. 204 In what 
might have been seen as a macabre instance of this relationship, it would also have 
adverted to the murders of the Chief Justice of Bengal and the Viceroy himself within 
six months of its publication, both at the hands of Indian Muslims (though no 
evidence was found then, or in subsequent historiography, to directly connect the 
murders to the Wahabi insurgents of Hunter's investigations)?05 But there are also 
other, altogether more suggestive levels, on which the accusation of 'sensationalism' 
would have been based. One of these entails the explicit connection made by 
reviewers between the 'Sensation' literary genre and the mode of the narrative itself, 
in which, as one anonymous reviewer put it, 'the detective of the day outdoes the 
exploits attributed to him in the latest sensation novel. ,206 In this sense, the 
characterisation of 'sensational' signals a recognition in the text of an attempt 
common to the genre of the Sensation Novel to actively mediate and refashion 
frustrated official and demi-official- that is, journalistic - descriptions of a particular 
social reality. In short, it proposes to uncover precisely those connections and 
conspiracies which elude the ordinary interventions of the legal institutions of social 
surveillance and discipline. Hunter's 'signal service' is in this respect more than a 
202 
203 Khan, Review, pp 5, 36. 
204 Har~, p 86. 
~05 Rob~son, Separatism, p 103. 
206 ~obmson, Separatism, p 104; Hardy, p 84. 
A Mahometan Revival' p 437. 
266 
natter of biographical hyperbole; it implies a material extension of the official British 
nteraCtion with its Indian environment. 
However, there is another dimension to this idea of mediation in which the 
;onflation of sensationalism and surveillance is, literally, a doubtful legacy. With the 
~ublication of Wilkie Collins' The Woman in White in 1860 the 'Sensation Novel' 
nad quickly come to epitomise and dominate what Lyall refers to as the 'popular 
literature' of the following two decades.207 It had even, in 1868, explicitly 
incorporated an Indian colonial dimension in Collins' equally celebrated novel, The 
Moonstone. There, Brahmins stalk the countryside of England in search of a gem 
stolen ftrst from the temple at Somnath by Tipu Sultan and then by British looters 
during the storming of his capital at Seringapatam. As with all Sensation Novels, 
their murderous conspiracy exposes a deeper infection at work throughout all levels of 
English society. But it also narrates the cathartic re-alignment of a disturbed 
Metropolitan identity, framing its transgressive critiques (here, of British imperialism; 
in The Woman in White of the social incarceration of women) within a conservative 
resolution.2os Given the discussion in Section 3.1 of the emergence in post-'Mutiny' 
India of the Indo-Muslim 'stranger', the Sensation Novel's obsession with secret 
infiltration from without marks it out as a genre peculiarly suited to the Anglo-Indian 
problematic of making visible and fIXing that elusive constituency within its 
representative discursive framework.209 At the same time, it offers to the colonial 
state an opportunity for narrating through the medium of a 'secret conspiracy' the 
resolution of its own elusive dimensions. In this respect, however, the marked 
ambivalence of this genre towards the project of revelation is perhaps worth 
emphasising ahead of the argument that follows. For the tension in the Sensation 
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Novel between transgressive revelations and conservative framework is strikingly 
reproduced in the contention at work on every page of Indian Musalmans between 
uncovering and deferring the final discovery of, a thoroughgoing will to rebellion 
among Indian Muslims. In this regard, Lyall's critique of the 'strong lights' and 
'hyperbolic fiend' at play in the rhetoric may in fact betray a readerly frustration at 
the disproportion exhibited in the text between promise and fulfilment. For the most 
remarkable - and least remarked upon in subsequent historiographical citations -
attribute of Hunter's 'signal service to the Empire' is his at times bathetic, lack of 
clarity. If the problematic of the Indo-Muslim 'stranger' is one of legibility, one 
might say that the repeated accusation that Hunter had given free rein to his 
'sensational' style was hardly fair. In a sense, in 1871 the subject itself would admit 
of no other genre. 
The conflict between a conservative and transgressive impulse in the 
Sensation Novel opens out the question of the wider background of legal innovation 
during the period under discussion. While historians have been quick to underscore 
the importance of the 'W ahabi' trials in forging an Anglo-Indian perception of Indian 
Muslims in the late nineteenth century, they have been less interested in the wider 
question of how such a markedly circumscribed movement could have come to such 
sudden and sustained attention, and have done so at the very moment when it had 
been all but extirpated.210 Despite the immediate backdrop of Muslim 'conspiracy' 
during the 'Mutiny', the incongruity between object and response was noted even at 
the time.211 Indeed, there had been accusations of repressive over-reaction in the 
Government campaign which (as suggested in Section 2.2) render it comparable to the 
excessive rhetoric and institutional response to the 'Thuggee' 'panics', trials, and 
campaigns of the 1830s. Radhika Singha has drawn convincing lines of 
correspondence between these events and the dramatic extension of a pan-Indian 
legislative reach to the colonial state.212 In this respect, there is some grounds for 
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comparison between the relation to dramatic new legislation of the novel by Captain 
Meadows Taylor, Confessions of a Thug (1839), and Indian Musalmans, instigated by 
Mayo partly as a rebuttal to the suggestion of 'tyranny' that had surrounded the 
conduct of his administration in regard to the 'Wahabis' .213 As with Confessions and 
the far-reaching Act :xxx of 1836 which it threw into relief, the alarms and 
excursions of Hunter's text can be seen as in part a justification for the unprecedented 
extension of Government intervention into Indian society in the 1860s - an intrusive 
trend in which Hunter himself, as Chairman of the Education Commission (1882), 
was later to play an important role?14 This inter-relationship of text, 'Wahabi' 
'panic', and legal innovation is crucial to an analysis of the Sensational tropes of 
transgression and conservation in Indian Musalmans, since they expose its 
provenance as, in part, a site of contest between opposing impulses in British rule at 
the time. These contradictory agendas can be briefly contextualised in terms of the 
comparativist debate that shaped nineteenth-century government policy in India. 
By the 1820s reformist Utilitarian arguments had begun to gain ground from 
the more conservative Orientalist theories which had predominated throughout the 
late eighteenth century. During this earlier period the administrative innovations of 
Warren Hastings and the scholarship of William Jones had done much to shape the 
Orientalist perception that Indian society was onto logically different from that of 
Britain and therefore required a separate body of laws and administrative structures 
arising out of its own precolonial socio-political institutions. Jones had insisted that 
these laws could be extracted from native texts directly by informed British scholars 
and applied across British India. British administration in India was thus to be carried 
out in an essentially 'Indian idiom' , one that carefully avoided disruption of the 
perception of continuity in rule.215 Through his project of translations, Jones provided 
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the tools of scholarship required to effect the task that Clive had set British rule in 
lndia when he insisted to the Bengal Council in 1765 that above all the 'Company's 
)()vereignty should be masked. ,216 In contradistinction, as early as the Govemor-
Generalship of Com wallis (1786-93) Anglicist arguments advocating the rights of the 
individual had emerged to challenge the presumption of ontological difference and 
what Cornwallis came to see as the deleterious adoption by the Company of 'Asian 
despotism,.217 As discussed in the previous section, this reformist impulse had its 
roots in the philosophical enquiries begun by the writers of the Scottish 
Enlightenment into the history and ideal configuration of civic society to the 
institutions of government. The nineteenth-century Utilitarian movement, from which 
the Anglicists would gain their most powerful advocates, evolved out of this body of 
writing, in particular through the transitional figure of Dugald Stewart, with its 
emphasis placed firmly on the role of legislation?18 As Jeremy Bentham declared, the 
need was less in confirming historical precedence than in a concentration on 'what the 
Legislator ought to do in future. ,219 The debate between Utilitarian and Orientalist 
theories should therefore be seen as a development of the contradictions within 
eighteenth-century Anglo-Indian administration between its agrarian and aristocratic 
mode, and the increasing emphasis on commercial 'independency' and 'self-
command' discussed in the previous section. Where the former attempted to interpret 
its remit in regard to what it saw as the historical development of indigenous 
institutions, the latter sought a way to lift the legislator beyond, and restrain, the 
inevitable corruption of its social context. In some ways, the increasing adoption 
among Indian legislators of the Utilitarian imposition of legislation with no other 
regard than to the felicific calculus, can be interpreted as a recognition of the kind of 
failure to situate British power within an Indian social context enacted in Cock Match. 
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n this regard, the Utilitarian impulse in colonial India represented an excision of its 
)wn historical circumstances: reforming Indian society de novo implied a similar 
ltemporal and supra-geographical reinvention of British rule. This is an important 
!lement in determining its post-'Mutiny' appeal. For although the arguments were 
lever ftnally resolved between Anglicist and Orientalist modes of government in 
British India, at the time of the composition of Indian Musalmans Utilitarian ideals 
for Indian governance were being given unprecedented institutionalisation in a raft of 
legislation which enacted the new principle of innovation on a rapidly changing 
d· . t 220 [n Ian socle y. 
At the heart of the Anglicist-Orientalist debate is that locus classicus of 
Utilitarian polemic over India in the nineteenth century, James Mill's History of 
British India (1817). Javed Majeed's recent excavation of the ideologies that 
informed Mill's descriptions of India usefully draws attention to Mill's preoccupation 
with the grounds for a new kind of comparativist discourse that was to gain 
ascendancy in the later nineteenth century. Under the terms of Mill's polemic, India 
was not consigned to an imaginatively separate, impenetrable space (a region of the 
'sublime' , as Burke had described it),221 or to its lost historical origins (an idea 
inaugurated by Jones 'recovery' of the Indo-European root of languages), but could 
be made to serve as the testing-ground for the formation of a modem, contemporary 
imperial British ethos. Such an ethos Mill argued, could only be enacted through a 
very different rule of law than had subsisted till then in British India (or indeed from 
that which subsisted in the oligarchic principles of eighteenth-century Britain, the 
primary object of his polemic). He therefore directed his critique towards the 
underlying assumptions of Jones' project to create a constitution in India based upon 
the codification of Hindu and Muslim law; such a codification, he argued, carried 
forward into India the iniquities of 'common law' in England.222 For Mill this rule of 
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'common law' - that is, law proceeding out of, rather than being brought to bear 
lPOn, social institutions - was subject in India (as indeed he believed it to be in 
England) to intolerable mutations over time and place, arising as he thought out of the 
iisorderly and arbitrary interpretations of native juristS?23 As Majeed describes it, 
Mill's History o/British India therefore set itself up as: 
an attack on the common law tradition for which history was expressive of a 
community's sense of identity, and for which what was important was not the 
objective identity of the whole or part of the body of law over time, but the 
conviction of continuity upon which the believed identity of a people rested. 224 
The maintenance of that 'conviction of continuity', so crucial to early administrative 
practice in a British India deeply concerned to 'mask' its sovereignty, was in Mill's 
view nothing less than the propagation of a dangerous and morally despotic illusion. 
Since he had seen the arbiters of these institutions - 'priestcraft' - as being at the root 
of the barbarity of the Indian state, his arguments implied a similar arbitrary 
despotism attached to the ICS officers who enforced their judgements.225 In this 
sense, Mill's philosophic Radical polemic developed the conservative Burkean 
discourse on Company rule from the late eighteenth century; but its intentions were 
not to advocate a retreat from the dangerous realm of colonial interaction, but to 
establish a more equitable basis for the comparison of colony and Metropolis. 'Asian 
despotism' was here a matter of collaboration, enacting upon other governments the 
iniquities of 'common law' in Britain. Mill's argument was therefore not that Indians 
should become more like the British, but that the British in India should be less like 
their Metropolitan counterparts. To do this, they would have to become not only 
strangers to their conception of Indian society, but to their own pre-'Mutiny' 
genealogy. At a fundamental level, then, the imposition of a Utilitarian agenda in 
India entailed for Anglo-Indians the revelation of themselves as foreigners in India. 
And at the same time it carried, perversely, the implication of self-estrangement. 
~~~ Ma~eed, Ungoverned, p 148. 
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Mill's History had been a set text on the Haileybury syllabus and its critique of 
Nhat it saw as the despotism of early Company rule constituted a primary reference 
)Oint for all ICS officers of Hunter and Lyall's generation?26 Nevertheless, in the two 
iecades before, and for a few years after, the Mutiny a 'paternalist system' of 
Idministration had predominated in which respect for indigenous custom, and a 
:>ersonalised authoritarian style of rule, centred on the arbitrary power of the district 
Jfficer?27 A style of rule, in other words, based on just that form of 'local 
knowledge' that Mill had eschewed in his History through the framing of an all-
encompassing British imperial ethos based on a universal rule oflaw?28 Mill's 
Utilitarian project was carried on in these years by reformers such as C E Trevelyan; 
but it was not until the 1860s and 1870s that the legal structure required to effect his 
original call for a supra-local, empire-wide ethos was substantially established. This 
agenda principally took the form of law reforms pushed through by John Strachey and 
Stephen Fitzjames Stephens. The new law codes (in particular, the 1861 Code of 
Criminal Procedure, the Succession Act of 1865 and the Evidence Act of 1872) 
shaped a post-Mutiny legislative paradigm requiring a neutrality which, it was argued, 
was by definition unavailable to natives. For the first time during the British rule of 
India, the principle that good government could only be adjudged and maintained by 
foreigners had been inscribed into the constitutional framework?29 This new 
legislative ethic, however, was less the triumph of Utilitarian ideals in official circles 
than has sometimes been thought by modem historians. The 'paternalist' trend with 
which it was associated in these years represented more than a matter of the happy 
coincidence of separate discourses, the disciplinarian style of the former enforcing the 
reforms of the latter.23o It takes on rather the aspect of a simultaneous counter-trend 
226 M , aJeed, Ungoverned, p 128. Its influence can be felt throughout Lyall's own history, The Rise and 
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owards the return to an Indian idiom. For it was during these years too that the pre-
Mutiny' policy of annexation was sharply reversed and the machinery of 
}overnment swung behind efforts to shore up the indigenous aristocracy as a bulwark 
>etween itself and the Indian populace.231 In a similar vein, the idea of purely 
consultative' councils comprising of India's 'natural leaders' was conceived in the 
Nake of the suppression of revolt, and implemented in 1861. Partly a means of 
!xtending the burden of tax-collection, it was intended to constitute a form of'durbar' 
:royal assembly) rule aimed at incorporating the landed gentry as a counter-balance to 
the new expanding class of English-educated Indians then beginning to petition for a 
)hare of government.232 The concept of the 'durbar' that underpinned official 
ieliberations during the evolution of these measures directly recalls the idiom of 
Victoria's Proclamation of 1858 in which she assumed the title of Empress of India. 
[t further predicts the form of her Imperial Assemblage of 1877, and the vigorously 
renewed attempts to appropriate a Mughal imperial language of ritual and political 
incorporation that marked these years.233 In other words, the inception of a material 
effort towards the disruption of continuity signalled by the new legislation was 
accompanied by the sudden return of a contradictory impulse to re-engage an Indian 
idiom for British rule. 
Approaching the climax to his quest in Indian Musalmans, Hunter draws the 
reader's attention to the matter of the recent legislation. Specifically, he mounts a 
lengthy argument for the repeal of the Act of 1864 abolishing government nomination 
of qazis (Muslim 'judges', as he describes them)?34 He cannot state too highly the 
significance of this seemingly unremarkable piece of innovating, utilitarian 
legislation. 'The question', he insists, 'is one of the most important that ever came 
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)efore the Indian legislator. ,235 His Indo-Muslim readers could only wonder at this 
nexplicable claim;236 but at stake here for Hunter is exactly that problem of 
;ontinuity which made the new law codes such contentious issues for the Anglo-
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lndian official community. As his text illustrates, the issue of nomination, a 
responsibility enjoined on the successors of Mughal rule, returns through the Indian 
Muslim to reveal the contours of an alien rule. Though the subject is placed under the 
general chapter heading, 'The Wrongs of the Mahomedans Under British Rule', the 
effects of the Act are seen as distortions to the British state. Specifically, in his 
estimation, every former aspirant to the office of qazi inevitably becomes an 'apostle 
of disloyalty' against the Government. 237 Thus the British neglect of its 'masked 
sovereignty' necessarily unveils a hostile environment. And yet equally, as Hunter 
insists in the same chapter, its shameful failure to step out from behind Mughal 
institutional norms had revealed a British dispensation crippled by a native-like 
'timidity', and hopelessly mired in the 'corruption' of the 'old system' .238 On the one 
hand, the dangerous revelation of discontinuity; and on the other, the equally 
devastating revelation of a corrupting Indian (Mughal) persona. Running between the 
two, and revealing its contradictions, is the Indian Muslim - whether as the 'kazi' 
sitting in the British court frustrating 'justice', or ejected from the premises only to 
become the 'apostle of disloyalty' on its doorstep?39 In this sense, he embodies 
within the text the deeply conflicted notion of self-revelation that characterised the 
colonialist search for an idiom of self-representation in the wake of the 'Mutiny'. 
Moreover, at the same time as he is held up as a gauge of the need for colonialist 
invisibility, he is required to become the visible and alienated incarnation of a 
repudiated pre-'Mutiny' genealogy. Thus the current Muslim discontent is 
transformed, for instance, into an expression of the Company's failure to openly 
m Hunter, p 192 2Jb • 
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mpose British education (that is, in English and using Christian instructors), instead 
>fsubmitting to the 'gigantic system of fraud' by which they continued Mughal social 
. . t' 240 ~ustoms and lnstttu IOns. 
In short, then, the problematic of exposing or concealing yet another Muslim 
conspiracy' is centred on issues of Anglo-Indian self-revelation and self-
!strangement. To this extent, 'conspiracy' substitutes for a failed narrative of British 
;>ower. And as with the over-inscription of the Mughal figure of authority, the 
lmpossible quest for a final, transfixing exposure is partly driven by the insoluble 
question of an Anglo-Indian ruling idiom. The Sensational handling of these 
contending currents of revelation and alienation, however, implies a marked 
difference to the effects of stasis surrounding the production of the Muslim 'fanatic' 
in 1857. There, the descriptive isolation of the Indian Muslim carried forward the 
concealed, reciprocal idea of a Civilian relationship to Indian society. As an outcast, 
the Muslim 'fanatic' narrated its constituency, a potential binding of British India kept 
alive at the sharp point of a perceived, omnipresent Semitic belligerence. Even so, 
requiring a constant and over-determined re-inscription, the cumulative effect of 
apparent stasis and clarity was deceptive. The variety of strategies of prophylaxis by 
which this hidden reciprocity operated was still liable to invasions of uncanny 
phenomena, or to sudden and precipitous collapse, opening out - as in Lyall's 
encounter with the fallen 'ghazis' - near-hysterical vistas of self-dispossession. In the 
Sensation genre, on the other hand, the ever-present possibility of self-dispossession 
is the mode of narrative rather than its exception. For this reason, there can be no 
viable construction of an 'Elsewhere' such as can be detected in 'Mutiny' narratives. 
Nor can there be the exposure of a pure point of opposition. Indeed, in the Sensation 
narrative the question of legibility is itself something of a red herring, leading the 
protagonist through torn veils of perception until finally confronted with an alienated 
aspect of themselves and their social reality. The climactic disclosure is always this 
revelation of an unpalatable connection between a known environment and an unruly, 
~~~)------------------
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;ontingent reality that, it seems, is also - somehow - part of its fabric. This is a 
;onnection, of course, that turns out to be symptomatic -literally, that is, a 
nanifestation of the irrational Symptom at work in an otherwise apparently consistent 
;ocial realm. The tension between the transgressive and conservative impulses in the 
;ensation Novel, at once tearing apart and suturing that social fabric, thus mimics the 
xmtinual struggle between the corrosive and preservative functions of the Symptom, 
;spoiling the game' even as it gives it a vital consistency. Self-revelation in the 
Sensation Novel is therefore never final and absolute but momentary, contingent and 
always partial. It is structured through tropes of imposture and masquerade that 
specifically work to test out and deconstruct polar identities; perceptions of what is 
outside or extraneous to the social field and what is inside or integral to its 
constitution are inevitably confused, transgressed, or even transposed.241 Separating 
them out again under this rubric becomes all but impossible. At the outset, then, we 
can say that the colonialist deployment of this mode of narrative necessarily signals 
the distressed recognition not only that the infectious indeterminacy of the Indo-
Muslim 'stranger' cannot be contained, but that it arises out of an irremediable British 
disorder. With this in mind, we can now proceed to a more detailed analysis of the 
effects of the genre not only in Indian Musalmans, but as a model for the treatment of 
the Indo-Muslim 'stranger' in Lyall's Asiatic Studies as well. 
As suggested above, the Sensation Novel is formally structured by successive 
scenes of revelation and deferral, whereby the detecting narrative is led through layers 
of deception to the heart of the mystery. A brief plot summary might read along these 
lines: a disturbance enters the social fabric from without carrying with it a secret 
infection; the infection is conveyed to the protagonists within; they in turn begin the 
quest for its source, which leads them deeper into a suddenly unfamiliar social reality; 
misreading clues, they stumble upon an endemic corruption, at the same time 
themselves seemingly succumbing to the disease. A final revelation, in which their 
complicity in the infection is also discovered, purges the social body of its foreign 
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:lement, and restores the protagonists to their rightful place in society. Despite this 
'esolution, however, it is the discovery of complicity that underwrites the plot - and 
ndeed, the genre. In The Moonstone, the infection from without - in the form of the 
,redatory Brahmins - illuminates, but has only a secondary effect upon, the main 
nystery; that is, they play only a peripheral role in actually solving the mystery of the 
:heft of the gem from an English country house. Just as the original introduction of 
the 'Moonstone' into English society was the result of English actions (the looting of 
fipu's palace), its theft from the country house is found to have been accomplished, if 
unconsciously (he was sleepwalking), by the English hero, Franklin Blake.242 
Similarly, in The Woman in White, the initial infection from without takes the form of 
an escaped inmate of a lunatic asylum. A connection (or if you like, contagion) is 
discovered between this 'woman in white' and the heroine, an heiress. It is only 
towards the end of the novel that the incarceration of the 'woman in white' is revealed 
to have been the lawless action of the heroine's future husband (himself posing as an 
aristocrat); but not before she and the heroine have exchanged roles. A resolution can 
then only be achieved through the death of the 'woman in white' (comparable to the 
departure of the 'Moonstone' and the Brahmins from England) and the restoration of 
the heroine to her 'rightful' social identity and fortune. Needless to say, the moral 
basis of such a 'rightful' social order has of course by this point been thoroughly 
undermined. 
This template fits precisely the structure of Indian Musalmans. Chapter One 
opens by identifying 'fanatic swarms' on the Northwest 'frontier,243 posing an 
immediate and infectious threat to the troops of the 'British Plains'. By the end of the 
chapter the 'chronic hostility' they maintain there has been revealed as 'chronic 
miseries ... transmitted as a bitter legacy to ourselves. ,244 The narrative promises to 
242 • ~ploymg an idiom of estrangement, this kind of reversal overturns the 'propriety' of almost all the 
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:race the infection as it moves from without to within, British India; but of course, it 
:-emains one step behind its quarry; the contagion has already crossed the border and 
:breatens to infect the entire social body. The chapter thus ends on a suitably 
sensational note of deferral: 'Nevertheless, we failed to reach the heart of the evil. . .It 
is not the traitors themselves we have to fear, but the seditious masses in the heart of 
. ,245 Jur Emprre. 
Chapter Two begins in earnest the task of uncovering the trail of the infection, 
from its perceived Arab origins to its British Indian headquarters in Patna. From the 
moment of its entry into British territory, however, it begins to evoke and become 
confused with, the colonial state itself. This development is fIrst heralded by Hunter's 
remark that the British were guilty of 'pouring oil upon the embers which we had left 
for dead, and nursing them again into a flame' .246 This image of resurrection prefaces 
a persistent strain of the uncanny, 'that class of the frightening which leads back to 
what is known of old and long familiar' and which in particular, estranges the 
'homely' and the 'native' ?47 For instance, the economic genealogy of the 'Wahabi' 
movement is discovered to be located in the same famine of 1769, which 'fIrst 
awakened the people of England to their responsibilities in India' ?48 Thus the 
foundations of the benevolent British Indian bureaucratic state were laid at just the 
place where the family of the chief revenue officer of the 'W ahabi' movement 
(Muhammad Shafi) first enriched itself, a point driven home by the fact that their 
fortune was made through supplying meat to the British troopS.249 In the same vein, 
the narrator-detective discovers that the 'Wahabi' buildings at Patna which outwardly 
resemble those of a Government district headquarters, contain within a dystopia of 
illegibility: 'a labyrinth of walls and outhouses with one enclosure leading into 
another by side-doors, and little secret courts in out-of-the-way comers. ,250 
24~ 
246 Hunter, pp 41-42. 
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~~8 Freud, 'The Uncanny', p 340. 
:49 Hunter, p 94. 
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vioreover, the regional organisation employs a bureaucratic jargon based on the 
3ritish Indian postal service;251 like the Government it pursues an alternative form of 
)rovincial taxation emanating from a 'District-Centre,;252 and it preaches its doctrines 
lirectly outside the District Magistrate's courthouse?53 By the end of the chapter this 
:laborate picture of an uncanny manifestation of the colonial state supersedes the 
lCtual 'Fanatical Conspiracy' (which bathetically, 'gives signs of breaking down,254), 
md prepares the way for a broader investigation into the true source of the 
'mystery,2SS of repeated Muslim insurgencies: the genesis of the colonial state itself. 
[n other words, the infection is now revealed as born within rather than carried from 
without, British India. More importantly, as with the uncanny metamorphosis of the 
personae of the leading protagonists of The Moonstone and The Woman in White, the 
roles of disguised conspirator and legitimate colonialist have at some mysterious 
moment been exchanged. Thus in Chapter Three it is the British state which is 
exposed as being not only a 'contemptible farce' in its earlier incarnation pretending 
deference to Mughal institutions,256 but as being the subject of a mysterious 
transposition from which it has failed to free itself. F or the moment of the crossover 
from Muslim to British rule is hidden from view. Like the bewildered heroine of The 
Woman in White who fmds herself suddenly and inexplicably incarcerated in the 
lunatic asylum in place of her doppelganger (in fact, half-sister), Hunter declares 
almost exactly midway through his narrative: 'I fmd myself unable to place my finger 
on any given year or decade of years as that in which the change was effected. ,257 
And not only have the identities of the (Muslim and British) protagonists been 
perilously confused, but the British state finds itself the subject of 'fatwas' which-
intolerably - designate it a 'Land of Islam' (,Dar-ul Islam'). Reversing these decisions 
in order to revise the designation into what Hunter translates as 'Land of the Enemy' 
m 
lSl Hunter, p 98. 
m Hunter, pp 81-82, 100. 
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'Oar-ul Harb,258) becomes the explicit and over-riding concern of Chapter Three?59 
'0 do this, like all Sensation heroes, the author must assume the disguise of the 
nemy, taking issue with the 'Mohamedan Law-Doctors' to argue the doctrinal case 
)f 'jehad' (or rather, 'hijra' - emigration - to a country from which 'jehad' can be 
{aged). In short, it becomes the quest of the narrative to retrieve the identity of the 
,erolheroine and reconstitute the social fabric of an upturned British India -
omething that can only be done, of course, by unmasking the 'Wahabis' as its polar 
,pposite. It is no coincidence that Hunter concludes that this would mean 
segregating' them from Indian society altogether.26o As in most Sensation Novels, 
he exorcism of the moment of transposition requires a death, or an enforced 
• • 261 
:nugratlOn. 
Alfred L yaH was not alone in his astonishment at the disturbing reversal of 
dentity at the heart of the narrative of Indian Musalmans. One otherwise favourable 
'eview, wondered at Hunter becoming' every now and then more Mahometan than the 
V1ahometans.,262 W Nassau Lees echoed the point in his sardonic observation that 
judging him by his own evidence, [the author] would be a Wahhabi [sic], ifhe were 
10t too good a Sunni or Shiah Muslim' .263 But Lyall's own vitriolic condemnation 
~oes beyond his overstated summary of the substance of Lees' complaints that Hunter 
158 Hunter's choice of 'Enemy' as a translation is itself significant of his preoccupation with re-
establishing polar identities. As Sayyid Ahmad Khan pointed out, a more correct translation would 
hav~ been 'country of war', placing the emphasis on the process rather than the opposing force (Khan, 
ReVIew, p XIX). That Hunter has gone out of his way to create this idiosyncratic bias is confirmed by 
the ,fact that 'war' would seem to have been its more common definition among even the British in 
IndIa. See, for instance, the roughly contemporaneous translation given by the ICS officer John Platt in 
John T Platts, A Dictionary of Urdu, Classical Hindi and English (New Delhi: Munshiram Mahoharlal, 
~pr. 1997; 1884), p 476. 
, Thus. for instance, the second half of The Woman in White is taken up with proving that the heroine 
~~ not the escaped inmate of the asylum that she has been labelled as by her villainous persecutor. 
Hunter, p 144 261 • 
I In The Woman in White we get both: the death of the 'woman in white' and the emigration (and 
:~r death) of the scheming Italian, Count Fosco. 
263 A Mahometan Revival', p 431. 
Lees. p 14. 
laS 'out-Heroded Herod' .264 In the original published version of Islam in India, he 
vrites: 
Stronger expressions could not have been employed if we Christians had done 
unto the Indian Mohamedans as their ancestors did so often to Christians; if we 
had persecuted them as Aurungzebe persecuted Hindus, or treated them with the 
hatred and savage cruelty shewn to unbelievers by Hyder Ali or Tippu of 
265 Mysore. 
[en years later, in Asiatic Studies, Lyall amended the passage to read: 'if we 
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:hristians had done unto Indian Mohamedans as Mahomedans have elsewhere done 
;0 often to Christians ... ,266 The correction is worth noting for the sidelight it casts 
lpon the author's intention to lift the narrative beyond the local and into the wider, 
rans-geographic context - and thus the need to emphasise in terms not susceptible to 
wbiguity that 'ancestors' refers to an extra-Indian context (,elsewhere'). It is this 
lntolerance of the possibility in the original phrasing of a corrupting and inescapable 
;ycle of relations between Christians and Muslims arising out of circumstances within 
lndia that exposes a hidden correspondence between the two apparently opposed 
authors. For the substance of Lyall's charge against Hunter's perceived partisan text 
is in fact its failure properly to separate out its combatants and rules of engagement. 
It is not Hunter's 'strong lights' that are under attack, but the methodology of his 
narrative which leads him to 'confound the essential with the accidental, to attribute to 
local and temporary causes symptoms which are inherent in and inseparable from our 
relations with the Mahomedans. ,267 In other words, he is being castigated for 
opposing what happens within India to what happens 'elsewhere'. Lyall's insistence 
on the primacy of the extra-Indian context - on that is, 'the religious rivalry of a 
thousand years,268 - as an infallible guide to contemporary colonial India is 
underscored between 1871 and 1882 by a blizzard of similar emendations to his 
264 
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ext?69 The sheer pedantic scope and consistency of these revisions indicates that for 
ts author, the original essay - written only fourteen years after the outbreak of the 
857 Muslim 'conspiracy' - had not sufficiently made the tenns of rivalry within 
ndia clear. In other words, it suggests that he considered his own text as potentially 
iable to the same charge of confusion it had framed against Hunter. 
Ironically, then, for both authors the further away the British in India travelled 
rom 1857, the more they required the framework of Muslim-British confrontation 
:lsewhere in order to understand their proper relations in India. Hunter imaginatively 
xmstructs the scenario of India being declared a 'Land of the Enemy', thus enforcing 
1 'Wahabi' emigration from which fresh and unambiguous battle-lines could be 
irawn up. Lyall traverses a thousand years of history, and an unspecified 
~eographica1 range, in order to efface the 'false perspective,27o provided by 
~ommentators such as Hunter who mistakenly look to India itself for their answers. 
For both writers, India is a region of threatening transpositions, one in which the lines 
between Muslim and British can easily become confused or submerged. For Lyall in 
particular, the spectators of Metropolitan Britain, so easily taken in by the 'effective 
use of European metaphors for Asiatic events and institutions' , are the audience upon 
whom the 'travesty' of 'local peculiarities' can have dangerous effects?71 Above all, 
it can lead them to misunderstand the true nature of the presence and actions of the 
'English' in India. In this sense, to 'confound' the 'essential with the accidental' 
refers equally - as it does in the text syntactically - to the fact of British rule within 
and that of Muslim sentiment beyond, India. As he puts it, authors such as Hunter 
(and W Nassau Lees - whose own critical review might have been expected to render 
him an ally) appear 'to connect every kind of [Mohamedan] discontent with those 
blunders and faults for which the English can be directly blamed.,272 Thus for Lyall it 
269 
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5 only through the medium of an essentialised, transhistorical Muslim identity that 
he British in India can properly be understood by their Metropolitan spectators. 
~onversely, it is through their contact with Muslims as Indian subjects that they risk 
leing misrepresented (in this case, by, in Lyall's view, the Metropolitan-ised Hunter) 
IS religious despots - as if they 'had done unto the Indian Mahomedans as their 
IIlcestors did so often to Christians'. Once again, then, the Muslims of British India 
lI'e located on the fault-line of the paradox of colonial secular neutrality. Only now it 
Nould seem that its exposure has become the inevitable result of any British failure to 
'ecognise a Muslim identity untainted by its Indian context. 
Two principal implications flow from this post-'Mutiny' formulation. The 
frrst is that the integrity of the colonialist identity is ensured by the consistent 
lpprehension of the pristine foreign origins of Indian Muslims: 'Semiticisation' 
perversely lifts the British out of their polluting colonial circumstance. The second is 
that any admixture of these polar identities carries with it the threat of the 
disintegration of the neutral colonialist persona and with it, the spectre of revolt. This 
is a scenario enacted time and again by late nineteenth-century Anglo-Indian 
literature. For instance, in her novel The Hosts of the Lord (1900), Flora Annie Steel 
rehearses revolt in a small North Indian town through the hybrid figure of Roshan 
Khan. Initially a subaltern officer in the British garrison ('smart as uniform could 
make him, still as discipline could hold him,273), he becomes the disaffected centre for 
a religiously-motivated rebellion by the Hindu citzenry. The revolt all but frees him 
of his debilitating British education and the novel ends with his death on the outskirts 
of town, his now openly sectarian, foreign identity doubly re-inscribed by the fact that 
he meets his fate at the hands of another fanatical Machiavellian outsider, the sword-
wielding Italian Jesuit missionary. In misrecognising his Muslim origins, the British 
had sewn the seeds of revolt; in seeing them exposed and segregated, British rule had 
restored the town to its loyal self. A similar passage from hybridity to exposure and 
segregation fuels one of Kipling's most celebrated short stories, 'On the City Wall' 
273 
Steel, Hosts, p 8. 
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1888). Like The Hosts of the Lord, the plot revolves around sedition and exposure. 
Jere, the conspiracy is that of the Punjab-based Sikh Kuka movement; but there is 
:vidence of its conflation in the narrator's mind with 'Wahabism' .274 Although the 
evelation of the urbane, English-educated Wali Dad's fanatical Muslim self at the 
:tory's climax does not end the conspiracy, it does enable the otherwise passive figure 
)f the English narrator to momentarily win the fickle attentions of the courtesan Lalun 
-that is, to seemingly become an 'insider' to the Indian world of the story. And in 
he larger framework, it also incites the closure of the story with the suppression of 
he conspiracy first by the rejection of the plotters by Indian society, and then by an 
monymous, apparently inflexible colonial apparatus. Ultimately Wali Dad's 
~xposure as a helpless fanatic makes visible, and precipitates the restoration of, that 
which the narrator had seemingly compromised through his attachment to the world 
of the courtesan and his unwitting involvement with her seditious plot: which is to 
say, it reveals the neutrality of the British state ('above all and behind all,275). At the 
same time, of course, it discloses the passive disposition of the rest of Indian society, 
unable and unwilling to participate in revolt. 276 
However, the facilitation through Wali Dad of the narrator's journey to the 
'inside' of Indian society generates far more ambivalence than this reading implies. 
The narrator's final words that he had 'become Lalun's vizier after all,277 suggest an 
uneasy transposition, not only to a subordinate place in Lalun's 'court', but as both a 
274 S ·fi 
peCI cally, the dates given by WaH Dad of the movement's battles with the British- 1846, 1857, 
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ubordinate to and a substitute for, WaH Dad himself, who is at one point named by 
,alun as her 'king': 'In this house I am a Queen and thou art a king. The Sahib [ ... ] 
hall be our Vizier - thine and mine, WaH Dad - because he has said that thou 
houldst leave me. ,278 The ambiguous nature of this relationship appears directly to 
ngender an over-inscription of sexualised imagery surrounding Wali Dad that is 
Jtogetber reminiscent of Zoffany's Nawab. After the narrator's implication in the 
:onspiracy to free the Kuka leader, Wali Dad is recreated as, all at once, the victim of 
I sexualised self-abuse, the lover-victim of the narrator, and the impotent former lover 
)fLalun: 
On returning to Lalun's door I stumbled over a man at the threshold. He was 
sobbing hysterically and his arms flapped like the wings of a goose. It was 
WaH Dad, Agnostic and Unbeliever, shoeless, turbanless, and frothing at the 
mouth, the flesh on his chest bruised and bleeding from the vehemence with 
which he had smitten himself. A broken torch-handle lay by his side, and his 
quivering lips murmured, 'Ya Hasan! Ya Hussain!' as I stooped over him. I 
pushed him a few steps up the staircase, threw a pebble at Lalun's City window 
and hurried home. 279 
Details such as the 'broken torch-handle' and his 'shoeless, turbanless' state render 
WaH Dad here a Nawab-like figure of impotence and exile (in this case, literally 
stripped of all his markers of Indian identity); but one ambiguously positioned in a 
sexually submissive relationship to the narrator 'stooped over him'. The sexualised 
imagery of his 'religious' frenzy here brings to a climax an excitation that begins 
with, and facilitates, the narrator's entrance into the conspiracy: 'I turned as I spoke 
and looked at his face. [Wali Dad's] nostrils were distended, his eyes were fixed, and 
he was smiting himself softly on the breast. ,280 The narrator's blind participation in 
the conspiracy (ferrying the escaped Kuka leader through the city) then directly 
parallels - indeed, we might say, is described by - WaH Dad's self-abusive trajectory, 
ending as they both meet again under Lalun's window. This coterminous 'journey' 
seems to counter the more overt suggestion in the narrative that it is a dispossession 
278 K'r 27'1 ~p ~g, 'City Wall', p 233. Italics in the original. 
280 K~pl~ng, 'City Wall', p 24 I, 
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tat Wali Dad has brought upon himself. It indicates rather that they are linked in a 
rocess of self-dispossessio~ the terms of which - as the over-inscription betrays-
ave eluded the control of the narrator. Inevitably, then, the simultaneous cuckolding 
nd neutering of the 'young Muhammadan' are soon replayed, when the narrator 
iscovers later that: 
Lalun's anns round my neck were put there to hide the money that [her servant] 
gave to [the Kuka leader], and that Lalun had used me and my white face as 
even a better safeguard than Wali Dad who proved himself so untrustworthy.281 
llus the narrator becomes both neutered prophylactic ('safeguard') and cuckolded 
.bject of exchange, facilitating the union of Lalun and the figure of the Kuka leader: 
miting, as one critic has put it, the representation of an inscrutable India and 
Gpling's conception of a legitimate (if only because hopeless) expression of an 
ndian 'nationalist' aspiration.282 Balked at the moment of fulfilment, he is revealed 
lS excluded from and mastered by, the inner workings of Indian society. In short, the 
itOry exposes him as no less an impotent 'vizier' than Wali Dad had proved himself a 
;elf-abused 'king'. Indeed, it is a measure of the extent to which the subject of 
iispossession has bested its author that the only successful bonding in this farce of 
nysterious couplings is that which takes place between Indian Muslim and Anglo-
[ndian, and ends beneath Lalun's window. In a sense, their passion and purpose are 
uselessly expended together, and neither gain admittance to the 'assembly' within.283 
As in Cock Match, then, dispossession in 'On the City Wall' is both mutual, 
and mutually inscribed. Although there is not the space here to go into it in any 
detail, a similar complex of parallelism, cuckolding, and mutual displacement 
between Roshan Khan and his erstwhile British colleague Captain Vincent Dering 
structures the plot of The Hosts of the Lord. The faint echo of Byron's 'The Giaour' 
that can be detected in the name of Kipling's courtesan, LaIun, is given a far more 
emphatic restatement in the form of the heroine Laiia over whom Dering and Khan 
211 K' I' 
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onduct their deadly rivalry. The terms of their own homosocial relationship are 
ealed when a bullet from Roshan Khan's gun, fired in 'impotent' rage against 
)ering, penetrates Laila's body - just as the Leila of 'The Giaour' becomes the 
nurdered 'exchange object' that seals the vampiric coupling of the Giaour and 
Iassan,z84 In each of these cases, the narrative insists upon the self-revelation of the 
nherent and visible difference of the Indian Muslim, only to fmd itself implicated in 
1Il intimate and self-alienating relationship with him, one that ends by setting them 
)()th outside of Indian society. The Indian Muslim has become, in this sense, hostage 
o the contingency of colonial autonomy. Intended as a secure point of contrast, his 
)ver-inscription reveals him instead as an agent of dissolution upon their self-
~presentation; Hassan-like, he hollows out rather than confirms, their claims to a 
leutral and paramount identity ('above all and behind alP). At the end of this section 
we will return to Hunter's quest to reassemble the persona of the British state through 
darifying its relationship to the Indian Muslim. Before we do so, however, these 
Sensational themes of masquerade, revelation, and the hollowing out of identity, can 
usefully be pursued into the essays of his most astringent critic, Alfred Lyall. In 
particular, they can be used to further interrogate the self-accusation of insufficient 
clarity implied by the revisions to his review discussed above, in which he sought 
specifically to press home the message of extra-Indian Semitic origins and with it, the 
implied counter-image of a pure and polar, British identity. 
Although Lyall included in the first edition of Asiatic Studies three essays 
which purport to draw their material from a wider source base than India, there is in 
fact only one chapter which actually deals directly with a contemporary extra-Indian 
context.
285 It is therefore significant that he should feel it necessary to travel as far 
away as China for this particular essay, concerning the possible relations between 
~g4 
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tate and religion. For an ICS official, of course, this form of geographical 
:isplacement would have been crucial to an exercise that was otherwise, under the 
lOst-Proclamation dispensation, publicly unthinkable. But in order to explore an 
mperial governmental relationship to religion, it would seem he had further been 
mpelled by a similar search for an extra-Indian point of clarity to the one that drove 
tis insistence on the prior Semitic context of Islam in India. In 1857-59, that latter 
:xtra-Indian Asian identification accompanied and legitimated the search for an 
ndian 'insider' status for the British by simultaneously establishing the counterpoint 
)fa pure and polar Muslim 'foreign' and de-nationalising identity. We can therefore 
'egard the essay on 'Relations Between the State and Religion in China' as to some 
!xtent a comparable attempt to reconfigure an otherwise disorientating British-Indian 
lexus from beyond its debilitating Indian circumstance. Such an interpretation is 
~inforced by reference to what appears to have been Lyall's principal source for this 
~ssay, the 1878 edition of Joseph Edkins' Religion in China.286 Originally published 
as The Religious Condition of the Chinese in 1859, it was one of the first detailed 
accounts of a region of the world and a set of religious practices that had only just 
come under the popular scrutiny of the British Metropolitan public. The treaties 
concluded subsequent to the 'Opium' and 'Arrow' wars of the 1840s and late 1850s 
had not just opened the region up to British trading interests but had begun to 
incorporate it in imperial strategic planning. Indeed, some historians have gone so far 
as describing it in this period as becoming a part of British 'informal empire' .287 
Edkins' account was framed more as a travelogue than an Orientalist analysis (it was 
not until the 1890s that comparative religious studies turned to Chinese religion in any 
depth288). But as the more explicit title of the 1878 edition indicated, it had a strong 
missionary content that reflected its author's activities as one of a growing 
286 , 
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1· . Chin 289 Thi .c. f onstituency of European evange IStS In a. s was a lorm 0 European 
!l'esence which British consuls of the time saw as distinctly deleterious to their 
rading ambitions in the mainland. In particular, the preaching of Protestant 
nissionaries was widely believed to be behind the millenarian movement that sparked 
tfIthe Taiping Rebellion which, between 1850 and 1864, had done so much to 
mdermine the desired stability of the Chinese government. 290 In travelling out of 
ndia, then, Lyall had not chosen a region free of the tension between imperial and 
eligious modes of governance. Indeed, he had entered a realm no less susceptible to 
he explosive potential of Protestant evangelism than India itself, an issue that he 
'efers to in the essay itself.291 
In this context, it is plausible that, while drawing from an evangelist's account, 
:he fact that Lyall makes no other reference to the propagation of Christianity partly 
reflects British imperial sensibilities in China as well as in India. But it also 
~ighlights the way religion in the essay can be consistently placed at the service of 
government rather than the other way around. It is a startling configuration of 
interests that strongly indicates the relevance to his discussion of the British self-
constitution in India as the integrative, petitioned hub of competing religio-ethnic 
constituencies. Through the Chinese government prosecution of Taoism as a state 
religion, Lyall turns this model inside out; what would be a de-nationalising sectarian 
agenda in India, is revealed in China as its very opposite, an integrative imperial 
framework. Leaving India is, in this sense, a way of estranging, and thereby 
attempting to reappropriate, the terms of a confused British ruling identity there. 
However, Lyall's use of Edkins as his primary source material is, in this regard, 
highly instructive. For it seems that he has extracted the subject of what he 
characterises as the state's manipulation of religion, against the grain of the book's 
289 Edkins, Religion in China: containing a brief account of the three religions of the Chinese: with 
observations on the prospects of Christian conversion amongst that people (London: Trubner & Co, 
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tWO interests; Edkins himself only mentions it four times, and then for the most part, 
n no more than passing, neutrally-expressed descriptions?92 While the stated subject 
,[Lyall's essay is the state prosecution of religion, it is therefore important to 
mderscore this decided bias with which he approaches its discussion. Which is to 
lay, his evident interest in the question of religion in China is not one of conversion or 
:vangelism, subjects which otherwise form the body of Edkins' book, but do so 
lowhere with reference to the state sponsorship of Taoism. This is a key observation 
Nith which to preface an analysis of the question of religious 'enthusiasm' that 
mderscores his essay, and which is even at times directly addressed.293 For Lyall, 
leither religion, nor Christianity in particular, of and for itself represents a desirable 
;)f substantial identity with which to stamp government. Indeed, it is the perceived 
potential of a religion - in this case, Taoism - for the fluid and markedly theatrical 
construction and reconstruction of the relations between state and society that makes 
it a subject of interest. Given the above discussion regarding 'insiders' and 
'outsiders', it is inevitable that for a legitimating counterpoint to these recognisably 
Sensational motifs of masquerade and self-alienation, Lyall turns promptly to Islam as 
a self-evident and inflexible category. As with Wali Dad, the narrator requires its 
visible and involuntary self-declaration before his perilous journey within Asian 
society can begin. 
As if taking his cue from Hunter, Lyall launches his essay in fme Sensational 
style, first with an uncanny manifestation, and then with a mysterious disappearance. 
The latter takes place after a prologue in which the 'climax' of Western forms of 
government is located in the modem ruling principle of 'divorce' between state and 
religion.294 The genealogy of this principle is traced back to contrasting 'earlier 
notions' of 'union' between these institutions, notions which it is found are still 
manifest in Islamic polities, and in particular in the current Pan-Islamist doctrines of 
the Ottoman empire. Islamic empire is thus characterised as at once the polar 
: Edkins, pp 48,56-57,65-66, 116. 
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>pposite of British imperialism, and an 'earlier' stage of its development - in other 
Nords, as something akin to an uncanny manifestation of its discarded primitive 
)C1'sona. After then setting the Asian stage entirely in terms of the 'barbarous' impact 
)flslam on its forms of government, Lyall brings down the curtain on this prefatory 
lCt, only to raise it on a suddenly emptied scene. China, he points out, is unique in 
Western Asia in escaping a 'Mahomedan invasion', and thereby preserving its 
;political continuity' ?9S In doing so, the country has succeeded in effecting precisely 
that which India, under the Muslim 'deluge', had been denied: 'bringing her religious 
doctrines and worship into practical co-operation with her secular organization. ,296 
For this covert disquisition on British Indian governance, then, the vexed question of 
'continuity' in the Indian context is introduced into an alternative Asian polity 
through the key excision of Islam. Because he has pre-characterised Islam as a prior 
manifestation of a European evolution, its excision implies that the trajectory of 
European history can also be interrupted, clearing an imaginative space for a new 
configuration of colonial intervention. This is, in effect, a classic Sensational 
paradigm: through its polar opposite that which is familiar is first estranged, then 
suddenly effaced. Moreover, the success of this imaginative intervention in colonial 
history thereafter relies upon its ability to reappear between defmitions, both 'inside' 
and 'outside' the social realm: 
The Chinese Government has this advantage, that although its dynasty is to 
some degree foreign, it is nevertheless not so far ahead of or so apart from the 
prevailing intellectual standard among its subjects that it cannot recognise or 
treat with religions of low or incongruous types without offending the public 
opinion of some influential body among its subjects.297 
Thus the disappearance of Islam, and with it the interruption of European history, 
reveals less a pristine Asian polity than a contemporary imperial government founded 
on ambiguity -literally, neither 'foreign' nor indigenous. In this way, Lyall has 
reformulated the ambivalence of British Indian 'continuity', recreating colonial 
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Jovernallce in the guise of an impenetrable Asian mystery. However, the preservation 
, 
If that mystery is now reliant upon the prior characterisation of a conspicuous Muslim 
:ounter-example safeguarding the integrity of its borders from without. 
Opacity appears therefore to offer itself up as a necessary, potentially 
)roductive trope. In striking contrast to Edkins, Lyall uses it deliberately to deepen 
he mystery. He conjures the Chinese government as an opaque and secretive 
)resence which 'surrounds itself with fictions and formulas', presided over by an 
Emperor who 'lives far away in Pekin, shrouded in semi-divine mystery' ?98 He 
describes the duplicitous possibility of ritual as if, in a sense, the state enlists itself not 
only as actor, but audience; as if the maintenance of the illusion is its own rationale. 
This can be glimpsed in the marked disjunction that opens out between the refmement 
of the theatrical artifice of the ritual, and the wilful illegibility of its essential purpose: 
The tradition of the Imperial Court is to keep the Emperor's person in august 
and majestic seclusion; the practice is to set out all their administrative 
proceedings and acts of state under imposing formularies and high-sounding 
moral ordinances, keeping the inner mechanism of the State secret and 
mysterious. 299 
In the hands of government religion becomes a means of disguising its intentions, 
enforcing a distance between its own performance and its true self, now 'secret and 
mysterious'. Religion here becomes, for Lyall, a matter of pure artifice. Thus the 
doctrine of transmigration in China is not simply described in theatrical terms; its very 
purpose is the production of theatre: 
That world which is not a bourne whence no traveller returns, but only a stage 
in the circle of existence, a place where you change forms as costumes are 
changed behind scenes, and whence you may come forward again to playa 
different part in a different character or mode of being, or in a subsequent act of 
the same drama. 300 
By allying government to religion emptied of its meaning, however, Lyall opens up 
the possibility that the opacity surrounding the governmental 'inner mechanism' 
~98 
m Lyall, 'State', pp 144, 147. 
300 Lyall, 'State', p 128. My emphasis. 
Lyall, 'State', p 147. 
293 
nasks a similar vacuity. Describing, for instance, the awards and titles distributed by 
he Chinese government to the souls of the dead, he makes a direct connection with 
he European gazetteer, the cornerstone of colonial administration, turning the one 
010 a form of the other: 
If such an institution as a Gazette were found in any other Asiatic country, one 
could hardly be wrong in taking it to be a very recent importation from Europe; 
but the Chinese, we are told, were publishing their Gazette ... many centuries 
301 
ago. 
J Islam represented an uncanny contemporary manifestation of a past phase of 
European history, modem European colonialism, it would seem, is pre-figured by the 
Chinese. Between them, the integrity of the British imperialist identity in Asia is put 
in question, so that it comes to seem itself an imperfect, artificial manifestation of 
original and determining Asian forms of government. Since the matter of artifice is 
its own rationale, the essay appears to hollow out British colonialism in India as 
literally a form without content. Thus Lyall's characterisation of the Chinese Gazette 
of the souls of the dead as a model of administrative paramountcy retrospectively 
ascribes to its European counterpart a dangerous lack of substance, turning inside out 
its paradigmatic capacity to render apparent, rather than disguise, the meaning of its 
Asian environment. In this sense, a more Sensational revelation could hardly have 
been approached. Moreover, the language of the essay itself enters into this 
blindness. The rationale of artifice means that the essay cannot allow itself 
consciously to interpret the intentions of the Chinese government: 'Whether seriously 
or cynically, the Government evidently thinks fit to fall in with and humour the 
anthropomorphic fanatics of its subjects ... ,302 Here the grammar seems to be caught 
up in its own drama of indeterminacy, the opening conditional clause prefacing, and 
undoing, the idea of intentional deception it then propounds ('humouring' its 
subjects). Thus for Lyall, advocating the possibility of theocratic rule entails a radical 
dispossession in terms of the faculty - so crucial to Orientalism, but so deceptive in 
301 
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he sensation Novel- to discern meaning. Literally, neither the narrative nor the 
:hinese government can know itself. 
As a productive outcome of this collusion in illegibility, the very idea of 
nteraction between state and subject becomes, potentially, emptied of significance. 
~h is seen to be enacting a part in which it has no belief - or rather, the belief it 
nanifests is only that of the need to perform its part properly. In particular, the 
;rucial part of that relationship emptied of its legitimate meaning is the capacity of 
~eligion to express disloyalty to the state: 
So the Chinese prefer to act as if the spiritual or divisive character of a mauvais 
sujet [disloyal subject] should make no difference to the authorities; and the 
people would probably think much less of a ruler who should take a religion of 
this kind too seriously when they themselves are by no means blind to its 
. al ki 303 practtc wor ng. 
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Religion is here not only a specie of counterfeit, but its part in defining an anti-
colonial movement becomes in effect, hostile. Invoking religion as their substantial 
form, such an insurgency only serves to reveal the paradox that here structures its 
relationship with the state. Merely the confmnation of a known illusion, the 'mauvais 
sujeC renders himself all but invisible, incapable of substantial action - or as Lyall 
puts it, not to be taken 'seriously'. In other words, in a world of impenetrable mystery 
fostered by religious interchange, the one irreducible pillar of meaning is the essential 
irrelevance of movements of insurgency that fail to perceive the illusion of religious 
theatre. Here then, is the anxious, conservative framework engirding the transgressive 
tendency of Lyall's consideration of the role of religion in colonial governance. So 
long as 'disloyalty' expresses itself through the deceit of religion, it renders itself not 
only meaningless in the Asian colonial context, but a sure sign of its extraneous 
relationship to a society fully apprised of the duplicitous terms of religious exchange. 
It is on the basis of this compact, that Lyall sees subject and ruler in China joined as 
'insiders' to the theatre of colonialism. 
~~----------------
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Effectively, Lyall has turned the theocratic state inside out. Based on the 
llusion of religion, it conducts its affairs through empty rituals aimed at the mutual 
leception of ruler and subject. If that subject attempts an autonomous manipulation 
)f their religious identity, they reveal only the terms of their own foolish self-
ieception. The state need not worry, since their protest is by its very nature, 
nsubstantial, and ultimately self-defeating, instantly erasing all claims to speak for 
he society out of which they might arise. Since Lyall has described it as hypothetical 
Jutside of China, we would not expect to encounter elsewhere in Asiatic Studies the 
above description of the self-revelation and involuntary exile of the illegitimately 
disloyal subject. Nevertheless, as an indicator of one of the guiding presences at work 
in this oddly displaced essay, it is worth noting that there is a single instance in which 
precisely this ideal state of affairs comes to pass. It occurs in 'Islam in India' and 
concerns the activities of a 'Wahabi teacher' who comes to Lyall's district of Berar to 
preach the word of reform. He is soon accused by the citizenry of actually preaching 
'sedition' against the government; and the colonial police, far from being alarmed at 
the possible seditious intent of a reformist zealot, are forced simply to take him under 
their 'protection' for his own good.304 His call for religious purity, it would seem, had 
only made him vulnerable to attack from within society. Like Wali Dad, he had done 
no more than precipitate his removal from it and confIrmed the nature of the compact 
between state and subjects. In this instance, then, the theocratic colonial utopia is 
given substance in India. The Asian region saved from the 'Mahomedan deluge' 
turns out to be a chilling illustration of Lyall's conception of a smoothly functioning 
colonial India, peaceably segregating the self-revealing 'outsider' from the knowing 
society within. 
This Indo-Muslim context of Lyall's reinvention of colonial rule in Asia 
returns us to the opening arguments of the essay. For against its pervasive narrative 
of disguise and impenetrability, Lyall had specifically opposed the 'dead levelling 
hand of Islam', lending to Muslim rule a mortality that the productive theatre of the 
lO4 
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. " If' t ' 'd 305 In f' Chinese imperiahst crrc e 0 eXlS ence aVOl s. terms 0 lIDperialism, Islam 
represents the fmite, China the future infInitive ('at once the oldest of Asiatic empires, 
and the most likely to outlast all others nowexisting,).306 Masquerade confers 
immortality; the inability of Muslims to disguise themselves and their 'intolerant' 
monotheism,307 provides the necessary fatal counterpoint. In short, he concludes, the 
'barbarity' of their system consists in its 'simplicity' .308 It is presumably for this 
reason of 'simplicity' - or visibility, if we were to rephrase in terms of the system of 
masquerade he describes in China - that Lyall considers Islamic rulers in West Asia 
as only achieving an 'impersonation' of 'the full idea of theocracy' .309 However, in 
the context of the disquisition on theatre that follows it, this phrase merits further 
consideration. In particular, it draws attention to the terms by which Lyall's reading 
of the full idea of theocracy becomes necessary. Without fully enlisting religion, he 
sees the non-theocratic ruler in Asia as being left not only incomplete ('in a 
dangerously imperfect condition'), but as vulnerable himself to impersonation: 
He leaves in other hands a lever that may be used to upset him, and he is cut off 
from the control and direction of an active, never-resting machinery, always at 
work among his people.310 
Like the protagonist of a Sensational mystery, he is open to appropriation and 
manipulation by an anonymous 'machinery'. In failing to deploy the masquerade of 
religion, Lyall suggests he will inevitably be possessed by it. This possession carries 
the implication that in being 'cut off' from the 'lever' of 'direction', he will become 
the victim of the same kind of paradox which, as a theocrat, he would force upon 
religious insurgents such as the 'Wahabi teacher'. In effect, his identity will be 
hollowed out and with it, his substantial presence within Asian society - a possibility, 
it must be remembered, always present in the Anglo-Indian consciousness of the 
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fragility of their 'empire of opinion', and of themselves as self-conscious, even self-
ieluding, actors before a potentially hostile audience.311 But it also further implies 
the presence of a particular substantial agent by whom the identity of the colonialist in 
Asia-or the absence of his identity - can be possessed. Lyall's claim that Islamic 
rulers only 'impersonated' the truly theocratic state indicates that in his estimation 
they may represent precisely such an agent, able to inhabit and direct another persona. 
In this respect, he implies that their (only partially successful) masquerade engenders 
his imaginative reinvention of British imperialism as a theocracy; they force the 
British into disguise. This perception is spelt out in Lyall's prior description of the 
Pan-Islamic activities of the Ottoman Sultan: 
for the Sultan has lately been disclosing some anxiety about the spiritual unity 
of Islam, and is showing a disposition to employ his claims to the Kaliphate as a 
means of taking upon himself the functions left vacant by the disabilities of a 
non-Mahomedan ruler in Mahomedan countries.312 
Since it was not published elsewhere, Lyall's essay on China may have been written 
as late as 1882. In which case, he would here be referring not only to the massive 
investments of British 'informal empire' in Egypt in the late 1870s but to its actual 
invasion and occupation by the British in 1882. These events had been preceded and 
accompanied by the rise in Pan-I slami st sentiment and the cause of the Ottoman 
Caliphate fostered there by Jamal al-din al-Afghani and Shaykh Muhammad' Abduh. 
However, clearly another, more intimate, point of reference is India itself, where 
despite the reservations voiced by Sayyid Ahmad Khan, Pan-Islamist ideas had been 
adopted by sections of the Indo-Muslim intelligentsia in the wake of 1857-59. 
Especially following the perceived lack of effective British aid to the Turks against 
the Russians in 1877-78, al-Afghani's writings and his 'bitterly anti-British' feelings 
had struck a sympathetic, if initially muted, chord.313 The motivations of Sultan 
Abdul Hamid II in wishing to promote the Caliphate had been questioned by al-
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Afghani himself?14 Nevertheless, the suggestion by Lyall that the Turkish Sultan has 
staked his claim to the Caliphate 'with no pretensions to sacred character' of his o~ 
indicates that he represents for the author precisely the model of theocratic 
masquerade on which the essay is based.31S As his intentions are to fill a 'vacancy' 
left by 'non-Mahomedan' rulers, we can posit that at some level Lyall considers the 
'imperfect' identity of the British colonialist state to be under threat from the idea of 
an Islamic possession. 
The disappearance of Islam with which the body of the essay begins is thus 
not so much a mystery the narrative sets out to explore, discovering in its place an 
uncontaminated region that it might imaginatively colonise. On the contrary, it 
represents the apprehension of a persecutor - and a possession - it must somehow 
elude. In this light, the portrait of a state founded on impenetrability must be read as 
an attempt primarily to forestall the reappearance of what might be thought of as an 
overfilled point of origin, a dispossessing (nominally 'Muslim') agent that might 
overwhelm its carefully maintained lack of substance. In a sense, this threat of 
dispossession is the meaning of the 'inner mechanism' that must keep itself shrouded 
in mystery. With this in mind, we can return the essay on China to its place in the 
obsessive pursuit in Asiatic Studies of a means of establishing a British purchase on 
Indian society and history. In particular, two interconnected sets of tropes 
surrounding Islamic possession that recur in the other essays in the volume facilitate 
its deconstruction as an overfilled and disorientating point of origin. Directly echoing 
the phrase used above in regard to the incursion of the Ottoman Sultan, the first set of 
tropes revolves around the image of a 'vacancy' open to manipulation. In his essay 
'The Religious Situation of India', the idea of such a 'vacancy' created by British rule 
in India is brought up time and again as a matter of urgency, presaging a fonn of 
'spiritual' anarchy ('interregnum'). He describes this unfilled 'vacancy' as the 
collision of the forces of 'civilisation' working itself out on Indian society in tenns of 
314 Ah 11~ mad, Studies, pp 63-64 . 
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both possession ('pouring of new wines into old skins ') and a self-destructive will to 
disorientation ('a dissolving force ... cutting away of anchors instead of hauling them 
llP,).316 This is an 'upheaval' which neither Britain nor Christianity will be able to 
direct;317 but above all, it is British rule that creates the 'vacancy' into which it will be 
directed: 
Some great movement is likely to come about in India, if only the peace lasts; 
but what may be the complexion of that movement, and whither its gravitation, 
. hi h . n1 318 is a question w c time 0 y can answer. 
Thus the British engender the circumstances of the 'vacancy' (by upholding the 
'peace'), and will reap its consequences. But another unknown force will fulfil and 
manipulate it. 
The second set of tropes is directly connected in this essay to this worrying 
perception of a 'vacancy' waiting to be filled, and to the cognate notion that the 
coming 'binding idea' is organically bound to British actions. They indicate that the 
question of priority is in fact central to the idea of possession that haunts Asiatic 
Studies; but also that the implied location of this priority in a peculiarly Islamic 
imperative is deceptive. They are tropes that reflect upon the evolutionary model set 
out in the West Asian context, whereby Islamic polities are recognised only as a 
developmental stage of British imperialism. But they suggest that this model is itself 
constructed as a means of holding down a far more fluid and disturbing set of 
perceptions. In the defIDing context of colonial India, the confusion inherent to this 
interrelationship can be fITSt glimpsed in the manner in which 'Mohamedan' and 
'Mughal' are always interchangeable denominations, but are frequently defined in 
explicitly contradictory terms. Thus in 'Islam in India' the 'Mohamedan of that 
country' is purely a 'soldier of fortune'; and in the same paragraph he is a member of 
a community moulded by 'compact and straight-pointed political designs. ,319 But this 
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'Mugbal'- defined incarnation appears to be a metamorphosis from their earlier 
;hafaCterisation in the same essay as 'a community which is bound together by a 
;ammon tie of faith' and thus resilient to political vicissitudes such as the 
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'Mohamedan' defmition would seem to be proleptic of the mysterious later reversion 
from an exclusively military-political bond into an expression of 'sincere 
intolerance' .321 Exactly this confusion can be seen in 'The Religious Situation in 
India' in Lyall's allusion to 'the weak and incomplete lien of Mahomedan faith' 
brought by the Mughals into India, 322 itself a direct contradiction of their irresistible 
evangelist designs set out only a few pages earlier. 323 
It would seem, then, that at some point Lyall considers the transformation 
from a political to a religious imperative took place. On the one hand, he seems to 
deny this kind of an interpretation by insisting repeatedly and - given the clear and 
contradictory divisions he himself draws up - irrationally on the nostrum that for 
Muslims, politics and religion are 'two sides of the same medal' .324 More 
consistently, however, there is a division set up by the tenses in which he deploys 
these two epithets, the former in the past and the latter in terms of the present. 
Moreover, in 'Islam in India', the transition between the two definitions appears to 
take place in 1857, only after which can the 'present religious temper' of the Indian 
Muslims be perceived.325 In other words, he places the British in a defining, catalytic 
role, engineering the transformation of the 'weak and incomplete lien of Mahomedan 
faith'. The implied dating of that transforming moment to the events out of which the 
colonial state was reborn from its Company incarnation already suggests something of 
a mutual inscription. Elsewhere, when this perception of reciprocity is given more 
direct expression, the 'Mutiny' - and indeed, the post-'Mutiny' political dispensation 
320 
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_ is carefully excised; but although the purely religious motivation provided by 
Christianity predominates, it is one guided by a British political hand. In 'The 
Religious Situation in India' , for instance, he warns that: 
Orderly Christian rule has given to Islam in India an opportunity for becoming 
regenerate and for re.uni!ing its strength, which it owes entirely to us. We have 
restored its commumcattons by sea and by land; we have already felt some of 
the consequences of pulling down the barriers which Ranjit Singh and his Sikhs 
set up on our north-western frontier between the Mahomedans of India and the 
rest of Western Asia. Mahomedanism may yet occupy a larger space in the 
d· . l' 326 history of In Ian ratlOna Ism ... 
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At the same time, this conceit of a symbiotic link between Islam and British rule 
replaces back into a colonial Indian context the evolutionary model of his essay on 
China, wherein Islam is the manifestation of a European primitive persona. Thus 
'Mahomedan' spiritual despotism and its will 'to prevail and, if need be, to persecute' 
. 
lS: 
only an anachronism; the unquiet spirit now abroad in India is no other than that 
spirit which troubled all Christian Europe for so many centuries , and which 
even in England has not yet been quite exorcised b~ the modem doctrine of 
toleration, or the modem affection of indifference. 27 
This phrase, 'the modem affection of indifference', recalls the theocratic charade; its 
anxiety over an underlying, mysterious and full identity here indicating that of a 
spiritually tyrannous Christianity, of which the rampant 'Mahomedans' are only an 
anachronistic manifestation. This current 'revivalism' is moreover, merely a response 
to the 'keen sense of emulation' stimulated by Christianity in India.328 And 
unconsciously mirroring the 'dead levelling hand of Islam' , Lyall links that 
stimulation directly to the fact that it has been 'levelled down by a neutral government 
to mere denominational equality', thus bringing British political and religious 
institutions at once into alignment with each other and Indian Islam.329 The 
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cumulative effect of this highly ambivalent set of images therefore is of a 
contemporary Indo-Islamic community catalysed by the British from a secular to a 
despotic religious incarnation. Simultaneously, Lyall conveys his sense of the 
uncanny irruption of a prior, substantial Christian persona from which the 
contemporary Indo-Muslim community takes its cohesive shape and persecutory 
purpose. This would seem to represent a reversal of the masquerade imagined 
through the portrait of the Chinese government, in which it is the British who were 
portrayed as the belated vehicle for an Islamic original. Here, it is Islam that proffers 
the aspect of a 'vacant', and disorientating, imaginative space colonised by the 
British. However, to take possession of it is also, in the confusion of categories that 
follows, to risk possession. It is precisely this disorientation that engenders the 
paradox of a religion playing a part in the 'history of Indian rationalism' - of, that is, 
'Mahomedanism' fulfilling the 'rational' foundations of British colonial history in 
India. Moreover, since for Lyall 'rationalism' was specifically, and diametrically, 
opposed to the 'unreasoning certitude' of the 'Mahomedan faith', the unnatural 
coupling of the two terms can only point towards his apprehension of this possibility 
in terms of the usurpation of its current Christian encumbent.33o In other words, the 
barriers between the concepts of religion and 'rationalism' in Lyall's thinking had 
already been breached.331 In this regard, the equivocation that surrounds the 
definition of the Mughal-'Mohamedan' would appear to betray a pre-existing 
confusion about the lines of demarcation between religious and political categories as 
they refer to British rule. 
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If we were to press the logic of this idea of prior British possession of a 
Muslim 'vacancy' into Lyall's Chinese context, it would seem that the Ottoman 
Sultan was not himself the substantial agent of dispossession, but a displaced 
representation of the British influence in India. Indeed, to insist upon the relevance of 
the defining context of colonial India to the essay on China would be to see him as a 
less threatening aspect of that influence - and this would be altogether congruent with 
the strong vein of fantasy that overtly organises the essay. Thus, the substantial 
agency of Islam threatening the fragile mystery of Asian colonial rule would itself 
seem to be no more than an effigy of a persecutory British religious presence, which 
we can now locate as the overfilled point of origin propelling the journey out of India. 
This Sensational insight can be further elaborated by reference to a repeated insistence 
throughout Asiatic Studies that the Mughals 'disorganized Hinduism without 
substituting any strong religious edifice of their own' .332 Lyall argues here that it is 
their failure to 'complete' their religious avocation that has created the 'vacancy' in 
India.333 Thus Muslim imperfection and British 'civilisation' become in this instance, 
the same disorientating agent. This transposition is by no means accidental. Lyall's 
notion of 'substitution' in this regard resurfaces in another context, one that reveals 
the vital bridge to the disjunction of past and future 'Mahomedan' communal 
identities. It takes place in reference to the same piece of legislation - the Act of 1864 
abolishing state appointments to the office of Qazi - that had so agitated Hunter, 
interrupting the perception of continuity and forcing upon the British a discomfiting 
visibility. In 'Our Religious Policy in India', Lyall comments on this rash move by 
saying: 'The very fact that we had ousted Musalman sovereigns should have made us 
more careful to supply their exact place. ,334 Earlier in that same essay he had written 
that the 'Mahomedans offer a kind of theocratic home rule' with which the British, 
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'mere sojourners in the land', cannot hope to compete.335 To compete, he therefore 
implies, and inhabit their role as rulers, the British would need to become the 
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perfection of the insufficient theocracy they had 'supplanted'. They would need to 
become, in effect, the perfection of the 'incomplete lien of Mahomedan faith' in India. 
On the other hand, in refusing this incarnation, they ensured its Calvary-like return as 
the 'present religious temper' of their 'Mahomedan' persecutor. 
We can now begin to see some of the more compelling reasons by which the 
reinvention of British colonialism that takes place through the Chinese government, 
and is seemingly propelled by a Muslim point of reference, needs to be displaced in 
this way. Through the repeated tropes of 'vacancy', 'imperfection' and 'completion' 
discussed above, it appears that the question of theocracy pertains to an Indian context 
in which the British fear the possibility that their 'secular' and 'neutral' identity has 
already been dispossessed. Figured through their perceived distortion of an 
'imperfect' secular Mughal state, the grotesquely inflated, substantial and fatal 
theocratic agents stalking them through the pages of Asiatic Studies are none other 
than fantastic images of a terrifying, and desired, self-revelation. The dispossession 
they everywhere perceive is one that takes place at the hands of the imagined 
integrity, or 'wholeness', of the theocratic persona, an irreducible ideological identity 
not subject to the debilitating hybridity of the colonial state and its dependency on 
representing others. This is the real protagonist of Lyall's theatre of Asian 
transformations, the British theocratic figure who both propels and destroys the 
masquerade, always at hand as the secret agent of dispossession; always ready to fill 
out the 'vacancy' at the core of the colonialist ruling identity. Thus, the theocracy 
Lyall imagines in China, in which its creators cannot be detected, and whose purpose 
is unknown even to themselves, seems plausible precisely because of the excision of 
Islam as a form of self-representation. The absence of this self-referential vocabulary 
seems to promise an arena in which the colonialist government cannot be reached by 
m 
th LY~Il,.'Our Religious Policy in India', The Fortnightly Review, p 400. This line was excised from 
e ASiatIC Studies version. 
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these demonic, nominally Muslim, agents of self-discovery. In contrast, the only 
possible theocracy he can allow himself to imagine in India is one in which the 
mysterious 'inner mechanism' of their conflicted identity as 'Christian rulers' is 
repeatedly and dangerously revealed as the 'barbarous' and 'simplistic' 'Mahomedan' 
presence, always on the point of overwhelming the fragile stability of the state. 336 As 
in all good Sensation Novels, the heart of the corruption - what we have elsewhere 
characterised as the paradox of secular Christian rule - can only be approached 
through this kind of self-alienating, near-fatal transposition. Through, that is, the 
irruption and repossession of the Symptom, returning to the system of self-
representation the precarious illusion of its consistency. 
In Lyall's experiment in China, it is therefore only a matter of time before 
such an irruption of the suppressed point of alienation points him back towards 
colonial India. After all, without its return there would be no need for the narrative in 
the first place; its very purpose is yet another working through of exactly this 
scenario. In this regard, throughout Asiatic Studies the source of these hybrid 
Symptomatic effects is always close to the surface; once apprehended, like James' 
figure in the carpet they reappear everywhere. They can be detected, for instance, in 
Lyall's 'Wahabi teacher', who is no more than a heavily ironised incarnation of Christ 
himself: 
He was an earnest reformer, and the abuses he denounced were patent; but in a 
few weeks he had quarrelled with the chief Moulvies of their district over 
questions of theology and ecclesiastic discipline, with all the Pharisees, and 
with Demetrius the silversmith ... All parties virulently accused him of sedition 
against Caesar, that is, against the Queen's Government. The British officials, 
taking a broader view of their duty than did the Roman Gallio, not only refused 
to interfere in a dispute about religious law, but also took measures to preserve 
orde~ and prevent violence to anr man, and the Wahabi was placed under the 
special protection of the police.3 7 
336 Or 
, as Wilkie Collins had put it only a few years earlier: the 'dark conspiracy [ ... ] on foot in the 
mIdst of ,. . , th th us inVarIably reveals 'the Oriental noblemen who pounce on us unawares to be none 0 er 
man I our own unruly 'passions'. Collins, Moonstone, p 222. 
"yaH, 'Islam', p 247. 
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It could be said that this kind of self-portrait, in which provocateur and provoked 
clearly represent for their author antagonistic aspects of the British state in India, 
constitutes the defming feature of the collection as a whole.338 But its most bathetic 
instance occurs in China, inevitably betraying the promise it held out to its author as a 
region empty of Muslim manifestations. Thus, instead of hannonious utopia, the 
essay ends fIrst with the rupture of the carefully wrought illusion of colonial 
theocratic invisibility, by the disorientating appearance of a Christian afreet. This 
takes the form of the 'Taiping insurrection' at the close of chapter, 'which is stated by 
all accounts to have derived its religious character and fervour from the 
misunderstood teachings of Christian missionaries' .339 Predictably, the unexpected 
force with which this image appears to take over and decimate his conclusions over 
the possibility of a British theocratic state, ensures that it is then quickly repossessed 
and transformed into its Muslim alter ego. The 'misunderstood' Christian element 
becomes' charged with a fanatic energy of a type more typical of Western than 
Eastern Asia'; and Lyall can do no more than lament in the final lines that: 
Probably nothing is more perilous to a Government that has incorporated the 
elder and milder religions into his system, and has soothed them and lulled them 
into tame and subordinate officialism, than an assault upon those very religions 
by a wild and ardent faith suddenly blazing up in the midst of them. 340 
A remarkably lucid summary, then, of the workings of the Symptom and its 
reassuringly fatal action on every attempt in the volume to reinvent British India 
Effectively, its endless repetition makes of Asiatic Studies an inexhaustible act of 
exorcism performed on the insoluble post-'Mutiny' problematic of figuring a British 
perch on Indian society. In the process, it has the effect of setting the Indo-Muslim 
338 ~e most phantasmagorical of these portraits entails the entirely imagined spectacle of Christian and 
~ushm missionaries ranged against each other (in 1872) across the whole oflndia, and poised to go 
tnt~ battle for the prize of passive and neutral Hindu proselytes. The battle threatens, of course, to 
obhte~te the precarious peace upheld by the state (Lyall, 'Religious', p 276). It should be noted that the~ ~s no evidence, either in British records or indigenous perceptions at the time, of Indo-Muslim 
;mbltlOns to evangelise outside their own communities (Sanyal, p 3; Jones, Socia-ReligiOUS, pp 210, 
16). 
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14O Lyall, 'State', p 149. 
Lyall, 'State', p 149. 
'stranger' on its outer limits, a figure of paradox lighted into meaning only through 
the insatiable, inflationary rhetoric of opposition. 
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Finally, it is these two aspects of segregation and paradox that I wish to return 
to, and underline, in Hunter's own equivocal search for clarity through the exposure 
of the Indian Muslim. They are the fundamental terms by which the 'stranger' is 
always apprehended, situated simultaneously between the 'inside and outside' .341 Not 
only does he expose 'the failing of the opposition itself, but his ambivalence puts in 
doubt 'the very principle of the opposition, the plausibility of dichotomy it suggests 
and feasibility of separation it demands. ,342 As we explored in Chapter One, these are 
the defining features of Steel's portrait of the Indian Muslim in 1905. There, the 
Muslim is separated out from the society in which he is discovered, susceptible only 
to the description of his self-deconstruction; literally opposed to his own existence in 
British India, he is the very embodiment of paradox. It is exactly this same image of 
an assembly of paradoxical, antagonistic components that structures Hunter's 
evocation of the 'Wahabi' conspirators over thirty years earlier. The astonishing 
consistency of these thumb-nail sketches in this respect is worth spelling out also for 
the manner in which they belie the very stereotype of Muslim inflexibility that the 
colonialist themselves had begun to insist upon from 1857 onwards. From the start of 
his investigation, Hunter is keen to establish this essential opposition between their 
stubborn failure to adapt to change and the 'more flexible Hindus' who were 
embracing British rule, 'pliant' where the Muslims are unbending.343 This was a 
point on which Lyall agreed; the revealed presence of Muslim 'barbarity' required the 
fundamentally 'conservative' nature of the 'Mahomedan', possessed of dangerously 
'reactionary susceptibilities' .344 But on closer analysis, what becomes apparent in 
Hunter's 'Wahabi' history is not a self-evident trail of conspicuous fanaticism, but a 
succession of diabolically flexible protagonists, comparable to the kind of skill at 
;~ I 
)42 Bauman, Ambivalence, p 61. 
343 Bauman, Ambivalence, pp 58- 59. 
3 .... Hunter, pp 11, 189. 
Lyal\, 'Islam', p 251. 
dissembling with which Lyall invests his admired Chinese theocrats. This theme of 
embodied paradox begins with Sayyid Ahmad, who manages to cover 'his former 
character as a robber beneath the sacred garb of a pilgrim', becoming a model 
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instance of the oxymoronic 'Wahabi'; or as Hunter puts it, a 'freebooter-saint' .345 For 
the narrative strongly hints that it is not so much a transformation as a simultaneous 
inner and outer identity: 'The internal change that took place in the Prophet's heart is 
known only to himself and to God, but it is certain that his whole outward conduct 
changed. ,346 Such a dissembling of extremes, however, in no way prevents his 
inability to operate in any other manner than as a self-evident 'fanatical incendiary', 
for it is precisely this quality that brings about his downfall, unable to conduct 
diplomatic manoeuvres among the Pathan tribes on the border.347 He is thus at once, 
a robber masquerading as a saint, whose inner self is nevertheless essentially 
fanatically religious, and who, though a master of dissimulation, finds it impossible to 
conceal or manipulate the fact. The only consistency manifested in these descriptions 
is the antagonistic terms of construction, apparently leant coherence under the rubric 
of disguise. It is this idea of self-contradiction that organises each 'W ahabi' portrait. 
Indeed, it is the sole means of description; we are to understand them as essentially a 
distillation of paradox. Thus, Sayyid Ahmad's disciple Titu Mian is found 'preparing 
in secret God's revenge', then 'throwing off all disguise'. 348 But equally Muhammad 
Shaft, the 'right hand of the Conspiracy', is characterised entirely through the 
perception that 'there was nothing of the religious enthusiast about him': paradox 
applies, and organises, even where no apparent contradiction can be uncovered. 349 
Similarly, when Hunter comments about the informer, Munshi Jaffir of Thaneswar, 
that 'his secret duties threw a religious halo even over his detested profession' (of 
'Scrivener'), he appears to suggest that his failure to disguise himself as any other 
34' 
346 Hunter, p 13. 
347 Hunter, p 61. 
348Hunter,pp 17-18. 
349 Hunter, p 45. 
Hunter, pp 94-95. 
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than a religious fanatic, was itself a brilliant piece of mendacity. 350 One that, in 
addition, carries with it the implied disjunction between his 'secret duties' and their 
'religious'sanctification. Thus religion can be at once: a disguise (Munshi Jaffrr); 
the essence behind a disguise (Titu Mian); and an absence which can itself (in 
Muhammad Shafi's case) function as a near-perfect disguise. In Sayyid Ahmad, the 
narrative has already discovered all three of these elements operating together. 
Perhaps more frankly than any other, the portrait of Munshi Jaffir discloses the 
fundamental terms of opposition at work in Hunter's 'Wahabi' riddle. The Munshi's 
'secret duties' engender a 'religious halo' as a form of disguise because they do not 
themselves entail a religious element. Instead, through the Munshi, they are 
transmuted into the duplicitous effects rather than the substance of, religion. 
Moreover, the actual meaning of those 'duties' seems to be equally unknown to their 
possessor, tricked into pursuing his 'detested profession' by the idea that it promotes a 
religious goal (and therefore makes being a 'scrivener' bearable). The true identity of 
his 'duties' thus remains, in a sense, 'secret' even to himself. In this regard, there is a 
secondary identification to be made here between the deluded 'Wahabi' conspirator 
and the British victim of Muslim 'conspiracy' in 1857, in which the Muslim 'fanatic' 
narrated a potential binding to Indian society kept alive at the sharp point of a 
perceived Semitic belligerence. In so far as they are both objects of 'conspiracy', 
'Wahabi' and Christian official may be perceived as, equally, Indian victims of a 
foreign persecution. For Hunter implies here that 'conspiracy' represents a separate, 
transfOrming agency, one that makes the Indian Muslim unknown to himself. This 
idea of victim and persecutor is given more direct expression in the narrative when 
Hunter remarks that Jaffir the Scrivener and Maulavi Yahiya Ali (the 'Spiritual 
Director of the Wahabi sect in India') were both 'earnest, conscientious men, who 
pricked themselves with the poisoned weapons which a false religion had put into 
their hands. ,351 The aspersion of 'false religion' is undermined by the open 
350 H 
HI unter, p 89. 
Hunter, pp 90,95. 
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admiration Hunter (along with most ICS officials of the period352) evinces throughout 
for the protestant reformist aspect of Islam, referring approvingly at one point, for 
instatlce, to the 'Wahabis' as the 'Unitarians of Islam' .353 Indeed, it is one of the few 
occasions in the text in which Hunter (in contradistinction to Lyall) hazards a direct 
opinion on Islam itself. Clearly, the descriptive 'false' arises partly out of a sudden 
awareness of the need to differentiate it from the otherwise unspoken circumstance of 
the 'true' religion (Christianity) in India. The duplicity here should therefore be 
understood as reinforcing the primary argument concerning its dual manifestation, 
separated out from and passively hostile to, its adherent - becoming an object, like the 
Munshi's 'secret duties', which they cannot own, but by which they may be 
destroyed. What transforms the passive into active hostility, and turns the 'weapons' 
on their owners, is the act of displacement. This disjunction between Islam and its 
manifestation in India makes of the denomination 'Indian Muslim' the essential 
paradox of the narrative. Thus as it crosses the border, Islam becomes the instrument 
by which Muslims in India are made 'false'. Entering colonial India, Islam is 
inevitably transmuted into conspiracy, which in turn transforms its victims into the 
paradox of disguise - and thus forces upon them a form of non-existence, undone, as 
it were, by an internalised antagonism. Under this rubric, the 'distempered class' 
which Hunter insists 'must be segregated', would refer to all Indian Muslims.354 
Descriptively, of course, that segregation has already taken place. 
This inevitable, falsifying action recalls another, more definitive, conjunction 
of Islam and transformation organising Hunter's narrative. Beginning as a 'revival' in 
which the 'religious element' predominates, Hunter describes the manner in which 
'Wahabism' in India is soon overtaken by 'the more certain and more permanent 
hatred which the Indian Muhammadans feel towards the English' .355 The religious 
element is here depicted as insubstantial - less certain, less permanent - than the idea 
~~~ Metcalf. Ideologies, p 142. 
. Hunter, p 59. In this comparison he may also be drawing on Gibbon's reference to '[Mahomet's] :~fant congregation of Unitarians'. Gibbon, p 674. 
HS Hunter. p 144. 
Hunter. p 68. 
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of opPOsition. Lyall makes the reverse observatio~ that the British had catalysed the 
Indian Muslim from secularism to religious revivalism. The point of correspondence 
betWeen the two interpretations lies in a debilitating marriage between a foreign and 
Indian identity, flushed out by an inevitable British agent. One might summarise it by 
saying that for both authors, at the core of Islam in India lies a transforming principle 
of opposition, an impossible desire for clarity arising out of the intolerable dilemma of 
displacement. In short, what makes of the Indian Muslim a contradiction in tenns is 
the presence of his hybrid British origins. The real quest of Indian Musalmans is 
therefore not to uncover the 'Wahabi' in British India, but to approach again the 
devastating foreign element to the British conception of the Indian Muslim. This is 
the source of the appeal of Muslim 'conspiracy' long after the last 'Wahabi' 
conspirator, or 'Mughal' insurgent, had been found in India.356 It carries within it an 
indispensable - and lethal- strain of Anglo-Indian communal identity, one that must 
be discovered, polarised and effaced. Deploying the Sensational mode, the narrative 
quest is therefore to remove precisely the alienating stigmata of displacement, 
uncovering and burying its British corpse all at once. Like the repeated exorcism 
enacted by Asiatic Studies, this is an impossible, inexhaustible process. As much as it 
entails the progressive Semiticisation of the Indian Muslim, it requires the constant 
visibility of its imperfect realisation as the necessary promise of a future, 
Symptomatic reappearance. On each occasion, however, the British element 
engineering the manifestation of 'conspiracy' can neither be entirely suppressed, nor 
finally separated out. In Indian Musalmans, it surfaces in the very idiom of the 
narrative, constantly evoking a relationship between the language of biological 
disease attached to 'Wahabism' and the relentless expression of British physical and 
psychic pain ('chronic miseries'; 'painful details'; 'painful to dwell on'; 
'inexpressibly painful incident'; 'a bitter legacy to ourselves,).357 But as with the 
H6 F . or mstance, in 1901 Francis Skrine insisted on the continued relevance of Indian Musalmans, 
wam~~ his readers that the threat 'is graver at the present day, for we are face to face with a revival of ~e Spmt of Islam throughout India'. Skrine, p 99. 
'W Hunt~r, pp 42, 142, 186,204. For expressions of biological degeneration associated with the 
ahabl ,see Hunter, pp21-23, 25,42,44, 67, 100, 144-145, 148-149. 
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ProteStant missionary in China, it reappears most directly in the fmal image of the 
essay. Arguing for British restraint in dealing with Muslim disloyalty, Hunter makes 
a last confused reference to the figure of Muhammad Shafi, the 'right hand of the 
Conspiracy' , whose family had made its fortune supplying meat to the British army, 
and who now returns as the most English of all apparitions. Indeed, as more English 
than the Anglo-Indians: 
[Government] should never forget how George ofCappadocia, after a life of 
obloquy as a parasite, as a defaulting bacon-contractor to the Roman Troops, 
and as a dissolute archbishop, obtained an apotheosis by an unwilling death, and 
became Saint George of Merry England.358 
The riddle of the 'Wahabi' is, in a sense, fmally brought home in all of its irreducible 
ambivalence. If we destroy him once and for all, Hunter warns, we will be left alone 
with our treacherous selves. A Sensational ending of which Wilkie Collins himself 
might have been proud, it brings to a disturbing close a narrative that may itselfbe 
considered an apotheosis, one that would point the way forward for all future AnglO-
Indian mediations. It is clearly the model for Steel's quest in India, which ranges 
across the country only to uncover the meaning of its subject in the paradox of his 
self-galled incarceration. But then by this point, on the eve of the partition of Bengal, 
the genre had become largely 'autonomized' - had gained, that is, an atavistic 
rationale of its own.359 Hers is therefore a portrait of isolation in which the real 
protagonists are artificially held apart at either ends of colonial society; and in which 
all that remains of their disorientating history is the curious and self-sufficient 
spectacle of a Muslim who cannot be Indian. Her casual epithet of identification, 
'like oW'Selves', can now be identified as the deceptive trace of a failed and deeply 
disturbing language of self-description. Pushed to the margins of her narrative of 
India, the thoroughgoing segregation of the Indian Muslim represents the extent to 
which the AnglO-indians had invested in that language in 1857; his relentless 
JSB H 359 unter, p 211. 
fI Ste~en Goldsmith describes the concept of 'autonomization' as 'the process by which a generic 
orm, m certain circumstances, becomes differentiated from the social world in which it originates and 
comes to seem autonomous.' Goldsmith, p 5. 
313 
semantic deconstruction, the pernicious and unpalatable hybridity he still retained 
fifty years later. Conceived as a fixed and cardinal point of visibility on their unstable 
map of an 'alien soil' , he had become a sign which fmally, like Kipling's laughing 
'Sadhu' , directed the colonialist anywhere but onwards. 
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Conclusion 
This study has sought to question the notion of the Indian Muslim as a 'get-at-able' 
point of orientation in colonialist discourse. It has therefore attempted not only to 
provide a more coherent and nuanced account for the consolidation in colonialist 
discourse by the early twentieth century of essentialised descriptions of Indo-Muslim 
antagonism towards the British Indian state, and of their irremediable isolation on the 
outer margins of Indian society. But also to interpret the less apprehended, but 
nevertheless marked, element of paradox that had by then come to structure this 
discourse. It has traced these three constituents back to their genesis in the perception 
of 'conspiracy' in 1857-59, a perception through which Indian Muslims emerged for 
the first time in British eyes as an integrated pan-Indian entity. The concentration by 
historians on the British need for a simple narrative of events, coupled with a 
predictable eruption of 'Musulmanophobia' fails to address adequately the radical 
discontinuity this remarkable phenomenon figured with previous colonialist praxis. 
Nor do these explanations account for its longevity and appeal, eluding the official 
factual refutations available from 1859 onwards; and reappearing in grossly inflated 
forms such as the 'Wahabi' trials of the 1860s and 1870s. Addressing this imbalance 
in the historiography of colonialist discourse, I have argued that historians have 
largely overlooked the contradictory ways in which 'conspiracy' was imbricated in 
1857 with a peculiarly Anglo-Indian crisis of self-representation. At the same time as 
it irradiated important lines of demarcation between officially secular and Christian 
identities, 'conspiracy' served to contain and focus Anglo-Indian communal anxieties 
over the future and purpose of British rule. Detailed analysis ofICS 'Mutiny' texts 
reveals that the idea of the 'insatiability' of the Muslim 'fanatic' is exactly mirrored 
by the note of deferral inscribed into Christian martyrdom, and that together they 
constitute a compelling, if conflicted, narrative of future purpose and solidarity. 
Muslim 'conspiracy' becomes in this way marked with the idea of a projected, 
unreachable Anglo-Indian communal identity that momentarily defers the need for 
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self_representation. In addition, we find that displaced tropes of alien origins, the 
unifying effects of religion, and a foreign patriotism destructive of Indian nationalist 
cohesion, integrate these narratives with the suggestion of a potential future binding 
of Anglo-Indian to Indian society. As the category 'Christian' recedes into an opacity 
that facilitates this rhetorical binding, the figure of the Muslim fanatic becomes over-
determined, separated out from the society around him in a relentless process of 
Semiticisation. 
In order to maintain this system of representation, however, the actual scene of 
Muslim-Civilian confrontation must either be consistently staged beyond the scope of 
'Mutiny' narratives, or its combatants held apart by a variety of forms of prophylaxis. 
Whenever this prophylaxis between Civilian and Indian Muslim breaks down, the 
accounts become immediately liable to alarming and sudden visions of self-
dispossession, in which the deferred colonialist identity is confronted with its own 
hollowness, filled by the substantial agency of a Muslim 'other'. Linking this anxiety 
with the interaction of colonialist idioms of self-presentation with Mughal 
institutional forms, I have suggested that Muslim 'conspiracy' in 1857 be regarded 
principally as a crisis in the configuration of paramountcy. In this context, the 
paradoxical figure of the Indian Muslim that emerges in post-'Mutiny' discourse is 
comparable to the disturbing indeterminacy with which Mughal figures of authority 
were represented at a similar moment of crisis in the late eighteenth century. For 
Anglo-Indians, the figure of the Indian Muslim carried forward a sublated dimension 
of their own communal identity, one to which, in the succeeding decades, they were 
drawn as a means of deferring the insoluble problematic of the projection of a neutral 
and secular colonialist persona. Caught between Utilitarian attempts to reform the 
British Indian state in the mould of a unified imperialist ethos, and the simultaneous 
resurrection of Indian idioms of self-presentation, the ambivalence of the Indo-
Muslim 'stranger' became in this period a deeply disorientating, but nevertheless 
indispensable, point of reference. Segregated within Indian society, yet crucially 
distorting the imperial imperative of his Semitic origins, in Anglo-Indian literature he 
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persistently shadowed - indeed narrated - the complex rhetorical manoeuvres and 
frugtrations of his colonialist authors. By the early twentieth century, this form of 
representation had taken on a life of its own. Effectively, it had become an 
'autonomized' genre bearing even less comparison to the multivocal public sphere in 
which a variety of Indo-Muslim movements were then claiming their place, than had 
the plethora of rebellious constituencies to the single-minded religious mission of his 
forebear, the murderous Muslim 'fanatic' of 1857. 
Far from being 'get-at-able', then, it is the very elusiveness of the Indian 
Muslim of Anglo-Indian discourse that underwrote his descriptive isolation. The 
concentration in this thesis on the first quarter century following the outbreak of 
rebellion in 1857 brings to light some of the less instrumental British compulsions 
that drove the later concession of the principle of segregation. It could be argued that 
the historiography of this process has been constrained by an underlying contradiction 
about the nature of the British conception of their Indian Muslim subjects. Robinson 
has placed this conception - that they were 'regarded, quite wrongly, as separated, 
distinct and monolithic' - at the generative hub of his explanation of the evolution of 
the India Councils Act of 1909. He looks upon it as a 'self-sustaining' belief, 
engendering the Aligarh Movement of the late nineteenth century, which in turn 
reinforced the conviction by demanding, between 1906 and 1909, the legislative 
enactment of its underlying rationale. I Yet there remains in his otherwise lucid 
summary of these events a vacillation between the insistence that arguments regarding 
British 'divide and rule' tactics have been comprehensively refuted, and the persisting 
key observation that the Muslims nevertheless represented to the Government of India 
'an important conservative force'? The account of British motivations offered above 
proposes an alternative mode of explanation. As essentially a discourse about power, 
~ Rob~son, Separatism, p 173. 
Robmson, Separatism, pp 163-64. The refutation referred to is that found in Matiur Rahman, From 
Consultation to Confrontation: A Study of the Muslim League in British Indian Politics, 1906-12 
(London: Luzac & Co, 1970), Chapters IV and V. For an emphatic statement of the 'divide and rule' 
~guments, see M N Das, India Under Morley and Minto: Politics Behind Revolution, Repression and 
eforms (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1964), Chapter VI. 
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the British conception of Indian Muslims goes beyond the idea of manipulation, and 
questions the priority, and stability, of the notion that they were a unified and separate 
organic entity. Instead, after 1857 this discourse requires them to be represented as 
such, in order that the British understanding of their own relationship to Indian society 
might be preserved intact. That is, Anglo-Indians came to require a constant 
clarification of Indo-Muslim separateness and unity as a means of forestalling an 
engagement with the ambivalence, and instabilities, contained in their own self-
projection as the secular, neutral and discontinuous arbiter of that society. It is 
through this guiding rationale that the British were vulnerable to an unreasoning 'high 
regard for the trouble it was believed that the Muslims as a whole could cause' , itself 
consolidating, legitimising, and indeed magnifying, Muslim League claims to 
segregated representation on behalf of that putative unity.3 Thus, despite his 
resistance to League claims, Viceroy Minto ultimately found himself throughout the 
negotiations directed by the dictum 'that though the Mahomedan is silent he is very 
strong.,4 Indeed, his initial opposition exemplifies the fact that this was a communal 
consensus that spread right across the Anglo-Indian political spectrum, and made of it 
such an effective force in bringing about a Liberal Government change of heart in 
London.5 When former Lieutenant Governor of the United Provinces, now Lord 
Macdonnell, identified himself as the most outspoken opponent of the Act in London, 
he made his case from within that spectrum. His thesis therefore echoed that of his 
rival spokesman in London, Alfred L yaH, then advising Secretary of State Morley to 
support the establishment of separate electorates.6 Where Lyall had, twenty years 
earlier, seen the Indian Muslim as deceptively displaced in his Indian environment, 
Macdonnell centred his rhetoric on the incontrovertible fact that the Hindus were the 
'real people' of India. 7 In doing so, he also drew indirectly upon Hunter's conceit of 
the falsified and falisifying Indian Muslim, through the eradication of whose 
: Robinson, Separatism, p 167. 
s QUO~ed in Robinson, Separatism, p 168. 
6 ROb~son, Separatism, p 155-59, 168-89. 
7 Robmson, Separatism, p 170. 
QUoted in Robinson, Separatism, pp 170-72. 
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(Mugbal) institutions 'the existence of the People discloses itself.,g What Macdonnell 
failed to intuit was that separate electorates were perhaps the most effective manner of 
making this point, while still leaving open the possibility of making it again at a later 
date. The implications this reading of the political vocabulary of 1906-9 might have 
for analyses of the Partition of India in 1947 would need to be carefully explored in 
regard to the subsequent development of colonialist discourse in this respect. 
Nevertheless, the reprinting of Steel's guidebook indicates that this discourse retained 
some currency among Metropolitan readers well into the 1920s.9 And Ayesha Jalal's 
study of the diplomatic manoeuvres leading up to that fInal concession would 
tentatively suggest that the post-war British administration in India was more 
susceptible to the logic of segregation than anyone, including its 'sole spokesman', 
had imagined. 10 
Although the primary emphasis has been on addressing the apparent 
inconsistencies in colonialist rhetoric regarding Indian Muslims, the Anglo-Indian 
liability to the logic of partitioning is only one application of the conclusions stated in 
this thesis. There are three further areas of enquiry towards which this study might be 
directed. The fIrst of these entails a re-evaluation of the complex interactions between 
Indo-Muslim and Anglo-Indian rhetorical strategies in this period, along the lines of 
the 'dialogic' analyses suggested by Christopher Bayly and Eugene Irschick.l1 This is 
the kind of textual investigation to some extent already undertaken by scholars such 
as Amrita Shodhan who has, for instance, contextualised the reformulation of Ismaili 
self-representations during the mid-nineteenth century in terms of their interactions 
with Anglo-Muhammadan law.12 Similarly, Farzana Shaikh has explored the nexus 
8 
9 Hunt.er, p 161. 
. In ~lS. respect, some ofthe fonns of interpretation applied in this thesis with regard to the mutual 
~ptl0n of AnglO-Indian and Indian Muslim, as well as the rationale of segregation, could also be 
~phed to E M Forster's A Passage to India (1924). 
Ayes~a Jalat, The Sole Spokesman: Jinnah, the Muslim League and the Demand for Pakistan 
(~bndge: Cambridge University Press, 1985). The successive reprints of Steel's India would 
certamly point toward the continuing hegemony of these perceptions in Metropolitan Britain ~oughout the 1920s. 
12 Bayly, Empire, p 370; Irschick, p 4. 
Shodhan, Chapter 3. 
between Islamic consensus and nineteenth-century colonialist forms of limited 
political representation; and Javed Majeed and Christopher Shackle have recently 
picked out and interpreted the incorporation of some Protestant cultural influences 
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into Hali's Musaddas. 13 However, the conclusions reached in this thesis about the 
instabilities that characterise this colonialist discourse, and the importance of Islam as 
a point of reference for British images of power in India, may encourage the analysis 
of a text like Musaddas for its cognate interrelationship of ideas of power and loss. In 
particular, it suggests that in reformulating an Urdu rhetoric of loss and regeneration, 
Hali may at some level have drawn upon, and perhaps partly addressed, points of 
vulnerability apprehended in Anglo-Indian discourse. Similarly, it might be argued 
that in seeking a means of transcending the divisions within its putative constituency, 
the text perceives, re-appropriates, and weaves into the ideal of the 'charismatic 
community', the very note of deferred self-defInition that had proved so dangerously 
appealing to an Anglo-Indian audience. I4 Such an analysis might prove fruitful for 
reinterpretations of the marked ambivalence evident in some of the subsequent genres 
of Urdu literature that drew so extensively on the Musaddas and whose multivalent 
rhetoric has so far been understood purely, and pejoratively, in terms of 'lament' and 
literary degeneration. Is 
At the same time, a similar line of enquiry may illuminate Sayyid Ahmad 
Khan's more direct engagement with Anglo-Indian discourse in his earlier 
publications, The Causes of the Indian Revolt (1859), and An Account of the Loyal 
Mohammedan of India (1860). The role of these works in the later development of 
the Aligarh Movement has rarely been addressed in detail; and yet it is here that his 
:: Shaikh; Shackle and Majeed, Hali's Musaddas, pp 1-80. 
, The concept of the 'charismatic community' in nineteenth century Indo-Islamic thought is discussed 
~ Francis Robinson, 'Nation Fonnation: the Brass Thesis and Muslim Separatism', in Journal of 
Commonwealth and Comparative Politics, 15,3 (November 1977); and Robinson, 'Islam and Muslim 
7Separatism' in 0 Taylor and M Yapp (eds), Political Identity in South Asia (London: SOAS, 1979), pp 8-112, 
IS See ' 
19 ,m Particular, Ram Babu Saksena, A History of Urdu Literature (Allahbad: Ram Narain Lal, 1~7~, and Muhammad Sadiq, A History of Urdu Literature (Delhi: Oxford University Press, repro 
5, 1964), For a critique of these works, see Pritchett. 
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claims to represent the Muslims of India to the British were first evolved. 16 In both 
works, Sayyid Ahmad Khan appears to be attempting to draft the assertion of unity in 
the British belief in 'conspiracy' into the task of describing an 'imagined' pan-Indian 
Muslim community. 17 In Causes in particular, he can be seen trying to suborn Anglo-
Indian definitions of Indian Muslims as foreign to India, to the assumptions of the 
sharif elite, in order to claim for them an exceptional treatment, but one that masks 
the slippages between communities based on clasS.I8 Moreover, this is done from the 
perspective of a group that had rarely before identified itself exclusively in terms of 
religion. 19 Yet at other points, he seems to draw up distinctions and exclusions that 
contradict this conflation of terms. What emerges is a highly ambiguous discourse in 
which the precise nature of the 'Muhammadan' community under discussion is almost 
as opaque a presence (and of course, powerful for its opacity) as that of the British 
'Mutiny' accounts it corrects. In the same way, Sayyid Ahmad Khan clearly plays on 
British anxieties in regard to acting through an Indian political idiom already 
colonised by Mughal precedent;20 and similarly, it could be argued that he 
manipulates British fears over their dangerous visibility as Christians in India?I On 
the other hand, there is also evidence within the text that the author actually accedes 
to some of the Anglo-Indian assumptions regarding the size and predominance of 
Muslim involvement in 1857, even as he later specifically questions them.22 These 
instances of a by turns conflicted, exploitative and collaborative, dialogue between 
Anglo-Indian and Indo-Muslim discourses open out a rich vein for the reinterpretation 
oflater nineteenth-century Muslim 'loyalism' and early twentieth-century 
'separatism' as vehicles for the negotiation of intensely hybrid and fluid idioms of 
16 See ~ . 
11 lor mstance, Lelyveld, pp 74-75. 
~e sense indicated here is that used by Benedict Anderson in regard to the role of imagination in 
~l.ng nationalist communities. Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the 
~rlgm ~nd Spread of Nationalism (London: Verso, 1983). 
SaYYld Ahmad Khan, Causes of the Indian Revolt, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, repr. 2000; 
19873 ), p 35. 
20 Lelyveld, pp 28-32. 
21 ~~ Causes, pp 11, 33, 48-49. 
22 '~141l, Causes, pp 16-20. 
Khan, Causes, p 35, 47-50. 
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self_representation?3 It is only through such dialogic investigations that we can begin 
to open out the narrow historiographical perception of 'the contented client of Syed 
Abroad's time,;24 and to properly question the prematurely sealed hypothesis that 'by 
1909, a Muslim identity was fmnly established in Indian politics. ,25 
The second area of enquiry entails pursuing the deceptive fIXity of British 
constructions of Indian Muslims into a reassessment of the evolution of Hindu 
nationalist thought. In particular, the conclusions reached in this thesis about the 
figure of the Indian Muslim as a disorientating point of comparison can be 
productively applied to a re-evaluation of the writings of ideologues such as V D 
Savarkar in the 1920s and 1930s. In this respect, the late nineteenth-century 
colonialist discourse on Islam in India has, for instance, been insufficiently explored 
in relation to Savarkar's attempts, through his concept of 'Hindutva', to construct a 
monolithic category of Hinduism using Islam as a self-evident stable and exemplary 
organic entity.26 Perhaps now more than ever, this kind of reconsideration is urgently 
needed. It could, for instance, help towards excavating the colonial genealogy of the 
speech by Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee to the Bharatiya Janata Party leaders 
in Goa during the communal massacres in Gujarat in April-March 2002. His 
references to the despotism of 'jehadi Islam ... which wants to mould the entire world', 
and his insistence that 'wherever there are Muslims, they do not want to live with 
others (who practise different faiths), , are strikingly reminiscent of those of Alfred 
23 Th' 
. IS sort of analysis might also be deployed on other textual levels, both in order to test the fluidity 
of ~Iscourses throughout the different levels of Anglo-Indian administration, and the dialogic ways in 
which they were received and reformulated in Indian society. One such nexus in this respect, might be 
Gauri Viswanathan's recent study of the late nineteenth-century Bengal Census, and the way in which 
Is~ ~as seen by colonial census enumerators and interpreters as secondary to an originary and 
mediating Hinduism (Viswanathan, pp 163-72). Subjects were therefore to be designated Muslim only 
to the.e~ent that they demonstrated their distance from Hinduism through explicitly Arabian 
1s1~lclsed features - a form of bias directly connected to the discourse this thesis has been examining. 
!hIS mstitutionalised interpretation might then productively be studied in terms of its complex 
tnte.raction with the process of 'ashrafisation' by which similar emphases were being sought out by 
SOCially-mobile Indian Muslim respondents. On late nineteenth-century 'ashrafisation', see Shaikh, p 
~; :t~n, Rise, pp 121-22; and Ahmed, Bengal, Chapter Four. 
2j ob~son, Separatism, p 173. 
16 Robmson, Separatism, p 173. 
See for instance, Jaffrelot, Hindu, pp 17-33. 
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Lyall.21 Where Vajpayee spoke of Muslims' preference 'to preach and propagate 
their religion by creating fear and terror in the minds of others' , over a century and a 
quarter earlier, Lyall had written of: 
Mahomedans, with their tenets distinctly aggressive and spiritually despotic, 
[and who] must always be a source of disquietude to us so long as their 
theologic notions are still in that uncompromising and intolerant stage when 
they openly encourage the natural predilection of all devout believers for the 
doctrine that their first duty is to prevail and, if need be, to persecute.28 
Indeed, in tenns of the prohibition of self-identification discussed in this thesis, the 
ideological crisis besetting the BJP-Ied coalition government bears some troubling 
points of resemblance to that of British governance in late colonial India. 29 
Finally, this thesis is intended as a contribution towards some of the 
more general, and embattled, recent attempts by scholars to disaggregate the 
monolithic categories through which Islam is still being constructed, both in countries 
of the North and of the South. Savarkar's consideration of the problem of unity 
frequently expressed itself in terms of what he called 'Pan-isms', which he saw as 
opposed to the unified territorial constituency of Hindus he sought to build; and chief 
among these 'Pan-isms' was the global reach and cohesive foreign allegiances of 
Islam. 3o The 'Hindu nation' was thus crucially reliant upon precisely the same binary 
construction that had sustained post-' Mutiny' Anglo-Indian discourse, in which the 
problems in the definition of the one category were deferred by focussing on the 
unreachable monolithic plenitude of the other. The reciprocity examined in this kind 
of binary in late nineteenth-century colonial India finds a further chilling echo in the 
crisis of definitions manifesting itself through the current revaluation of 'worldwide' 
Muslim 'conspiracy' .31 It is a strategy of self-representation most famously put 
: 'Vajpayee Hits Out at Jehadi Islam' in The Hindu, Saturday, 13 April 2002. 
29 Lyall, 'Islam', p 242. 
On this crisis, see 'The Best of Times for Hindutva' in Business Standard, Tuesday, 16 Apri12002; 
and Thomas Blom Hansen and Christophe Jaffrelot, The BJP and the Compulsions of Politics in India 
~ew Delhi: Oxford University Press, repr 2001; 1998). 
31 Jaffrelot, Hindu, pp 26-27. 
Edward W Said, Covering Islam: How the Media and the Experts Determine How We See the Rest 
1t~~ World (London: Vintage, repro 1997; 1981), pp xxiv-xxxvi; Joel Beinin and Joe Stork (eds), 
alllleallslam: Essays from Middle East Report (London: I B Tauris, 1997), Chapter Three. 
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forward by Bernard Lewis in his article, 'The Roots of Muslim Rage', and Samuel 
Huntington in his thesis on the 'Clash of Civilizations', and now given a political 
programme in the 'global war on terror' announced by the Bush administration.32 The 
reliance this rhetoric places upon the perceived global cohesiveness of the category of 
Islam disguises the reciprocity at work between that elusive entity and the no less 
problematic, and plural, category of 'the West'. The historical invariance of the 
fonner as 'primitive and backward' is set in contradistinction to the historically 
situated 'modernity' of the latter; at the same time, the implicitly secular, neutral and 
democratising agenda of the latter is determined through the unremitting, predatory 
and despotic 'fanaticism' of its Islamic opponents.33 As in colonial India, the 
intrusion of Islam obscures the local and political landscape, summoning up an 
answering, uninflected 'Western' 'Pan-ism'. Nor is this kind of binary deployment of 
Islam as a category solely the province of 'Western' ideologues. In his discussion of 
the 'discourse of cultural authenticity' that has played such an important role in the 
reform movements of the Arab Middle East since the end of the nineteenth century, 
Aziz Al-Azmeh has pointed out the workings of a not dissimilar set of occluding, 
oppositional categories. They result, in the language of reformers, in the construction 
of identities that are essentially 'empty', predicated -like Said's 'paranoid' discourse 
of , Oriental ism' - on a fundamental 'act ofnaming.,34 In both the rhetoric of the 
reformers and in Western constructions of ontological Islamic difference, what is at 
stake is the 'unreflected assumption of the fixity and finality of the interlocutors', 
each seeking to stabilize itself through the naming of the other as discrete, 
homogenous and all too often, antagonistic.35 As this thesis has argued in terms of the 
maintenance of the self-construction of British rule in India, such discourses rely 
upon, and can so easily be traduced by, the fatal appeal of monolithic designations. In 
32 
Bernard Lewis, 'The Roots of Muslim Rage', The Atlantic Monthly 266 (September, 1990); Samuel 
P Huntington, 'The Clash of Civilizations' ,Foreign Affairs (summer, 1993). For critical discussions of 
these articles, see the new Introduction to the 1997 edition of Said's Covering; and Beinin and Stork, 
~olit~cal, pp 3-25. 
3. Saul, Covering, pp to-II, 30. 
35 Al-Azmeh, p 91. 
AI-Azmeh, p 17. 
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the Anglo-Indian image of Islam in India, the religious element concealed an 
ambivalent secular agenda; the foreign persona, a desire for an indigenous berth; and 
the perception of an unshakeable unity, the terror of a collapsing communal 
imperative. The task facing the analyst of a not dissimilar renascent image of Islam is 
therefore to uncover beneath its rhetoric of the 'clash of civilizations', the concealed 
recognition of a familiar hybridity. 
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